• Thanks for stopping by. Logging in to a registered account will remove all generic ads. Please reach out with any questions or concerns.

Divining the right role, capabilities, structure, and Regimental System for Canada's Army Reserves

  • Thread starter Thread starter Yard Ape
  • Start date Start date
TCBF said:
- Agreed.  Bring on the consultants and operational analysts and let the study begin.  I can live with the unbiased results, whatever they end up being.

And hopefully they will not end up beached on the same shoals as previous viability studies.

And in the interim, we cannot expect the chain of command to simply postpone any and all decisions while waiting for study results in the hope that all will agree to them, because that's never going to happen.  Supporting the idea of studies for their own sake has an way of being used to postpone decisions in the hope that the perceived "enemy" will move on before an unwelcome decision is reached.
 
Michael O`Leary said:
Attraction, recruiting and retention may be a national problem which equally affects Reg and Res, but that doesn't eliminate the immediate issues of understrength units competing for recruits.

- No it does not.  So let's get going and take effective national action, instead of ineffective local action.

Michael O`Leary said:
In an earlier post you brought up the concept of decisions being reversed when situations changed, and supported that idea in a subsequent post seeking clarification.  Don't pass off changes to the Reserve structure now as "dismantling" and "admission of failure" when reversal is always possible.  Unless, of course, the argument is again going to get hung up on protecting cap badges rather than positions for soldiers.

- We should make potentially damaging changes without scientific study and not worry about the results because we can always change it back if it does not work?  I disagree.  Ideally, we don't make the damaging changes to start with.  Making them and having to change back later is a worst case scenario, not a rational 'Plan B'.

- The symptoms are poor recruiting and retention.  What is the illness?  Do we treat the symptoms or the illness?
 
In the case of Winnipeg are they really fighting for recruits? or are they getting twice the number? Some people might be swayed by the chance to wear a shirt? ( I know its a kilt - just some old rivarly dies hard ;D)
 
Michael O`Leary said:
And hopefully they will not end up beached on the same shoals as previous viability studies.

And in the interim, we cannot expect the chain of command to simply postpone any and all decisions while waiting for study results in the hope that all will agree to them, because that's never going to happen.  Supporting the idea of studies for their own sake has an way of being used to postpone decisions in the hope that the perceived "enemy" will move on before an unwelcome decision is reached.

- Well, dammit, yeah...

- So: What is the DS solution?  Without throwing out the baby with the bathwater.  Evolution, not Revolution?
 
- Units without people cost little, unless we count the infrastructure, in which case we disband the unit and close and sell the Armoury.  Happenned a lot in the early to mid 1960s, when we lost a LOT of rural and small city units and sub-units.  Something about only forces-in-being needed for the inevitable nuclear war.  We sure could use the soldiers those rural units could have been developing today if they were still with us.  I guess the 'hats were wrong about that too!

I agree.That is the strength of our National Guard and Reserves.We still have those small town armories.
 
TCBF said:
- So: What is the DS solution?  Without throwing out the baby with the bathwater.  Evolution, not Revolution?

It is very unlikely that there is a rubber-stamp "DS Solution".  More likely, there are a dozen possible solutions depending on different local circumstances, each of which could result in a stronger organization.  These could include, but not be limited to:

* Reduction to nil strength
* Amalgamation
* Dispersal of sub-units to viable recruiting areas
* Move of units to viable recruiting areas
* Re-roling
* Creation of new units/sub-units to match population demographics

I would suggest a comprehensive solution addressing various local problems across the country might involve any and all of these possible solutions.
 
Okay...I've been off these means for a long time (for a variety of reasons).  I drop back in and, wham, here's a topic that's near and dear.

Interestingly, the tone of some of the posts in this thread seem to suggest the Camerons are "going away".  They aren't, in any way, shape or form.  They are going to be tactically grouped with the RWR's, which for the most part means they are going to share a common C2 superstructure.  The advantage is the collectivization of training between the two infantry units in Minto Armoury; this will result in greater numbers involved in training, and economies of scale in training administration.  A similar situation currently exists in Saskatchewan where, for some time now, the Royal Regina Rifles and North Saskatchewan Regiment have been tactically grouped under an N Sask R unit HQ.  Likewise, the artillery units in 38 CBG (10 Fd Regt, 26 Fd Regt and 116 Ind Fd Battery) have been tactically grouped for several years in the 38 CBG Artillery Tactical Group (ATG).  Both of these latter examples are highly successful.  I just attended Ex Prairie Defender 08 in Dundurn, and was witness to the impressive results achieved as a result of the Saskatchewan inf grouping.  All of the inf from 38 and 41 CBG on the ex performed well, but the Saskatchewan units' performance was exceptional, in no small part because of the advantages of training larger number of infantry soldiers together, under a common C2 infrastructure, through their IBTS and other gateway training that led up to Prairie Defender.  I would note that the RRR are still very much alive and well in terms of their Regimental identity, in spite of being grouped with the N Sask R.
 
Michael O`Leary said:
It is very unlikely that there is a rubber-stamp "DS Solution".  More likely, there are a dozen possible solutions depending on different local circumstances, each of which could result in a stronger organization.  These could include, but not be limited to:

* Reduction to nil strength
* Amalgamation
* Dispersal of sub-units to viable recruiting areas
* Move of units to viable recruiting areas
* Re-roling
* Creation of new units/sub-units to match population demographics

I would suggest a comprehensive solution addressing various local problems across the country might involve any and all of these possible solutions.

- I know which ones I would try first, but that is a good start to a comprehensive list.

- dglad's post is heartening.
 
tomahawk6 said:
I agree.That is the strength of our National Guard and Reserves.We still have those small town armories.

I would suggest this is an example of the American culture of Civic Nationalism in action. Canadians for the most part are not motivated by the same sort of ideas of community, duty and civic responsibility as our American cousins (especially Americans who live outside the major urban centres). This may be one of the systemic reasons our Reserve system has recruiting and retention issues; "we" think the solution is to better compete with McDonald's for bodies when the sort of person who we should be looking for thinks of service in the military as a vocation rather than a part time job.
 
Thucydides said:
... Canadians for the most part are not motivated by the same sort of ideas of community, duty and civic responsibility as our American cousins...

- Not to sure about that.  I DO know we don't articulate it all that well.
 
As someone who prefers the British/Canadian "regimental system" and spent my short militia career in a unit that was lucky to muster a full platoon for training, I have to reluctantly agree that re-orgs/amalgamations/nil strengths/disbandments should be something to consider.

I am proud of the history of my regiment in the Interior of BC, and would hate to see it amalgamated or disbanded, but sometimes those are the proper options to take.  The regimental system here and in the UK has been constantly evolving over the centuries.

I had read earlier in this thread that the RMRangs and the Seaforths were tactically grouped under a single HQ.  Is this the way of the future?  Or amalgamation?  I would hate to see my old regiment disappear, but the regimental system must evolve to the present realities if it is to survive.

My 0.94 Afghanis...

EDITTED TO ADD:  My old regiment was created by amalgamating several independent rifle companies throughout the Kootenays and Okanagan.
 
I agree. I don't agree with this tactical grouping business. I think we should just amalgamate the regiments. Platoon and company size units are ridicolous.
 
ArmyRick said:
I agree. I don't agree with this tactical grouping business. I think we should just amalgamate the regiments. Platoon and company size units are ridicolous.

Tactical grouping is, by far, the more palatable option from a wide number of points of view.  Amalgamation, disbandment, etc. are certainly other options, but they involve much more "friction" in implementing.
 
Sometimes the truth hurts. I look at pretty much all of our regiments. They have changed in few or many ways since their first ancestory units came about. Sometimes the changes are super ficial like cap badges being modified or in other cases, They amalgamate and form new regiments.

Look at the Lorne Scots, formed 1936 from 3 other units. Those units had proudly fought in the first world war and many volunteers had served in the Boer war. Did we dishonour their sacrifice by amalgamting them into a new regiment? No, not at all.

Our reserve regiments need to get off this holy-er than though can not touch our regimental heritage business and accept changes. Amalgamation is the best process in my opinion because it keeps alive the tradition of the existing units (Like a marriage) when they form a new one.

I think simply disbanding or reducing to nil strength some units would be a greater sin.

Lets move forward, shall we?
 
MCG said:
Effectiveness is the biggest pay off.  How effective is a platoon sized regiment when it comes to developing company and battalion skills?  How effective is a vertically linear chain of command when it comes to producing CWO, Maj & LCol?  If tactical groupings only serve to ensure reserve battalions are regularly able to put real companies in the field on a weekend ex, then we will have introduced a significant improvement in effectiveness of force generating capabilities.

I had my last weekend ex as a reservist this weekend...

I would agree from what I saw with everything you just said, as watching a company attack done by people who were only used to platoon minus tactics proved to be a slaughter- even when they were only up against a section of OPFOR.

From my observations, there were often companies composed of platoons from 2-3 different regiments. Many of the soldiers were so fresh that they had barely done platoon level training, and it was clear that the different sub-sub units had not had time to practice enough together. They basically all fought their own little section or platoon level battle, uncoordinated.

Maybe time to start training us all together a little more often, whatever way it has to be done. An extra weekend a month wouldn't hurt either..a few hours prep for the year doesn't do much...

Blah two cents from a maggot...


P.S There were enough Snr Officers and RSM's kicking around to lead a REAL brigade, at least we have one thing right!  ;D
 
popnfresh said:
P.S There were enough Snr Officers and RSM's kicking around to lead a REAL brigade, at least we have one thing right!  ;D

No, we're not doing it right.  How many of those LCols have actually commanded a Bn - or even a real Coy?  And for how long?  A weekend doesn't cut it - there's all kinds of shortcuts we take on a weekend ex that would leave the platoon / company / bn in a world of hurt if we tried the same things on a longer time period - that's especially true in the support aspects of the jobs.  So let's ask the same of the "RSM"s and their past - have they been a real CSM for a prolonged period of time?

We do experience on the cheap for senior leaders, leaving them without the experience to be effective leaders.  But because we must constantly meet the churn every 3 years for another LCol and another CWO we promote the last one standing, or people without enough practical experience at their rank level.

But then we have the dilemma - those who reach senior ranks came through that system, so it must work, because they made it, right?

No names, no pack drill:  When a full Colonel can't bother to learn how to pronounce the name of the individual he's appointing as the CO of one of his units he's surpassed by far his maximum level of incompetence.  But those events occur and recur because no one is willing to say "51 Infantry Bns in the Reserves?  Bullspit!" and take appropriate action to ensure a system and structure that fits our numbers.  If the government wants a Reserve Force of X thousand soldiers, build a structure to fit, with appropriate leadership - and don't perpetuate every unit and its brothers just because at some point in the past 200 years they may have done something.


 
dapaterson said:
No, we're not doing it right.  How many of those LCols have actually commanded a Bn - or even a real Coy?  And for how long?  A weekend doesn't cut it - there's all kinds of shortcuts we take on a weekend ex that would leave the platoon / company / bn in a world of hurt if we tried the same things on a longer time period - that's especially true in the support aspects of the jobs.  So let's ask the same of the "RSM"s and their past - have they been a real CSM for a prolonged period of time?

Sorry sir, I guess my sarcasm wasn't as easy to detect as I had hoped, but your thoughts have summed up what I meant. ;)
 
How is removing cap badges going to increase the amount of time reservists train? or the level which they train?

As for moving forward, the appears the reserves have...tactical groupings
 
How long does a "tactical grouping" have to remain in place before people admit its an amalgamation in all but name?  If tactical groupings are created because certain units have been unable to maintain personnel numbers or a credible line of succession and have no foreseeable way to recovery, than what is the point in dancing around the issue to please the "protect the badges" crowd?  How few cap badges need to be present to still say there's a second unit there at all?
 
Back
Top