Informing the Army’s Future Structure

[KevinB]

I've spent the last year examining and interviewing folks about Army Transformation just before and during the Afghanistan years. I still do not have a clear picture of how the process worked and who made what decisions. In some cases its clear. In others there are gaps and fog. The problem is that every step of the way is a collaborative process where there are champions for whatever opposing viewpoints there are. It's hard, however, to assign blame even when you know, with 20/20 hindsight that blame should be assigned and that, at the time, the poor outcome was reasonably foreseeable.

Where we are today is mostly as a result of decisions made in the first six years of this century followed by the reluctance of a later generation to change course when it should have become obvious that the course was not optimal. My view of F2025 is that we're still in that same rut.

Just looking at the language of SSE makes it pretty clear to me that the Mandate to the Army wasn't a LAV centric force.
It needs to be capable of Full Spectrum Operations - which requires both Heavier and Lighter forces than the Symmetrical LAV army offers.

It was painfully obvious to me on the previous infinite Light working groups that the Army didn't understand what it should be, and was making some terrible choices because of that.

I'd be fully happy (and most of you know my distain for heavy forces) if the Army went ahead and got 2 BN worth of AJAX (because GDLS), and a Reg't worth of SPA.
1 CABG. - boom done.
1 Armored Battle Group in High Readiness - the other not, with the plan to get 2 more at a later date for the Res units in 1 CABG.

The LAV's then go to 2 medium Bde (maybe 3), that are 30/70, and you have 1-2 Light Bde, and the CS Bde

 

[Infanteer]

I will concede that we try to impart some flexibility into the doctrine so that we don't get stuck at one point in history. But, for example, our doctrine has consistently said that we need 4 x coys in an inf bn.

Yeah, but what is that grounded in? Because the doctrine guy says so, or the general signs off on it? "4x Coys in an Inf Bn because that's what we had in 1944?" There are numerous examples of Battalions being combat capable with 3 x coys - the entire US and German armies fought the Second World War with this organization, and there are numerous modern cases as well. I've also seen cases where doctrine is justified by rules; "Rule of Four - 1 find, 1 fix, 1 strike, 1 exploit" but when you dig into these, you'll find there is no historical justification to support the statement. Someone just thought it sounded right.

Our doctrine needs to be:

1. Grounded in something other than "this is how we've always done it." Our organizations should be built off operational analysis and experimentation. For example, is the anti-armour capability of a battalion better off bolted onto every section carrier or concentrated into a platoon? Don't know, but we should have something objective to validate the decision.
2. Related to reality. I had one doctrine guy tell me that "doctrine must be what should be, and not influenced by peacetime resource constraints" but if Kingston builds unicorns that will never see the light of day, then the manual and the dreamed up organization is toilet paper and will be ignored by those who have to apply it. We've had four companies in our outdated infantry manual for decades, but its never been implemented in peacetime or on operations in decades, so its not helpful to the practitioner.

 

[Kirkhill]

"doctrine must be what should be, and not influenced by peacetime resource constraints"

I wonder what he would have made of the wartime resource constraints of the Western Desert Force and the 14th Army? The WDF in particular was using anything and everything, including the enemy's.

 

[GR66]

[SNIP]Obviously the manpower to fill out 23 deployable manoeuvre battalions with a full complement of full time soldiers isn't there. But there is more than enough staff there to fill the battalion headquarters with full-time leadership when one adds up the PYs associated with the deleted divisional headquarters, the non deployable brigade headquarters and the number of personnel currently in the RSS.

That leaves the question of how many full-time and/or part-time companies does each manoeuvre battalion need. And I emphasis need here for day-to-day training and career progression and not for operational deployments. The question of what a battalion needs in garrison and what does it need on operations are two very distinct ones and should not be confused. IMHO, each battalion is adequately served with both career progression and training capability if it has a minimum of one full-time, fully equipped company as well as skeleton full-time leadership staff for the remaining companies which are manned by reservists. A battalion with just one company is obviously not on high readiness by itself, while a battalion with two full companies would be at a higher level. To create a battalion at very high readiness could require the designation of a third company from another battalion in the brigade or having a "ready" company fleshed out by reservists.

Effectively, battalions with a reduced number of soldiers but with at least one company of full-timers and the cadre headquarters for the other companies could still train both the full-time and part-time components in up to full battalion exercises. This would be a steady state activity to bring the entire force (not just the RegF component) to an overall higher state of readiness and capability than it has now and would also give an end-state overarching structure to the force which would be the goal for the development of doctrine and equipment programs.

To sustain operations, a program of managed readiness would be superimposed on only a part of the force depending on the missions selected. Specific battalion headquarters would be designated for deployment well in advance and would be filled out with the requisite manpower from with their organic RegF component augmented, if necessary, by additional RegF or ARes companies from across the force. Since there are now a total of 23 rather than 12 deployable battalion headquarters such rotations are more easily managed across the entire force structure. Similarly, if there is a need for a brigade headquarters there are now five manoeuvre brigade and three support brigade headquarters to choose from.

As a result of having a larger pool of brigade and manoeuvre battalions headquarters to choose from for deployments, the force as a whole would have less interruption allowing it to train both its RegF and ARes companies to a higher state of individual and collective training.

I've previously put up a potential org chart for such a force to illustrate the concept. Quite frankly I've been rethinking aspects of it particulalry from the service support side (I'm leaning more towards a US brigade support battalion concept) but the old model will do.

The one thing you'll have to admit is that this isn't a mere rearranging of deck chairs proposal.

View attachment 68614

Couple of questions...

1) If every Brigade-sized (or Battle Group-sized for that matter) deployment is going to either require Ad Hoc assignments of sub-units from other Battalions or will require mobilization of Reserves, then is there any need to group the Battalions into permanent, domestically based Brigades at all...or could you simply group a handful of deployable Brigade HQs (with no permanent Battalions attached) and a number of "independent" Battalions within a Regional support structure and build your Battle Groups/Brigades as required for deployment?

2) Some of your Battalions have support companies (e.g. AT Companies or UAV/Loitering Munition Companies). Does this give the required mass to develop and support these specialist capabilities, or would it be better to group these units into their own Battalions so they can concentrate their equipment and expertise geographically and post out individual Companies/Platoons as required.

3) There have been questions raised in this thread about what realistic force generation capabilities the Reserve regiments have. What's your sense to at what level an individual Reserve Regiment could generate a Company-sized grouping for deployment? Would it only become viable at say the 30/70 level? Is a 10/90 split realistically enough Reg Force staffing in a unit to be able to force generate a Company? How do you see a 70/30 split working...would it be formed Reserve Sections into a Platoon for example or more like individual augmentation?

 

[Mortar guy]

Yeah, but what is that grounded in? Because the doctrine guy says so, or the general signs off on it? "4x Coys in an Inf Bn because that's what we had in 1944?" There are numerous examples of Battalions being combat capable with 3 x coys - the entire US and German armies fought the Second World War with this organization, and there are numerous modern cases as well. I've also seen cases where doctrine is justified by rules; "Rule of Four - 1 find, 1 fix, 1 strike, 1 exploit" but when you dig into these, you'll find there is no historical justification to support the statement.

Infanteer, where is this hubristic dismissal of history and doctrine coming from? Are you so dead set on making the F2025 COA work that you will throw away common sense? I know it's fun to bash doctrine writers, but do you honestly believe that we get to just make up whatever structure we want and throw it in a book? Do you believe that those who write doctrine aren't aware of history? I have an MA in War Studies and have written a bit about infantry doctrine and organization - how much more do I need to know before I am qualified to write? Besides, I am given no free hand whatsoever in what I write but am bound by the wishes of the CA leadership, history, future concepts, NATO doctrine, and a dash of common dog.

You reveal a misunderstanding of how doctrine is written when you say: "our organizations should be built off operational analysis and experimentation". Great idea! In fact, ADC and CALWC are going to go back in time 30 years and retroactively apply your insightful suggestion. But all ribbing aside, exercises and experimentation have been run almost continuously by CALWC, ADC, ALLC, CORA, AEC (and their previous iterations). What is more, we participate in allied experimentation and keep up to speed with developments in allied doctrine. Should a battalion have four companies? Yes. Any 2Lt with a rudimentary understanding of math can reach that conclusion. But does a battalion have to have four coys (as we did when I was a subbie)? Of course not. But should our doctrine change every time some some fad or resource pressure comes along? No, that would be as dumb as dismissing the long history of military and academic thought that got us to our current structures. So, our four-company-plus-combat-support model is based off of 70+ years of learning, study, and common sense. What's the two-company battalion model in F2025 based off?

You mention the US Army's structure in WWII - good point. In October 1940 the US Infantry restructured their battalions from four to three rifle companies. This wasn't because 'three is gooder than four', but because they consciously re-invested in heavy support weapons. The weapons company in a WW2 US infantry battalion, and the weapons companies at the Regimental level made ours look puny. Machineguns, anti-tank guns, mortars, howitzers (later self-propelled howitzers - manned by infantry!) galore; it more than offset the lack of manoeuvre companies in US Army eyes. That worked for them, based on their tactics. US battalions almost never operated without substantial reinforcement of regimental, divisional, and non-divisional combat support elements. Saying "three companies worked for the US Army" doesn't really matter for us as the context is different.

I hope you can see the irony of saying "...the dreamed up organization is toilet paper and will be ignored by those who have to apply it." while discussing the infantry battalion structures in F2025.

 

[TangoTwoBravo]

Yeah, but what is that grounded in? Because the doctrine guy says so, or the general signs off on it? "4x Coys in an Inf Bn because that's what we had in 1944?" There are numerous examples of Battalions being combat capable with 3 x coys - the entire US and German armies fought the Second World War with this organization, and there are numerous modern cases as well. I've also seen cases where doctrine is justified by rules; "Rule of Four - 1 find, 1 fix, 1 strike, 1 exploit" but when you dig into these, you'll find there is no historical justification to support the statement. Someone just thought it sounded right.

Our doctrine needs to be:

1. Grounded in something other than "this is how we've always done it." Our organizations should be built off operational analysis and experimentation. For example, is the anti-armour capability of a battalion better off bolted onto every section carrier or concentrated into a platoon? Don't know, but we should have something objective to validate the decision.
2. Related to reality. I had one doctrine guy tell me that "doctrine must be what should be, and not influenced by peacetime resource constraints" but if Kingston builds unicorns that will never see the light of day, then the manual and the dreamed up organization is toilet paper and will be ignored by those who have to apply it. We've had four companies in our outdated infantry manual for decades, but its never been implemented in peacetime or on operations in decades, so its not helpful to the practitioner.

I think I spoke with the same fellow. "We aren't going to write a new Infantry Battalion in Battle because we don't want to enshrine what is in effect now." I get fighting a guerrilla battle against change, but come on. Its a doctrine manual. It has no real independent life outside of application. We aren't monks guarding sacred texts in some monastery.

 

[daftandbarmy]

I think I spoke with the same fellow. "We aren't going to write a new Infantry Battalion in Battle because we don't want to enshrine what is in effect now." I get fighting a guerrilla battle against change, but come on. Its a doctrine manual. It has no real independent life outside of application. We aren't monks guarding sacred texts in some monastery.

Unless, of course, it's books like 'The Three Block War' or 'On Killing', then you'd better be able to quote chapter and verse for certain people or your career might be at stake

 

[Fabius]

Based on a few comments from some people rather senior and/or experienced in the ways of Ottawa I am beginning to think the reason we have F2025 making no sense and Bns with two Coys is that our premise of combat power mattering is in fact wrong. Or at least wrong in some minds. The thing that matters is CONTRIBUTING and therefore 100 people sent overseas is as good as a LAV Coy. The CAF and the CA is organizing so as to participate in waving the flag. SSE may not reflect that but that's the GoC's day to day decision making it seems.

 

[dapaterson]

I think I spoke with the same fellow. "We aren't going to write a new Infantry Battalion in Battle because we don't want to enshrine what is in effect now." I get fighting a guerrilla battle against change, but come on. Its a doctrine manual. It has no real independent life outside of application. We aren't monks guarding sacred texts in some monastery.

 

[Brad Sallows]

So the reason for four-company battalions is due to having fewer add-on capabilities? Riflemen are cheap; equipment and munitions are expensive?

 

[Kirkhill]

So the reason for four-company battalions is due to having fewer add-on capabilities? Riflemen are cheap; equipment and munitions are expensive?

Judging from the comments, especially pertaining to the lack of "Middle Management" it seems that we are heading back to 1914 all over again.

We went from 10 companies of 50 commanded by Captains to 4 companies of 200 commanded by Captains that were promoted to Majors because we didn't have enough Captains to go around. Captain/Majors were augmented by Sgts promoted to Lts.

 

[TangoTwoBravo]

Doctrine should be principles that guide us to the attainment of our objectives. Barring a real change in the character of war, those principles should remain relevant even when the details of organization change.

 

[Brad Sallows]

We went from...

I doubt we're going back that far, and my comment was glib, but looking at some of the decisions in recent years regarding how some capabilities were moved around (if not close to extinguished), I have to wonder how often the decisions are rigorously driven by history, evaluation, operational analysis, allied experience, etc. And I admit to being a bit of a fan of more firepower, fewer line grunts.

 

[Kirkhill]

I doubt we're going back that far, and my comment was glib, but looking at some of the decisions in recent years regarding how some capabilities were moved around (if not close to extinguished), I have to wonder how often the decisions are rigorously driven by history, evaluation, operational analysis, allied experience, etc. And I admit to being a bit of a fan of more firepower, fewer line grunts.

I wouldn't be averse to self propelled weapons companies with one inhabitant per vehicle and let AI do the rest. It has worked for the Air Force for a while.

 

[Brad Sallows]

I wouldn't be averse to self propelled weapons companies with one inhabitant per vehicle and let AI do the rest. It has worked for the Air Force for a while.

High-value weapons systems are high-value targets. Is a regimental (brigade) cannon company (or a battalion DFS vehicle platoon in addition to everything else) really worth more than several Carl G in each rifle platoon?

[Add: what I have in mind as "more firepower" is artillery and AD. If I could have 6 more guns, I'd want them in the brigade or divisional artillery.]

 

[Kirkhill]

High-value weapons systems are high-value targets. Is a regimental (brigade) cannon company (or a battalion DFS vehicle platoon in addition to everything else) really worth more than several Carl G in each rifle platoon?

[Add: what I have in mind as "more firepower" is artillery and AD. If I could have 6 more guns, I'd want them in the brigade or divisional artillery.]

I suggest that the Carl G's then become high value targets

Like these guys (edited for a better clip)

 

[Infanteer]

There is a lot of mixing of concepts here. Many of you are mixing Force Generation (which is how the CA organizes forces at home to garrison and train to various levels) and Force Employment (which is how we tailor forces to fight). Force 2025 does not lay out specific force employment concepts, nor does it argue that its organizations are intended to fight as organized in Canada.

 

[FJAG]

Doctrine should be principles that guide us to the attainment of our objectives. Barring a real change in the character of war, those principles should remain relevant even when the details of organization change.

And those objectives include organization, equipping and training.

I'll harken back to what I said about one and two company battalions above. That's doable in a peacetime environment if, for example, we make commitments like a single company battalion in Latvia.

But, the big factor should be that for full spectrum warfare the organization will be for a full doctrinal battalion supported by a mobilization system that both staffs, equips and trains the additional elements to be mobilized within a given time frame. And just as important the battalion needs to be supported by the appropriate system of enablers that are habitually outside of the battalion.

I think that is where there is a disconnect. One needs to have a clear understanding of what the doctrinal end state is and have a path to it. It's been some time since I did Command and Staff but in my day that taught us doctrinal establishments and tactics but there was no actual path to create or equip those doctrinal organizations in fact. My guess is, and you'll know much better than I, that we still have one organization that we teach in theory (and perhaps falls in line with our doctrinal documents), but no actual path to achieving that structure if and when required.

 

[GR66]

There is a lot of mixing of concepts here. Many of you are mixing Force Generation (which is how the CA organizes forces at home to garrison and train to various levels) and Force Employment (which is how we tailor forces to fight). Force 2025 does not lay out specific force employment concepts, nor does it argue that its organizations are intended to fight as organized in Canada.

That's why I was questioning why all the ORBATS we see here (including mine) tend to be set up showing Force Employment Brigades as if that's the way we'll deploy them. Instead of Divisions and Brigades with assigned units mirroring deployed entities in Canada, could we instead just have regional support units (mirroring the Regional Joint Task Force boundaries?) to manage facilities and infrastructure with a variety of independent Brigade HQ's and Battalions hosted there and focusing on force generation for deployments.

 

[daftandbarmy]

There is a lot of mixing of concepts here. Many of you are mixing Force Generation (which is how the CA organizes forces at home to garrison and train to various levels) and Force Employment (which is how we tailor forces to fight). Force 2025 does not lay out specific force employment concepts, nor does it argue that its organizations are intended to fight as organized in Canada.

I'm just reading this and about half way down it mentions Force 2025 as follows, which makes it sound like a blend of FG and FE. And I could be very wrong, naturally :

Ready Forces​

• Force 2025 will review all components of the CA and will seek to optimize and modernize its structures to meet current and projected operational requirements as well as support SSE initiatives. One of the objectives of Force 2025 is to continue the integration of the Primary Reserves, Canadian Rangers, civilians and the Regular Force into a single, integrated team. This integration will enhance command and control relationships and training opportunities, and clarify assigned tasks and integration points, ensuring that the CA is prepared to carry out assigned tasks and support concurrent operations. This will be achieved, in part, through efforts to refine attraction, recruiting, and retention initiatives, implement policies that enable the operational capability of Reserve personnel, while ensuring that administration is streamlined, and continue developing and integrating Reserve Mission Tasks to build capacity and depth. During FY 2021-22, Force 2025 work will include options analysis and selection of a course of action;

Ready Forces - Canada.ca

The plan’s focus is on the work the Defence team will do in the year ahead to serve Canada.

www.canada.ca