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Informing the Army’s Future Structure

I've heard this dozens of times and have heard the same words come out of multiple Officer's mouths.

"We can't cut units because we will never get back what we lost"

So I think the general consensus seems to have been that we should just hollow out said units in anticipation we might need them again some day as opposed to striking them from the order of battle.

Hmmmmmm 🤔

Sounds a lot like the entire reason we have both Reserve Order of Battle and a Supplementary Order of Battle 🤨 for this exact purpose.
Maybe I'm a bit jaded here but isn't the real issue PYs. Losing PYs is a problem; losing a unit only concerns the mafia that dominates that unit. If we convert an infantry battalion to a more needed maintenance battalion then the CAF wins but the Roping and Riding Fusiliers will have one less LCol on their regimental board of governors and one less vote at the Army's big boys table.

I'm on the side of breaking up the three mafias. Cut them down to one battalion each and component transfer six battalions from the ResF to the RegF.

Just as an aside. How's that having a ResF RFL 2 company in a Reg F battalion going to work out? Last time I looked NDA s 31(2)(a) provided that:

(2) An officer or non-commissioned member who
  • (a) is a member of, serving with, or attached or seconded to, a component, unit or other element of the Canadian Forces that has been placed on active service, ...
shall be deemed to be on active service for all purposes.

All Reg F units are on active service at all times; reserve units and members aren't unless outside Canada or unless specifically placed on active service.

Just sitting here thinking like a lawyer :unsure:

Oh and by the way, most of you seem to be becoming as cynical as I am.

🍻
 
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Maybe I'm a bit jaded here but isn't the real issue PYs. Losing PYs is a problem; losing a unit only concerns the mafia that dominates that unit. If we convert an infantry battalion to a more needed maintenance battalion then the CAF wins but the Roping and Riding Fusiliers will have one less LCol on their regimental board of governors and one less vote at the Army's big boys table.

I'm on the side of breaking up the three mafias. Cut them down to one battalion each and component transfer six battalions from the ResF to the RegF.

Just as an aside. How's that having a ResF RFL 2 company in a Reg F battalion going to work out? Last time I looked NDA s 31(2)(a) provided that:



All Reg F units are on active service at all times; reserve units and members aren't unless outside Canada or unless specifically placed on active service.

Just sitting here thinking like a lawyer :unsure:

🍻

Go ahead, I dare you....

Just try and get rid of - or seriously downsize - a Regiment that has a former Speaker of the House of Commons, and a former Prime Minister, on their list of Honouraries.

It's OK, they'll warm up the electrodes before attaching them to your quivering frame... :)

i dare you a christmas story GIF
 
Maybe I'm a bit jaded here but isn't the real issue PYs. Losing PYs is a problem; losing a unit only concerns the mafia that dominates that unit. If we convert an infantry battalion to a more needed maintenance battalion then the CAF wins but the Roping and Riding Fusiliers will have one less LCol on their regimental board of governors and one less vote at the Army's big boys table.

I'm on the side of breaking up the three mafias. Cut them down to one battalion each and component transfer six battalions from the ResF to the RegF.

Just as an aside. How's that having a ResF RFL 2 company in a Reg F battalion going to work out? Last time I looked NDA s 31(2)(a) provided that:



All Reg F units are on active service at all times; reserve units and members aren't unless outside Canada or unless specifically placed on active service.

Just sitting here thinking like a lawyer :unsure:

🍻
And I'm sure someone will use that little tidbit to get paid more money 😁
 
Go ahead, I dare you....

Just try and get rid of - or seriously downsize - a Regiment that has a former Speaker of the House of Commons, and a former Prime Minister, on their list of Honouraries.

It's OK, they'll warm up the electrodes before attaching them to your quivering frame... :)

i dare you a christmas story GIF
I'd love to have the chance. Use all your influence to get me made MND. I don't think you have to be a member of Parliament.

I'd appoint you and DAP as deputy ministers. My guess is that half of the GOFOs would quit immediately which would take care of item #1 on our To Do list.

😉
 
I'd love to have the chance. Use all your influence to get me made MND. I don't think you have to be a member of Parliament.

I'd appoint you and DAP as deputy ministers. My guess is that half of the GOFOs would quit immediately which would take care of item #1 on our To Do list.

😉
Being a elected member is just a formality people accept. It is an appointment, it can be a member of the senate or anyone else.


FJAG for MND!
 
But this is the crux of the problem, a Battalion with 2 rifle companies, isn't a Battalion. Calling it a Battalion is dishonest.

You then run in to the problem of when you tell the Government you have a battalion "AVAILABLE TO DEPLOY" you end up having to take people from elsewhere, that actually have another task and set of responsibilities they are supposed to be looking after.

Do this once and you create a small problem, make this your SOP and the small problems begin to compound in to bigger problems.
This COA seems crazy to me. Designing a formation that can only be deployed by gutting a whole series of other formations.

To my mind, if you're going to only maintain 12 x Mech Companies then you'd be better off having a single Brigade with 3 x fully manned Mech Battalions along with all the tanks and a full Artillery Regiment with 3 x 6-gun Batteries. The remaining 3 x Mech Battalions could be your "Force Protection" Battalion which would also provide some extra depth if you ever had to deploy the Brigade. On top of that you'd have the single, fully-manned Light Infantry Battalion.

The "surplus" 4 x Infantry Battalion HQ's (along with the remaining RCHA HQ's and STA/FO Batteries) could provide the command elements of a pair of Reserve Brigades, each consisting of 2 x Territorial Infantry Battalions, an Artillery Regiment and consolidated Armoured Recce/Combat Engineer/Service units.
 
This COA seems crazy to me. Designing a formation that can only be deployed by gutting a whole series of other formations.

To my mind, if you're going to only maintain 12 x Mech Companies then you'd be better off having a single Brigade with 3 x fully manned Mech Battalions along with all the tanks and a full Artillery Regiment with 3 x 6-gun Batteries. The remaining 3 x Mech Battalions could be your "Force Protection" Battalion which would also provide some extra depth if you ever had to deploy the Brigade. On top of that you'd have the single, fully-manned Light Infantry Battalion.

The "surplus" 4 x Infantry Battalion HQ's (along with the remaining RCHA HQ's and STA/FO Batteries) could provide the command elements of a pair of Reserve Brigades, each consisting of 2 x Territorial Infantry Battalions, an Artillery Regiment and consolidated Armoured Recce/Combat Engineer/Service units.
Apparently not in Canada...

I'll be honest I am appalled at the "transformation" in Farce 2025.
The Asymetrical vision apparently died on the vine - and rearranging deck chairs option was chosen.

I see zero net gain for the CA in this at all, and generally a Loss.
5 Divisions? Someone should give CCA a sword so he can disembowel himself.
2 Divisions - is pushing it already with the CA actual numbers.

I am heavily in favor of restructuring the Res Force - but all I see being done is a shuffling of paper - and no actual restructure.

12 Mech Companies - used to mean 3 Battalions (4 Rifle Coy / BN).
So that would be 1 Medium Bde of LAV Inf, if you go to the 3 Rifle Coy/BN then you get 4 BN's

I am legitimately at a loss, it appears to me that the CA is completely it's own worst enemy. All that exist now is a Force that is too Light to fight, and too Heavy to rapidly deploy.

F- from me.
 
Awesome discussion here. I note that COA 3.1 was selected and we are losing light battalions - well we are really losing half of the Reg F infantry (27 rifle coys to 12) in the Army. We will be left with 6 x 'mech' bns with 2 x coys each (along with a ARes coy). The Army seems to gain a PSYOPS Bn and a FP Bn. Oh, and CANSOF gets a LIB that they don't want. Am I right in feeling this is the stupidest possible COA?
What does COA 3.1 propose for the Reg Force Armoured and Artillery Regiments?
 
I am legitimately at a loss, it appears to me that the CA is completely it's own worst enemy. All that exist now is a Force that is too Light to fight, and too Heavy to rapidly deploy.

F- from me.
Amen Kev. What's craziest to me are the apologists and ugly-baby syndrome sufferers who cannot see what a gong-show this is. We will fail to achieve what we were told to do in SSE (concurrency, light forces) and we will struggle mightily to generate forces for current named operations, IRUs, NATO commitments, and extant CONPLANs. All of that was true before this COA, but now it will be much harder - not easier. None of the cuts to the RCIC make us more "relevant" or "combat capable", nor do any of the additions to the other Corps/branches.

It is a very dispiriting time to be in the Army.
 
The doctrine folk today seem allergic to the idea of codifying organizational structures.
As a guy currently writing infantry doctrine, I respectfully disagree. We put quite a bit of effort into getting the organizational structures right - the problem is that our work and advice is ignored. I will concede that we try to impart some flexibility into the doctrine so that we don't get stuck at one point in history. But, for example, our doctrine has consistently said that we need 4 x coys in an inf bn.
 
As a guy currently writing infantry doctrine, I respectfully disagree. We put quite a bit of effort into getting the organizational structures right - the problem is that our work and advice is ignored. I will concede that we try to impart some flexibility into the doctrine so that we don't get stuck at one point in history. But, for example, our doctrine has consistently said that we need 4 x coys in an inf bn.

This is normal, unfortunately.

I can't count the times we've been engaged by an organization, to help make it better and, during the information gathering phase, turn up good work done before we arrived that was generally ignored by leadership, mainly for internal political reasons I think.

'Do what you told yourselves to do a couple of years ago', is a fun message to deliver as an outsider ;)
 
So, in the current resource constraints of the Army, how many such battalions are possible?

With base support, other arms, and other capabilities required from within that same resource base, I suspect N is less than nine.

So where, then, can and should the Army as an institution take risk? Which capabilities must be full time to generate readiness, which ones can be part time to build up to readiness, and which ones can be zero loaded and created as needed?

Perfect doctrine that ignores resourcing constraints? Already have Corps 86 to fill that need, thanks.
 
I understood Corps 86 to be incomplete - had not gone through a scrub-down after everyone submitted their starting wish lists. At least it was understood to be unrealistic and treated accordingly. How should we characterize organizations that have gone through various reviews and still ignores resourcing constraints?
 
This is normal, unfortunately.

I can't count the times we've been engaged by an organization, to help make it better and, during the information gathering phase, turn up good work done before we arrived that was generally ignored by leadership, mainly for internal political reasons I think.

'Do what you told yourselves to do a couple of years ago', is a fun message to deliver as an outsider ;)


Ici aussi.

Nothing clients seem to like more than spending government money to review their commercial operations only to studiously ignore any and all findings.
 
So, in the current resource constraints of the Army, how many such battalions are possible?

With base support, other arms, and other capabilities required from within that same resource base, I suspect N is less than nine.

So where, then, can and should the Army as an institution take risk? Which capabilities must be full time to generate readiness, which ones can be part time to build up to readiness, and which ones can be zero loaded and created as needed?

Perfect doctrine that ignores resourcing constraints? Already have Corps 86 to fill that need, thanks.


I'll go.

Three regiments. Each of 1 singular 1980 vintage battalion and a couple of independent companies.

Add a LAV Squadron to each Armoured Regiment.
 
To my mind, if you're going to only maintain 12 x Mech Companies then you'd be better off having a single Brigade with 3 x fully manned Mech Battalions along with all the tanks and a full Artillery Regiment with 3 x 6-gun Batteries. The remaining 3 x Mech Battalions could be your "Force Protection" Battalion which would also provide some extra depth if you ever had to deploy the Brigade. On top of that you'd have the single, fully-manned Light Infantry Battalion.
12 Mech Companies - used to mean 3 Battalions (4 Rifle Coy / BN).
So that would be 1 Medium Bde of LAV Inf, if you go to the 3 Rifle Coy/BN then you get 4 BN's
I see zero net gain for the CA in this at all, and generally a Loss.
I agree that this is a net zero gain. In fact I think it's a loss but not for the reason that there isn't a full three or four company battalion. I's because there are, IMHO "useless" divisional headquarters, too many "useless" brigade headquarters and barely enough "useful" battalion headquarters.

The major problem facing the CA is a lack of people in the RegF while the ARes is relegated to providing infill to RegF units. Concurrently we are doing day-to-day deployed missions that are built around less than full battalions and on occasion supervised by a truncated brigade headquarters. During Afghanistan those brigade headquarters were overstuffed but the long and the short of it was that to maintain sustained deployments (whether peacetime or wartime) at six month rotations, we had to adopt destructive readiness cycles which had units rotating and reconstituting at a furious rate.

I know that most here see the solution to the CAs problems as "full" battalions. I don't. I think that "undermanned" battalions, and brigades, but more of them, are the answer.

Firstly, If there is no deployable role for a division headquarters (other than 1 Cdn Div in CJOC) then get rid of them and harvest the PYs out of them.

Second, get rid of the superfluous nondeployable ARes Bde headquarters. If it doesn't deploy then it shouldn't exist. Again, harvest the PYs. That to me means calculate what constitutes a reasonable number of deployable bde headquarters that the total number of personnel in the CA could fill and maintain the appropriate number of bde hq properly manned for that task. One can debate the numbers but IMHO we can sustain eight deployable bde HQs and the nondeployable CADTC as a brigade equivalent entity with our current RegF and ARes authorized strengths.

Again while one can debate the brigade mix as between manoeuvre and support, but I think a reasonable one which allows for both the operation on a day-to-day basis as well as the expansion to a full 1 Cdn Div, if ever required, would be a mix of five manoeuvre brigades, a sustainment brigade, a combat support brigade and an artillery brigade. That would create a full division with two manoeuvre brigades left over as a reinforcement capability.

The switch over from the current three deployable and 11 non deployable brigades means a reduction in the number of total manoeuvre battalion headquarters from 12 deployable manoeuvre bn headquarters and roughly sixty-eight non deployable ones to a total of 23 deployable manoeuvre battalion headquarters. I count infantry battalions, armoured regiments and recce/cavalry regiments as manoeuvre battalions.

Obviously the manpower to fill out 23 deployable manoeuvre battalions with a full complement of full time soldiers isn't there. But there is more than enough staff there to fill the battalion headquarters with full-time leadership when one adds up the PYs associated with the deleted divisional headquarters, the non deployable brigade headquarters and the number of personnel currently in the RSS.

That leaves the question of how many full-time and/or part-time companies does each manoeuvre battalion need. And I emphasis need here for day-to-day training and career progression and not for operational deployments. The question of what a battalion needs in garrison and what does it need on operations are two very distinct ones and should not be confused. IMHO, each battalion is adequately served with both career progression and training capability if it has a minimum of one full-time, fully equipped company as well as skeleton full-time leadership staff for the remaining companies which are manned by reservists. A battalion with just one company is obviously not on high readiness by itself, while a battalion with two full companies would be at a higher level. To create a battalion at very high readiness could require the designation of a third company from another battalion in the brigade or having a "ready" company fleshed out by reservists.

Effectively, battalions with a reduced number of soldiers but with at least one company of full-timers and the cadre headquarters for the other companies could still train both the full-time and part-time components in up to full battalion exercises. This would be a steady state activity to bring the entire force (not just the RegF component) to an overall higher state of readiness and capability than it has now and would also give an end-state overarching structure to the force which would be the goal for the development of doctrine and equipment programs.

To sustain operations, a program of managed readiness would be superimposed on only a part of the force depending on the missions selected. Specific battalion headquarters would be designated for deployment well in advance and would be filled out with the requisite manpower from with their organic RegF component augmented, if necessary, by additional RegF or ARes companies from across the force. Since there are now a total of 23 rather than 12 deployable battalion headquarters such rotations are more easily managed across the entire force structure. Similarly, if there is a need for a brigade headquarters there are now five manoeuvre brigade and three support brigade headquarters to choose from.

As a result of having a larger pool of brigade and manoeuvre battalions headquarters to choose from for deployments, the force as a whole would have less interruption allowing it to train both its RegF and ARes companies to a higher state of individual and collective training.

I've previously put up a potential org chart for such a force to illustrate the concept. Quite frankly I've been rethinking aspects of it particulalry from the service support side (I'm leaning more towards a US brigade support battalion concept) but the old model will do.

The one thing you'll have to admit is that this isn't a mere rearranging of deck chairs proposal. :giggle:

Force 2027 30-70 Option 2.jpg

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So, in the current resource constraints of the Army, how many such battalions are possible?
To be brutal honest perhaps an honest look at what is needed comes first.
Buying more and more and more LAV variants is a major expense.
I don't know how the XXXX the CA prioritizes capital acquisition projects - but how can someone sit straight faced in front of a room and ask for more LAV's - when the CA is missing other major items.

With base support, other arms, and other capabilities required from within that same resource base, I suspect N is less than nine.
N can be less than 9 and that is fine -- maybe it should be 6, but no fricken way should it be 6 cookie cutter LAV clones, as it misses a lot of the marks the CDN GOV set for the CA to do in their missions.
So where, then, can and should the Army as an institution take risk? Which capabilities must be full time to generate readiness, which ones can be part time to build up to readiness, and which ones can be zero loaded and created as needed?
The Army doesn't get to decide that in a vacuum - they are given a Mission by the Gov of Canada.
If the mission exceeds what is possible, then the CCA needs to make a case as to why.
Right now all I see is people patting themselves on the back for a job well done, when they probably should be asked for their resignation.

Perfect doctrine that ignores resourcing constraints? Already have Corps 86 to fill that need, thanks.
The have 1 Bde with actual equipment and personnel.
 
The Army doesn't get to decide that in a vacuum
I've spent the last year examining and interviewing folks about Army Transformation just before and during the Afghanistan years. I still do not have a clear picture of how the process worked and who made what decisions. In some cases its clear. In others there are gaps and fog. The problem is that every step of the way is a collaborative process where there are champions for whatever opposing viewpoints there are. It's hard, however, to assign blame even when you know, with 20/20 hindsight that blame should be assigned and that, at the time, the poor outcome was reasonably foreseeable.

Where we are today is mostly as a result of decisions made in the first six years of this century followed by the reluctance of a later generation to change course when it should have become obvious that the course was not optimal. My view of F2025 is that we're still in that same rut.

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