LAV 6.0

[Kirkhill]

Mary sounds clever....

 

[FJAG]

To have two squadrons of MBTs and one recce squadron per regiment, at bare minimum we would need 114 tanks, so really we would need 228. For three tank squadrons it would be 171, or 342.

If we simply bought 600 Abrams, that would basically solve everything. All three regiments would be fully equipped, plus about 40 or 50 tanks for the armour school at Gagetown, and we could station a squadron or more in Latvia.

That strikes me as aggressive math.

For starters a squadron doesn't need to be four troops/19 tanks. Most countries work with a three troop/14 tank squadron and add two for the battalion headquarters so a two MBT squadron regiment needs between 30 to 40 tanks depending on configuration.

Add to that a minimum of 14 tanks for additional training and, lets say a half dozen tech spares plus between a half dozen to a dozen specialized hulls. Basically with 60 tanks you could have and train a two squadron regiment.

As I said above, if you wish to forward deploy a regiment that should more realistically be a three-squadron, 44-tank regiment with a dozen specials. To this I would add between 40 and 60 additional tanks for training and spares back home.

There is no requirement to triple up the numbers unless you desire to deploy an armoured division. Combat losses. Yup. You have to figure that in. There may be some at some point, but how many extra hulls do you want to have hanging around for that. I don't know how many tanks we lost to combat losses since Korea (or even during Korea) but my guess is none. It's an assumption of risk thing.

I think that you could make a reasonable argument to the government that if they wanted to forward deploy a mech brigade to Europe with a 44 or 59-tank Regiment, that we would need an additional 20 - 30 hulls to supplement the 74 gun tanks, 11 ARVs and 18 AEVs we already have. In a pinch, assuming the maintenance system is beefed up, we could probably make do with what tanks we already have. Remember that when we bought the Leo 1s at the height of the Cold War we bought 114 to support the deployment and training sustainment of one forward deployed armoured regiment of 59 tanks.

Anything above that number would have to work on the basis of a defence policy prepared to forward deploy more than one armoured brigade group. I do not see that as a realistic possibility.

 

[quadrapiper]

There is no requirement to triple up the numbers unless you desire to deploy an armoured division. Combat losses. Yup. You have to figure that in. There may be some at some point, but how many extra hulls do you want to have hanging around for that. I don't know how many tanks we lost to combat losses since Korea (or even during Korea) but my guess is none. It's an assumption of risk thing.

What sort of losses would need to be allowed for from a robust training program?

 

[FJAG]

What sort of losses would need to be allowed for from a robust training program?

I've really no idea. We never lost any M109s and tanks are sturdier than that. Most everything is fixable except maybe a disastrous in-turret ammo fire. Even an in-bore premature might only need a breach and barrel replacement.

Do any of our armoured guys know how many Leos (or even Centurions) we lost in training?

We do seem to have quite high VOR rates these days but that is really a function of a maintenance system that's not operating at optimum levels. Our VOR rates on M109s and the supporting M113/577/548/578 fleet in the late 70s early 80s was fairly low.

 

[daftandbarmy]

What sort of losses would need to be allowed for from a robust training program?

We used to kill at least two or three people annually... is that what you meant?

 

[KevinB]

I think that you are wrong here.

An ABCT runs at 84 tanks.

The latest one I have is 96, but regardless I think Canada’s 3:1 Inf:Armour Regiment / CMBG really requires more tank squadrons than you have currently, simply to make up for the attempt at using the LAV as an IFV.

Canada can rustle those up. There are more than enough LAVs and 155mm howitzers. They're only not enough if you rule out LAV6s as infantry carriers and M777s as close support artillery.

The lack of Anti-Armor weapons currently in the CMBG means the tank is your only realistic option for anti tank work.

The point is you don't have to be an ABCT. You can be a mech or armoured formation with a lot less than what a top of the line ABCT is equipped with. There are lots of mech and armour formations out there with Leo2A4s and with infantry carriers not as capable as the LAV6.

For the size of Canada’s Army compare to the GDP of Canada I would argue you should have at least the same equipment as a ABCT if not more.

Do I want to see better gear? Sure I do. But I'd be prepared to deploy a 44 tank battalion and two 44 LAV battalions with a battalion of M777s as a mech brigade to Europe today out of the resources we have knowing we have enough gear back home to sustain that.

I think that the CA has way too many critical missing pieces to present a viable CMBG for Europe.

That is actually a very thought provoking article for the times. It's particulalry relevant again today as we have a generation of leaders that haven't experienced heavy metal in a serious dust-up during their entire career and who are facing the questions of how to meld it into all the new technology hitting the battlefield. We're not just looking to think outside of the box but trying to build a whole new box from scratch.

I really liked it - I’m of course a hybrid as I started in the Cold War and ended during GWOT. But I see the need for both a heavy Armor Division and a Light Division for Canada — frankly given the option, I’d just run the LAV’s off a short pier and make an artificial reef
But I think a Stryker type Brigade in both the Light and Heavy Divisions could be workable to make use of those - and it’s a good platform for OOTW as well.

 

[TangoTwoBravo]

I think that you are wrong here.

An ABCT runs at 84 tanks. Canada can rustle those up. There are more than enough LAVs and 155mm howitzers. They're only not enough if you rule out LAV6s as infantry carriers and M777s as close support artillery.

The point is you don't have to be an ABCT. You can be a mech or armoured formation with a lot less than what a top of the line ABCT is equipped with. There are lots of mech and armour formations out there with Leo2A4s and with infantry carriers not as capable as the LAV6.

Do I want to see better gear? Sure I do. But I'd be prepared to deploy a 44 tank battalion and two 44 LAV battalions with a battalion of M777s as a mech brigade to Europe today out of the resources we have knowing we have enough gear back home to sustain that.

That is actually a very thought provoking article for the times. It's particulalry relevant again today as we have a generation of leaders that haven't experienced heavy metal in a serious dust-up during their entire career and who are facing the questions of how to meld it into all the new technology hitting the battlefield. We're not just looking to think outside of the box but trying to build a whole new box from scratch.

When do you consider was the last time we had a generation of leaders that had experienced "heavy metal in a serious dust-up?"

 

[Spencer100]

We used to kill at least two or three people annually... is that what you meant?

I read that way too at first.

I was thinking are you looking for Starship Trooper rates of training attrition?

 

[Kirkhill]

The latest one I have is 96, but regardless I think Canada’s 3:1 Inf:Armour Regiment / CMBG really requires more tank squadrons than you have currently, simply to make up for the attempt at using the LAV as an IFV.



The lack of Anti-Armor weapons currently in the CMBG means the tank is your only realistic option for anti tank work.


For the size of Canada’s Army compare to the GDP of Canada I would argue you should have at least the same equipment as a ABCT if not more.


I think that the CA has way too many critical missing pieces to present a viable CMBG for Europe.


I really liked it - I’m of course a hybrid as I started in the Cold War and ended during GWOT. But I see the need for both a heavy Armor Division and a Light Division for Canada — frankly given the option, I’d just run the LAV’s off a short pier and make an artificial reef
But I think a Stryker type Brigade in both the Light and Heavy Divisions could be workable to make use of those - and it’s a good platform for OOTW as well.

Kevin, what are your guys going to do when you are operating alongside all of the national variants of battalions and brigades currently manning the Eastern Front?

I don't argue that the Army needs more stuff. I don't even argue that Canada, as a country, can afford more stuff. But the stuff we choose to buy and we choose to fight with may not be the same stuff that you would choose to buy. Vis Bradleys vs CV90s for starters.

 

[Maxman1]

That strikes me as aggressive math.

For starters a squadron doesn't need to be four troops/19 tanks. Most countries work with a three troop/14 tank squadron and add two for the battalion headquarters so a two MBT squadron regiment needs between 30 to 40 tanks depending on configuration.

Add to that a minimum of 14 tanks for additional training and, lets say a half dozen tech spares plus between a half dozen to a dozen specialized hulls. Basically with 60 tanks you could have and train a two squadron regiment.

As I said above, if you wish to forward deploy a regiment that should more realistically be a three-squadron, 44-tank regiment with a dozen specials. To this I would add between 40 and 60 additional tanks for training and spares back home.

There is no requirement to triple up the numbers unless you desire to deploy an armoured division. Combat losses. Yup. You have to figure that in. There may be some at some point, but how many extra hulls do you want to have hanging around for that. I don't know how many tanks we lost to combat losses since Korea (or even during Korea) but my guess is none. It's an assumption of risk thing.

I think that you could make a reasonable argument to the government that if they wanted to forward deploy a mech brigade to Europe with a 44 or 59-tank Regiment, that we would need an additional 20 - 30 hulls to supplement the 74 gun tanks, 11 ARVs and 18 AEVs we already have. In a pinch, assuming the maintenance system is beefed up, we could probably make do with what tanks we already have. Remember that when we bought the Leo 1s at the height of the Cold War we bought 114 to support the deployment and training sustainment of one forward deployed armoured regiment of 59 tanks.

Anything above that number would have to work on the basis of a defence policy prepared to forward deploy more than one armoured brigade group. I do not see that as a realistic possibility.

Maybe other countries are wrong and squadrons of 19 tanks is the way to go.

Buying "almost enough" is one of the issues plaguing Canadian procurement, as we end up burning up our kit trying to do more with less, and that's without getting into combat losses or training accidents. The concept of Two is One, One is None allows us to do proper maintenance on a vehicle without reducing operations as we could rotate vehicles every six months, greatly reducing wear and tear while also allowing us to scale up if needed.

 

[Kirkhill]

Maybe other countries are wrong and squadrons of 19 tanks is the way to go.

Buying "almost enough" is one of the issues plaguing Canadian procurement, as we end up burning up our kit trying to do more with less, and that's without getting into combat losses or training accidents. The concept of Two is One, One is None allows us to do proper maintenance on a vehicle without reducing operations as we could rotate vehicles every six months, greatly reducing wear and tear while also allowing us to scale up if needed.

To be honest I do prefer the notion of "one in the drawer, one in the wash and one on my back". With that we might still have had working Leo1s to donate to Ukraine ... and M113s.

 

[Kirkhill]

But we could still manage that with 81 tanks. It just means 27 tanks in the field at any one time.

 

[FJAG]

When do you consider was the last time we had a generation of leaders that had experienced "heavy metal in a serious dust-up?"

I'm being flippant of course. But I'd put that point in time at when Canada pulled its brigade out of Germany. We turned the Army into an agency that looked at Bosnia and the the Afghan counterinsurgency as our mission sets. That's over two decades during which we abandoned high intensity mechanized combat. You can't do that without consequences.

When you have such a lengthy period where your leadership has rejected the possibility of high intensity mechanized combat, has divested itself of most of the equipment needed for such a fight and not replaced it with equipment of equal or better value and your exercises are aimed at operations well below high intensity then you raise a generation of junior leaders who do not have the experience necessary to add the flesh to their theoretic learning ... if in fact they have time to learn the theory in the first place.

Look. I know we have pockets of professionalism, and have always had them. But an armies capabilities are not measured by a few people who are devoted to learning their craft. It's measured by the standards of the force as a whole and Canada has been underequipped and undertrained for too long for it not to have an effect. Our allies recognize that, when pushed, our folks are capable of jury-rigging things to make a good showing but they also know that the extent to which Canada can go to the well is very limited. I think our troops know it too when you consider the numbers in which they are leaving the force. Often when a perception exists there is a reality to it that some inside the organization don't see.

I think that even in my day we were riding on the coattails of a reputation earned by a previous generation of Canadian soldiers. I watched it slowly slip away over several decades. And I do know that Canadian soldiers performed well in Afghanistan, but that is a whole different scenario from what we are talking about here. I hadn't been keeping that close an eye on it in the last few decades but nearly everyone that I've talked to over the last two years expressed the view that while the Army was focussing on counter terrorism it lost far too many skill sets for high intensity operations to compensate for. Experience comes from learning and doing. We may perhaps still teach but we simply do not give a large enough portion of the force the constant, repetitive and varied "doing" to develop a firm experience base for the level of combat we are now talking about.

 

[daftandbarmy]

I read that way too at first.

I was thinking are you looking for Starship Trooper rates of training attrition?

They were 'accidents', of course, but encouraged the rest of us nonetheless

 

[GR66]

That strikes me as aggressive math.

For starters a squadron doesn't need to be four troops/19 tanks. Most countries work with a three troop/14 tank squadron and add two for the battalion headquarters so a two MBT squadron regiment needs between 30 to 40 tanks depending on configuration.

Add to that a minimum of 14 tanks for additional training and, lets say a half dozen tech spares plus between a half dozen to a dozen specialized hulls. Basically with 60 tanks you could have and train a two squadron regiment.

As I said above, if you wish to forward deploy a regiment that should more realistically be a three-squadron, 44-tank regiment with a dozen specials. To this I would add between 40 and 60 additional tanks for training and spares back home.

There is no requirement to triple up the numbers unless you desire to deploy an armoured division. Combat losses. Yup. You have to figure that in. There may be some at some point, but how many extra hulls do you want to have hanging around for that. I don't know how many tanks we lost to combat losses since Korea (or even during Korea) but my guess is none. It's an assumption of risk thing.

I think that you could make a reasonable argument to the government that if they wanted to forward deploy a mech brigade to Europe with a 44 or 59-tank Regiment, that we would need an additional 20 - 30 hulls to supplement the 74 gun tanks, 11 ARVs and 18 AEVs we already have. In a pinch, assuming the maintenance system is beefed up, we could probably make do with what tanks we already have. Remember that when we bought the Leo 1s at the height of the Cold War we bought 114 to support the deployment and training sustainment of one forward deployed armoured regiment of 59 tanks.

Anything above that number would have to work on the basis of a defence policy prepared to forward deploy more than one armoured brigade group. I do not see that as a realistic possibility.

Maybe other countries are wrong and squadrons of 19 tanks is the way to go.

Buying "almost enough" is one of the issues plaguing Canadian procurement, as we end up burning up our kit trying to do more with less, and that's without getting into combat losses or training accidents. The concept of Two is One, One is None allows us to do proper maintenance on a vehicle without reducing operations as we could rotate vehicles every six months, greatly reducing wear and tear while also allowing us to scale up if needed.

Interesting info from the article @KevinB posted M1A2 TANK BATTALION ORGANIZATION: A CALL FOR INNOVATION:

Starting on page 26 of the report it looks at various alternate configurations for an M1A2 Tank Battalion and they found that:

As a result of the above critique, the Armor Center recognized the 60-tank alternative (4-tank platoons, 4-platoon companies and 3-company battalions) as the most favorable alternative based on the cursory analysis.

 

[FJAG]

Interesting info from the article @KevinB posted M1A2 TANK BATTALION ORGANIZATION: A CALL FOR INNOVATION:

Starting on page 26 of the report it looks at various alternate configurations for an M1A2 Tank Battalion and they found that:

It gets more interesting as you go along.

Recommendations emanating from institutions that hold vested interests in the eventual outcome are naturally conservative. As stated earlier, there is solace found in the historically proven status quo.

The four alternatives put forward by the Armor Center offer little in the way of innovation. The substantial range between alternatives (36 to 63 tanks per battalion) obscures the fact that there are no innovative organizations forwarded for analysis. The options are: three or four tanks per platoon; three or four platoons per company; and three or four companies per battalion

After analysing the factors that the Armor Center used the author concluded

The net result was criteria that favored larger (hence more lethal and survivable) organizations. Larger may be the right answer, but it must be for the right reasons

It is human nature to clasp onto the familiar present in lieu of the uncertain future - regardless of the potential apparent in the future. Yet, only by letting go of the decades-old rationale behind armor organization can the armor community realize the full potential of Force XXI. Innovative ideas must emanate from within the armor community on how best to organize to take advantage of this technology

In the end under Force XXI, no tank battalions were formed at all. Instead the option that they went for was combined arms battalions which at first consisted of two tank companies of 14 tanks each and two Bradley companies of 14 Bradley's each. That subsequently changed to an ABCT having two combined arms battalions of two tank and one infantry company and one battalion of two infantry and one tank company.

 

[Kirkhill]

Experience comes from learning and doing.

Can I offer one quibble?

IMO experience comes from doing and learning.

Fail fast and often is as good a mantra as any.

Your health!

 

[Kirkhill]

I’d be impressed if it could mount Javelin too, and had tracks, and perhaps was called CV90

The Polish Brimstone Carriers - Dual Mode Brimstones - Fire and Forget MMW seekers and Laser Designated.
24 ready rounds when mounted on a Krab/K9
12 when mounted on a BMP-1
8 when mounted on a 4x4
3 when mounted on a UAV that can be carried in the back of a Hilux

Ground launch is more than 10 km
Air launch is more than 30 km plus the range of the UAV

So. Do you need Javelin on each LAV in a platoon or could you keep Javelin as a dismount weapon and add a Brimstone platoon to each company and a company to each battalion? Or a battery to each brigade? Or all of the above?

And to complicate the matter further there is the Martlet Lightweight Multi Role Missile which was developed in conjunction with the RN and is mounted on Lynx helicopters and 30mm deck-mount guns but is also compatible with the Starstreak launchers of the RA and is being used in Ukraine as a lower cost ManPAD targeting drones.

Lightweight Multirole Missile (LMM)

LMM is a lightweight, precision strike multirole missile designed to be fired from a variety of tactical platforms on Land, Sea and Air against a wide range of conventional and asymmetric threats.

www.thalesgroup.com

Perhaps a 30mm turret with Martlets focused on countering the air threat but very capable against a range of surface threats might be a better fit for the LAV Infantry Platoon?

 

[McG]

Perhaps a 30mm turret with Martlets focused on countering the air threat but very capable against a range of surface threats might be a better fit for the LAV Infantry Platoon?

Apparently any future weapon upgrade will skip 30 mm as a consideration. The limited improvement over 25 mm not being worth the cost. So we will be looking at 35 mm to 50 mm for the IFV.

 

[Kirkhill]

Apparently any future weapon upgrade will skip 30 mm as a consideration. The limited improvement over 25 mm not being worth the cost. So we will be looking at 35 mm to 50 mm for the IFV.

So a Millenium revolver with AHEAD shell and Armour Piercing shot?