Divining the right role, capabilities, structure, and Regimental System for Canada's Army Reserves

[dapaterson]

Teddy:

From my lofty perch in NDHQ I can see little to disagree with:

The generation gap is real and will hopefully lead to change sooner rather than later;

Some senior Reserve leaders are Last Man Standing, or at least Loudest Man Standing - kept around well beyond their capability level, competence or best-before date;

The "Gotta Get A Gong" show is real - though from here it seems to be an equal-opportunity affliction, with Reg F members also scrambling for meaningless behind the wire jobs to get that tick in the box;

The "Old-timers" like certain HCols and the R2k crowd (whose name now truly shows that they are behind the times) are in my opinion part of the "Mess as #1 priority group - I'd go so far as to say that certain units (no names or pack drill here, either) view the Reserves as a federally-subsidized social club with automatic weapons;

If we are to have a Reserve force of 19,000 under the Army (including the field signals) we need a realistic model, with limited redundancy, to optimize it - and ensure we have what we need - somehow I don't think that 97 Infantry LCols are really needed in a force of that size.  If we assume 4000 folks will be not yet occupationally qualified at any one time, that leaves 15K trained troops to allocate; if they are all rolled into generic bns of 300 troops  (too small, but let's use that figure) we have a need for 50 LCols - all cap badges and trades - without having any C2 above the unit level (the usefulness of the current CBG construct is another topic for another time);

A quick review of the CFDS announced today seems to show that TBG didn't make the cut - it will be interesting to see what happens next...  at least they got those Suburbans with the look-cool factor.


Hmm... your post reads almost like something my former boss would have written...  >

 

[dglad]

Likewise, I find little to disagree with in this.  However, I would add one point...that IN SPITE of its shortcomings, we are producing, in the Res F, effective soldiers and officers who are deploying on operations and are carrying their weight.  The system that's producing them may be clunky and outmoded in many respects, but producing them it is.  I will note that it's straining at the seams to do so, and it's not clear that it can do so indefinitely.  But let's make sure that in critiquing the system we don't, in the process, inadvertently send the message to these fine men and women that they are a deficient product of that system.

And...it's in these folks that the answers may lay.  All of the change that many may wish to impose on the P Res may very happen organically, as these soldiers become more and more senior leaders in the same system.

 

[George Wallace]

Likewise, I find little to disagree with in this.  However, I would add one point...that IN SPITE of its shortcomings, we are producing, in the Res F, effective soldiers and officers who are deploying on operations and are carrying their weight.  The system that's producing them may be clunky and outmoded in many respects, but producing them it is.  I will note that it's straining at the seams to do so, and it's not clear that it can do so indefinitely.  But let's make sure that in critiquing the system we don't, in the process, inadvertently send the message to these fine men and women that they are a deficient product of that system.

And...it's in these folks that the answers may lay.  All of the change that many may wish to impose on the P Res may very happen organically, as these soldiers become more and more senior leaders in the same system.

I think the PRes has reached its "Breaking Point" right now.  Not enough Instructors left to keep regeneration in motion.  Crses at the lowest levels not being run due to the lack of Instructors.

TFs are taking, in more ways than one, a toll on PRes regeneration.  Not only are the "Instructors" that are direly needed for training deploying, but on return, many will CT to the Regular Force.  This wouldn't be a bad thing, if there were strong cadres of Instructors to continue on, but there aren't.  One solution is to put more Reservists onto Regular Force courses, and that doesn't restrict them to Leadership and Career Crses, but also on the most basic of Crses to include BMQ, SQ, and Crses like Dvr Wheeled.  There is a need to make this old "Total Force" concept, exactly that - Total Force.

The biggest problem other, than that, with the Reserves is Administration.  Too much "Dead Wood" in the RMS staffs of many Reserve Units, failing to get even the most basic of Administration done in a timely manner.

Sorry.  Did I rant there.......

 

[Nfld Sapper]

Yes and No there George  ;D

A prime example of the lack of Instructional Cadre for the Reserve Serial, CFSME is cutting contracts for any length this summer to accomodate the availability of instructors.

 

[daftandbarmy]

I think the PRes has reached its "Breaking Point" right now.  Not enough Instructors left to keep regeneration in motion.  Crses at the lowest levels not being run due to the lack of Instructors.

What do you mean? We've been allocated 2 x BMQ spots this summer. That's certainly enough to sustain an infantry unit these days, isn't it?  Well, if it comes down to it, I used to be pretty good on the C6. They still have bayonet attachments on those quick change barrels don't they?

Pass the Kool Aid please.... 

 

[dglad]

I think the PRes has reached its "Breaking Point" right now.  Not enough Instructors left to keep regeneration in motion.  Crses at the lowest levels not being run due to the lack of Instructors.

TFs are taking, in more ways than one, a toll on PRes regeneration.  Not only are the "Instructors" that are direly needed for training deploying, but on return, many will CT to the Regular Force.  This wouldn't be a bad thing, if there were strong cadres of Instructors to continue on, but there aren't.  One solution is to put more Reservists onto Regular Force courses, and that doesn't restrict them to Leadership and Career Crses, but also on the most basic of Crses to include BMQ, SQ, and Crses like Dvr Wheeled.  There is a need to make this old "Total Force" concept, exactly that - Total Force.

The biggest problem other, than that, with the Reserves is Administration.  Too much "Dead Wood" in the RMS staffs of many Reserve Units, failing to get even the most basic of Administration done in a timely manner.

Sorry.  Did I rant there.......

Unless I'm missing something, it sounds like you're proposing to...make more Reg F soldiers.  There's nothing inherently wrong with that, but loading Reservists onto Reg F BMQ, SQ, trade and leadership courses is just making Reg F soldiers, but at a reduced rate of pay and sans a lot of benefits.  Unless, of course, they simply become Reg F soldiers, in which case, they aren't Reservists.

The problem is a complex cascade.  The Reg F has come to rely on the Res F to fill out its TF CFTPOs, so Res F soldiers are being drawn into TFs, so Res F force generation falters, meaning fewer Reservists are available to fill TFs, meaning that those that ARE available are stretched even more.  If we're going to make a Total Force that means rolling the Res F into the Reg F...then fine, let's just say that.  But I don't think that, for a lot of reasons, this is going to work particularly well, either.

Note the highlighted and underlined bit above.  That's where the key to all of this sits.  I'm of the opinion that the Res F really doesn't lack for capacity or capability, it's just poorly and inefficiently organized for what it's being asked to do.  I maintain that it's producing good soldiers, but I can't really deny that it's reaching its limits.  Clearly, some substantial reform is going to be required.

 

[rifleman]

Why don't we just consider this 21 century mobilization for the CF with no end in site. I believe in that context, it lends to tactical groupings with combined administration for those on reconstitution. When or if this every ends, the reservists on Class C and B'A' will need a place to go back to, when the regular force is looking for places to hide again.

 

[McG]

As a side if you are going to quote someone, you should use the entire context, not just the part that supports you arguement
"There is probably a segment of the recruiting base that want a 'taste' of the military and signing 5 years of your life away is preventing them from joining.

You were not taken out of context.  You little extra bolded bit makes absolutely no difference.  The purpose of the reserves is not to provide the national hobby service.  If the reserve provided no capability to the larger CF, it would not exist to fill the role of adventure camp or hobby club.  The purpose the reserves is not to be the employer for the people you’ve described; the reserves uses those people (and others) as a human resource for it to fill its actual purposes:

• Individual augmentation to Regular Force units
  This is the provision of individual soldiers to fill out units, sub-units & HQs.  Reservists providing this capability are both on operations overseas & here in Canada backfilling for regular force soldiers on ops, parental leave or whatever.
  
• Add to force generation depth (sub-unit augmentation to mobilization base)
  This is the provision of formed sub-sub units or larger organizations.  Reservists are capable of doing this depending on the role & mission.  However, the nature of modern combat and our way of procurement will ensure that this never occurs above the Coy level (and even this will only be in relatively permissive environments).  Despite the speed at which new equipment is arriving, Afghanistan is showing that there are serious delays & challenges when you wait until everyone is at war before trying to buy what you need.  The international market is having trouble meeting the demand for some product while we wait.
  
• Add to force generation breadth (specialized capabilities)
  The CF reserve can provide specialist capabilities or skills which do not exist in the regular force.  I believe CIMIC is done this way.
  
• Provide the Canadian Forces with a community footprint
  The reserve force provides visibility of the military in Canadian communities.  In other words, reserve units serve to remind Canadians that the CF exists, to “win hearts & minds” domestically, and to communicate locally with the public.

So, when deciding how to organize it is the above list that should be the guiding factor as far as what number, size and type of units we should have.  Demographics should only be used to help guide where we physically place the units.

 

[George Wallace]

Unless I'm missing something, it sounds like you're proposing to...make more Reg F soldiers.  There's nothing inherently wrong with that, but loading Reservists onto Reg F BMQ, SQ, trade and leadership courses is just making Reg F soldiers, but at a reduced rate of pay and sans a lot of benefits.  Unless, of course, they simply become Reg F soldiers, in which case, they aren't Reservists.

No.  I am not proposing to make more Reg F soldiers, although in some units up to 50% of their trained members do CT to the Reg F.  What I am saying, is that due to the shortage of Instructors, it is time to start putting Reservists onto Regular Force BMQ and SQ Crses to generate enough pers to fill the gaps that we will soon see when the current rush to train Instructors is over.  Currently the Reserves are seeing BMQ, SQ and Dvr Wheeled Crses cancelled due to the lack of Instructors and resources to hire Privately (such as Calian).  Reservists are being employed in St Jean and Borden to Instruct Reg F BMQ and SQ Crses.  This is yet another strain on the Reserve Instructor Pool.  Reservists must receive the same qualifications as their Reg F counterparts, and some Trades are doing just that.  Time to start putting more Reservists onto Reg F Crses. 

Just because a Reservist is on a Reg F Crse doesn't mean (s)he is going to be Reg F.  It does give them a fixed period of Trg to receive the same quality of Trg as their Reg F counterpart.  It promotes "networking" and familiarity in how each other operates, making it much easier to integrate Res F pers on operations.  In the end, the Reservist will return to their parent unit much better trained and more experienced.  Should they decide further down the road to make it a full-time career, so be it; but they will be able to enter the Reg F already qualified in their Trade.

The problem is a complex cascade.  The Reg F has come to rely on the Res F to fill out its TF CFTPOs, so Res F soldiers are being drawn into TFs, so Res F force generation falters, meaning fewer Reservists are available to fill TFs, meaning that those that ARE available are stretched even more.  If we're going to make a Total Force that means rolling the Res F into the Reg F...then fine, let's just say that.  But I don't think that, for a lot of reasons, this is going to work particularly well, either.

There are already some Trades and Crses that are facilitating Reg/Res mixed Crses.  As stated above, it standardizes the training of both Reg and Res F pers.  Subliminally, it adds to the "Total Force" integration.

......... I'm of the opinion that the Res F really doesn't lack for capacity or capability, it's just poorly and inefficiently organized for what it's being asked to do.  I maintain that it's producing good soldiers, but I can't really deny that it's reaching its limits.  Clearly, some substantial reform is going to be required.

Yes I agree with it being poorly and inefficiently organized.  It is producing some excellent soldiers.  Some do stay on in the Reserves.  Many move on to the Regular Force.  Current Deployments and taskings such as St Jean and Borden to augment the Reg F Trg System have brought the Reserves to the Breaking point.  It is time for them to stop trying to do their Trg on their own, but to integrate themselves into the Reg F Trg System.  Maintaining a number of small Trg facilities at Units is inefficient.  Time to concentrate our Instructors and Staffs into one or two permanent locations.

 

[McG]

Why don't we just consider this 21 century mobilization for the CF with no end in site. I believe in that context, it lends to tactical groupings with combined administration for those on reconstitution. When or if this every ends, the reservists on Class C and B'A' will need a place to go back to, when the regular force is looking for places to hide again.

I'm not tracking.  Are you suggesting permanent use of Class C & B to keep the regular force field units at 100% for the duration of our Afghanistan mission or are you suggesting tactical groupings of reserve units should only last until the Afghanistan mission ends (or slows)? 

 

[rifleman]

I'm not tracking.  Are you suggesting permanent use of Class C & B to keep the regular force field units at 100% for the duration of our Afghanistan mission or are you suggesting tactical groupings of reserve units should only last until the Afghanistan mission ends (or slows)? 

Both, it all depends on the situation at the time

 

[rifleman]

You were not taken out of context.  You little extra bolded bit makes absolutely no difference.  The purpose of the reserves is not to provide the national hobby service.  If the reserve provided no capability to the larger CF, it would not exist to fill the role of adventure camp or hobby club.  The purpose the reserves is not to be the employer for the people you’ve described; the reserves uses those people (and others) as a human resource for it to fill its actual purposes:

I'm not suggesting it be a hobby service. I'm saying I know lots of reg force members that joined the reserves first to see whether they would like it, instead of commiting to a BE. Although its a good thing that there were weekend warriors during the bleak years, as it appears they are needed now

 

[McG]

Both, it all depends on the situation at the time

Given that the need for amalgamations or tactical groupings was identified in this thread well before the current operations in Kandahar, I don't think it is a temporary measure that can be reverted as soon as the Op tempo subsides.  Unless someone identifies a CF requirement for a larger Army reserve, there is no argument to grow units.  There are currently too many units to efficiently & effectively make use of the soldiers authorized to the system as a whole.

I'm saying I know lots of reg force members that joined the reserves first to see whether they would like it, instead of commiting to a BE.

So, you are proposing the reserves also have the role of a pseudo farm team in that the reserves recruits people into the CF and eventually transfers many to the regular force?

 

[rifleman]

Given that the need for amalgamations or tactical groupings was identified in this thread well before the current operations in Kandahar, I don't think it is a temporary measure that can be reverted as soon as the Op tempo subsides.  Unless someone identifies a CF requirement for a larger Army reserve, there is no argument to grow units.  There are currently too many units to efficiently & effectively make use of the soldiers authorized to the system as a whole.
So, you are proposing the reserves also have the role of a pseudo farm team in that the reserves recruits people into the CF and eventually transfers many to the regular force?

I've never agreed that amalgamations was the issue even back then.

The reserves in the past 20 years have already been a farm team for the regs.

 

[Harris]

Speaking as a Company Commander who normally only commands 35-45 people on a weekend Ex, I'm all for Tactical groupings.  I had 140 pers in my Company on South Bound Trooper, and it was great to actually have pers to do the jobs needed, and to give orders to more than one Pl Comd.

While I hear that some Units are at their max, unfortunately that isn't the case for the majority of Units where I'm located.  My Unit can barely keep up with the CT's and transfers, yet alone increase in size.

Should Units be retained to keep their capbadges?  No!!!  Can we keep a Company of the Highland Balloon Fusilers as part of the Mountian Goat Regiment, Yes!!!  Then the Platoon commanders will command a proper Pl, I will command a proper Coy, and the CO will command a proper Bn.  Currently only the Pl comd gets to do this if he's lucky.

Perhaps that will also eliminate the "last man standing gets to be CO" problem.

 

[TCBF]

While it may be a cost-saving alternative, I don't see it being a logistically sound idea. While our unit's BOR operates quite well, and things get processed in a reasonable amount of time, I know it's not the same for all units. Particularly in Winnipeg where you have multiple units parading out of the same armoury and sharing the same orderly room. I've heard horror stories from some of the Camerons and Winnipeg Rifles I know about the time it takes for anything to get through. They're administrating units of differnt trades, under different commands (WRT the local Med Coy), and with completely different priorities. Is it any wonder things get mixed up?

Besides, don't you think it's about time Ottawa STOPPED looking for cost cutting ventures anywhere outside of NDHQ? Don't we have more generals now than we did at the peak of WWII? Don't you think there's FAR more fat to be trimmed in that one little building than in the CF in its entirety?

- I think we should look a this 'post from the past' before we tinker so much that we break something.

 

[McG]

- I think we should look a this 'post from the past' ....

It has been addressed.  For one, the driving reason for tactical groupings would not be efficiency (cost savings) it would be effectiveness (better collective training & leader development).  Another observation might be that common orderly rooms exist, they have existed for some time now, and they exist even without tactical groupings.  Even in regular force "super bases" you will find certain administrative functions are centralized.  But as I said, your question from the past has been addressed to varying degrees in the past:

There are several reserve units that sucessfuly run off-site sub-units.  There are also several succesfull independant sub-units (though there were more before the medical branch became its own command).  Why can't this success be repeated in other Coy sized units?  Don't forget that a company can have an Ops O/BC, Admin O, Liaison O, and Trg NCO.  I would recoment the Trg NCO be added to the full time staff.

The proposal I have given my support to still keeps much more headquarters in place by retaining the existing brigades and reducing the number of battalion HQs.  In the same move Coy HQs would grow and the central battalion HQ would be larger than any of the previous regimental HQs.  One of my concernce with Infanteers proposal is that I envision independantly located platoons.  I do not think that these would have the staff resources to sustain themselves. 

the same number of administrative staff would probably still be utilized if not more. 

Well the unit would be in "company establishment" they still would have all the support they had as they would still have a battalion HQ to plans Ops/ and assist in any administration(BOR/ASU/Whatever you want to call it) that the COY clerk cannot handle.  My clerk has no problems with supporting 125+ pers with BOR support.

I might suggest a mixed system for the reserves.  In places like Montreal, Toronto and Vancouver, where numbers and proximity permit I think amalgamated battalions with conventional orders of battle would probably work just fine.  In places where numbers and distance conspire against the formation of units perhaps independent companies or squadrons would be a better anwer.  For example The Calgary Highlanders might become the 10th Independent Company (Calgary Highlanders) Western Canada Field Force or some such and be constituted as a combat team complete with a 5 or 6 platoon structure and incorporating service support.

Kirkhill: actually, the amalgamation could work even in areas of geographic dispersal. I give our Bde as an example: it is not uncommon for us to have soldiers drive two hours to get to the Armoury, and we already have a few COs who commute a considerable distance to their HQs. On top of that, the Bde Comd Gp is selected from across three Provinces: our Comd and DComd are from Wpg but our ACOS and BRSM are from Thunder Bay, seven hours travel time to the east.

In the case of a unit amalgamated across a wide area (as we have proposed for our Artillery and our Svc Bns) it really would not result in a huge change for the majority of soldiers, who would continue to parade at their home armoury as they do know. The people erquired to move would be those in key unit-level positions. Under this system the leadership of the component sub-units would be provided by the OC and SM (as it really should be...) with the unit-level folks concentrating on unit-level issues and dealing with Bde HQ.

Our proposals further provide for the eventual redistribution of full time staff, with the sub-units having an FTS somewhat smaller than it is now, composed mainly of Class B, while the majority of the RegF positions would be concentrated in a stronger and more capable bn HQ FTS that also included Class B.

Most of the Admin in the Regular Force is or soon will be on central database programs like "Peoplesoft" , CFTPO and so on, and a lot of Reserve admin is migrating there too. The idea of orderly rooms and clerical functions could go to the boards if this is taken to its conclusion. (Soldiers can and will do their own queries, while course reports etc. get fed in by the course staff, QM records by the QM staff, the CSM swipes every soldier's "smart card" at first parade to input pay etc).

(A few years later & today the PS can do their own leave passes on-line.  In reality, the Coy clerk will not be replaced, but perhapse some admin will start happening over greater distances & with less effort.)

Nobody has explained, at least to me, how amalgamating several smaller units into one larger one suddenly compresses the time required to learn and demonstrate all the lower level collective BTS.  Nobody has explained where, if positions are eliminated, all the administrivia goes.  Are all the reserve unit staff really just a bunch of time wasters who have learned to fit three weeks' worth of administration into 45 Class "A" days?

Right now a Reserve unit administers itself as a battalion, and carries the load of paperwork and command structure expected to run a battalion. However, a reserve unit does not have nearly the same resources as a real battalion to run that administrative load - not as many clerks, not the various cells, not the full-time staff to do all the work that needs to be done, etc.

Reserve units generally claim to be able to field a company. So what exactly is everyone above the company level doing? An operational Reg F company manages to run itself on one clerk, an OC, 2ic, a CSM, and a CQ. A Reserve company is run by: a CQ/RQ, Coy CoComdrCoy 2ic, CSM, RSM, CO, DCO, Adjt, Ops & Trg O, and a BOR - and all that to get guys out one day a week, one weekend a month, and in reality it probably fields a platoon.
My unit fielded the equivalent of a overstrength platoon on the last 7-day concentration. But, on any given weekday we usually have 3 people working full-time in the BOR, plus the Adjt, the RSS WO, CQ, a Recruiting Officer, and various others doing pay administration or odd jobs. The tail is definitely overwhelming the teeth.

Very few positions would be eliminated.  Instead, many would be moved to where they are more efficient [or effective].  The biggest efficiencies would be gained by reducing secondary duties (UEnvO, RadSO, UGSO, OIC Armoury, SHARP Instr, IO, etc).

If you've got a particular point that you want to make, then make it.  You don't need to dredge up 4 year old posts as an excuse to remind us the sky will fall if anyone dare evolve "break" the regimental system as it currently exists in the Army reserve.

 

[rifleman]

It has been addressed.  For one, the driving reason for tactical groupings would not be efficiency (cost savings) it would be effectiveness (better collective training & leader development).  Another observation might be that common orderly rooms exist, they have existed for some time now, and they exist even without tactical groupings.  Even in regular force "super bases" you will find certain administrative functions are centralized.  But as I said, your question from the past has been addressed to varying degrees in the past: If you've got a particular point that you want to make, then make it.  You don't need to dredge up 4 year old posts as an excuse to remind us the sky will fall if anyone dare evolve "break" the regimental system as it currently exists in the Army reserve.

Its no different then those who say that we have to re-invent the wheel in order to get anywhere. Sorry but we were discussing that 20 years ago, and I'm sure that it was discussed before that.

btw, the superbase consolidation of services aren't exactly for effectiveness, its because their trades are short too.

 

[McG]

I've never agreed that amalgamations was the issue even back then.

Well, I am quite convinced that it has been required for going back over a decade.  It is the fault of neither the reserves or reservists.  It is simply a matter of authorized manning.  We do not have enough positions authorized in the reserve to justify the number of units that currently exist.

The reserves in the past 20 years have already been a farm team for the regs.

Movement goes both ways between the components, but ...
My question was not whether people transfer to the Regular Force from the Reserve.  My question was, do you think this should be a formally recognized role of the reserves.

btw, the superbase consolidation of services aren't exactly for effectiveness, its because their trades are short too.

I never suggested the purpose for consolidated services at bases.  I only mentioned that it happens to illustrate that it has nothing to do with either the regimental system or tactical groupings.

Its no different then those who say that we have to re-invent the wheel in order to get anywhere. Sorry but we were discussing that 20 years ago, and I'm sure that it was discussed before that.

It is not that there should be no repeat of discussion (especially if resolution of a concept is not reached).  However, it is either lazy or intentionally misleading to quote page 4 of a 56 page thread, not adding any content or interpretation of one's own, and pretend the question has gone unanswered (when that is clearly not the case).

Should Units be retained to keep their capbadges?  No!!!

At the same time, we can remove units without removing any cap badges.  This may be an easier option for some to swallow. 

 

[rifleman]

Movement goes both ways between the components, but ...
My question was not whether people transfer to the Regular Force from the Reserve.  My question was, do you think this should be a formally recognized role of the reserves.

sure why not. I did forget that the reserves is also a retirement plan for double dippers

I never suggested the purpose for consolidated services at bases.  I only mentioned that it happens to illustrate that it has nothing to do with either the regimental system or tactical groupings.

I'd say it is basically a tactical grouping of administrative/ logistic services

It is not that there should be no repeat of discussion (especially if resolution of a concept is not reached).  However, it is either lazy or intentionally misleading to quote page 4 of a 56 page thread, not adding any content or interpretation of one's own, and pretend the question has gone unanswered (when that is clearly not the case).

okay got ya