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Informing the Army’s Future Structure

My recollection is that we were still being instructed on 4 company battalions in 309(3) at Gagetown in 1982.
What was being instructed at a school is beside the point, and the extant publication still has 4x companies. These weren't actual organizations from the late 60s on, as the sources I provided above indicated.
 
What was being instructed at a school is beside the point, and the extant publication still has 4x companies. These weren't actual organizations from the late 60s on, as the sources I provided above indicated.
So tell me again about doctrine/dogma if even your schools can't adhere to it.

Fugg me gently.
 
I couldn’t agree more, we used to be able to teach the organization of an Infatry Bn out of the Platoon in Battle, try doing that now. No one in the bloody thing has ever seen 4 companies let alone the anti tank company. It’s absurd. And I agree with you that this works up, what a Bn is should be codified so that the CDS can be show an document that clearly lays it out.
1 VP had 4 Coy and Cbt Spt Coy in the mid 90's - as did some of the other 1-2 BN's - but simply because removal of the MG Platoons from Cbt Spt Coy, 4 CMBG close out, zero manning the 3rd BN's and the CAR disbandment, as soon as the 3rd Bn's where reactivated - the 4th Coy went away - and much thinner Coy's occurred.

I have never seen an Anti-Armor Coy - was always ADP (Armor Defence Platoon), or just called TOW Platoon.



I'd like to point out that the CAR had a better ATGM arrangement in 1990 with the TOW on the Iltis than anyone outside of CANSOF does currently in the CA.
 
I'd like to point out that the CAR had a better ATGM arrangement in 1990 with the TOW on the Iltis than anyone outside of CANSOF does currently in the CA.

Another pet solution to Canada's Militia Conundrums has been to use the CAR Cdo model as the basis for a Militia Unit.

1 It reduces the Rank structure by putting a major in charge.
2 It reduces the recruiting requirement by dropping the numbers from the 600-1000 range to the 200-250 range
3 It combines rifles with mobile combat support (81s, ATGMs, HMG/GMG)
4 The combat support can be brigaded, as can the rifles, either together or separately
5 The unit can be self-contained and employable as a single entity
6 The unit can hive off formed elements to support regular force taskings.
7 You would end up with 48-51 Company Cbt Tms (Theoretical)

I believe that creating a small, local, functional, light organization would improve recruiting and thus improve you chances of finding 51 deployable platoons from your 51 coys, or even just 51 sections.


Canada suffers from Geography. This puts a lot of trades and trainers into small, widely dispersed packets that are broadly accessible.
Let the MCpls train their teams and sections. With the rudiments then the Militia troops tasked to the regs for deployments and exercises can the be brought up to standards.
 
1 VP had 4 Coy and Cbt Spt Coy in the mid 90's - as did some of the other 1-2 BN's - but simply because removal of the MG Platoons from Cbt Spt Coy, 4 CMBG close out, zero manning the 3rd BN's and the CAR disbandment, as soon as the 3rd Bn's where reactivated - the 4th Coy went away - and much thinner Coy's occurred.

I have never seen an Anti-Armor Coy - was always ADP (Armor Defence Platoon), or just called TOW Platoon.



I'd like to point out that the CAR had a better ATGM arrangement in 1990 with the TOW on the Iltis than anyone outside of CANSOF does currently in the CA.
RIP my briefing note about divested G Wagons and tow systems.
 
Another pet solution to Canada's Militia Conundrums has been to use the CAR Cdo model as the basis for a Militia Unit.

1 It reduces the Rank structure by putting a major in charge.
2 It reduces the recruiting requirement by dropping the numbers from the 600-1000 range to the 200-250 range
3 It combines rifles with mobile combat support (81s, ATGMs, HMG/GMG)
4 The combat support can be brigaded, as can the rifles, either together or separately
5 The unit can be self-contained and employable as a single entity
6 The unit can hive off formed elements to support regular force taskings.
7 You would end up with 48-51 Company Cbt Tms (Theoretical)

I believe that creating a small, local, functional, light organization would improve recruiting and thus improve you chances of finding 51 deployable platoons from your 51 coys, or even just 51 sections.


Canada suffers from Geography. This puts a lot of trades and trainers into small, widely dispersed packets that are broadly accessible.
Let the MCpls train their teams and sections. With the rudiments then the Militia troops tasked to the regs for deployments and exercises can the be brought up to standards.
The Army Reserve has enough problems without being shoehorned into yet another purposeless and unstructured model.

First of all, the CAR's establishment varied with the season. It was constantly rejigged and, more often than not, for no reason that had its genesis in an actual attempt to improve its organizational efficiency. Usually the reorgs were based on issued relating back to its three parent regiments, CAF manpower issues and a changing CAF mission focus.

Secondly the CAR's organizational structure offers zero advantage over a light infantry battalion once you strip away the airborne aspect. In many ways its not as robust. As far as the Cdo itself is concerned it was nothing but, more or less (depending on time and place), than a light rifle company.

There is no advantage to having self-contained sub-units (with engr, arty, armour etc grafted in). It reduces flexibility while putting an excessive burden on the sub-unit in developing the technical expertise of these specialists. A commando is no more self sufficient or able to operate independently than a light rifle company. It needed the CS and CSS that the CAR and higher formations provided.

There is nothing that the suggested model could do that couldn't be done by fully manned brigades whose battalions and regiments have company sized sub-units distributed in small armories around the region.

On the other hand there is one thing such distributed brigades can do which your 51 commandos can't do - come together as fully functioning battalions or brigades if and when necessary.

🍻
 
Another pet solution to Canada's Militia Conundrums has been to use the CAR Cdo model as the basis for a Militia Unit.

1 It reduces the Rank structure by putting a major in charge.
2 It reduces the recruiting requirement by dropping the numbers from the 600-1000 range to the 200-250 range
3 It combines rifles with mobile combat support (81s, ATGMs, HMG/GMG)
4 The combat support can be brigaded, as can the rifles, either together or separately
5 The unit can be self-contained and employable as a single entity
6 The unit can hive off formed elements to support regular force taskings.
7 You would end up with 48-51 Company Cbt Tms (Theoretical)

It didn't -- the original organization of 2 Cdo's had Light Col's commanding them and where significantly larger than a Coy sized entity -- later with the regimental change to go to a 3 Cdo system, it was much more akin to a conventional infantry unit - as it removed the support part of the Commando and they really where no longer a self contained entity (major fail IMHO - as Paratroops need to have that organic support).


I believe that creating a small, local, functional, light
Pick 2 of those ;)

organization would improve recruiting and thus improve you chances of finding 51 deployable platoons from your 51 coys, or even just 51 sections.


Canada suffers from Geography. This puts a lot of trades and trainers into small, widely dispersed packets that are broadly accessible.
Let the MCpls train their teams and sections. With the rudiments then the Militia troops tasked to the regs for deployments and exercises can the be brought up to standards.
I think the CA needs significant rationalization - making smart choices in units based on location/geography for the reserves is one.
But they need to be effective - and a Commandoesque entity that can parade 22 troops isn't going to do anything effectively.
 
The battalion anti-tank platoon evolution is interesting. I've always thought of it as necessary and sufficient to prevent the battalion from being embarrassed (dislodged) by a few tanks (coy gp or less). A 12-piece platoon strikes me as a company. A guess: the larger number of pieces was a response to the Cold War expectation of one day facing hordes of T-whatevers and being expected to defend against a TR or MRR.

If the infantry companies have enough AT capability to look after themselves against a few tanks, you don't need the platoon. If you're facing down a force built around a tank battalion or more, you'd want backup from a div AT bn (or bde AT bty) if the coy weapons aren't enough.
 
The battalion anti-tank platoon evolution is interesting. I've always thought of it as necessary and sufficient to prevent the battalion from being embarrassed (dislodged) by a few tanks (coy gp or less). A 12-piece platoon strikes me as a company. A guess: the larger number of pieces was a response to the Cold War expectation of one day facing hordes of T-whatevers and being expected to defend against a TR or MRR.

If the infantry companies have enough AT capability to look after themselves against a few tanks, you don't need the platoon. If you're facing down a force built around a tank battalion or more, you'd want backup from a div AT bn (or bde AT bty) if the coy weapons aren't enough.

Just going from memory here but, in dismounted inf Bn I've been part of in the past, each pl/ tp had 1 x 84mm.

The Bn had a MILAN platoon, equipped with 16 x firing posts. Yes, this was a big pl/tp.

On deployment, each rifle company usually had a 4 post det attached, and there was one in reserve/ one extra allocated to the main axis. The CO could, and often did, reallocate as required based on factors like the enemy and ground.

That gave pretty good Anti-tank coverage out to 1850m, as I recall, and the MIRA TI sight was invaluable for surveillance well beyond that range.

Whenever possible, dets from the MMG Platoon were co-located with the MILAN dets. The MMG Pl had 9 x GPMG SF teams, which were usually allocated on a basis of 2 per Coy, with 3 in reserve/ on the main axis etc. Their main task was to chop up the crews bailing out of busted tanks, separating the dismounted infantry from the tanks etc. This augmented the 4 x GPMGs each platoon fielded, of course.
 
The battalion anti-tank platoon evolution is interesting. I've always thought of it as necessary and sufficient to prevent the battalion from being embarrassed (dislodged) by a few tanks (coy gp or less). A 12-piece platoon strikes me as a company. A guess: the larger number of pieces was a response to the Cold War expectation of one day facing hordes of T-whatevers and being expected to defend against a TR or MRR.

If the infantry companies have enough AT capability to look after themselves against a few tanks, you don't need the platoon. If you're facing down a force built around a tank battalion or more, you'd want backup from a div AT bn (or bde AT bty) if the coy weapons aren't enough.
While we held additional anti-tank regiments at the divisional level in WW2, I'm not aware of any modern army holding any ground based anti-armour resources above the brigade level.

As an example, the current SBCT considers the MGSs which have all been moved into one company in the cavalry squadron as an anti-tank company. The IBCT's heavier anti-armour weapons are in the weapons companies of the infantry battalions. ABCTs have tanks and lots of TOWs on the Bradleys and then all BCTs have lots of Javelins everywhere.

In a larger sense you can consider the attack helicopters as the division's anti-armour forces.

Things will well change as we go more to AUAVs and anti-armour precision projectiles with long range artillery. Things are in a state of flux - except in Canada where we're in a state of f***ks.

🍻
 
The Army Reserve has enough problems without being shoehorned into yet another purposeless and unstructured model.

First of all, the CAR's establishment varied with the season. It was constantly rejigged and, more often than not, for no reason that had its genesis in an actual attempt to improve its organizational efficiency. Usually the reorgs were based on issued relating back to its three parent regiments, CAF manpower issues and a changing CAF mission focus.

Secondly the CAR's organizational structure offers zero advantage over a light infantry battalion once you strip away the airborne aspect. In many ways its not as robust. As far as the Cdo itself is concerned it was nothing but, more or less (depending on time and place), than a light rifle company.

There is no advantage to having self-contained sub-units (with engr, arty, armour etc grafted in). It reduces flexibility while putting an excessive burden on the sub-unit in developing the technical expertise of these specialists. A commando is no more self sufficient or able to operate independently than a light rifle company. It needed the CS and CSS that the CAR and higher formations provided.

There is nothing that the suggested model could do that couldn't be done by fully manned brigades whose battalions and regiments have company sized sub-units distributed in small armories around the region.

On the other hand there is one thing such distributed brigades can do which your 51 commandos can't do - come together as fully functioning battalions or brigades if and when necessary.

🍻

We will continue to disagree.

I don't see a problem with brigading company combat teams. A Brigade could just as easily be filled with a Regimental Group of Company Combat Teams, an Artillery Regiment, a Cavalry Regiment and a Service Support Group.

Montreal, Toronto and Vancouver (maybe - given the Left Coasts inability to organize much of anything) could possibly support a Brigade Structure.

The rest of us are spread hither and yon. It makes no sense to put all the engineers in one town, all the cavalry in another and no infantry units for hours in either direction.

You lot in the arty have your independent batteries. Why not independent companies?

No matter how many games we play we are never going to raise the nation en masse, reinstitute conscription and send the 1st Canadian Army back into the field. It ain't gonna happen. We need to do the other thing. Whatever that is.
 
While we held additional anti-tank regiments at the divisional level in WW2, I'm not aware of any modern army holding any ground based anti-armour resources above the brigade level.
I believe that the Russians still have a divisional level anti-tank battalion in their motor rifle division structure. As I recall, it’s mostly used to cover obstacles with direct fire. But this structure may have been because the Russians prefer to centralize their attack helicopter force, unlike the US, who push AH-64 Apache down to divisions.
 
We will continue to disagree.

I don't see a problem with brigading company combat teams. A Brigade could just as easily be filled with a Regimental Group of Company Combat Teams, an Artillery Regiment, a Cavalry Regiment and a Service Support Group.

Montreal, Toronto and Vancouver (maybe - given the Left Coasts inability to organize much of anything) could possibly support a Brigade Structure.
In larger areas yes - simply because you have a much larger pool of manpower.

The rest of us are spread hither and yon. It makes no sense to put all the engineers in one town, all the cavalry in another and no infantry units for hours in either direction.
It actual does - because then you actually have a Platoon, as opposed to a gaggle of different trades.
If you have 45 folks - 7 of which are Armoured, 7 of Infantry, 7 Gunners, 7 Engineers, 7 Medics, 7 Comms, 1 Vehicle Tech, and 2 Weapons Tech's - how to they train? Who teaches them, what sort of refresher courses can they do.
Or do they simply go to the mess and drink?

You lot in the arty have your independent batteries. Why not independent companies?

No matter how many games we play we are never going to raise the nation en masse, reinstitute conscription and send the 1st Canadian Army back into the field. It ain't gonna happen. We need to do the other thing. Whatever that is.
Independent entities really don't exist - they eventually fall under something.
I think the first step for 99.99% of the Reserve force is to get a viable Platoon sized organization that can be relied upon. Then expand it as circumstances allow.
Personally, I would stick them all under a Reg Force umbrella - and reroll them as needed and applicable.
 
In larger areas yes - simply because you have a much larger pool of manpower.


It actual does - because then you actually have a Platoon, as opposed to a gaggle of different trades.
If you have 45 folks - 7 of which are Armoured, 7 of Infantry, 7 Gunners, 7 Engineers, 7 Medics, 7 Comms, 1 Vehicle Tech, and 2 Weapons Tech's - how to they train? Who teaches them, what sort of refresher courses can they do.
Or do they simply go to the mess and drink?


Independent entities really don't exist - they eventually fall under something.
I think the first step for 99.99% of the Reserve force is to get a viable Platoon sized organization that can be relied upon. Then expand it as circumstances allow.
Personally, I would stick them all under a Reg Force umbrella - and reroll them as needed and applicable.

Agreed that independent entities eventually fall under something. And that is a good thing.

As to mixed trades?

7 of which are Armoured, 7 of Infantry, 7 Gunners, 7 Engineers, 7 Medics, 7 Comms, 1 Vehicle Tech, and 2 Weapons Tech's - how to they train? Who teaches them, what sort of refresher courses can they do.

7 armoured ? - 7 drivers and VCs - 4 vehicles with GPMGs/GMGs
7 gunners? - 7 mortarmen (7 infanteers with 2 tubes)
7 engineers? - 7 pioneers (7 infanteers that can blow things up real good)
7 medics? - 7 combat aid types (7 infanteers that can patch up people)
7 comms? - 7 signallers (7 infanteers that can communicate (and drive))
1 Vehicle tech? - excellent - somebody to keep the running gear running
2 Weapons techs? - ideal -
7 infantry - well, its a start. useful scouts if nothing else.

And if that lot can't train themselves with on line resources, a couple of officers and some RSS, and keep themselves busy then I don't know what would engage them.

All of the members have a foot on the rung to their next corps transfer.

And by the way, my expectation is of 200 to 250 on the rolls for each local sub-unit.
 
Agreed that independent entities eventually fall under something. And that is a good thing.

As to mixed trades?

7 of which are Armoured, 7 of Infantry, 7 Gunners, 7 Engineers, 7 Medics, 7 Comms, 1 Vehicle Tech, and 2 Weapons Tech's - how to they train? Who teaches them, what sort of refresher courses can they do.

7 armoured ? - 7 drivers and VCs - 4 vehicles with GPMGs/GMGs
7 gunners? - 7 mortarmen (7 infanteers with 2 tubes)
7 engineers? - 7 pioneers (7 infanteers that can blow things up real good)
7 medics? - 7 combat aid types (7 infanteers that can patch up people)
7 comms? - 7 signallers (7 infanteers that can communicate (and drive))
1 Vehicle tech? - excellent - somebody to keep the running gear running
2 Weapons techs? - ideal -
7 infantry - well, its a start. useful scouts if nothing else.

And if that lot can't train themselves with on line resources, a couple of officers and some RSS, and keep themselves busy then I don't know what would engage them.

All of the members have a foot on the rung to their next corps transfer.

And by the way, my expectation is of 200 to 250 on the rolls for each local sub-unit.
Historically that really doesn't happen - Inf BN's get Platoons on ex or less, Arty Regiments field a gun, Armoured Regiments field a MilCot or two...
The Ary independent FD Bty's used to generally provide a gun...

The reason that they made units specifics to townships etc was to amass the recruit pool into one unit.
Generally not done anymore for regular units due to casualties wiping out entire villages effectively, but it is still necessary in the Res since the numbers are generally low.
 
The Commando 21 Orbat is interesting.

It centres on two 'Close Combat' companies and two 'Stand Off' companies based on the assumption (I suppose) that one fires, while one moves, kind of like a larger scale fire team:

The Commandos​

The primary fighting elements of the Royal Marines are the battalion-sized Commando units.

  • 40 Commando
    (based at Norton Manor Barracks, Taunton, Somerset)
  • 45 Commando
    (based at Condor Barracks, Arbroath, Angus, Scotland)
Each Commando is organised into 6 companies. Each company is made up of platoon-sized Troops:

  • 1 Command Company:
  • 1 Logistic Company:
    • A Echelon 1 (A Ech1)
    • A Echelon 2 (A Ech2)
    • Forward Repair Team (FRT)
    • Regimental Aid Post (RAP)
    • B Echelon (B Ech)
  • 2 Close Combat Companies :
    • Company Headquarters
      (Coy HQ)
    • 3 Close Combat Troops
      (Troop HQ, 3 Rifle Sections, Manoeuvre Support Section)
  • 2 Stand Off Companies
    (1 x tracked, 1 x wheeled)
    consisting of :
    • Company Headquarters (Coy HQ)
    • Heavy Machine Gun Troop
      (6 x HMG / GMG)
    • AT Troop
      (6 x Javelin)
    • 1x Close Combat Troop
      (5 officers + 78 other ranks)

 
Historically that really doesn't happen - Inf BN's get Platoons on ex or less, Arty Regiments field a gun, Armoured Regiments field a MilCot or two...
The Ary independent FD Bty's used to generally provide a gun...

The reason that they made units specifics to townships etc was to amass the recruit pool into one unit.
Generally not done anymore for regular units due to casualties wiping out entire villages effectively, but it is still necessary in the Res since the numbers are generally low.

But we are talking about the Militia here. We are talking about recruiting and organizing people locally.

Those that want are free to join the Regs for full time pay.

The Regs and their requirements are not the same as those of the Militia. Which is at the heart of the problem with the Canadian Army. The Regs think the Militia exists to serve them.

This article from the National Post a couple of days ago is interesting. Primarily because it addresses the very question I had about the role of the Militia as a Provincial National Guard.


Greg Taylor: Despite what Trudeau says, sending the Army into Ottawa is not his decision to make​

Military assistance to a provincial government or its police services to maintain public order does not require an agreement from the federal government


The provinces are responsible for public order: the Ottawa Police Service exists under policies and regulations set by the provincial Ministry of the Solicitor General. Police do sometimes request military assistance, referred to as “support to law enforcement,” but it is usually relatively minor, such as providing an unarmed armoured vehicle to transport police responding to an armed standoff.

If Ottawa’s chief of police was thinking about such minor support from the military, then Trudeau’s comments would be valid. However, given the situation that has unfolded in Ottawa over the past week, it is likely that Ottawa is contemplating far more substantial military involvement, referred to as “aid of the civil power.”

Aid of the civil power — i.e., military assistance to a provincial government or its police services to maintain public order — does not require an agreement from the federal government. Under the National Defence Act, provinces have the right to “requisition” military aid of the civil power. The word “requisition” is extremely important. During a public welfare emergency, such as a flood, provinces may request military assistance, and that request can be denied. A requisition is quite different.

The right of provinces to requisition military support is laid out in Part VI of the National Defence Act. Section 277 states that, in the event of a riot or disturbance, provincial ministers responsible for public order may “by requisition in writing addressed to the Chief of the Defence Staff, require the Canadian Forces … to be called out on service in aid of the civil power.”

If the Provincial Solicitors General can "require", not "request" but "require" military assistance it can only be because the Provincial governments, in particular the Lieutenants Governor, have equal authority over the available military forces, including the Militia, as the Governor General.

The answer to the question concerning the lack of a Provincial National Guard is that the Provinces already have one, the Canadian Armed Forces, including the Militia.

The Militia does not exist to serve the Regs. The Regs, and the Militia, exist to serve the Provincial and Federal governments. At their discretion.
 
The Commando 21 Orbat is interesting.

It centres on two 'Close Combat' companies and two 'Stand Off' companies based on the assumption (I suppose) that one fires, while one moves, kind of like a larger scale fire team:

The Commandos​

The primary fighting elements of the Royal Marines are the battalion-sized Commando units.

  • 40 Commando
    (based at Norton Manor Barracks, Taunton, Somerset)
  • 45 Commando
    (based at Condor Barracks, Arbroath, Angus, Scotland)
Each Commando is organised into 6 companies. Each company is made up of platoon-sized Troops:

  • 1 Command Company:
  • 1 Logistic Company:
    • A Echelon 1 (A Ech1)
    • A Echelon 2 (A Ech2)
    • Forward Repair Team (FRT)
    • Regimental Aid Post (RAP)
    • B Echelon (B Ech)
  • 2 Close Combat Companies :
    • Company Headquarters
      (Coy HQ)
    • 3 Close Combat Troops
      (Troop HQ, 3 Rifle Sections, Manoeuvre Support Section)
  • 2 Stand Off Companies
    (1 x tracked, 1 x wheeled)
    consisting of :
    • Company Headquarters (Coy HQ)
    • Heavy Machine Gun Troop
      (6 x HMG / GMG)
    • AT Troop
      (6 x Javelin)
    • 1x Close Combat Troop
      (5 officers + 78 other ranks)



But that organization didn't survive contact in Afghanistan. Commandos were reorganized into Combat Teams with the MGs, ATGMs and Mors distributed among the Companies. And that seems to be the basis for the 150 man Vanguard Strike Company which will form part of the RN's Littoral Response Groups.

The Royal Marines are currently undergoing a bold modernisation project – known as the Future Commando Force programme – which will overhaul how the world-famous green berets operate.

As part of this restructuring, more than 150 Royal Marines and Army Commandos will come together this autumn to form the Vanguard Strike Company.

The company will head on its maiden deployment in mid-2021 after further trials later this year and ongoing equipment, structural and tactical experimentation associated with the Future Commando Force.

Commandant General Royal Marines, Major General Matt Holmes, said: “The Vanguard Strike Company will lead and inform how the Royal Marines and Army Commandos will operate and fight in a dynamic, technological era of warfare.

“We envisage several of these networked sub-units persistently forward deployed around the globe, with an array of sophisticated enabling capabilities, to present dilemmas to adversaries whilst supporting partners. These will all be at high-readiness, as a capable forward contingency force at the core of the Royal Navy’s Littoral Response Groups.”

The deployment next year will see the first practical demonstration of kit, equipment, training and organisational change necessary to shape the concept further and bring it quickly to the forefront of the Royal Navy’s contribution to national security.

The elite commandos will work in small, versatile teams that will be tailored for the respective mission they will be facing – calling on areas of expertise and hone skills necessary to bring an advantage depending on the type of operation.


A large number of capable sub-units rather than one, singular, brigade.
 
But that organization didn't survive contact in Afghanistan. Commandos were reorganized into Combat Teams with the MGs, ATGMs and Mors distributed among the Companies. And that seems to be the basis for the 150 man Vanguard Strike Company which will form part of the RN's Littoral Response Groups.




A large number of capable sub-units rather than one, singular, brigade.

'Vanguard Strike'.... because just one warry adjective isn't enough ;)

I recall, post-Falklands, and especially in 45 CDO, there was this lingering and general dissatisfaction with the Cold War orbat, mainly because going up against well entrenched near peer Infantry (who had some pretty good/ better kit and even or better numbers) scared the hell out of them.

At the time, we focused mainly on getting extra GPMGs to the sections as that was all we had, pretty much.

I assume this effort to drive heavier fire power further down the food chain by employing lightweight heavy hitters like Javelin, is part of this legacy.
 
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