Divining the right role, capabilities, structure, and Regimental System for Canada's Army Reserves

[McG]

- Interesting standard - let's hold all units to it, regular and reserve.  Let's put all regular units in competion with other units to see how well they can recruit and retain, then offer them the same future the Camerons face if they can't compete.

You are makeing an apples to oranges comparison.  Regular Force pers get posted to & from units.  Reservists do not get posted and a unit's viability depends on its ability to maintain numbers (amongst other things)

 

[dapaterson]

- By all means, tactically group effective sub-sub units and sub-units into units.  All four or five regiments can compete for the combined command positions, and may the best leaders win.  We STILL don't need to disband units to do that. 

The QOCH has not been disbanded, nor is there a plan to do so.  There will be one RHQ manned for both units, but there will still be two units extant - it's just that one individual will be appointed as CO of both units (and another appointed as RSM of both).  So, should the units grow and prosper (or should there be the need) we can see two LCols and two CWOs again.

No disbandment.  No permanent casing of the Colours.  Just a company-minus (or maybe, better, a platoon plus - and has been such for a decade at least) that's started third-parties on a misleading letter-writing campaign.

 

[TCBF]

I suppose it doesn't have to be, as long as one agrees that every estimate must be situated to save each and every existing regiment.

And that is exactly the mindset that will see the regimental system set aside as an inefficient anachronism when the Army decides that change must be pursued.

The diehards will be hoist on their own petards.

- Here is my short list of "... inefficient anachronism when the Army decides that change must be pursued."

1.  The tank.  (Ooops, they got that wrong).
2.  The A1, A2 and B Echelons (oops, now that we are projecting force outside the wire, we sort of miss those, too).
3.  Medium lift helicopters. (Bye Chinooks! ... Hi Chinooks!)
4.  the QOCHofC...

- Okay, I actually DO agree that we need to exact some efficiencies here and there.  We have, in Canada, amalgamated/converted/reduced to nil strength/disbanded/struck off the order of battle units before and will no doubt do so again.  However, blaming units for poor recruiting when the entire recruiting, training, corporate pay and benefits package is out of their hands is intellectually dishonest.  If we need to save the equivalent of some  LCol's wages, lay off the guys and gals flying the long mahogany bombers somewhere near an OC Transpo route, unless THEY can come up with a revitalization plan to recruit and retain reservists into the presently existing units.  Naturally, it will take political will at a higher level.  It will be much more difficult than slashing a cap badge and claiming victory.

 

[TCBF]

The QOCH has not been disbanded, nor is there a plan to do so.  There will be one RHQ manned for both units, but there will still be two units extant - it's just that one individual will be appointed as CO of both units (and another appointed as RSM of both).  So, should the units grow and prosper (or should there be the need) we can see two LCols and two CWOs again.

No disbandment.  No permanent casing of the Colours.  Just a company-minus (or maybe, better, a platoon plus - and has been such for a decade at least) that's started third-parties on a misleading letter-writing campaign.

- Now THAT makes sense to me...

 

[tomahawk6]

Maintaining nominal regiments just to keep them on the rolls isnt worthwhile from a financial and a manning standpoint.This practice doesnt make sense when the CF is short on manpower and money.Furthmore keeping a two tier reserve/militia system is wasteful.Either do away with the militia altogether or make them a volunteer unpaid force.I would favor disbanding the militia and move personnel into the Pres.

 

[TCBF]

You are makeing an apples to oranges comparison.  Regular Force pers get posted to & from units.  Reservists do not get posted and a unit's viability depends on its ability to maintain numbers (amongst other things)

- "Reservists do not get posted" - Sure they do, just not by the military, but they come and go just as much.  How many RESO officers stay in their same unit after they get their degree?  They follow the job offers to other cities (and hopefully, other units).

- " and a unit's viability depends on its ability to maintain numbers (amongst other things)" - Agreed, but we should not hold a knife to their throats by holding them responsible for falling numbers when the falling numbers are the results of nationally imposed restrictions, cuts and short-sighted policies.

 

[TCBF]

Maintaining nominal regiments just to keep them on the rolls isnt worthwhile from a financial and a manning standpoint.This practice doesnt make sense when the CF is short on manpower and money.Furthmore keeping a two tier reserve/militia system is wasteful.Either do away with the militia altogether or make them a volunteer unpaid force.I would favor disbanding the militia and move personnel into the Pres.

- An interesting - but unnecessary - move.  The CF Primary Reserve is colloquially called "The Militia".  Before WW2, the Canadian military (as distinct from the RCN/RCAF) consisted of the Permanent Active Militia (colloquially called "The Permanent Force") and The Non-Permanent Active Militia", or NPAM.  In other words, 'Regular' or 'Reserve', in 1938, we all would have been Militia of one form or another.  NDA 1949, I believe, changed that.

- Units without people cost little, unless we count the infrastructure, in which case we disband the unit and close and sell the Armoury.  Happenned a lot in the early to mid 1960s, when we lost a LOT of rural and small city units and sub-units.  Something about only forces-in-being needed for the inevitable nuclear war.  We sure could use the soldiers those rural units could have been developing today if they were still with us.  I guess the 'hats were wrong about that too!

 

[Michael OLeary]

- Here is my short list of "... inefficient anachronism when the Army decides that change must be pursued."

1.  The tank.  (Ooops, they got that wrong).
2.  The A1, A2 and B Echelons (oops, now that we are projecting force outside the wire, we sort of miss those, too).
3.  Medium lift helicopters. (Bye Chinooks! ... Hi Chinooks!)
4.  the QOCHofC...

So, the basis of your argument is, since some decisions have been reversed when the situations changed, we should not change anything else in case it becomes necessary to reverse that too?

However, blaming units for poor recruiting when the entire recruiting, training, corporate pay and benefits package is out of their hands is intellectually dishonest. 

At no point have I suggested that a regiment should be disbanded because of poor recruiting.  If any number of units in an area are not up to strength and historically do not maintain a strength close to their authorized number of positions, to me the logical assumption is that they are dividing the potential number of recruits.  This results in a number of weak units where one or more strong ones might be maintained.  This is not essentially a failure to recruit unless you want to suggest that reserve recruiting is nothing more than a contest between co-located units.

 

[Michael OLeary]

- " and a unit's viability depends on its ability to maintain numbers (amongst other things)" - Agreed, but we should not hold a knife to their throats by holding them responsible for falling numbers when the falling numbers are the results of nationally imposed restrictions, cuts and short-sighted policies.

So please enlighten us, under exactly what conditions would you find it appropriate to disband, reduce to nil strength or amalgamate any Reserve unit?

 

[TCBF]

So, the basis of your argument is, since some decisions have been reversed when the situations changed, we should not change anything else in case it becomes necessary to reverse that too?

- No.  I am saying that perhaps if a proper estimate of the situation had been done in the first place, those decisions would not have been made.  However, once made, they must be reversed if needed.  At least we can do that nowadays, without fear of embarrassing certain senior mandarins.

At no point have I suggested that a regiment should be disbanded because of poor recruiting.  If any number of units in an area are not up to strength and historically do not maintain a strength close to their authorized number of positions, to me the logical assumption is that they are dividing the potential number of recruits.  This results in a number of weak units where one or more strong ones might be maintained.  This is not essentially a failure to recruit unless you want to suggest that reserve recruiting is nothing more than a contest between co-located units.

- I agree with you.  Others have implied that a failure to recruit and retain should be considered along with a unit's future.  As for filling only one unit by having only one unit to fill, I fear that we underestimate the attraction/repulsion young men and women may feel for a local unit because of who or where their ancestors served or lived.  Children absorb a lot of standards and beliefs from their parents and the tendency of sons and/or daughters to join a unit because their parent(s) were or were NOT in it (or captured by it!) has not been studied.  Limiting a choice in units may actually lower the number of applicants.

 

[Michael OLeary]

- I agree with you.  Others have implied that a failure to recruit and retain should be considered along with a unit's future.  As for filling only one unit by having only one unit to fill, I fear that we underestimate the attraction/repulsion young men and women may feel for a local unit because of who or where their ancestors served or lived.  Children absorb a lot of standards and beliefs from their parents and the tendency of sons and/or daughters to join a unit because their parent(s) were or were NOT in it (or captured by it!) has not been studied.  Limiting a choice in units may actually lower the number of applicants.

This is another unsubstantiated premise used to defend the existence of existing regiments. How many units reported recruiting difficulties because of this specific reason after any past reorganization?  No-one has yet produced data that proves or disproves this opinion.  How many Reservists simply would not have joined the Reserves if their "father's regiment" did not exist when they were ready to try the army themselves?  Unless it can be proven that this is a significant factor then it is only one more red herring.

 

[dapaterson]

Sigh. The "County Regiments" are great history, but not such great recruiting any more - since Canada is an increasingly urban nation.  Keeping a presence in many far-flung communities is a great idea - but make them platoons or companies of larger units, and bring them together to train in numbers that make it worthwhile.

Last time I checked there was only one unit in all of the Army Reserve that routinely parades at or above 300 personnel on a monthly basis.  That's a solid 2 companies plus a small HQ.  That leaves how many others struggling to field a single company - at best?

 

[TCBF]

So please enlighten us, under exactly what conditions would you find it appropriate to disband, reduce to nil strength or amalgamate any Reserve unit?

- Offhand, I can't think of any at the moment, possibly outside of obliteration in combat, and then only as long as necessary.  I do know, however, that none of the reasons mentioned on this thread are sufficient.  

- But, you know me, I always like to keep an open mind.  If you came up for a reason for any of the above radical changes to a unit that made sense to me, I would be more than happy to agree with you.

- However, as it stands, disbanding a unit merely because it (and or other units) are understrength strikes me as more of a fashion statement than the result of any long term, thought-out study.

- I type this knowing full well what an emotional issue this is.  Every change has unforeseen reactions. The Lake Superior Regiment (Motor) decided to become the Lake Superior Scottish Regiment in 1949, to help recruiting in an area with a lot of Scots blood.  Twenty-five  years later, we joked that we may have gotten more recruits in the seventies as The Lake Superior Finnish/Italian/Ojibway (pick one) Regiment,  but one never knows...  times change.

 

[TCBF]

Sigh. The "County Regiments" are great history, but not such great recruiting any more - since Canada is an increasingly urban nation.  Keeping a presence in many far-flung communities is a great idea - but make them platoons or companies of larger units, and bring them together to train in numbers that make it worthwhile.

Last time I checked there was only one unit in all of the Army Reserve that routinely parades at or above 300 personnel on a monthly basis.  That's a solid 2 companies plus a small HQ.  That leaves how many others struggling to field a single company - at best?

- You raise a good point, as our population shifts, so should some of our Armouries - or, at least build new ones.  Perhaps a system where people in a town with no Armoury could join the SupList reserve, take recruit and trades trg, go on tour, etc.  They cannot parade every week, but they can do call-outs.

- As for a units 'Strength": units have been hobbled by low manpower ceilings and lack of man days for so long that it would be complete folly to even dream of blaming them for low numbers. That does not even hint at results of the "National Climate of Political Leadership" which can deter recruiting by disbanding regiments, delaying incentive pay, closing interesting bases/postings, retiring unique aircraft/ships/vehicles/equipment that young people were interested in working on....  This ain't like Abitibi closing down another paper mill.  The results are much more subtle.

 

[Michael OLeary]

- Offhand, I can't think of any at the moment, possibly outside of obliteration in combat, and then only as long as necessary.  I do know, however, that none of the reasons mentioned on this thread are sufficient. 

- But, you know me, I always like to keep an open mind.  If you came up for a reason for any of the above radical changes to a unit that made sense to me, I would be more than happy to agree with you.

- However, as it stands, disbanding a unit merely because it (and or other units) are understrength strikes me as more of a fashion statement than the result of any long term, thought-out study.

When the population of an area doesn't produce enough recruits to sustain the units in that area, why is that not a valid reason to examine unit structures and groupings and, if a logical analysis supports the decision, to reduce or amalgamate?

If you cannot imagine any reason to eliminate or amalgamate any unit, then there is no use continuing this debate since you have already decided to dismiss any argument.

 

[rifleman]

I'd say disbandment of a unit, reg or res, could be determined if there is no reason to have them and there would actually be some sort of savings. I believe that tactical groupings are a long time coming.

 

[TCBF]

When the population of an area doesn't produce enough recruits to sustain the units in that area, why is that not a valid reason to examine unit structures and groupings and, if a logical analysis supports the decision, to reduce or amalgamate?

If you cannot imagine any reason to eliminate or amalgamate any unit, then there is no use continuing this debate since you have already decided to dismiss any argument.

- I won't dismiss that argument, as it is a good one.  However, where has the population fallen?  Rural Saskatchewan, maybe a few other places.  Winnipeg had a population of 179,000 in 1921, and 633,000 in 2006.  Perhaps a recruiting and retention problem, but certainly not  a shrinking recruiting base.  As a percentage of population, Winnipeg may have a higher military participatory rate than the GTA.

- The REAL problem, is why won't Canadians join - and stay - in their local Militia units? (or the Regular Force, for that matter).  There has to be a national, holistic solution to this.  Dismantling the organization bit-by-bit strikes me as an admission of failure before we have even started to try and solve the problem.

 

[TCBF]

I'd say disbandment of a unit, reg or res, could be determined if there is no reason to have them and there would actually be some sort of savings. I believe that tactical groupings are a long time coming.

- If there is no longer a military function to be performed by a unit in it's present role, then it should be re-roled.  In WW2, The Fourth Canadian Infantry Division became The Fourth Canadian Armoured Division.  In fact, some Canadian Infantry regiments got tanks before some Canadian cavalry regiments did. 

 

[Michael OLeary]

- I won't dismiss that argument, as it is a good one.  However, where has the population fallen?  Rural Saskatchewan, maybe a few other places.  Winnipeg had a population of 179,000 in 1921, and 633,000 in 2006.  Perhaps a recruiting and retention problem, but certainly not  a shrinking recruiting base.  As a percentage of population, Winnipeg may have a higher military participatory rate than the GTA.

- The REAL problem, is why won't Canadians join - and stay - in their local Militia units? (or the Regular Force, for that matter).  There has to be a national, holistic solution to this.  Dismantling the organization bit-by-bit strikes me as an admission of failure before we have even started to try and solve the problem.

Attraction, recruiting and retention may be a national problem which equally affects Reg and Res, but that doesn't eliminate the immediate issues of understrength units competing for recruits.

In an earlier post you brought up the concept of decisions being reversed when situations changed, and supported that idea in a subsequent post seeking clarification.  Don't pass off changes to the Reserve structure now as "dismantling" and "admission of failure" when reversal is always possible.  Unless, of course, the argument is again going to get hung up on protecting cap badges rather than positions for soldiers.

 

[TCBF]

...  Unless it can be proven that this is a significant factor then it is only one more red herring.

- Agreed.  Bring on the consultants and operational analysts and let the study begin.  I can live with the unbiased results, whatever they end up being.