CDN Aviator said:
I had to run my engineer section out of an LSVW and that was in a RegF regiment.
I've also seen regular engineer Recce Sgt operating out of the back of LSVW attempting to support BGs ... and we do attach Recce Sgts to Recce Sqn from time to time.
tango22a said:
The only problem is if you forcefully re-role, re-badge or re-name PRes Regiments that....
I was not proposing a forceful re-rolling of units. Instead, I was presenting the idea of maintaining a combat role while adding a second domestic role. That being said, if the combat role of a unit is not relevant to operational requirements then the CF is not getting a good return for any investments made into that unit.
tango22a said:
I am also willing to bet if the Armoured Recce Role disappears that there will be more than a few VRs.
Maybe but if we are hypothesizing that the reserve armd recce role is not relevant to operational requirements, then the interests of the CF are best served by re-rolling to something which is relevant. We will just have to accept that some pers may choose to leave because their hobby is not in line with the military's needs (and that's okay because the military is not a federally funded hobby club).
tango22a said:
The problem is that due to over-tasking the RegF cannot train people from PRes to a standard useful to deploy in an ARMOUR trade. Most PRes Armour soldiers end up being employed outside their trade.They still deploy and do a good job, but I am sure many would prefer to be employed as Armoured soldiers. Lack of money, lack of training and mainly a lack of WILL to remedy this situation will lead us into careering around in ever-decreasing circles until we finally bite ourselves on the a**.IMHO the system is badly strained and the only solution is an increase in funding which I can't see happening with today's economic situation.
This drives right to the heart of defining relevance to operational requirements. It is not enough to show that a capability is required on the battlefields of today or tomorrow (though if the capability is not required for either that would be a clear indicator of no relevance to operational requirements). For a reserve capability to be relevant to operations, we must be able to employ the reservist within his occupation. We must also be able to properly train and maintain that capability internal to the reserves (ie. no expectation of reg force training cadres coming down to do it). We must be able to provide whatever equipment this requires (recognizing that there are resource limitations regardless of component).
For as long as I can recall, the government has never funded procurement of sufficient AFV to meet the requirements of the regular force (it is possible that M113 purchases were adequate but that is too far before my time). This under-resourcing is unlikely to change, and it would be irrational to degrade the already limited regular force capability in order to carve out the charity case vehicles to sustain that capability in the reserves. The CLS has stated that he will not be seeking multi-million dollar vehicles for the reserves (it is only affordable at the expense of an operational regular force capability). Cascading Coyote to the reserves will not resolve the problem either. When Coyote is replaced, there will be a new vehicle with new fires & sensor systems and the Coyote trained reservist will still not be employable in regular force armd recce.
It was not my recent intent to discuss the utility of various reserve type units, but as Armd Recce was brought up: perhaps those units would better serve the CF through providing combat engineers (for which there is a high demand for reservists to deploy in their role), CIMIC or some other capability.
tango22a said:
I seem to get the feeling that many RegF personnel would rather be done with PRes, since they feel monies could be better expended elsewhere.
tango22a said:
As I said before I feel that the RegF would be more than happy to see the PRes Strike its tents, turn in what little equipment it has and disappear QUIETLY.
Some might feel that. I've seen a summary of a report done by finance pers in Ottawa showing that the reserve Bde as a collective were significantly more costly than the regular brigades. Could we do better putting all our money into the regular force? I don't know, but I suspect such a move would do more harm than good. As it is, the report that I previously mentioned certainly did not study enough detail to allow anyone to answer this question either. There were too many details which could not be broken down further for any refined insight.
Reserve units with operationally relevant mission tasks (both domestic and international) are what the Army and the CF needs.