Divining the right role, capabilities, structure, and Regimental System for Canada's Army Reserves

[dglad]

How long does a "tactical grouping" have to remain in place before people admit its an amalgamation in all but name?  If tactical groupings are created because certain units have been unable to maintain personnel numbers or a credible line of succession and have no foreseeable way to recovery, than what is the point in dancing around the issue to please the "protect the badges" crowd?  How few cap badges need to be present to still say there's a second unit there at all?

What difference does it make?  If the units' collective training is improved, soldiers are able to experience training in more meaningfully-sized organizations, overhead is reduced and, yet, unit identities are retained, then how does this not represent a good compromise solution to an otherwise thorny issue?

 

[Michael OLeary]

What difference does it make?  If the units' collective training is improved, soldiers are able to experience training in more meaningfully-sized organizations, overhead is reduced and, yet, unit identities are retained, then how does this not represent a good compromise solution to an otherwise thorny issue?

It is a good compromise solution.  Is it expected to be the permanent solution in every case where it is implemented?  Or might it turn out to be an intermediate objective in some cases?

 

[geo]

Ummm... a tactical grouping means that we combine units for the short term... always deferring to someone else the need to deliver the unpleasant message that.... the current system does not work AND WE MUST change things to make them better.

3 Plt of A Coy of the Ping Pong Fusiliers does not a battalion make and just because a plt WO is the most senior person in the Battalion does not make him qualified to be a CSM or shudder... a RSM.

And that poor Plt LT training with 30 men does not develop his abilities towards becoming the leader of a Battalion - and all that it means.

Amalgamation is a system that has been done in Other Commonwealth countries over the centuries... what makes a Canadian Militia unit so...... untouchable ???

 

[ArmyRick]

Here is my opinion based on 18 years of regular/Reserve service.

This tactical grouping works for weekend exercise and sure everybody keeps their cap badges but I don't agree that it works.

When people WEAR a common cap badge, they do come together as more of a family. It is why the regimental system works. Human nature will always have that they're different mind set. I once worked on a weekend exercise with another unit, I was a section commander brought in to lead another unit's section on a brigade exercise (my unit had a surplus of SR NCOs go figure) and the boys had to get a bit of an ass kicking from me because they dragged their heels and what not. I asked them why and they were told on the side to not give me the time of day. I earned their respect through competence and I hate to say it, but fear.

How often does sh*t like this happen when units mix? More than you think. Yes it is stupid and immature, it actually reminds me of that Dr Seus cartoon with the cartoon critters getting stars on/off their bellies so they can be different.  However in the real world it happens.  

Now my time in the REG F and on several tours, I find a stronger bond with the soldiers in a battalion. Yes true, they take augmentees under the wing. However all in all, they are a stronger cohesion. It is the same cohesion I see that works when you operate at your own unit. Everybody is part of the same family. I can't fully explain the mindset, but it is there.

The other advantage I see to unit amalgamation is reducing the LT COL and CWO.

Once again I stand by opinion that tactical grouping is a temporary measure at best. I am a strong beleiver in moving forward with amalgamation of many units.

 

[rifleman]

Its not that its untouchable, for me its 'who cares?' The removal of Cap Badges doesn't do anything to address all the issues with reserves. Its time to accept the fact, that they aren't full time, however are making it possible for us to carry out current operations without the cost of employing all reservists full time.

I guess it will be a problem as long as Colonels have to wear a 'generic' cap badge because they can't so their job while wearing their unit/branch accroutements,
as long as we have to change colour of berets because of the branch/ element we work with,
as long as we have to form a new regiment, with new acccroutements when it could be a joint unit, with a multiple of existing trade/ unit members.

 

[geo]

The other advantage I see to unit amalgamation is reducing the LT COL and CWO.

Wrong....

The advantage of merging / combining units into formal full strength battalions is that Ptes, Cpls, MCpls, Sgts, WOs, MWOs, CWOs AND DITTO for Lts, Capts, Majs and LCols who will develop experience training as a full battalion and not as a cheap immitation of one.

 

[rifleman]

The advantage of merging / combining units into formal full strength battalions is that Ptes, Cpls, MCpls, Sgts, WOs, MWOs, CWOs AND DITTO for Lts, Capts, Majs and LCols who will develop experience training as a full battalion and not as a cheap immitation of one.

If you don't have the numbers, you will never achieve that aim, even if you had one cap badge. Having a battalion structure in the reserves can almost be considered Battalion TEWT. There is still a benefit.

 

[Michael OLeary]

Its not that its untouchable, for me its 'who cares?' The removal of Cap Badges doesn't do anything to address all the issues with reserves.

But if finding those solutions results in changes to cap badges as one of the parts of a workable solution to build stronger units . . . oh, wait, I get it, you were trying to trivialize the whole cap badge thing so people would nod and agree with that simplistic view, and there I was trying to bring the discussion back to reality.  I'll quit now and just wait to see what solutions the Army develops.

 

[McG]

Human nature will always have that they're different mind set.

I've seen this problem cause friction between reservist elements of the same cap badge from different units, and I've seen different cap badges come together and work outstandingly.  More important that what people are wearing on their foreheads is that they must regularly be trained to work as a team.  If you get that regular training as a team, the soldiers will get past the cap badge thing.  If you don't have that regular training as a team, then the soldiers are going to have problems even if they all wear the same badge.

The other advantage I see to unit amalgamation is reducing the LT COL and CWO.

This same advantage would come from standing permanent tactical affiliations.

 

[dglad]

The cap-badge thing is, frankly, a red-herring.  We are witnessing the evolution of a generation of soldiers who, if used to working together, will do so without particular regard to cap-badge.  Again, to take the Royal Regina Rifles and North Saskatchewan Regiment as an example, young soldiers from both those units were quite blunt that they work and play together so much that they don't really distinguish one unit from the other.  The Camerons and Royal Winnipeg Rifles are in much the same situation.  For that matter, all five of the 38 CBG units work together enough that they have developed a significant cohesion.

I've been in the Reserves for 31 years and am extremely proud of my Regiment.  However, I've come to realize that these young soldiers really are pointing the way forward.  You go on exercise with someone, share a trench with someone, go on patrol, get wet and cold, drink too much, etc. etc. with someone, and you develop a cohesive bond that transcends cap-badges.  We see this on operations all the time; I commanded Roto 0 of Ops Bronze and Boreas in BiH and had essentially 100 odds and sods wearing about 40 different cap badges and, you know what?  Within a month, it was an integrated team working for a common purpose.  This isn't to say that Regimental identity isn't important, but frankly, I think our TROOPS are capable of attaching exactly the appropriate amount of weight to it, in what amounts to an instinctual way.

Are tactical groupings a permanent solution?  Maybe they are, and maybe not.  Perhaps the more important question is, do they achieve the end-state of an improved and more efficient training experience for our soldiers?  So far, it appears that they do, while allowing us to focus other energies on designing and delivering said training.  The day may come when we need to take the issue of amalgamation, disbandment, or whatever, head on.  In the meantime, however, tactical groupings are doing an effective job of training our soldiers more effectively.

 

[daftandbarmy]

I find it odd that, in a time of 'war', we are considering making the infantry smaller.

Shouldn't we be beefing up the reserve infantry units and promoting higher levels of more effective attraction, recruiting and an 'outward focus' vs. amalgamation, contraction and an 'inward focus'?  It seems to be more of a marketing and leadership issue than any inherent weakness of the militia system. It feels like a cop out or 'withdrawal in contact'.

True, the British amalgamated several times but it doesn't seem to help with getting the numbers up. You could even argue that, as units with close identities to geographical regions close down, the army becomes even further distanced from its true support base: the public.

If a private sector business wanted more market penetration, they'd open new stores. We should do the same. Given the apparent stress levels in the Reg F re: manning levels, it would also seem to make more sense to diversify our risk and spread the load across more units, or even consider (shock, horror) mobilizing a few reserve infantry units to help take the strain.

 

[dglad]

I find it odd that, in a time of 'war', we are considering making the infantry smaller.

Shouldn't we be beefing up the reserve infantry units and promoting higher levels of more effective attraction, recruiting and an 'outward focus' vs. amalgamation, contraction and an 'inward focus'?  It seems to be more of a marketing and leadership issue than any inherent weakness of the militia system. It feels like a cop out or 'withdrawal in contact'.

True, the British amalgamated several times but it doesn't seem to help with getting the numbers up. You could even argue that, as units with close identities to geographical regions close down, the army becomes even further distanced from its true support base: the public.

If a private sector business wanted more market penetration, they'd open new stores. We should do the same. Given the apparent stress levels in the Reg F re: manning levels, it would also seem to make more sense to diversify our risk and spread the load across more units, or even consider (shock, horror) mobilizing a few reserve infantry units to help take the strain.

I don't think we are contemplating making it smaller, actually.  We're attempting to make it more efficient and effective in terms of its ability to train Res F infantry soldiers.  The theory is that two units each of, say, 100 personnel (each a company minus) that are located close together, or even co-located, will provide better training as a single unit of 200 personnel (a company plus).  The specific point to make is that, being tactically grouped, the two units remain two units from a Regimental identity point of view, but are grouped as a single unit for training and admin purposes.  So...no reductions in size or "community footprint".  In fact, the better training for the soldiers can actually increase both attraction (since we know our best attraction mechanism is word of mouth) and retention.

Standing up new Regiments?  Now, that's an interesting idea.  There are quite populous parts of the country (for example, Mississauga) that have no Res F presence at all.  It's a long and cumbersome trek from Mississauga to Moss Park Armoury, so there's a large potential market for recruits that's, at least arguably, going "untapped".  Perhaps, rather than talking about amalgamation or dissolution, we should be talking about MOVING units from where they're struggling to recruit from a stagnant or even shrinking recruiting base (often in competition with other Army Res units, Naval Res units, etc.), to one that is completely unexploited.

 

[dapaterson]

There are ongoing initiatives to grow existing units in underserved communities.  Getting the approvals to build new facilities in those communities, however, remains a bit of a gordian knot.

Right now the Army Reserve is at or over its target strength.  So most units will be in a mode to recruit for sustainment.  That's just the simple reality - and it's the Government's role to decide and set the desired strengths for the CF.  Certainly, DND/CF can quietly advise behind the scenes, but decisions are made by Government.

 

[daftandbarmy]

Great idea.

Or have existing units open company/ squadron armouries in rapidly growing areas of the country. E.g., The Fraser Valley is apparently the fastest growing region in Canada with an anticipated population of well over 1 million within in 10 years yet, apart from the Westies who have a company in Abbotsford, and 6 Fd Sqn who has a sub-unit in Chilliwack, there is little military presence there. 39 CBG units could each be tasked with standing up a sub-unit there. Many of those who parade in downtown Vancouver based units live there anyways. Despite having a population of over 80,000, there are no military units in Prince George "The Capital of Northern BC". Why? No idea.

Other Bdes could easily do the same I mean, seriously, there are probably enough Newfies in Northen Alberta right now to stand up a Bn of the Royal Newfoundland Regiment  ;D

 

[dglad]

There are ongoing initiatives to grow existing units in underserved communities.  Getting the approvals to build new facilities in those communities, however, remains a bit of a gordian knot.

Right now the Army Reserve is at or over its target strength.  So most units will be in a mode to recruit for sustainment.  That's just the simple reality - and it's the Government's role to decide and set the desired strengths for the CF.  Certainly, DND/CF can quietly advise behind the scenes, but decisions are made by Government.

I'm aware of this.  But units in some parts of the country are having difficulty even offsetting attrition.  There are many reasons for this (focusing on demographics that just aren't themselves growing, and may even be shrinking; too many units for the available recruiting pool; problematic recruiting strategies; etc.)

The ceiling for Army Res strength is another debate.  Perhaps there are some capabilities we don't need in the Res F, which would allow us to strengthen the ones we do.

 

[geo]

I find it odd that, in a time of 'war', we are considering making the infantry smaller.

Shouldn't we be beefing up the reserve infantry units and promoting higher levels of more effective attraction, recruiting and an 'outward focus' vs. amalgamation, contraction and an 'inward focus'?  It seems to be more of a marketing and leadership issue than any inherent weakness of the militia system. It feels like a cop out or 'withdrawal in contact'.

Problem in Canada is with the concentration of "like" units in urban regions... consider that in Montreal, there are( RMR, R de Mais, Fus MR, BW and CGG) a total of 5 infantry units that are all within 5 miles from each other... probably less.  It doesn't make sense.  The largest is at about 250 Pers... the smallest fluttering at 100.

They have the makings of a decent sized battalion and they all live in the same general area - making it eminently possible to train together all the time - should the training stores and training area be able to handle them.

 

[McG]

I find it odd that, in a time of 'war', we are considering making the infantry smaller.

Absolutely nothing is getting smaller.  A lot of these too small units don't have much authorized room to grow.  If you think of  it in the sense of two 24 boxes of beer that are both half full.  If you move all the bottles to one box, you still have as much beer.  However, in reserve case there are a bunch of boxes with only a dozen to half dozen bottles each, but we keep them in thier boxes so that each brand has the glory of keeping its own mostly empty box.

There is also absolutely no latent potential in the existence of a cap badge.  The existence or lack of a cap badge will not affect our ability to force generate additional battalions for war (should the requirement ever come).  That capability comes from our total trained and experienced soldiers.  If we gain more experienced soldeirs from a process that sees few cap badges, we will actually increase our capability.

Regiements are important, but cap badges are are only the deck chairs in developing the Army's future.  A proper force structure is the foundation, and that must be done right even if it upsets a few cap badges.

 

[daftandbarmy]

Seen.

It's just bizarre that here we have authorized units, many based in the largest urban concentrations in the country, who are struggling to find and keep people. It's like we're dying of thirst in the middle of a lake because we can't seem to get to the water. And I don't buy the oft quoted argument that the youth of today don't find the military a popular career option.

Of course, members of individual units will tell you that "we're doing better than those other units" with all the joyful competition that creates, but in general it seems like a bit of a train wreck when it comes to finding and keeping people.

 

[George Wallace]

It's just bizarre that here we have authorized units, many based in the largest urban concentrations in the country, who are struggling to find and keep people. It's like we're dying of thirst in the middle of a lake because we can't seem to get to the water. And I don't buy the oft quoted argument that the youth of today don't find the military a popular career option.

Some of the problems may lie in the lack of access to the Armouries.  As cities grow, the downtown Armoury is further and further from the young Recruits.  Spending a couple hours on public transit, with the problems of no transit after a Parade night, can have detrimental affects on a Units Nominal Roll.  DND has to move some of these Armouries out of the downtown core and out to where the population is.  People really don't want to travel an hour or two through the city to parade, and then the same amount of time to return home.  Some metropolitan areas have transit services ending too early for members to get home.  Long distances in city traffic and lack of parking are also a factor. 

Yes, DND owns some marvelous historic buildings on "Prime Real Estate" in many cities, but if these locations are becoming less accessible to the members of the Units housed in them, then they are becoming derelict.  Money has to be spent to "move out to where the members are".

 

[geo]

Those historical buildings have a multitude of problems when trying to bend them to current military life.....

- QMs down in the bassement - with little or no handling equipment to get said goods from one floor to the next....
- No loading docks to facilitate the loading and unloading of vehicles...
- Classrooms & office space for one company....
- etc, etc, etc.....

Time to hand over those old historical buildings to DHH... time to build or sublet buildings where we need them and in a size / configuration that we need.