Divining the right role, capabilities, structure, and Regimental System for Canada's Army Reserves

[TCBF]

...However, it is either lazy or intentionally misleading to quote page 4 of a 56 page thread, not adding any content or interpretation of one's own, and pretend the question has gone unanswered (when that is clearly not the case). ... 

- I did not say it had gone unanswered.  I just don't like the tone of some of the answers.  A bit strident, bordering on situating the estimate.  Another few pages and this 're-organization' will almost qualify as it's own occult religion.

Anyway, I said:

"- I think we should look a this 'post from the past' before we tinker so much that we break something."

... and I still think that.  "First - do no harm." 

 

[McG]

I just don't like the tone of some of the answers.  A bit strident, bordering on situating the estimate. 

I honestly believe that you’ve situated the estimate toward a notion that absolutely nothing of the regimental system must change (except to maybe add more regiments).  Several posters in this thread have outlined specific benefits ranging from improvement of collective training, better leader development, and improved focus on mission tasks vs administrative overhead.  That’s several steps better than cryptic warnings of vague doom awaiting anyone who brings change to the regimental system:

… before we tinker so much that we break something."

"First - do no harm."

They key is: "First - Do No Harm."

Re-organization is always attractive to those not being re-organized.  Invariably, more harm than good is done, and any economies made are fleeting.

Every time we let people play with the system, they only make it worse.

We tinker with it [our regimental  system] at our peril, and we must always heed the law of unintended consequences.

Yes, there is a requirement to do a thorough estimate and there always will be unknowns.  However, if we are paralyzed with fear & decisions are not made, then far more damage will be done through stagnation & inaction.  But, I see you've raised a few more points which may have been inadequately addressed, so I'll try to add a little more for you now.

Exactly what we need - programs that make our present structure work.

No.  We need a structure that meets the needs of the CF & Canada.  That is the structure that we need to make work.  It is very unlikely that the present structure is the one which meets the needs.  Its deficiencies (including & going beyond the grossly undersized units) have already been well laid out by several posters (

Keep the Regiments - we may need them someday

If we HAD to amalgamate, I think it might be best to reduce to nil strength the other affected units, rather than amalgamate them.  That would allow an expansion later. 

The number of cap badges has no bearing on our ability to force generate or expand.  If the Army reserve needs to double it’s size in 10 years, it could choose to add a second battalion to each regiment (including the Armd Regts).  Specific cap badges are not required for this.

We need more units - not less. 

Do we?  We don’t need units for the sake of having units, so why? How many & what size?



… Maybe we’re not talking the same language.  For the purpose of this thread, let’s stick with:
Regiment ≠ Unit
Regiment ≈ Military family/clan of non-specific size
sub unit < unit < formation
Company (or Squadron) ≤ unit ≤ Battalion
Sub unit ≤ Company

At the moment, all regiments exist as units (battalions) not because we’ve specifically determined these units are required but because we’ve been attempting to preserve all the regiments (and preserve them as battalions too).  This is backwards.  This is the regimental system driving force structure as opposed to the needs of the CF & Canada.  Proposing to grow every regiment so that it can be a full viable battalion is working from this same backward end.

By defining an employment concept & the capabilities required, we can then determine the number type and size of units required.  If the existing regimental system can be made to fit this organization (and I see not reason of the top of my head why it could not fit) then it can be kept.  This may mean that regiments have to accept sub unit status as opposed to full unit status.

They [little unit-level command structures] maintain traditional and historical ties to the towns they are based in, and provide a framework for anything up to and including general mobilization during an emergency. 

A Pl under a LCol is going to provide very little of value in time of general mobilization. 

Given the mobility of our society today, how close are those “historical ties” to towns?  More and more often (and with the exception of the big cities) you will find that the town in which one was raised is not the town in which they go of to school (college or university) and it is not the place they eventually settle down for a career.  Going a step farther, I tend to support the implied reality of this rhetorical question:

If Reserve soldiers join "a Regiment" rather than seek jobs, and esprit
de corps is "so high" because of the "Regimental System", why is there such
a high attrition rate?

 

[JRMacDonald]

Having read through most of this and watching TCBF have his lucid , and occasionally, wry comments jumped on, I felt I had to re sign in after 4 years.
TOM-  i think most of your commentary is bang on.  Of course, I used to understand your conversation when we were in the hallway, rigging ruckksacks , drinking strawberry wine.
SO, what ever happened to Land Force Reserve Restructure (LFRR)????  The "miracle" program for the Reserve. Wasn't it supposed to "sort out " exactly what we're chatting about? We got through Phase 1+2, but Phase 3 died fm lack of will, bad politics, and eventually lack of $$$$!
JRM

 

[TCBF]

Jim,

- It wasn't strawberry wine, it was a Zinfandel.  Since neither of us augered a ruck in from 1000 feet - the wine must have helped us do a good job.

- I think I have been a bit obstinate in some ways, but it's not from a fear of the THEORY of change, but past EXAMPLES of change.  Anyway, I am going to give this a rest for awhile, and look out my office window at the glow of a burning Wainwright training area!

 

[Kirkhill]

Here's an alternate definition of a Regiment: a Club.

A Club much like the Kiwanis or the Knights of Columbus.  A voluntary association of individuals in a community that come together for a social purpose.

The difference between the ...... Highlanders and the Kiwanis is that the ....... Highlanders are offering themselves for military service to their community and their government.

Their government will decide how many of the Volunteers it will choose to employ and in what role and how they are to be organized.

But the ....... Highlanders supplies a willing pool of support and a body of bodies that can be supplied with a sufficient minimum of training that would permit the government to entrust resources to them rapidly in the event of a crisis: local, national or international.

The wealthier the government is the more volunteers it can afford to train, equip and deploy.  The more, and more varied, crises it can respond to.

The key value of the local Regiment is that it supplies a locus of concentration, a place where supporters of the government and the community can concentrate their efforts to demonstrate their willingness to serve.

The Regiment can comprise Regulars (individual and formed), Reservists (individual and formed), Cadets, Auxilliaries, Honouraries and released, trained members, some with useful skills. 

IMHO the Regiment should be primarily a locally funded organisation, after the fashion of the Scouts or Cadets, with some government support.  It is ultimately an expression of local civic mindedness.

If the government chooses to have the Regiment supply a platoon or a brigade then it is incumbent on the government to supply the tools and resources to make that happen.

But there is no reason at all why the Regiment cannot continue as a living entity regardless of the government's demands on it.

Paychecks for ten people to organize a community is fairly small potatoes. 

Rather than focusing on platoons per CO and Regiment perhaps it would be more advisable to ask how many Regiments a community needs.  Is it impossible to see a Warkworth Regiment and a Toronto Regiment with the Warkworth Regiment supplying a section of truck drivers and the Toronto Regiment supplying and all arms brigade?

 

[dglad]

Rather than focusing on platoons per CO and Regiment perhaps it would be more advisable to ask how many Regiments a community needs.  Is it impossible to see a Warkworth Regiment and a Toronto Regiment with the Warkworth Regiment supplying a section of truck drivers and the Toronto Regiment supplying and all arms brigade?

These questions are not mutually exclusive, and are linked.  The more unit there are in a community (yes, in this context, unit = Regiment.  Unit also equals Ind Fd Bty, Sig Sqn, Fd Amb, Nav Res unit, etc. i.e. anything that has its own UIC and unit comd and will be drawing on the recruiting pool to fill its ranks), the fewer tps will be available per CO (or OC, in the case of ind sub-unit-sized elems).  For example, in Thunder Bay, my home town, there is an inf Regt, a Fd Amb, a Svc Bn, a Sig Sqn and a Nav Res unit.  That's five units for a city of 115,000 (give or take).  Frankly, that's a disproportionately high number of units for the size of population...about 1 unit per 20000 people.  Winnipeg, a city of 653,000 (or about 713,000 if you consider the entire metro area; this comes from http://www.winnipeg.ca/cao/pdfs/population.pdf), has seven units (two inf Regts, one Armd Recee Regt, a Sig Sqn, a Svc Bn, a Fd Amb and a Nav Res unit.  Technically, the two inf Regts are being tactically grouped, but are maintaining separate Regt identity; there is also a Fd Engr Sqn being formed, but seven is still the working number).  That's about 1 unit per 100000 people.    Now, all units in Thunder Bay and Winnipeg are hungry for recruits, but some much more so than others.  The trouble is that when you divide the available pool of potential recruits up this way, some units are inevitably going to suffer in terms of "platoons per CO".

The solution, if we want to make units with sufficient "critical mass" to provide effective and efficient training for our soldiers?  Increase the number of soldiers per unit.  That means either increasing the number of recruits (to paid ceilings, anyway), or reduce the number of units (either fully, by eliminating units, or "virtually", by grouping them in some fashion).  There really aren't any other options.

 

[geo]

dglad... it's not a question of how many units are serviced by the population of Thunder Bay but, how many servicemen & women are generated by the Thunder Bay region.

IIRC that "service battalion" amongst other things is about the size of a platoon.

 

[McG]

The solution, if we want to make units with sufficient "critical mass" to provide effective and efficient training for our soldiers?  Increase the number of soldiers per unit.  That means either increasing the number of recruits (to paid ceilings, anyway), or reduce the number of units (either fully, by eliminating units, or "virtually", by grouping them in some fashion).  There really aren't any other options.

Exactly.  From my perspective, a unit with a single sub-unit (regardless if this sub-unit is full size or not) is below critical mass for most types of units (particularly all the combat arms).  Extrapolating from your two options we could raise the paid ceiling of every unit to allow for a full Bn, or we can group like units which are only established for a single company sized "mission element."

The option of making every unit a full battalion is unrealistic for several reasons.  Politically, the funding for infrastructure, equipment and pay will never happen.  From a CF perspective, I do not think we have a need for an Army reserve that is so large (though I do think there is a requirement for something larger than we have now).  Lastly, I do not think the Canadian population could fill (and keep filled) the ranks of a reserve force that large.

it's not a question of how many units are serviced by the population of Thunder Bay but, how many servicemen & women are generated by the Thunder Bay region.

It is both and neither.  We need to ask how many units (and sub-units) can be sustained by a region, and this number will be derived from the number of individual reservists that can be sustainably generated from that region.  If a region is home to more units than it can sustain, then some must be closed, moved or reduced to sub-units.

If a region is unable to sustain a unit but can sustain a sub-unit, then we could have a Coy/Sqn (retaining a Regt identity but with no HQ above the Coy) that reports to a Regt neutral Bn HQ in a neighboring region. 

Therefore, I believe the reserve structure will require selectively targeted growth & reductions (with only growth happening at the aggregate level), some unit relocations (maybe), and permanent groupings of companies within larger inter-regional battalions.  The individual companies can retain regimental identities, and there is value in ensuring they do. 

 

[TCBF]

dglad... it's not a question of how many units are serviced by the population of Thunder Bay but, how many servicemen & women are generated by the Thunder Bay region.

IIRC that "service battalion" amongst other things is about the size of a platoon.

- About 1965 (when the Fort William Armoury burnt down), Port Arthur/Fort William (now Thunder Bay) had HMCS Griffon, LSSR: two companies in Port Arthur and two in Fort William, The Port Arthur Service Bn, 118 Bty Fort William (until 1955), etc.  After the FW armoury burnt down, The LSSR concentrated in Port Arthur.

- The LSB (Lakehead Service Bn - started as the Port Arthur Service Bn, re-named in 1966): after the crunch of 1970, only 138 Tpt Coy RCASC was left.  Then, 18 Thunder Bay Svc Bn was created in 1975.

- Comm Res: The first recruits for 3 Tp 735  Comm Sqn were trained by the LSSR in the spring of 1973. They became 736 Comm Sqn a few years later.

- So we have a long history of units getting smaller/bigger/ disappearing etc.

 

[kratz]

I was driving into the base today. I have to admit, traffic on a Sunday is light. Stopping at the traffic light my eye caught the lone Armour flag. While I have not served under their colour, we all serve our contry. In these days leading to the nation's remembrance let's remember all the contributions to our freedomes.

 

[ArmyRick]

Kratz,

yes we do have to honour ourselves and the previous war vets on Nov 11,

However what does your post have anything to do with this topic?

 

[McG]

Article Link: TERRITORIAL BATTALIONS: CAN THEY WORK?

I understand there was significant push-back when some units were assigned purely domestic missions back during the cold war (I believe it was called national survival).  What if every unit were assigned two roles from the national level: one domestic role and one fole for international operations?

There is not a lot of requirement for FOO parties and howitzers on Dom Ops.  However, there is a need for liaison parties to come from somewhere.  Traditional Artillery units could all share a Army directed domestic liaison role.  Thoughts?

 

[tango22a]

MCG:

The only problem is if you forcefully re-role, re-badge or re-name PRes Regiments that you will be snowed-under by VRs which seems to be behind most themes over the last 30-40 years. I seem to get the feeling that many RegF personnel would rather be done with PRes, since they feel monies could be better expended elsewhere.

It's a little bit like when an army formation returns from overseas..." Oh good, now we can get back to real soldiering!!"  I can assure you that even if the PRes soldier has lived and soldiered for years on a shoe-string  ( BTDT ) that they are as fiercely proud of their Roles and Regiments as the RegF are.

Cheers,

tango22a

 

[Michael OLeary]

The only problem is if you forcefully re-role, re-badge or re-name PRes Regiments that you will be snowed-under by VRs which seems to be behind most themes over the last 30-40 years.

Really?

How many people actually walked away when the Elgin Regiment became 31CER?

Does anyone know?

Maybe the cry of mass VRs is really just a myth used to argue against changes to units.

 

[tango22a]

Michael:

Can't answer the question, but I do Know there were more than a few transfers to both I H and WindsorR.

tango22a

 

[tango22a]

Michael:

I am also willing to bet if the Armoured Recce Role disappears that there will be more than a few VRs. It takes a certain kind of perverse person to put up with the kind of BS
that the PRes has to put up with,but most PRes regiments/battallions have this in Spades.I know that many times we gave up training money,equipment etc. so the RegF was fully kitted. How about all the money that was spent out of the PRes budget to rebuild Meaford Trg Area? As I said before I feel that the RegF would be more than happy to see  the PRes  Strike its tents, turn in what little equipment it has and disappear QUIETLY.

tango22a

 

[Edward Campbell]

... I feel that the RegF would be more than happy to see  the PRes  Strike its tents, turn in what little equipment it has and disappear QUIETLY.

Nonsense!

About 20% of the Afghan mission establishment is being filled by Reserve Force members. Only an idiot (and there are some, I grant you, in each component) would want to damage the Reserves.

But, is e.g. recce, as taught/practiced in the Primary Reserve RCAC today, a useful skill for the sorts of operations we are likely to face in the next generation or should we be rethinking roles and tasks?

I don't think asking the question is a bad idea. But, I hope, I do understand the frustration so many Reserve Force members must feel as they look back on so many missteps and just plain dumb ideas.

 

[Haggis]

About 20% of the Afghan mission establishment is being filled by Reserve Force members.

True, Edward, and that number approached 40-45% on the final big rotos in Bosnia.  However there are still members of the Reg F who see the operational employment of Reservists as a political rather than strategic initiaitive.  In short, I've often been told that there are Reg F soldiers being left at home "so a Reservist can have a tour".

Rubbish??  You bet!  But to a homebound Reg F soldier who sees a Reservist "deploy in his place", it a favourite axe to grind.  On the other side of the coin, once deployed, you can't tell the diference between them because "there ain't no hatbadge on a helmet"!

 

[Michael OLeary]

Michael:

I am also willing to bet if the Armoured Recce Role disappears that there will be more than a few VRs. It takes a certain kind of perverse person to put up with the kind of BS that the PRes has to put up with,but most PRes regiments/battallions have this in Spades.

First it's "snowed-under" now its "more than a few".  Surely someone, somewhere has real numbers for this.  It can be quantified and then we can dispense with allusions to swarms of soldiers turning in their kit.

I know that many times we gave up training money,equipment etc. so the RegF was fully kitted.

When exactly were each of these years of plenty for the Reg F, I don't recall them.  Which vehicle fleets didn't the Reg F also run into the ground before getting replacements.  Were we not all subject to the same pay freeze during the dark days of no money for anyone?

How about all the money that was spent out of the PRes budget to rebuild Meaford Trg Area?

Odd, I seem to remember a lot of PRes units taking advantage of what Meaford had to offer.  As the Range Control Officer (RCO 1996-1999, then other staff positions, posted out in 2000) there I saw some units regularly.  I also recall meeting other Reservists who simply told me that "their unit" doesn't go to Meaford.  Sounds like a unit choice whether or not that training facility was used to its possible extent.

As I said before I feel that the RegF would be more than happy to see  the PRes  Strike its tents, turn in what little equipment it has and disappear QUIETLY.

Personally I find that to be very very narrow and very negative view.  At my current P RES unit I keep hearing that for many positions on upcoming overseas deployments, eligible Reserve applicants will be given priority over Regular Force candidates.  The very rational explanation is that the service acknowledges that a Reservist may only get one opportunity to put the rest of their life on hold and deploy. while at the same time it economizes on the Reg F soldiers for future missions.  That hardly sounds like a plan to stamp out the P Res.

 

[tango22a]

ERC:

The problem is that due to over-tasking the RegF cannot train people from PRes to a standard useful to deploy in an ARMOUR trade. Most PRes Armour soldiers end up being employed outside their trade.They still deploy and do a good job, but I am sure many would prefer to be employed as Armoured soldiers. Lack of money, lack of training and mainly a lack of WILL to remedy this situation  will lead us into careering around in ever-decreasing circles until we finally bite ourselves on the a**.IMHO the system is badly strained and the only solution is an increase in funding which I can't see happening with today's economic situation.

Cheers,

tango22a