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Thinking about the Infantry Attack

In my sect, I've been trying this work for the last little while and it's been working.  Rather than the textbook B A C D frontal that we all know and love, I have two independent teams - my support team & assault team.  My two C9s, 1 grenadier and 1 2ic are in the support, everyone else is in my assault team.  Sup keeps the en head down, aslt flanks and attacks.

I've found that you need a very switched on 2ic to control the support.  And good communication.  I've also found that it's very easy to get the assault team over extended, esp if the en force waits until you're right up on them or if they have hidden positions. Four guys aren't enough - an extra fire team w/ assaulters would sure help.  With FRS radios between the 2ic and myself, it's easy to C & C.

With the good Sgts point, about changing platoon tactics, this would definitely change the platoon.  Rather than one firebase and three sections to kick around, th Pl Comd could have more than one smaller firebases, each able to concentrate fire on different positions.  The Pl 2ic would need to have a very reliable method of controlling the sect 2ic / secondary fire base comd, as would the Pl Comd when they're assaulting though.  Am I making sense here?
 
That's the problem; unless you are doing the experiments (and proper experiments with WES or Miles gear and O/C's to record the action), it is really hard to describe some of these things. I may think I understand what you are saying Booya, but until I see the video, I may just be blowing smoke. BTW, good work on the experiments. Also well done for your unit giving you the leeway to try this out.

One possible way to think of this is to "stack" the sections, so the lead section outflanks/neutralizes a position, then the next two slide through the hole and continue the advance. Since the ideal is to demoralize the enemy and force them to abandon the positions through fear and panic rather than at the point of a bayonet, the platoon 2I/C's job may be to husband the resources to deal with potential counter-attacks, and drop off the resupply "package" to the re-orging section as the platoon moves past.The Pl Comdr will be near the front of the stack to monitor the action, vector in outside resources if req, and prep the two sections for the next bound.

I think something like this would work both for mech and light. Mech units have the luxury of attached firepower from their LAV, while light forces should have speed and stealth on their side.
 
I have two independent teams - my support team & assault team.  My two C9s, 1 grenadier and 1 2ic are in the support, everyone else is in my assault team.  Sup keeps the en head down, aslt flanks and attacks.


    Sounds good, but in my opinion, I tell my section that they will probably never be a scenario where a lone section has to conduct a frontal. Especially when there are larger weapons assets within the Pl. A section attack, in my section, is rehearsal of a Pl attack. I'll explain battle drills 1-4 are if the section is in the support base within the platoon, and 5-7 are id they are in the assault group. To spend the time and energy on "experimenting" is lost effort, you should be doing that at the platoon level. I do agree with Majoor.. good for you for at least making training more fun.
 
Rounder said:
    Sounds good, but in my opinion, I tell my section that they will probably never be a scenario where a lone section has to conduct a frontal. Especially when there are larger weapons assets within the Pl. A section attack, in my section, is rehearsal of a Pl attack. I'll explain battle drills 1-4 are if the section is in the support base within the platoon, and 5-7 are id they are in the assault group. To spend the time and energy on "experimenting" is lost effort, you should be doing that at the platoon level. I do agree with Majoor.. good for you for at least making training more fun.

You know, I hate to sound like I'm contradicting points I made earlier in this same thread (I also believe that you can't entirely separate the sect attack's "format" from that of the pl or coy), but I don't entirely agree.  I concur that frontals at any level are usually to be avoided, but I don't agree that there will NEVER be a scenario in whch a lone section has to conduct an attack, frontal or otherwise.  In very close country or urban terrain, it's a very definite possibility.  And even in more open country ops, the sect having some ability to conduct independent manoeuvre, within a zone of responsibility that, itself, is part of a pl's zone of responsibility, which is part of a coy's, etc. is a good thing; the job of the higher levels is to keep things joined up and coordinated with higher assets (more direct fire wpns, indirect fire, etc.)  The essential thrust of this thread was that the sect attack should evolve beyond rote drills (which are useful for teaching the basics) to more flexible, more innovative approaches.  As long as the bigger picture is kept in mind, that's probably a very desirable thing.
 
Just my two cents. I think the idea we teach troops that a section is never on the battlefield by itself and therefore in war would never perform a section attack (be it frontal or flanking) is WRONG !
We should really look at how we are doing operations these days.
How many times (be it Bosnia, Kosovo, A-stan or East Timor) do we find a section out doing a patrol even if it is with a LAVIII ? It happens quite alot. Now think about the current threat wich is most likely going to p@ssed off beligerents with AKs or a suicide bomber. This more than likely would happen (or has in some cases) in an urban setting. The idea of the "lone enemy OP engaging us on a plain empty field" is silly.
However IMO, those drills we teach troops on QL3/SQ/BIQ (depending on what generation you are) is a good training tool. Once in an operational unit (battalion) then section commanders should practice "out of the box" scenarios.
 
Once in an operational unit (battalion) then section commanders should practice "out of the box" scenarios
.

Agreed.  Moreover, the chain of command must give junior leaders the time and space to try out those ideas, and in the spirirt of mission command, accept when things don't go as planned - in training.

I have a theory that if a Coy has 5 trg days, 2 go to the Sect Comd, 2 to the Pl Comd, and only one to the Coy Comd.  Trg is about trying stuff out, and perfecting what works.  In order to do that, a comd needs both time and space...

 
The biggest problem with that scenario is the "hit all the check boxes" mentality. I did five months of pre training for ROTO 13, and to tell the truth, it seemed rushed because of all the directed training we were to do, and all the various "check box items" (for want of a better term), that we had to hit. As a result, our training was broad, but not very deep. If a leader was not good at a task (and I fumbled on a few occasions), there were very few opportunities to go back and do the task over again, much less try various permutations.

Perhaps an analogy is in order: A peasant on a battlefield in the middle ages could flail away with a bill hook or other large, sharp agricultural instrument and be quite dangerous to anyone who got in the way. If the peasant was lucky, his lord may have arranged for some limited training by a Sergeant or mercenary soldier, so he would know a set of offensive and defensive moves, increasing his effectiveness against the opposing rabble.

Of course a knight or samurai warrior, with a lifetime of training behind him had the knowledge of parries, blocks, countermoves and strikes to weave through the simple strikes and blocks a peasant could use. One on one, the trained warrior had the knowledge and practice to mow down lesser opponents, and could comport himself well against multiple opponents as well.

My advice to anyone planning an exercise or training scenario is to SLOW DOWN and exercise a few things very well, rather than try to cram in too much. We want to make contact on our terms, not be mowed down like a bunch of peasants on teh 21rst century battlfield.
 
I concur that frontals at any level are usually to be avoided, but I don't agree that there will NEVER be a scenario in whch a lone section has to conduct an attack, frontal or otherwise.  In very close country or urban terrain, it's a very definite possibility.



    In a PSO we're trained to form an inner cordon and break contact. You are right, it isn't impossible, but it is seeming more unlikely.
 
Rounder, send me an email would ya please ? I am curious who you are? Cheers Rick Waechter.
 
An interesting topic, as seen by the varied replies and potential threads.  I am new to the forum, and Army.ca in general, so take my comments as you will.  I will state that I am currently posted to CMTC, in Wainwright.  For those of you who have not had the pleasure, wainwright appears to be a prison camp, form out of the 40's, wait a second that's what it was.  Anyway, CMTC's concept is to put tactics to the test, utilising the newest and most up to date WES system.  Now I could go into all kinds of detail about the system, but that could take a while, I will answer any questions to the best of my abilities, as they roll in.

Now, the WES system here will enable the OC(Observer Controller) to properly debrief the troops at all levels, right down to the lowly Pte.  This will allow all to see the effects of a sect atk on an OPFOR, that will have varying mandates depending on the training required by the unit going through at that time, anywhere from terrorist type atks, to full fledged force on force of equal capabilities.  The system tracks every player on the battlefield, including Vehs, and will allow AAR's to include what the attack looked like tactically on a map displaying the units movement down to the individual.  So the doctrine of the Sect Atk, will be put to the test repeatedly, and allow CMTC to upgrade or change doctrine as required.

In my opinion, and my experience the Sect Atk has changed over the last 16 years, from flankings right through to frontals, which from my perspective are only limited by the leader of the Atk, the leader and individual soldier must still use his/her initiative to use the ground to the best of thier abilities, leaving the 'frontal assault' to much interpretation, it's only a frontal in the sense that the section remains inline with itself, for the most part, but can, and does, approach the En from whichever direction is most tactically sound.

So should there be changes in doctrine, all I can say is that in the next few years that answer will be addressed by the activities at CMTC, starting next week with the first trials of the system and techniques of the OC's

 
This is just my 2 cents worth.  There are a multitude of ways to conduct a section attack, but I think that Jnr Comds do not get enough practice to try new ways of doing them, especially in the reserves. In my unit it's about keeping the young soldiers interested and lesser to improving Jnr Comds. Does anyone else have a similiar perspective from the Reserves.

Some of my Jnr Comd only get to do section attacks while attending or teaching on courses, and with the limited training and attendance we have in the reserves, some comd's may only do 1 or 2 attacks per year. I guess what I am saying is that Jnr Comd's need practice as do all soldiers, and what we as Comd's can provide for them and not burn them out either.

 
DGlad has expounded repeatedly on what I think is a very valid point - that section attacks for the most part do not occur in a vacuum.  Even if a section is forced to fight its own tactical battle at some point, it will do so as part of the larger platoon and company battle.

Going on this idea, and applying the principal of preparing all your leaders to fight two levels up, perhaps our training of the section commanders should start at the company level.  Teach prospective section commanders the principles of company and platoon level tactics and techniques; only after this is done does the course move into a detailed examination of what the section can do.  The purpose of using a philosophy like this is not so much to ensure that section commanders can lead a company if need be (although in a truly FUBAR situation, it may be necessary) but to ensure that section commanders are given a framework with which to guide their tactical decision making by.

I think that simply taking prospective leaders into the field and having them fumble around with a rifle section does nothing to teach them on how the section fits into platoon and company battlespace and doctrine.  By adhering to a "two-level up" philosophy, we are giving our section commanders a better appreciation for how their level of command interacts with notions such as the commanders intent and the main effort, etc, etc.

Cheers,
Infanteer
 
Ah the thread that never dies. What are we up to now 2100 + pages views and over 90 posts. One hopes that amongst those lurkers are some that can actually take the ideas being put forward here and implement them.

I've been meaning to add another two cents worth to this debate for a bit now and every time I sit down to write it out, someone beats me to the punch, or adds another point that is worth a comment.
So bear with me a bit as this post may make Le Miserables look like a bathroom break read.

First of all let's deal with the gadgets and high tech ideas floated about like HUDs   to improve command and control. Lets try not get too wrapped up on the Starship Troopers gear. It will eventually come at it's own pace. The Infantry has been around since the first Neanderthal picked up a piece of lumber and went to take and hold the second Neanderthal's cave.

Some of the kit presently issued and talked about elsewhere on the board makes me a bit jealous
when I compare it to what I was issued in the 1970s and 1980s. I'm sure a WWII vet would make
similar comments about the "kit" available in the seventies and eighties.

Lets also not get too impressed with the gee whiz kit in and of for itself. History is full of examples of motivated â Å“stone ageâ ? armies defeating well equipped â Å“modern high tech onesâ ?, Abyssinia, Afghanistan, and Vietnam come to mind. Or as a old crusty Sgt once put it to me. A modern GPMG with all the bells and whistles is absolutely useless if the gunner is blazing away in the wrong direction and the enemy sneaks up behind him and bashes his head in with a rock.

Re improved comms at the section level an excellent idea to improve the tactical flexibility and options at that level. I've never understood why in this day and age I can have a cell phone that can call almost anywhere in the world, from anywhere in the world, take pictures, play games and a bunch of things I still haven't figured out at an almost unbelievable cost, and is small enough to continually misplace, Yet the Army can't come up with a decent personal radio?

Again though there are/will be some drawbacks that will need to be worked out.

I had a keen section commander in my company who went out to Radioshack and grabbed one of those walkie talkie sets usually used by parents to keep track of the rugrats at Canada's Wonderland. We gave him the ok for him and his 2ic to use it on an FTX and afterwards I asked him how effective he thought it was.

He said that while it improved direct comms between the two of them, overall comms in the section was less so. Also his situational awareness was lower. They were so busy chatting that they were not able to watch their arcs, the ground etc. Sort of a tunnel vision effect. Mind this is something that could be worked on with training.

Re comms security, encryption, and proper voice procedure. Is this really an issue at the section level in a quick attack. We're not talking Bde HQ here. If some Intelligence types on the other side pick up the following conversation tidbit:

"Joe watch right"
"Bob pop a couple of rounds into those bushes to your left."
"Harry cover, I'm changing mags"
"Everyone we go on three, ok"

and then can use it to seriously hamper an entire formation then we have more important things to worry about than the section attack.

More than one person has suggested going away from the present 2 "mini sections" fire groups back to the old style fire support group, manoeuvre group. Personally having used both, I think that the present two mini sections each built around a C9 is a better more flexible organization, but the whole idea is to allow the comander on the ground the option to use what he feels best as warranted by the situation ( bear with me on this).

That organization was needed with the old C2 because honestly you needed two of them grouped together to provide a decent amount of firepower. With a belt fed real machine gun backed by 3 automatic assault rifles one of which has an integral grenade launcher, do we really need that formation?

It was suggested at one point that the Brits were going back to it. Can't remember if that line of thought was followed up on here though. Last I heard the Brits were adopting the FN Minimi (M249/C9) at the section level in addition to their LSW, at two per section. I presume that the mag feed LWS would then become a designated marksman wpn in the section with it's heavier barrel, bi pod etc.

This seems to go with the org they and we now use of 2 fire groups. Incidentally this was first used by 2 Para in the Falklands. Prior to that the Bits used the fire group/rifle group with the former built around an FN Mag 58 GPMG at the section level commanded by the section 2ic. 2 Para doubled the number of GPMGS per section, developed tactics to go with this new org and the rest is history.

Incidentally the after action report from that conflict makes good and still valid reading for the employment of light infantry in a low intensity conventional conflict.

Infanteer (I believe) brought up the classic Zulu tactic. This know as the Horns of the Buffalo or Horns of the Bull Buffalo was actually a "brigade" level formation/tactic using 4 or more Zulu Impis or regiments (bns). Mind it could be adapted to a Coy or even Pl level tactic.

Basically they would advance in a three up one in reserve formation. The centre unit (the head) would initially engage the enemy and try and lure them forward. The two flanking units (the horns) would make a classic pincer movement to cut off and surround the enemy. Then the fourth unit, (the loins) usually the largest r heaviest would then move forward and destroy the enemy. As a character in the movie Zulu said" bloody simple" but also "bloody effective."

There has also been put forward the idea that sections will never fight by themselves so therefore developing/improving   section tactics is not needed. I noticed someone beat me to it in debunking this. Two example in modern conflicts that involve a "section commanders war" were the Brits in Northern Ireland in a mainly urban (Belfast and Derry) but some rural (Armagh) environment. Second was the bush war in Rhodesian from 1965-1980. The Rhodesian Light Infantry and other security forces units often fought at the section/stick level (4-8 men usually commanded by a very junior NCO) without immediate support from higher (Pl or Coy)levels.

I choose both as similar to the type low-level operations we may see ourselves involved in, and arguably have been in the past 10 years.

Even if the others and I are wrong and the only conflicts the Canadian Army sees itself involved in are large sweeping conventional battles ala the Second Canadian Corps in Western Europe in 1944-45,
does anyone seriously believe that at some time a section commander is not going to find him/her self stuck out there and forced to think and fight on his own.

Even if not it's a moot point. One of the underlying ideas of this thread was to develop good leadership skills. Last time I checked good section commanders often go on to be good platoon commanders and/or 2ics. Bad ones presuming they live past their first mistake do not.
(end pt 1)
 
(Part 2)

I knew this board wouldn't let me get away with posting all this in one thread.

So where do we go from here. We need a multifaceted approach to training the section and section commander. At the first level we stay with the basics, as is the case now. Weapons handling (all weapons), marksmanship, fire control, fire and movement, field craft, etc etc.

At this level we stay with the â Å“text bookâ ? scenario noted often enough here of one or two enemy crouched under the tree or bush right at 12 o'clock on the axis of advance. They'll stay there unthinking, unmoving and not reacting and â Å“dyingâ ? gloriously for the cause as the section overruns them. Noting new at all here and what is taught at the Battle School (TQ1/QL3 or whatever it's called this week) level right.

We keep working on these basics, using blanks, MILES, Simmunition and eventually live fire to hone and maintain these skills. The simple drills we've developed are taught and practiced until the soldiers are so comfortable with them that they react instinctively, like oh a drill movement.

Now we move it up a notch. Same text book scenarios, not too imaginative but we change the environment. Section attacks in thick woods and/or jungle, urban settings, mountains (if available). We also do them at night.

Sure odds are that we won't be conducting a section attack in these conditions but there are always exceptions to the rule, and the purpose of this level is to build the self-confidence in the basic drills and to start people thinking outside the box. At the very least I'd include winter ops here if nothing else. Someone noted on another thread it's a skill set that has atrophied recently due to other demands. Anyone remember how much fun fire and movement was in snowshoes.

Next and final stage is where the â Å“text bookâ ? goes out the window. By this time the section and section commander is pretty confident in their skills so we need to challenge them before they become overconfident, stale, and ineffective.

Now the notional enemy may not be hiding under the lone bush at 12 o'clock. They open fire from the left/right or both flanks. They are dug in maybe in depth and/or there are more than one or two of them. They don't stick around but fall back and hit and run if the suppressing fire isn't sufficient to keep them pinned. During the reorg, an enemy force then immediately hits the lead section having just gone through the attack while they are vulnerable. All the scenarios and horror stories noted earlier can be tossed into the mix at this stage.

The initial result may well be chaos. With control breaking down and that's fine. This is training and we want to make mistakes here and not on the two way range. From this the section now begins to come up with options. What works, what might work, try it, debrief, talk about it, and try something else? After awhile the skill set and confidence in the skills and capabilities will again be high.

At this level with â Å“enemyâ ? popping up all over the place you obviously can't use live fire, but MILES and other simulations will help somewhat. The idea to is to show options to improve the ability to react to differing situations and apply those parts of the basic drills that will work.

Also at this level you'll see the section commander trying new organizations (and being allowed to do so) to suit the ground and/or tactical situation such as discussed here, fire groups with both C9s, designated section marksman etc.

Here too we can really increase the realism of the training too. How often do we really practice the resupply, and dealing with casualties and POWs? Toss them into the mix, so that they are not unknowns. Everyone should be up on their combat FA skills and simulated casualties in the middle of the attack are another factor that has to be practiced and dealt with. Odds are you are going to lose some people in a section attack. How do you deal with it, how does it affect you plan especially if they are key people that go down (M203 or C9 s or the Sect Comd or 2ic)?

You'll note I keep saying section and section commander. For this to be really effective the sections have to remain together as long as possible to really develop a group cohesiveness. I realise that's not an option especially with under strength reserve units who often may have to cobble ad hoc sections together for weekend training. The better the troops know each other and their commander the faster and easier goes the training and overall the more effective it is. Mind that's not rocket science and we are all aware of it.

Even if you have to break this rule, use it as a training aid. Sections platoons etc that have taken casualties will have replacements right and the level of training, experience and expertise may not be the same. Another factor that can be â Å“practiced.â ?

Concurrent with this is the development of thee leadership skills. I've seen too many threads and comments here about â Å“I'm only a Cplâ ? or â Å“it's a gimme rank.â ? That is so much Bovine fecal matter. The reality of the situation is that M/Cpls and Cpls in the Army are in command roles. In combat that reality will become even more so.

Some do well some do not. For most it's a matter of training, confidence in their skills, attitude, and experience.

In an ideal world we would have all our Sections with Sgt commanders and M/Cpl 2ics both qualified (ISCC) and all sorts of other skills. Better yet every 031/R031 would be qualified ISCC immediately after they become qualified Infanteers. Unrealistic I realise for many reasons, logistics, costs, and the simple fact some people are just not capable of the decision-making and leadership skills required.

What we have to do to the best of our ability is continue to try and train two up. As noted A Rifle Company is four casualties away from being commanded at least for a while by the CSM, a section two from being run by a Private. More importantly if you're taking those sorts of casualties the person who steps up to the plate better be really good at it, because obviously the original plan has gone seriously wrong.

Anyone who's reading this and or contributed to the thread who is a section commander stop and ask yourself this question. Can everyone in my section do my job? And I mean in a firefight for a few rather hectic and frightening minutes, not 7/24 in garrison. Can they call in and direct indirect fire support? Can they look at ground, and make a good combat estimate? Can they make changes quickly in plan (as I said if you're out of it chances are your original plan is kind of useless too)? Can they control the section? Can they give orders and expect them to be followed? Basically can they lead?

If they can't all or some, who can? Can the others be brought up to that level? How? If only some are they in a position to take over?

Those not in a command role ask yourself the same questions, could you do it? If no why not? Could you be trained taught to do so? How much effort and/or time would it take?

Remember if that trained Sgt or M/Cpl (presuming that there was one in command in the first place) is hit, the 2ic is usually not in a position to immediately take over. After the firefight and the objective is taken, then he/she becomes the section commander. Before that odds are it will be someone else a senior (or not) rifleman.

Integrating this into the training at the earliest levels is really not that hard to do. I know of some units that have done so in the past. You start at the tes\x book level giving everyone a shot at being 2ic or Sect Comd just as you do being the C9 gunner once they've learned the basics. Move up to the level where the text book is tossed our and repeat. Time consuming yeah, but this is our bread and butter.

At the very least you are talent spotting and beginning to develop your NCO cadre early on. Better yet you know you have effective sections that can do the job if and when the boss goes down.

The Canadian Corp came up with this concept prior to Vimy. Studying the Imperial British Army techniques of everyone follow the educated chap with the swagger stick into the MG fire and when he gets chopped stand around with your finger shoved up a convenient orifice until killed worked so well at the Somme, that us amateur colonials decided to try something else. Realising that in war one might actually take casualties, the units at Vimy went through extensive prep training where everyone knew everyone else's job. Cpls and Sgts had the basic idea of how to command and fight Platoons and Companies and Ptes Sections just in case they had to. Time to get back to that.

Ok thanks for bearing through that 2,800 odd words of drivel. If I'm way off base here or just restated the bleeding obvious let me know and I'll crawl back under my rock.

 
Just to add a comment here from reviewing some stuff on the RAF Regiment and it pertains both to Danjanou's comments pertaining to MaxFlex and also to the discussion about the use of the G-Wagen.

The RAF section is 8 men organized in two identical 4 man bricks.  They conduct foot and vehicle patrols.  They have access to both Open and Hard top Landrovers.  Two Land Rovers are assigned per section, 1 per brick.  For airfield security missions the seem to use the open  Land Rovers - presumably because the enemy is at a distance.  In urban settings they use the armoured hard tops - protects them from kids throwing bottles and bricks amongst other things. 

Same section different vehicles for different duties.

Another variant for section operations is when an urban area patrol is conducted two rifle men will dismount from each vehicle and form a composite brick of 4 while the two vehicles each with a driver and a man out the hatch will orbit the area the foot patrol is operating in as a pair.

Just another couple of observations -  how many situations and how many drills are we up to now?  Anybody keeping count?

Cheers.
 
Danjanou,

Great post - obviously it aged with time, as you pondered whether or not to post.  It has given me a lot to think about in terms of how to train, and many elements of this post may appear in the future should I ever be in the position to implement them.

Dave
 
We are all orbiting around the same basic ideas: more and better training, focus on the leadership aspects, give the section commander more flexability to experiment with doctrine, and take a look at how emerging technologies can help/hinder the soldiers in the fight.

What is needed to really keep going with this is for readers/posters of this thread to get out and actually implement these ideas at whatever level is possible. (Since I work in the G-6 branch of a Bde HQ, I will have to conduct the mission with briefing notes and emails while setting up for a deadly flanking in the CAJ).

Given the speed and flexibility of modern communications, those of you in the field either in units or working at the MTC in Wainwright can keep us appraised of your ongoing experiments and work. Not only will lessons learned be passed on faster, but it should also spark new ideas. Prediction, if we work at this seriously, section battle drills and Pl level tactics could be reformulated in about two years. This wouldn't be CTC DS solution type stuff, but more a corporate understanding that the majority of sections and platoons have and use.

If the idea of "Two Up" training is seriously entertained at unit level (even just taking section commanders into the Coy CP during a TEWT or CAX), then we should start seeing benificial results in a three to five year period, as these sergeants and MCpls are promoted and move into higher level positions (especially those who CFR)

Since technology is not going to wait for the CF, personal investments in "field" items will have dividends. During pre training for ROTO 13, I found myself as acting Pl Comd in a defensive position, which was "bumped" that night. With the lack of TCCCS radios and NVG's in the Pl, I pulled in people to act as runners a la WWI, while savvy troops used their digital cameras in "night" mode as NVG substitutes, and FRS radios to keep section integrity. It was a complete kludge, but it worked. Find what works and share it !
 
Danjanou said:
Re improved comms at the section level an excellent idea to improve the tactical flexibility and options at that level. I've never understood why in this day and age I can have a cell phone that can call almost anywhere in the world, from anywhere in the world, take pictures, play games and a bunch of things I still haven't figured out at an almost unbelievable cost, and is small enough to continually misplace, Yet the
Army can't come up with a decent personal radio?

Again though there are/will be some drawbacks that will need to be worked out.

I had a keen section commander in my company who went out to Radioshack and grabbed one of those walkie talkie sets usually used by parents to keep track of the rugrats at Canada's Wonderland. We gave him the ok for him and his 2ic to use it on an FTX and afterwards I asked him how effective he thought it was. He said that
while it improved direct comms between the two of them, overall comms in the section was less so. Also his situational awareness was lower. They were so busy chatting that they were not able to watch their arcs, the ground etc. Sort of a tunnel vision effect. Mind this is something that could be worked on with training.

Re comms security, encryption, and proper voice procedure. Is this really an issue at the section level in a quick attack. We're not talking Bde HQ here. If some Intelligence types on the other side pick up the following conversation tidbit:

"Joe watch right"
"Bob pop a couple of rounds into those bushes to your left."
"Harry cover, I'm changing mags"
"Everyone we go on three, ok"

and then can use it to seriously hamper an entire formation then we have more important things to worry about than the section attack.

I think with more practice on when to use radio or not, troops will figure out when to use radio (ie when the noise is too loud or a fireteam is detached from the sect, etc). Troops jabber probably because they're not used to having a radio.

I personally don't like yelling long distance to get a message across, it having to pass through several people and precious seconds to get to me. :)
 
Danjanou - I wish we had officers that believed in realistic training.  Myself and a few of the other Snr NCO's in my Regiment were 'brought up' by a WO that served in Africa (RLI and South Africa), and he tried to teach a lot of these lessons to us, but he ran into constant roadblocks both by the officers (who I think were intimidated) and by the old school reg force guys who had the attitude of "that's the way we did it in 1978 so that's the way we do it!" Unfortunatley those young officers are now in command roles and they want to get to coy/bn level ops right away, forgetting that they still have only a platoon or two to work with. Another roadblock is the concept of 'rehearsing' for evaluation exes. Last year all of our patrolling ex's were basically dress rehearsals for Cougar Salvo. There was no imagination or originality at all. After 17 years a guy starts to get frustrated, I believe it's only a matter of time in this modern world when our tactics will get tested. I have had a taste already (Medak) but it was only a whiff. I agree with you, we need to train hard, and realistic. The two maxims that come to mind are - 'you fight how you train' and 'the more you sweat in training, the less you bleed in war'. Anyway, rant aside, we try to implement this type of training at some level, but they want to do too much with not enough training days.
 
<OK. here comes the black hatter with his hands in his pockets>

First, I have to say I'm very impressed with the length and expertise that has evolved here. I've tried to drop in from time to time, and have to admit, I haven't thoroughly read through it all. So that's my disclaimer.

I'm not overly versed in section attacks for obvious reasons and I hope I'm not oversimplifying things with my next comment.

In the Corps we also have "Drills" for doing our various tasks. One of the hardest things we have to do is to train the young Crew Commander that a "Drill" (not talking gunnery here BTW) is not the hard and fast way a particular task has to be done. It is to be used as a guide, but changed for the particular situation. We use - Warning, Security, Recce, Plan - as the way of doing things. Where the - Plan - is how to best apply the particular "Drill", modified or not. Perhaps one of the ways to change the rigid mindset of "it has to be done this way, cause it's the "Drill" would to simply stop calling it that. Just my $00.02

Hope that made sense, and now, I'll let India get back to sorting his world :)
 
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