Informing the Army’s Future Structure

[Brad Sallows]

I suggest that the Carl G's then become high value targets

We're down in the weeds again. Yes, we can reduce things to absurdity. But for that specific example it's harder to kill 54 section-level weapons than a 6-gun cannon company (assume a triangular formation), and I see advantages in decentralizing some kind of direct fire capability (HE, anti-armour, markers, etc). For similar reasons, I'd favour keeping dismounted machine guns in the platoons if someone suggested consolidating them all as vehicle-mounted (but dismountable) weapons. NLOS dismountable ATGW sounds attractive, though.

 

[Weinie]

Doctrine addresses the “what” and the “why.” The “how” and the “who” can be addressed in a multitude of ways.

 

[Kirkhill]

We're down in the weeds again. Yes, we can reduce things to absurdity. But for that specific example it's harder to kill 54 section-level weapons than a 6-gun cannon company (assume a triangular formation), and I see advantages in decentralizing some kind of direct fire capability (HE, anti-armour, markers, etc). For similar reasons, I'd favour keeping dismounted machine guns in the platoons if someone suggested consolidating them all as vehicle-mounted (but dismountable) weapons. NLOS dismountable ATGW sounds attractive, though.

You're not the first person to legitimately make that observation. I do tend to go granular at times.

And yes, I agree entirely with the value of dismountable weapons and weapons carriers vice special purpose mounted weapons.

 

[Fabius]

If the CA can’t generate forces that can be employed without a complete adhoc reorganization of the individual manpower of its units and formations then we can’t realistically have units and formations on readiness timelines of 5-30 days.
Furthermore our high readiness training is then not actual high readiness training if none of the units or formations will fight in their training configurations nor with the personnel that went through the training in their specific positions.

 

[FJAG]

Doctrine addresses the “what” and the “why.” The “how” and the “who” can be addressed in a multitude of ways.

I've always prescribed to the position that a complete doctrine has cognitive, procedural, organizational, material and moral components.

See here at page 20.

 

[Weinie]

I've always prescribed to the position that a complete doctrine has cognitive, procedural, organizational, material and moral components.

See here at page 20.

That is your position. I would describe that as incorrect.

 

[Infanteer]

Doctrine is merely that which is taught. However you doctrinistas want to describe it, I need to flip open the manual to see what the accepted baseline organization is for "X." If "X" is a company, I need doctrine to say "this is a company" so that the Army Commander, the Brigade Commander, and the Platoon Company all understand the same thing when the term "company" is used.

Someone posted the SBCT doctrine pub image a bit earlier, which is a good example.

 

[FJAG]

That is your position. I would describe that as incorrect.

To be fair and giving credit where it is due, it was Ian Hope's position. I subscribe to it.

 

[Weinie]

To be fair and giving credit where it is due, it was Ian Hope's position. I subscribe to it.

Operational Doctrines are just fat and verbose PAM's from which TTP's (how and who) are derived. I know Ian, and he is brilliant in many ways, but Joint Doctrine is a level above what he ascribes to.

My .02.

 

[Weinie]

Doctrine is merely that which is taught. However you doctrinistas want to describe it, I need to flip open the manual to see what the accepted baseline organization is for "X." If "X" is a company, I need doctrine to say "this is a company" so that the Army Commander, the Brigade Commander, and the Platoon Company all understand the same thing when the term "company" is used.

Someone posted the SBCT doctrine pub image a bit earlier, which is a good example.

Doctrine is a form of catechism. But at the Joint/Keystone level, it should not describe what a Coy looks like.

 

[FJAG]

Operational Doctrines are just fat and verbose PAM's from which TTP's (how and who) are derived. I know Ian, and he is brilliant in many ways, but Joint Doctrine is a level above what he ascribes to.

My .02.

PAMs can be as thick or as fat as the writer makes it. Our current trend seems to be teaching people how to suck eggs and I agree that they are verbose.

His though and mine is that doctrine unifies and is the foundation for everything. When you know how you want to fight then you can form your organization; Once you know how to fight and how to organize then you know what equipment you need and can acquire the type and quantity needed; Once you know how you want to fight and the organization and the equipment then you know how to train on it; and so on. As conditions change you reset and adjust.

The Army's problem right now, as I see it, seems to be that the way we fight is because independently arranged equipment, organization and training schemes flounder around and converge in the middle. The Army is more a product of serendipity than coherent and comprehensive planning.

Doctrine is a form of catechism. But at the Joint/Keystone level, it should not describe what a Coy looks like.

Doctrine is overarching and should certainly dictate what the company should look like. Obviously not at the Joint/Keystone level but doctrine isn't limited to only one level. And similarly there can be differing doctrines that dictate how a company looks. A heavy combined arms company should obviously look and operate very differently from how an airborne company looks and operates.

 

[Infanteer]

Doctrine is a form of catechism. But at the Joint/Keystone level, it should not describe what a Coy looks like.

Sure, but this is a thread on tactical organizations. You're the only one talking about joint keystone doctrine.

 

[Weinie]

Sure, but this is a thread on tactical organizations. You're the only one talking about joint keystone doctrine.

Ok, then keep it at the tactical, and don't introduce doctrine into the mix.

 

[Kirkhill]

So. 5th Brigade. Black Watch, Calg Highrs, Maisonneuves.

Verrieres Ridge, The Scheldt, Hoogerheide, Bergen Op Zoom, Walcheren.

Companies reduced and reorg'd. Sergeants as OCs. Lts as COs. Replacements with no infantry training.

Where is the instruction that teaches soldiers how to manage that constant flux? How to create a fighting force out of the tools at hand?

Is it so much different when the bullets are flying? Shouldn't it be easier when it is just civil servants deciding how many troops you have on parade and what weapons are available?

 

[markppcli]

Doctrine is merely that which is taught. However you doctrinistas want to describe it, I need to flip open the manual to see what the accepted baseline organization is for "X." If "X" is a company, I need doctrine to say "this is a company" so that the Army Commander, the Brigade Commander, and the Platoon Company all understand the same thing when the term "company" is used.

Someone posted the SBCT doctrine pub image a bit earlier, which is a good example.

I couldn’t agree more, we used to be able to teach the organization of an Infatry Bn out of the Platoon in Battle, try doing that now. No one in the bloody thing has ever seen 4 companies let alone the anti tank company. It’s absurd. And I agree with you that this works up, what a Bn is should be codified so that the CDS can be show an document that clearly lays it out.

 

[markppcli]

Infanteer, where is this hubristic dismissal of history and doctrine coming from? Are you so dead set on making the F2025 COA work that you will throw away common sense? I know it's fun to bash doctrine writers, but do you honestly believe that we get to just make up whatever structure we want and throw it in a book? Do you believe that those who write doctrine aren't aware of history? I have an MA in War Studies and have written a bit about infantry doctrine and organization - how much more do I need to know before I am qualified to write? Besides, I am given no free hand whatsoever in what I write but am bound by the wishes of the CA leadership, history, future concepts, NATO doctrine, and a dash of common dog.

You reveal a misunderstanding of how doctrine is written when you say: "our organizations should be built off operational analysis and experimentation". Great idea! In fact, ADC and CALWC are going to go back in time 30 years and retroactively apply your insightful suggestion. But all ribbing aside, exercises and experimentation have been run almost continuously by CALWC, ADC, ALLC, CORA, AEC (and their previous iterations). What is more, we participate in allied experimentation and keep up to speed with developments in allied doctrine. Should a battalion have four companies? Yes. Any 2Lt with a rudimentary understanding of math can reach that conclusion. But does a battalion have to have four coys (as we did when I was a subbie)? Of course not. But should our doctrine change every time some some fad or resource pressure comes along? No, that would be as dumb as dismissing the long history of military and academic thought that got us to our current structures. So, our four-company-plus-combat-support model is based off of 70+ years of learning, study, and common sense. What's the two-company battalion model in F2025 based off?

You mention the US Army's structure in WWII - good point. In October 1940 the US Infantry restructured their battalions from four to three rifle companies. This wasn't because 'three is gooder than four', but because they consciously re-invested in heavy support weapons. The weapons company in a WW2 US infantry battalion, and the weapons companies at the Regimental level made ours look puny. Machineguns, anti-tank guns, mortars, howitzers (later self-propelled howitzers - manned by infantry!) galore; it more than offset the lack of manoeuvre companies in US Army eyes. That worked for them, based on their tactics. US battalions almost never operated without substantial reinforcement of regimental, divisional, and non-divisional combat support elements. Saying "three companies worked for the US Army" doesn't really matter for us as the context is different.

I hope you can see the irony of saying "...the dreamed up organization is toilet paper and will be ignored by those who have to apply it." while discussing the infantry battalion structures in F2025.

I suppose the question comes down to what is the purpose of publishing doctrine that describes organizations that do not exist in reality? I understand they should, but they don’t, and I’d be curious to know that last time any Bn had 4 companies and an anti tank company. Surely this has to effect the way we plan and think somewhere down the line.

 

[Good2Golf]

What’s the latest effective date on “The Battle Group in Operations?”

Is it even a current document?

 

[Infanteer]

I suppose the question comes down to what is the purpose of publishing doctrine that describes organizations that do not exist in reality? I understand they should, but they don’t, and I’d be curious to know that last time any Bn had 4 companies and an anti tank company. Surely this has to effect the way we plan and think somewhere down the line.

One source I've found is that they were chopped in 1969 when the European commitment was rolled back (Kasurak, Canada's Mechanized Infantry and I think Maloney's War Without Battles as well). There was a brief return in the late 1990s as 4 CMBG and the Airborne Regiment were collapsed, but FRP quickly took those away.

I've never found a source that suggests Anti-Armour Companies were a thing outside of the publication. For a while, 3 R22eR was an Anti-Armour Battalion in 4 CMBG, but that was done away with as well.

What’s the latest effective date on “The Battle Group in Operations?”

Is it even a current document?

2011, which makes it fresh paint in our doctrine library. But this does not speak to unit organization, only to tactical groupings.

 

[markppcli]

One source I've found is that they were chopped in 1969 when the European commitment was rolled back (Kasurak, Canada's Mechanized Infantry and I think Maloney's War Without Battles as well). There was a brief return in the late 1990s as 4 CMBG and the Airborne Regiment were collapsed, but FRP quickly took those away.

I've never found a source that suggests Anti-Armour Companies were a thing outside of the publication. For a while, 3 R22eR was an Anti-Armour Battalion in 4 CMBG, but that was done away with as well.



2011, which makes it fresh paint in our doctrine library. But this does not speak to unit organization, only to tactical groupings.

Thank you I very much appreciate that.

 

[Kirkhill]

My recollection is that we were still being instructed on 4 company battalions in 309(3) at Gagetown in 1982.

Also the Anti-Tank Platoon could have anything from 4 to 12 TOW. At 12 I have some vague recollection of it being able to act as a Coy but it was still part of the Combat Support Coy along with the 8 mors, the Pioneers, the 7 to 14 Lynxes in the Recce Pl and a number of Obs Dets with radars and NOD-LRs.

Maybe some of the other old geezers have got better recall. But, I know for sure, we were still talking about 4 Rifle Companies in 1983, 5-132 sticks in my mind as an organization. 10 man sections - although usually 9. Rifle Group and Gun Group (2x FNC2) 4 Wpns Dets to the Coy (1/coy and 1/pl) - 60mm, CG-84 and Browning 7.62. 1 Obs Det per coy.