Only in a very restricted setting (woods, urban and similar) is a section likely to actually have to manoeuver on its own, and then the ranges and intervisibility would be far more equal.
I'm not sure I buy this. Looking at the plethora of historical examples provided in some of the literature I've got concerning section level tactics, countries which adopted section level maneuver within their doctrine used it to great success throughout a variety of situations. The weapons of a section include grenade launchers, machine guns, rifles, grenades, and cold steel if need be; as such, a section is clearly capable of utilizing a combined arms approach to an enemy threat. The key of a combined arms is not that different systems are used in concert, but that they are combined in both time and space to present multiple and yet different threats to the enemy in such a manner that to adequately deal with one he must expose himself to the other.
In the scenario that Danjanou presented above, the lone rifleman hiding in the grass is clearly able to counter the threat posed by the section advancing across the grassy field because the section tactics were used in a the fashion of "supporting arms"; each group within the section took turns at presenting a threat to the enemy in the form of a smattering of rifle fire and LMG bursts. However, properly concealed and with a good firing position, the enemy was clearly able to deal with the each individual threat (1 Group or 2 Group) in succession and was not very vulnerable in his position to the equal firepower presented by either group - end result, his superior position and a poor use of tactics resulted in clear defeat of a superior force (8 - 1).
A lone rifleman should not be a platoon sized objective. Looking at it from the standpoint of a combined arms approach by a maneuverable section, the situation may have panned out differently. Rather then fanning out in arrowhead en masse and moving together across the field, the section, in an unequal, two-element format as described in the first post in this thread, leapfrogs its assault group and its support group across the field. When effective enemy fire is encountered, the section commander quickly assesses the situation and determines the course of action.
The support group, armed with two LMGs and two Grenade Launchers, is capable of putting down a high degree of suppressive fire. Even if it cannot determine the exact location, the indirect nature of machine gun bursts and 40mm grenades lobbed in the general direction of the enemy should provide an appropriate threat to the enemy. The assault element, with three or four men armed with grenades (offensive and defensive) and rifles, is quick and mobile and relies on its ability to quickly close distance and assault as its threat.
In this situation, the support group may go firm and start flinging down some ordinance in the direction of the enemy fire. The assault group may pull back and attempt to skirt around the position. Even if the assault group cannot determine the exact position of the enemy, by the fact that it is quickly moving into the enemies rear should provide a good psychological effect on him due to the fact that his rear has suddenly become his flank.
The combined arms approach is utilized perfectly. If the enemy rifleman moves to escape the firepower of the support section or to suppress it somehow, he leaves himself open to the quick moving riflemen of the assault section. If he attempts to ward off the assaulting rifleman, he risks encroachment by the fire of the support section. In this situation, the platoon commander may elect to come up with the Platoon Marksmen, presenting a third form of threat (long range, accurate fire) to the enemy and making his position even more untenable.
The key is to give section commanders the capabilities and the leeway to figure out what solution will work best. Saying that "section boundaries will always be X meters" or "this tactic will probably only be used in close terrain" acts to limit the usefulness of a technique and the creativeness of a commander. It assumes that we will always engage the enemy on our terms.
Clearly, each tactical situation is unique and as such demands its own approach for success. I believe the key to doing this is to train section commanders to use good judgement and to train them to be unorthodox if they have to; their overall goal is to defeat the enemy. Since they are the sharp end of the spear, they will often have a good idea on how to do so if they are adequately prepared, tactically and doctrinally, before going into battle. The section level battle (and these do exist, there are many examples in this thread), like any other battle, is won by the creativity and boldness of the commanders, not by the breadth and depth of manuals, PAMs, and drill solutions.
Danjanou said:
Most of us are on the same page in this discussion, which is a good thing. Question what is the next step?
Good point Danjanou. We can all state our positions until the cows come home, but unless we propose solutions, we are just "spinning our tires in the mud."
From my understanding of history, following the development of the section in WWI, there were three paths taken. The French Army looked on the section as an indivisible whole; the lowest level of independent action was to be the Platoon. The Germans were the opposite. The Section was the lowest level of tactical maneuver; as such, they were always attempting to use maneuver to successfully exploit the notion of combined arms (like the pincers quote I put above). The British took a middle road, and this is the path we naturally followed and inherited.
As Michael O'Leary so clearly points out in his essay, our Army has left this notion and gravitated to the path that the embodied the tactics of the French Army. The Canadian Infantry section is not seen as an independent unit of maneuver, but rather an indivisible block that is used by the platoon commander. All the section commander does it determine at what level and pace the section advances forward at.
I believe this is the wrong approach to tactics. As I quoted before, there are two types of tactics "good tactics" and "bad tactics". Reducing a section to only being able to advance in extended line upon the enemy is as foolish as ordering a platoon commander to line his sections up and attack frontally in every scenario. Not only does the historical record show that section level manever often leads to more effective platoons (in the case of German and Israeli infantry tactics), but the ever increasing diffusion of the modern battlefield as a response to modern firepower makes the likelihood of the section level battle even more pronounced. Here are a few examples that come off the top of my head:
- An urban scenario in which the platoon is fragmented among different buildings
- Difficult terrain, in which the immediacy of a battle and the possibility of a platoon flanking may be impossible due to terrain realities
- The advance may be so fast that to deploy a platoon in a hasty assault may waste valuable time in taking out a lone enemy that the section is capable of defeating if employed correctly (using combined arms). Likewise, a section may be scouting or patrolling and find itself required to defeat an enemy on its own.
- Even in more simple terrain (like the plains of Wainwright) the Platoon commander may be faced with more then one threat, as a result his section commander must deal with the lone position while the Platoon commander takes his support and the other sections to face a more immediate threat. Battle on open terrain will not always be laid out according to standard Canadian practice like so:
Y - lone enemy position
X - support section
X X - flanking sections
The tactical situation becomes completely different when the following is inserted
Y - lone enemy position
X - support section
Y - flanking enemy fireteam X X - flanking sections
(In this case, the Platoon may have advanced into a "cauldron", effective platoon level tactics breakdown in the face of multiple threats and company level tactics may be unavailable in the near future)
To me, the solution starts with the idea that tactical training should be based upon instilling the notions of tactical understanding, sound judgement and decisive action upon section commanders. The current approach is to ground repetitive procedure, methodical textbook approach, and checklist solutions to tactical training. Although, like we have all agreed, this is useful for developing an elementary understanding of section level tactics, it quickly becomes irrelevant to a more advanced appreciation of the topic.
There should be no right or wrong methods of utilizing the section in battle; the validity of one's method can be judged by its results (for which WES like MILES are very helpful). If a section commander failed to check off all the boxes in the evaluation and yet kills the enemy without a casualty, he passes; likewise someone who personifies school-defined standards and gets high grades for the school solution and yet has his entire section destroyed should be considered a failure.
As well, section tactics should be taught and evaluated using a variety of enemy postures. Enemies will not always be dug in on a hill by themselves. Enemies should counterattack, withdraw, attack, cover eachother, etc, etc - just like we would fight. Some may argue that this reduces the objective nature of evaluations in that some may get harder tests then others, but if structured properly, a good commander who thinks should be able to consistently come out successful while a poor commanders lack of tactical ability will become apparent, no matter how easy a fight he is given.
One method I've seen constantly pop-up in literature on tactical training is the notion of the "staff ride". Not even requiring troops or enemies, the instructor takes his troops into the field and walks through the terrain. Throughout the walk he will put a student on the spot. "What would you do a lone enemy started firing from this direction.", What would you do if you heard enemy tanks on that ridgeline". Students are timed and must make spot decisions. As scenario's develop, the instructor can throw "curve balls" in to assess how the student will adapt to friction and sudden changes in a fluid battle. "You've moved to attack and encounter a minefield, what do you do now?"
The purpose of such training is to evaluate and refine the capabilities for judgement within the aspiring commanders. As a course moves into actual exercises with troops, weapons and WES, and enemy forces, the focus on the judgement of the leader will still remain formost in what the instructors should evaluate, only now the scenario has become much more demanding with confusion, casualties, and a thinking enemy who reacts to ones decisions.
Battle is a form of human interaction. As such, it is not a "science" that can be taught and formulated through concrete laws; as a form of human interaction it is made up of a multitude of psychological, social, cultural, political, moral, and physical factors which give every battle its own unique nature. Our teaching of tactics at any level should reflect this idea.
