Divining the right role, capabilities, structure, and Regimental System for Canada's Army Reserves

[rifleman]

If its manning levels that are a problem, although I would hazard a guess that its not prevalent across the board. The reason would be to increase recruiting. There is probably a segment of the recruiting base that want a 'taste' of the military and signing 5 years of your life away is preventing the from joining. Going to a reserve unit, would increase the number of potential deployable soldiers and even potential reg force members.

 

[McG]

The reason [that the Army reserve needs to grow] would be to increase recruiting.

Is this what really you mean to say?

There is probably a segment of the recruiting base that want a 'taste' of the military and ...

I'm sorry but no.  The reserves do not exist to be the adventure camp for people who fancy they want a taste of the military .... it's like suggesting hospitals should exist for the primary benefit of those who want to be doctors as opposed to existing for those who need medical help.

I am not saying that the reserve should or should not be larger.  However, I do reject arguments based on the need to keep cap badges viable or based on providing assured employment for those looking to fill a curiosity.  Neither of those are requirements of the CF.

 

[rifleman]

Unlike others, I have learnt to not just think about my organization but its affect on the overall plan. I was commenting on those who believe that the reserves are being held back from recruiting more. Some units may have that problem, but for the most part, I do not think thats it.

As for the 'taste'. I know that there are many people who are concerned about commiting 5 years of there lives to a job that they may not like. The Reserve is not only a introduction to those people, it can translate into an component transfer later down the road. As well, instead of them waiting until they finish school to join the regs and do basic, they can be doing the training while finishing school.

As a side if you are going to quote someone, you should use the entire context, not just the part that supports you arguement
"There is probably a segment of the recruiting base that want a 'taste' of the military and signing 5 years of your life away is preventing them from joining.

 

[dglad]

Except, perhaps, in a very few specific cases--probably in the largest urban centres--I don't believe that recruiting limits are a significant issue and are, in fact, a red herring.  I think most Res F units could recruit like hell and all they functionally end up doing is offsetting attrition.  In other words, we could remove recruiting limits completely and we wouldn't see a major explosion in the size of the Res F.  When I was the CO of a Res F infantry unit, I never paid any significant attention to my paid ceiling; it simply wasn't an issue.  Attrition generally ate up whatever I was bringing into the unit.  This is the reality of living in a mid-sized city with a university and college...we would generally have a soldier from the time he/she joined at about 17 or 18, until he/she left to pursue a career elsewhere in the country/world at about 22 or 23.

This whole debate hides a deeper and much more important issue--it isn't how many people we're recruiting, it's WHO we're recruiting.  The Res F still leans heavily across the country on the young, white male demographic, but in many areas (both urban and rural), that demographic is actually dwindling as a percentage of the population.  When we crack other, higher potential demographics in our recruiting, THEN I suspect numbers are going to become more of an issue.

 

[cavalryman]

My unit appears to be one of those specific cases (we're in a large urban area).  We've exceeded our established positions, filled all of our 5000 series positions, have borrowed positions from other units in the brigade and have people on the rolls with no position numbers.  We have recruits coming in a steady flow and were told last winter to stand-down our recruiting for the rest of the fiscal year since we're so far over establishment.  Right now, the only way I can bring in new blood is by shifting people on Class B outside the unit to the PRL, encouraging marginal, i.e. one night a month participation only, troops to consider handing in their release, etc.  Make of that what you will

 

[dglad]

My unit appears to be one of those specific cases (we're in a large urban area).  We've exceeded our established positions, filled all of our 5000 series positions, have borrowed positions from other units in the brigade and have people on the rolls with no position numbers.  We have recruits coming in a steady flow and were told last winter to stand-down our recruiting for the rest of the fiscal year since we're so far over establishment.  Right now, the only way I can bring in new blood is by shifting people on Class B outside the unit to the PRL, encouraging marginal, i.e. one night a month participation only, troops to consider handing in their release, etc.  Make of that what you will

What I'd make of this is that you're in a fortunate and obviously successful unit.  Sadly, this isn't true for most Res F units in Canada.

 

[TCBF]

- Talking with a friend about this topic a few years back, he thought that raising the age for enlistment for the PRes from 16 to 17 cost them a lot of retention.  Pers joined later - if at all - and did not necessarily have time to develop in a primary group before coming under the scattering effects of further education.

- As much as I agree that this attrition is regretable, if reserve units existed in the places young people moved to in order to work or go to school, we might not have as big a problem.  Then again, can you be 'posted' as a reservist, or do you have to turn in everything and start over?

- My experience with older recruits regular as well as reserve - is that they can come with too much baggage. Too many previous physical and mental injuries, too many family and business commitments, etc.  Perhaps, as a former CFRS Cornwallis instructor, I was spoiled: we would pick up 130 recruits for a Platoon and the average age would be maybe 18 - if that.  Young, uninjured, no baggage, eager and keen.  Blank slates on which to draw the character of a soldier.

- The other advantage of young students is you have the summer to train them.  Reservists with full-time jobs get comparatively little time off for courses - even less if their employers are Canadians of convenience whose primary loyalty is not to Canada.

 

[dglad]

- Talking with a friend about this topic a few years back, he thought that raising the age for enlistment for the PRes from 16 to 17 cost them a lot of retention.  Pers joined later - if at all - and did not necessarily have time to develop in a primary group before coming under the scattering effects of further education.

- As much as I agree that this attrition is regretable, if reserve units existed in the places young people moved to in order to work or go to school, we might not have as big a problem.  Then again, can you be 'posted' as a reservist, or do you have to turn in everything and start over?

- My experience with older recruits regular as well as reserve - is that they can come with too much baggage. Too many previous physical and mental injuries, too many family and business commitments, etc.  Perhaps, as a former CFRS Cornwallis instructor, I was spoiled: we would pick up 130 recruits for a Platoon and the average age would be maybe 18 - if that.  Young, uninjured, no baggage, eager and keen.  Blank slates on which to draw the character of a soldier.

- The other advantage of young students is you have the summer to train them.  Reservists with full-time jobs get comparatively little time off for courses - even less if their employers are Canadians of convenience whose primary loyalty is not to Canada.

This is all very true.  We had some phenomenal young men and women attending university and college in Thunder Bay who became excellent soldiers and leaders.  Unfortunately, most of them didn't stick around, because Thunder Bay is one of those places young people to come to for school (both the university and college here are very good), and then leave to pursue their fortunes elsewhere.  My position on this quickly became, ah, well, this can't really be avoided...so let's find a reason to celebrate it.  I spent some time tracking soldiers who moved away from Thunder Bay, keeping tabs on whether they stayed in the system or not.  I was quite gratified to find that more than 50% (I think it was 55% of the 40 or so soldiers and officers I followed up on; don't recall exact numbers now) stayed in the system, joining other units in Toronto or Vancouver or Montreal or wherever life had taken them.  So, in that sense, my unit's training was successful in itself, and in a strategic sense as well insofar as it created soldiers who went on to contribute to other units.  When you look at this strategically, it was beneficial for the army as a whole, so that's a good thing.  It's another reason to be less concerned about cap badges and to try to adopt the "longer view".  We're all in this together, after all, and all I really care about is that we have well-trained soldiers ready to deploy on domestic or expeditionary ops with the minimal amount of prep.

 

[cavalryman]

- As much as I agree that this attrition is regretable, if reserve units existed in the places young people moved to in order to work or go to school, we might not have as big a problem.  Then again, can you be 'posted' as a reservist, or do you have to turn in everything and start over?

This is an interesting point, because the demand is there, and as far as I know, there is no formalized system in place, but there should be.  We've greeted with open arms members of other units (both armoured and non-armoured) who moved to our corner of the great white north for school for a year or two, and who wanted to keep parading but not transfer from their parent unit/branch.  A friendly exchange of emails with the parent unit was all it took to let them keep their kit, status, etc, but get paid by us, train with us, etc - without actually being transferred to our establishment.  It's been a bit of a regular thing to see different cap badges in our ranks, but what the heck, its troops who want to work and since we're short of positions, it gives us extra troops without impacting on the available position squeeze.  A few of them end up transferring in the end anyways when they find themselves working around here after school.

 

[SeaKingTacco]

It's another reason to be less concerned about cap badges and to try to adopt the "longer view".  We're all in this together, after all, and all I really care about is that we have well-trained soldiers ready to deploy on domestic or expeditionary ops with the minimal amount of prep.

I spent a few years with 1 AD Regt (Lanark and Renfrew Scottish) in the early 90s.  I had the good fortune to work for an enlightened CO who had this precise outlook.  We knew that we would recruit the vast majority of our soldiers while they were in High School; lose half of them in a 1-2 years to university and most of the rest after that.  We weren't overly worried about losing NCOs- being so close to Petawawa, we had a waiting list of qualified ex-Reg Force personnel from Cpl to MWO wanting to join the unit- the entire WO and Sgts Mess was Ex-Regular Force.  The thing was, we really encouraged and facilitated unit transfers.  If I found out that a troop was going to university in Toronto (for instance), I would find out through his chain of command which unit he/she might like to serve with there- I would phone that unit and set up a transfer.  Mostly, the troop actually stayed with the PRes, because we took the long view that  all PRES units were in it together.

My thoughts- look beyond your own unit.  If a troop is leaving your geographical area for whatever reason, find him or her a unit to go!

 

[dapaterson]

You're assuming that there's a properly resourced master plan for the reserves somewhere beyond 'fill up the rifle sections of reg force units when required' that would drive this decision making.  :

Every time such a plan is created the hue and cry have it destroyed - "How dare you do X to unit Y?", ignoring the fact that unit Y hasn't paraded more than 80 people for a decade, or that X would meet a need.  The Buckshot Fusiliers in all their glory must be preserved and promoted to the detriment of any other unit.

Multiply that across the dozens of units across this country and you have a recipe for a slow spiral of decline.

There's also a blindness in the Reserve community, a refusal to admit that all functions in the Regular Force cannot be effectively done in the context of part-time service.  High cost skills (those that take too much time and/or money to build) do not lend themselves to our Reserve model of voluntary service.  So combat divers and jumpers make no sense.

Right now Government has set the strength limits for the Reserve Force.  But instead of optimizing within that limit we continue to perpetuate dozens of small, inefficient, unneeded units.  I'm all for maintaining and increasing community presence; but let's call a group of 120 folks a company, not a regiment (with the staff and clag that attaches to a regiment).  A unit of 120 can be a viable company - but make it a Regiment and you've suddenly taken another 10-20 people out of the line and into staff.  Multiply that across the current structure and you've got a lot of fat to trim.

The mobilization myth needs to be busted, and perhaps realistic plans for any future expansion need to be drafted before any wholesale reform is conducted.  But the status quo is unsupportable.

 

[daftandbarmy]

Agreed.

My firm belief is that the main reason why the status quo hasn't changed in the last 100 years is primarily because there has been no firm vision, with the leadership and will required to achieve it. Remember 10/90 and all those other half baked, short term schemes to 'reform' the reserves? Well, they all collapsed due to a 'drive by' approach to leading change. The reserves quite simply can't make the shift to a new operating method without someone on high selecting and maintaining the right aim over a 5 to 10 year period and. quite naturally, revert to the former methods when the vision wanes.

Ironically, in peacetime, we can't seem to practise what we preach for wartime success.

 

[Fishbone Jones]

I love being portrayed as a ponti masquerader

 

[TCBF]

- Of the last 100 years, the status quo worked until the cold war, when many reserve units were given a another role: "National Survival".  They kept their general mobilization roles (why not? not costing anything) but now also trained for re-entry operations into nuked cities.  Remember: we sent soldiers to experience nuke blasts in the USA.  Sixty pers from 1 RDU attended the Apple II blast in May 1955, occupying trenches 3 km from ground zero of a 29 kiloton shot (Hiroshima was 13 kt, Nagasaki was 21 kt).  So, the RCN, Cdn Army and RCAF were into the nuke business in a big way, and needed reserve units to develop re-entry skills AS WELL AS their normal common to corps functions.  They adapted.

- If the past is any guide, a major mission of the reserves appears to be "to survive' in whatever state it is in in order to be available to provide whatever is needed next.

- They key is: "First - Do No Harm."

 

[blacktriangle]

Well said.

I made the same point a few pages back, in that those who wish to serve will continue to do so in other capacities.

Lots of people are CT'ing out of the res trade as it is, and those left behind don't even have adequate vehicle numbers...talk about lame.

Is there any possibility of having reserve armoured units focus soley on assault troop tactics? Are the Reg F units still without assault troops? What about having reservists train to form echelons for the Reg units?

Workable or no?

 

[ArmyRick]

CSA 105, I agree 100% with what you said.

We need to put the NEEDS of the army first and the desires of Regimental/corps loyalty second. End story.

I see a big oppurtunity to expand the infantry and engineers by re-roling the g-wagon units.

 

[Fishbone Jones]

I'm sure if you went to the C lines and told everyone to take down their black beret, and badge, cross the road to the crystal palace and they were all RCR tomorrow, you'd get much the same reaction.

It's not like we didn't/ haven't been asking for PCF courses for years. We had bisons, they disappeared. Soon, we'll be left with two G-wagons in the compound. Our single Milcot was VMO'd, likely never to be seen again. Yes we're at war, and the equipment has to come from somewhere, but don't blame us for not being able to maintain qualifications. We've been screaming for years for the Corps to define a role we could work within, to no avail.

Ignorance is bliss when it comes to the Corps and its Reserves.

I've said before, we should all be outlying Sqns of our closest Reg force Unit (RCD in Ontario). At least things would be done somewhat equitable, and then at least, they may give a damn instead of treating us like the red headed step child.

Death by a thousand cuts.

 

[TCBF]

- Fallex 88, 1 RCHA offered Recce Sqn some flyovers.  They wanted to broaden their experience partways through the Ex, I guess.  I later joked that they gave us a mix of guys who could not stay awake on sentry and guys who were so keen that they drove everybody nuts asking questions.  We were darn glad to have them, though, as an extra warm body in a tracked recce patrol means more hours of badly needed sleep  for each of the other members.

Later, in Lahr, I met a bunch of Armoured reservists who had been on Fallex, but everywhere BUT with Recce Sqn.  They went nuts listening to the stories the young Arty reservists were telling.

One asked me how he could have a shot of working with Recce Sqn on the next Fallex.  "Easy" I said, "Join the Artillery!"

We kept asking for them, but were told they were not 'available'.  They didn't need to be able to drive a Lynx or fire a fifty - we would teach them enough so they could contribute.  But - never happened.

 

[dapaterson]

As long as folks like Arms Advisors (Hello, Col Spike!) insist that all Res units must be the same, and won't entertain having, say, the R de Hull train on kit from the RCD and train with the RCD, with similar arrangements in Valcartier, Edmonton and perhaps Gagetown, this problem will continue.

[war story]

Armd Advisor:  "I know if you look nationally we don't have enough troops to sustain this task, but if you look at each area individually we do!" - I guess that's Black Hat Math 101.

[/ war story]

 

[Teddy Ruxpin]

For my 2000th post, I feel like unloading, as this is a subject that has caused me much angst over the years.

IMHO

• There is a generation gap within the Reserves that is increasing in scope and complexity as more junior soldiers and leaders gain warfighting experience, leaving their seniors far behind.  The new generation is much more comfortable and conversant with Regular Force issues and does not generally have the "baggage" so often seen with older folks.
• Reserve senior leadership remains populated in small part by the blindingly incompetent who have arisen to their current positions based entirely on longevity and availability.  While this is sometimes seen in the Regular Force, it is not nearly as prevalent. Many of these people are now falling all over themselves to get on tour in an effort to catch up with their soldiers and to get a "real" medal.  The time to retain personnel simply because they're "good guys" is long past and is something we can ill afford
• Honoraries and organizations like Reserves 2000 hardly help the case of the "new" Reservists who are not harkening back 60 years when addressing operational issues.  They muddy the waters, make issues emotional and are not grounded in the operational reality.  The recent tempest in a teapot regarding Reserve units in Winnipeg is a perfect example of how destructive this gang can be. Get rid of the lot.
• The Army needs to come to grips with what it wants the Reserves to do.  Armoured Recce has been cited in the posts above.  There is no current operational role for "light" recce.  Why are we structured to produce this in vehicles that cannot deploy?  Reserve units will never deploy as formed units in the current operational context - why do we continue to pretend they will?  Moreover, there seems to be an abject failure to realize that if the PRes is limited to "commercial off the shelf" equipment and the like, it increases the training delta when force generating for operations.
• One of the first things I would do would be to get the PRes out of the NPF business - the running of messes, mess accounts and the like.  This serves no real operational purpose and eats away at unit admin capabilities.  I've known some COs (no names, no pack drill) to devote the majority of their time to mess/NPF issues.
• While we might retain cap badges, colours and the like, there is no reason for the command and control structure to be on a regimental/battalion basis.  The LCols and RSMs should go for 80% of units and the entire system restructured to reflect reality - on a sub-unit basis.  Downrank the whole structure by one if need be.
• The Reserves need to be realistic as to what can be accomplished given their training limitations and the operational reality.  Operations are never going to be structured around PRes availability or the length of time Reservists can get away from work/school.  Learn to live with it - the system is not designed to get you on tour.  Similarly, course lengths within very technical trades or on complex equipment is not going to be reduced to the traditional two week window.  If "part-time" Reservists cannot train on equipment in the traditional length of time, they should not expect to be issued with it.
• Our employment model for Reservists is outmoded and in desperate need of replacement.  It was designed for an Army that served very routine rotations in places like Cyprus, where there was no requirement for lengthy work-up training and where rotation dates could be predicted years in advance.  This is no longer the case.  We are an Army at war and need Reservists who can be available for years in some cases.  As it is now, the Army would collapse without full-time PRes staff.  It is time to acknowledge this and to give the "Class" system a hard shake.
• Efforts to focus the Reserves on domestic operations are doomed to failure unless the system changes dramatically.  In my experience, most large domestic operations have required an immediate deployment of soldiers.  Moreover, there remain some ALEA-type domestic ops (prison security springs to mind) that will force the Regular Force to maintain a short-notice domestic response capability, no matter what is done with the Reserve Force.  The PRes focus (vice the Army's, where it hardly registers) on TBGs and the like is entirely misplaced and entirely poltically driven - our efforts are elsewhere and we cannot afford to have role-specific units awaiting the once-every-ten-years domestic ops event.

/rant.  Flame away...

The above and a buck fifty might get you a small Timmies...

TR