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LAV 6.0
- Thread starter Mountie
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Give all the TAPV's to Ukraine.
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Frankly I don’t think IBCT’s make any sense unless they are a specific task; airborne, air assault, Light/Mountain/Arctic etc.
Putting a Light Tank in an IBCT just means it’s got way more mobility, and your Inf in ISV etc won’t keep up.
I’m not a fan.
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Maybe we should donate them to Russia for Ukraine
MJP
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I suspect that would be super challenging given that the TAPV uses a in-service support model where the CAF does not own any spare parts.
We would likely have to pay out the remainder of the ISS contract plus buy parts before sending
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So do that and get rid of the problem.
P.S. No nothing about the vehicle other than what I have read. Local unit has them.
P.S. No nothing about the vehicle other than what I have read. Local unit has them.
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Kirkhill's version of the US ORBAT - and yes he knows Divisions are the new old thing.
The US Army and Marine Corps combined fields 40 infantry brigades (46 if the Strykers are considered as motorized infantry brigades) versus 14 armoured brigades. Roughly 3 infantry brigades for every armoured brigade.
20 | IBCT - Reg | |
20 | IBCT - Res | |
4 | SBCT - Reg | |
2 | SBCT - Res | |
10 | ABCT - Reg | |
4 | ABCT - Res | |
35 | Cannon Bn - Reg | |
37 | Cannon Bn - Res | |
14 | Rocket Bn - Reg | |
12 | Rocket Bn - Res | |
87 | Aegis Ships | |
3 | THAAD Bn - Reg | |
16 | Patriot Bn - Reg | |
9 | SHORAD Bn- Reg | |
7 | SHORAD Bn - Res | |
1 | MLR | |
Since 1916 the Infantry have had a requirement for a large gun to remove obstacles in double quick time. The only way to drag a suitable gun into the environment was to put a motor on it and mount it on tracks. Armour protection is nice to have but it must be noted that the infantry being supported don't have armour. They have shovels.
The US Army has gone out of its way to declare that they are not fielding a light tank, a wheeled tank or any other kind of tank to support their infantry. They are fielding a Mobile, Protected, Firepower System to supply limited support to the infantry. Just like they fielded a Mobile Gun System to supply limited support to the Stryker infantry.
The Armoured Brigades are too valuable in their shock role, and too few, to be wasted in support of the infantry.
The intellectual forebears of the MPFS and the MGS were the 4 MPH Brit Mk IV male with its MGs and 6 pdrs crawling along with the infantry and the German StuG. The MkIVs were manned by the Machine Gun Corps - they were mobile pill boxes. The StuGs were manned by the artillery. They were mobile, armoured field guns assigned to support the infantry and separate from the Panzer Korps.
If the US want's to be logically consistent then they would assign the MPFS and the MGS to the Divisional Arty Group along with the Cannons, Rockets, LRATGMs and Air Defence.
PS - Re Air Defence - given that Air Defence includes Theater assets like THAAD I say fit to aid the AEGIS fleet to the mix. I also added the Marine Littoral Regiment because although it has a Coastal Rocket Battery and an Infantry Battalions it also has an Air Defence Battalion.
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MJP
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I didn't say that. I only said we don't own the spares. The spares still exist as second and third line for both domestic and expeditionary use. Pretty sure there's some deployed in Latvia right now.
The CAF does 1st & 2nd line work and the OEM does 3rd/4th line. Nothing stops us from using the vehicle in an expeditionary role.
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@Kirkhill you can’t really lay it out like the sheet above.
From our Friend Doctrine
https://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/ARN31505-FM_3-96-000-WEB-1.pdf
The IBCT is an expeditionary, combined arms formation optimized for dismounted operations in complex terrain—a geographical area consisting of an urban center larger than a village and/or of two or more types of restrictive terrain or environmental conditions occupying the same space (ATP 3-34.80). The IBCT can conduct entry operations by ground, airland, air assault, or amphibious assault into austere areas of operations with little or no advanced notice. Airborne IBCTs can conduct vertical envelopment by parachute assault. The IBCT’s dismounted capability in complex terrain separates it from other functional brigades and maneuver BCTs.
Mission variables, categories of specific information needed to conduct operations, help to determine the task organization and required augmentation for the IBCT. For example, if additional tactical mobility— the ability of friendly forces to move and maneuver freely on the battlefield relative to the enemy (ADP 3-90)—is required, the higher tactical headquarters can temporarily augment the IBCT with aviation assets to conduct air movements or air assault operations (see FM 3-99). Augmentation can include wheeled assets such as the mine-resistant ambush protected family of vehicles (see ATP 3-21.10).
The role of the IBCT is to close with the enemy by means of fire and movement to destroy or capture enemy forces, or to repel enemy attacks by fire, close combat, and counterattack to control land areas, including populations and resources. Fire and movement is the concept of applying fires from all sources to suppress, neutralize, or destroy the enemy, and the tactical movement of combat forces in relation to the enemy (as components of maneuver applicable at all echelons). At the squad level, fire and movement entails a team placing suppressive fire on the enemy as another team moves against or around the enemy.
1-4. The IBCT performs complementary missions to SBCTs and ABCTs. The IBCT optimizes for the offense against conventional, hybrid, and irregular threats in severely restrictive terrain. The IBCT performs missions such as reducing fortified areas, infiltrating and seizing objectives in the enemy’s rear, eliminating enemy force remnants in restricted terrain, and securing key facilities and activities. The IBCT conducts stability operations tasks in the wake of maneuvering forces.
1-5. IBCTs configure for area defense and as the fixing force component of a mobile defense. The IBCT’s lack of heavy combat vehicles reduces its logistic requirements. Not having heavy combat vehicles gives higher commanders greater flexibility when adapting various transportation modes to move or maneuver the IBCT. Airborne IBCTs conduct airborne assault-specific missions. All IBCTs can conduct air assault operations. (See FM 3-99 for information on airborne and air assault operations.)
From our Friend Doctrine
https://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/ARN31505-FM_3-96-000-WEB-1.pdfThe IBCT is an expeditionary, combined arms formation optimized for dismounted operations in complex terrain—a geographical area consisting of an urban center larger than a village and/or of two or more types of restrictive terrain or environmental conditions occupying the same space (ATP 3-34.80). The IBCT can conduct entry operations by ground, airland, air assault, or amphibious assault into austere areas of operations with little or no advanced notice. Airborne IBCTs can conduct vertical envelopment by parachute assault. The IBCT’s dismounted capability in complex terrain separates it from other functional brigades and maneuver BCTs.
Mission variables, categories of specific information needed to conduct operations, help to determine the task organization and required augmentation for the IBCT. For example, if additional tactical mobility— the ability of friendly forces to move and maneuver freely on the battlefield relative to the enemy (ADP 3-90)—is required, the higher tactical headquarters can temporarily augment the IBCT with aviation assets to conduct air movements or air assault operations (see FM 3-99). Augmentation can include wheeled assets such as the mine-resistant ambush protected family of vehicles (see ATP 3-21.10).
The role of the IBCT is to close with the enemy by means of fire and movement to destroy or capture enemy forces, or to repel enemy attacks by fire, close combat, and counterattack to control land areas, including populations and resources. Fire and movement is the concept of applying fires from all sources to suppress, neutralize, or destroy the enemy, and the tactical movement of combat forces in relation to the enemy (as components of maneuver applicable at all echelons). At the squad level, fire and movement entails a team placing suppressive fire on the enemy as another team moves against or around the enemy.
1-4. The IBCT performs complementary missions to SBCTs and ABCTs. The IBCT optimizes for the offense against conventional, hybrid, and irregular threats in severely restrictive terrain. The IBCT performs missions such as reducing fortified areas, infiltrating and seizing objectives in the enemy’s rear, eliminating enemy force remnants in restricted terrain, and securing key facilities and activities. The IBCT conducts stability operations tasks in the wake of maneuvering forces.
1-5. IBCTs configure for area defense and as the fixing force component of a mobile defense. The IBCT’s lack of heavy combat vehicles reduces its logistic requirements. Not having heavy combat vehicles gives higher commanders greater flexibility when adapting various transportation modes to move or maneuver the IBCT. Airborne IBCTs conduct airborne assault-specific missions. All IBCTs can conduct air assault operations. (See FM 3-99 for information on airborne and air assault operations.)
FJAG
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That's interesting as the typical equipping for a "tank" battalion is 44 with 14 per company and two in the battalion headquarters. When that went to combined arms battalion the company stayed the same but the battalion headquarters went down to just one tank.
With a set of 42 that undoubtedly means three companies of 14 each with none assigned to battalion headquarters and therefore probably means that they will be distributed without an intent to ever "mass" two or more MPFV companies.
Interesting as well is this CRS paper discussing deploying 14 MPFVs per IBCT-basically a single company. At 14 per IBCT and with a total of 504 hulls, the Army could equip up to 36 IBCTs. The Army has 14 Active IBCTs and 20 ARNG IBCTs which roughly jives. If the plan is to put a full 44-MPFV-battalion in each IBCT then it could only equip 10-11 (all subject to how many are retained for training and spares)
If one takes a look at the new divisional structures under the Force 2030 construct then the MPFVs are not allocated to the IBCTs at all but are aggregated in a single battalion at the divisional level (from where I expect they will be allocated out at roughly one company per IBCT. That's much more in line with infantry dismounted doctrine.
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Depends on the CAB - Armor Heavy BN retain the 2, the Bradley Heavy have none, although not sure if that is just in practice or theory as well.
The 4-6-8 Bradley Platoon juggle has made some wet ink on 2030 a little runny.
I've been hearing about pushing them to the SFA Brigades in Div's, as complete Bn's potentially to be Penny Packed as needed?
I'm not sure any ink is dry anywhere with them, from the SFAB to Stryker formations - there are several options.
I would argue they shouldn't be part of a Dismount Brigade structure, given the dispersion of Stryker Bde's to both Light and Armor/Mech Divisions, I would put them with the Stryker's as the support requirement is already much larger than a Foot/Light Wheeled entity.If one takes a look at the new divisional structures under the Force 2030 construct then the MPFVs are not allocated to the IBCTs at all but are aggregated in a single battalion at the divisional level (from where I expect they will be allocated out at roughly one company per IBCT. That's much more in line with infantry dismounted doctrine.
Honestly all it is in a Tracked MGS - and our Dismounted Doctrine for ICBT's doesn't cater to an MGS.
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Congressional Research Service
14 MPFs per IBCT
504 MPFs in total = 36 MPF Companies in total or one for each of 36 IBCTs.
That marries up with the MGS fielding rate
3 MGS per coy
9 MGS per bn
27 MGS per SBCT
3 BCTs = 1 Division
36 IBCTs = 12 Infantry Divisions (Lt, Mtn, Abn, Air Aslt)
Each division will be allocated one single 3 company MPF Battalion - centralized for training and maintenance but, like the MGS, to be fielded in penny packets to supply DFS to light forces.
The role of the MGS was
The role of the MPF is
Both the MGS and the MPF have anti-armour roles but those are not their primary roles.
In my view they are not tanks. They are Direct Fire Self Propelled Guns designed for infantry support - just like the WW2 StuG and the pre WW1 Field Gun.
The allocation or one Battalion per Division also conforms to the USMC allocation prior to the decision of the USMC to divest itself of tanks completely.
With what Canada has available we could create two Infantry Divsions, one regular and one reserve, each with a DFS regiment equipped with Leos. We could thicken up the Leos with AMOS or NEMO 120mm LAVs and then invest heavily in 7 cannon regiments, 3 rocket regiments, 2 Patriot/THAAD regiments and 2 SHORAD regiments.
That would bring us into rough conformity with the US at our notional 10:1 ratio.
We might even be able to find 1 ABCT to add to the mix.
14 MPFs per IBCT
504 MPFs in total = 36 MPF Companies in total or one for each of 36 IBCTs.
That marries up with the MGS fielding rate
3 MGS per coy
9 MGS per bn
27 MGS per SBCT
3 BCTs = 1 Division
36 IBCTs = 12 Infantry Divisions (Lt, Mtn, Abn, Air Aslt)
Each division will be allocated one single 3 company MPF Battalion - centralized for training and maintenance but, like the MGS, to be fielded in penny packets to supply DFS to light forces.
The role of the MGS was
The role of the MPF is
Both the MGS and the MPF have anti-armour roles but those are not their primary roles.
In my view they are not tanks. They are Direct Fire Self Propelled Guns designed for infantry support - just like the WW2 StuG and the pre WW1 Field Gun.
The allocation or one Battalion per Division also conforms to the USMC allocation prior to the decision of the USMC to divest itself of tanks completely.
With what Canada has available we could create two Infantry Divsions, one regular and one reserve, each with a DFS regiment equipped with Leos. We could thicken up the Leos with AMOS or NEMO 120mm LAVs and then invest heavily in 7 cannon regiments, 3 rocket regiments, 2 Patriot/THAAD regiments and 2 SHORAD regiments.
That would bring us into rough conformity with the US at our notional 10:1 ratio.
We might even be able to find 1 ABCT to add to the mix.
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Again my point of the doctrinal roll of the ICBT involves terrain that doesn’t mesh with the MPFV.
You don’t intentionally put Leg infantry in those positions - you use Stryker or Armor/Mech units.
The Mountain, Airborne or Air Assault missions don’t leave a lot of room for it - and the goal of dismounted forces is complex terrain.
FJAG
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I'm going of the latest (2021) CBO force structure primer. It puts 1 tank per CAB regardless if tank or Bradley heavy.
So far my only real line diagram of the new Waypoint div structures comes from Battle Order here. Each of the Cavalry Squadron and the MPFV battalion is marked as an individual div asset. I can see that the Cav Sqn gets used as a div asset (although a troop per IBCT is possible) but the MPFV will most probably be distributed. That said, their respective CSS looks problematic to me. I don't doubt that there may be some nesting them elsewhere to solve that as they work things out.
I'm not sure what role SFABs have in a div structure. They strike me as outside the divisions in both peace and war operations.
The only role for SBCTs that I've seen so far is as the third BCT in the Standard heavy Div. I first questioned that but it actually makes a bit of sense to have a mechanized infantry BCT working behind two ABCTs.
In a lot of ways the MGS never really made sense from when it was in a platoon in each Stryker company to its role now as a direct fire support vehicle in the SBCTs Cav Sqn. It had a purpose that didn't pan out and then went looking for a job to do. Glad Hillier didn't get his way on those. Not necessarily a bad concept but not the right vehicle.
I'm actually a supporter of sturmgeschutze with infantry in addition to a proper suite of anti-armour weaponry (mostly for their anti personnel and anti materiel cheap rounds capability).
FJAG
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The MGS were pulled out of the battalions. They've been reduced in number to 12 MGS in the sole weapons company of the SBCT Cavalry Sqn.
The positioning of the MGS v the MPFV dictate that they have different tactical purposes even though both provide the same direct fire capability.
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I’ll be honest I have never seen a MGS doing anything other than parked in a storage lot.The MGS were pulled out of the battalions. They've been reduced in number to 12 MGS in the sole weapons company of the SBCT Cavalry Sqn.
The positioning of the MGS v the MPFV dictate that they have different tactical purposes even though both provide the same direct fire capability.
They haven’t fixed a number of the issues with them.
I’m not sure there is a will to try anymore, I could be wrong though, as I don’t really follow the Stryker side of the house.
That said, on the last Div roadmap I saw there were some Stryker Brigades getting added to 3rd Inf Div in VXIII Airborne Corps, and 1st and 2nd ABCT being moved out - but not sure that ever went anywhere.
If one looks to support a forcible airborne entry, landing a Stryker formation does provide more protected mobility for either the airhead or to push out forward.
But beyond that I don’t see much of a role in a Light entity, much as I don’t see the MPFV doing much either.
Inside the Div, the SFAB’s I suspect will be used for rear area security, MSR security and convoy protection for the Support Bde.
I think their utility in larger war fighting has been questioned and a role fitted so that can be retained for Peace Support/COIN missions in the future.
daftandbarmy
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It's also a pretty uniquely North American approach to assume that you will be the only 'game in town' when the balloon goes up, so you need to be fully self-contained, which can be extraordinarily wasteful and isolationist while ignoring all the benefits that a strong foreign policy/ diplomatic arm can accrue to any intervention force.
Some European forces, for example, plan on having 'host nation' support when they get on the ground wherever they're going, in some way, whether that be through wepons, armour, logisitcs vehicles and other similar support. This can be a huge load off of the military side of the force.
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