Thinking about the Infantry Attack

[Spooks]

To comment on some divertted topics here:

As for attacking the unsuspecting trench diggers and them not knowing what is going on and failing to return fire in an effective amount of time - this is because RoEs are never clear especially for a group of candidates going through the training system.

For example, during out BIQ defensive we were everywhere. Instructors were yelling at us why we were not shooting at the enemy and things along that line. First, you never knew 'what' the enemy really was during that whole ex. Aside from the fact that EnForce lived in a 10man tent about 50m away from the command tent, with them coming and going to prep for furutre activites for us didn't help since you didn't know if they were attacking or coming in from ambushing your recce unit that was out on patrol. You have their vehcicles always coming in and not (which strangely are also your vehicles that you use) along with brass coming out for a peek at the new troops by driving right across your front or something like that.

The en would have the same uni on as us, use the same tactics (ie. the frontal section attack). After attacks, they would come up on the position to talk to the PlCmdr and some who were cocky would shoot you in your trench as they passed though because you shot at them a hundred times with mere blanks, they were obviously alive and could do so. That brings up the ineffectiveness, esp during the training phase on the method of conducting the section attacks with mere blanks. We're taught the theory of it all but come time to practice it, it is less than spectacular. With a section and WeapDet laying down on their position with an impressive amount of firepower they can still go to a knee and doubletap every 3 seconds without us having the effect that 'Hey, he died under the initial doubletap-dash-down'.

The best training we did though (aside from half of it being a little outdated) was trench clearing and FIBUA. In trench clearing, EnForce was given the go to 'think'. They would throw/kick our grenades back at us, lob smoke to our position to blind us, gas us so we had to mask up, work in teams, and so on. That forced us to think as we acted and everyone learned a lot out of the day. In FIBUA, the EN was given the same freedoms, granting them the rights to toss grenades from the top floor to bounce to the bottom floor from which we were advancing, to hide behind some very good shelters protecting them from the initial grenade toss (forced you to make sure you clear your corner), or even, dare I say, move. They even left the building catching out flankguards off-guard and were able to reinsert in an already clear area of the house. After each bout (in which we used different tactics each time) we were all taken outside and shown physically the fatalities and injuries. It showed that when you didn't watch your arcs and the en popped out killing 5 of you, that those 5 people could have changed the 50% survival rate to maybe a 60%.

My four rubles
-Spooks

 

[Scoobie Newbie]

Infanteer with regards to your post and emphasis on Sgt's leading I couldn't agree more.  It is sad to note however that the leadership is now not being promoted on merit but on TI or the need to fill a position.  This can lead to people who through no fault of their own are thrown to the wolves with minimal experience.

 

[HollywoodHitman]

The section attack is still an excellent means of training troops proper reaction to effective enemy fire. It's the responsibility of the commanders to ensure that their troops and NCO's aren't frontal attack drones. Imagination and effort is all it takes. Empowering NCO's to react and counter attack is also the responsibility of the commanders as is the ingenuity of the OPFor. War is not meant to be fair. There are rules of course....Or are there? The enemy will likely not fight conventionally, so the NCO needs to be able to think outside the box and fight the enemy on their level.....But the soldier needs to think inside it first, learn the conventional methods, and develop the basics in order to grow out of it. Some excellent points made by all of you. Enjoyable reading.

 

[rw4th]

I'd like to add one thing here I didn't see mentioned. I think in any force-on-force training it's important for the OPFOR to have a designated mission of their own, and to â Å“play their roleâ ? so to speak. What does this mean? Well, if the ex calls for an assault on a defensive position, then the OPFOR should have a designated area to defend.  They can and should defend it intelligently, but they need to be â Å“in characterâ ? and remember that their job is to defend it, and not use â Å“guerillaâ ? tactics to ambush the attackers and then fade away. As part of the training scenario, the theoretical context they are operating in should be expressly stated: for example â Å“They are manning trenches as part of defensive position that covers area Xâ ?.

When playing OPFOR it's easy to just make an a** of yourself, but it's much harder to be an intelligent enemy that provides soldiers with a valuable training experience.

The problem as I've experienced it, is that very few leaders are properly trained to plan and organize force-on-force training. As stated the enemy force is told to just sit there like fig. 11 targets while they are attacked. If they are given more freedom then that, they are rarely given any context for their action, resulting in disorganized chaos.

 

[Infanteer]

Your 100% correct RW4TH.

Freeplay training, if unconstructed, can result in a glorified and expensive game of paintball - with the end result of know real training value involved for any of the participants.

The Maneuver Warfare Handbook gives good references to successful freeplay exercises run at various levels by the US Marine Corps during the 80's.  The biggest success story was 2nd Marine Division; it CO, General Al Gray (future commandant), managed to surprise his unit by parachuting a formation from the 82nd Airborne into the middle of his units force-on-force exercise.

A free play, force-on-force exercise should be structured for each participating unit to learn certain aspects of the phases of warfighting; they can be given orders from higher up (defend this bridgehead, take the junction, advance to that grid) while the free-play aspect of the exercise allows the commanders to use their head to figure out the best way of doing so.

 

[dglad]

Hey all--

Unfortunately, thinking about the "section attack" as something unto itself is somewhat specious.   It is extremely unlikely that a single section would ever undertake an attack on its own (specific instances, maybe--a fighting patrol, for instance, or a fleeting opportunity, or reaction to an ambush).   The "section attack" is a useful training vehicle for teaching soldiers the fundamentals of individual fieldcraft (selection of fire positions, fire and movement in pairs, groups and teams, etc.)   It's also good for teaching, and building the skill-levels of section comds.   But a section would operate in the context of a platoon, and that of a company, etc.   That's a key point to remember when discussing the section attack as an actual offensive operation, and not just a training device.

When I was a sect comd, and was taking part in, say, a pl attack, I would work with my fellow sect comds (including the wpns det comd) to coordinate our actions, and that in the framework of direction from the pl comd, the pl WO.   As we worked together more and more, we got used to operating as a team, using sections and the wpns det as components of something greater than the sum of its parts.   This stuck with me later on, as a pl and a coy comd.   I'll be the first to say that a division attack is really a series of coordinated section attacks, but the fact is that they're coordinated, with each piece benefitting from the contributions of its fellows.

To me, the more interesting question is, are we approaching offensive operations generally from the correct philosophical direction?   We are pretty fixed in our idea of frontages, combat power ratios, etc.   But MILES is a brutal and unforgiving player in the game; it isn't unusual to finish a "successful" attack with 20, 30 or even 40 percent friendly casualties.   That simply isn't acceptable.   Rommel, in his book "Infantry Attacks", underscores the role of some fundamental principles of manoeuvre warfare normally applied to much larger scale ops to the small unit.   He demonstrates the use of intense firepower and deception to isolate small pieces of a larger enemy, gain lodgements by pushing forward small groups of attackers, and exploit with other through the resulting gaps.   This wasn't theory; Rommel employed tactics like this against Italian defenders in WW1 time and time again.   This wasn't the head-long steamroller...this was a carefully orchestrated, very deliberate picking apart of defenses by creating gaps and exploiting through them.   Rommel's idea was to fix the enemy, both physically and psychologically.   Individual enemy soldiers, or small groups of them, would retain the ability to manoeuvre, but Rommel strove to make that manoeuvre largely irrelevant by defending or doing economy of force things in those areas he hadn't chosen to isolate and attack.

Do we view the battlefield at the small-unit level correctly?   Do we consider how to properly use suppressive fire?   Do we look at ways to break the battlefield into smaller, more manageable pieces, or do we simply hope for a flank or else resign ourselves to going "up the middle" (again)?   And do we really give adequate weight to things like deception and psychological fixing at sect, pl and coy levels?   Frankly, I think it's time to reconsider our whole philosophy of ops at the low tactical level, because in many ways, that's where the war is really fought and won.   How much of what a section does should be drills, and how much should be given over to the creative thought and imagination of its leader and its members?

 

[Infanteer]

It is extremely unlikely that a single section would ever undertake an attack on its own (specific instances, maybe--a fighting patrol, for instance, or a fleeting opportunity, or reaction to an ambush)...
But a section would operate in the context of a platoon, and that of a company, etc.   That's a key point to remember when discussing the section attack as an actual offensive operation, and not just a training device.

Unfortunately, that is a misconception that history seems to delight in proving wrong.    The notion of the "emptiness of the battlefield", the increasing diffusion of soldiers on the ground due to the increasing lethality of modern firepower, will only serve to further exacerbate this trend.

Despite the fact that we may intend for a set-piece battle utilizing the coordination of platoons and companies, at times the friction of combat intercedes.   English and Gudmundsson, in On Infantry site numerous examples of where German tactics prevailed over more linear French and British approaches which insisted on viewing the squad/section as an indivisible, linear unit in the field that was incapable of handling an independent task.   The larger, clunkier platoons were tactically out-maneuvered by independent sections utilizing fire and maneuver and driven by their commanders intent to outflank their opponents; this was implicit in doctrine which gave each German platoon a healthy number of belt-fed machine guns and the impetus to get get in behind their opponent and break down any sense of cohesion.   As On Infantry points out;

For the Germans, who explicitly rejected linear forms of warfare in the first postwar edition of their infantry training manual, the metaphor corresponding to the French idea of the barrage was the pincer.   At every level, from squad up to the division, the idea underlying tactical action was trapping the enemy in both claws of the pincer.   In the attack, this often took the form of fire and maneuver, with the fire of one element occupying the enemy while the other worked its way forward to a spot from which it could deliver a decisive blow.   In the defence, the pincer idea underlay both the way in which counterattacks were conducted and the manner in which they fit into a larger scheme for trapping the enemy....
What was different about German tactics that emerged from the Great War was the integration of small pincer maneuvers into larger ones.   that is to say, the pincer maneuvers of squads and platoons formed the arms of the pincer maneuvers of battalions and regiments and the maneuvers of battalions and regiments formed the arms of pincer maneuvers of divisions."

On Infantry: pp 40-41"

Obviously, the underlying tenet is that the Infantry is capable of greater tactical success if it infuses into its doctrine the notion that the Section is an independent unit of maneuver.   German tactical advantage, both in the evolution of Stosstrupp tactics in WWI and its natural progression into WWII, provides weight to this claim.   The Russians and the Japanese also excelled at section level tactics when they were not committed to suicidal charges, although they focused more on the infiltration as opposed to the envelopment and assault.   The Israelis have also shown tactical expertise in the past at using independent sections to seize difficult objectives.

We are pretty fixed in our idea of frontages, combat power ratios, etc.   But MILES is a brutal and unforgiving player in the game; it isn't unusual to finish a "successful" attack with 20, 30 or even 40 percent friendly casualties.   That simply isn't acceptable.

Exactly the point I am trying to make.   Perhaps the fact that their is a very real belief in our Army that the section is not a maneuver unit has led to what Captain O'Leary highlights in his article; namely, tactical stagnation, looking at the section attack, as you say, only as a mean to instruct on fire and movement and not as a way for the section to achieve tactical dominance in battle.   In refusing to recognize the Section as such, we limit its capabilities and the capabilities of our Section commanders and have regressed to the point where we line up in extended file and advance, no different then the tactics of the Great War.

 

[dglad]

Unfortunately, that is a misconception that history seems to delight in proving wrong.    The notion of the "emptiness of the battlefield", the increasing diffusion of soldiers on the ground due to the increasing lethality of modern firepower, will only serve to further exacerbate this trend.

Despite the fact that we may intend for a set-piece battle utilizing the coordination of platoons and companies, at times the friction of combat intercedes.  

No dispute, and I think we run the risk of ending up in heated agreement.   I by no means suggest that sects are "sealed" into rigid lock-step with one another, as are pls with pls, and so on up the tactical scale.   I fully believe that the sect is capable of a degree of independent manoeuvre.   But that manoeuvre, even in the "empty" battlefield, will be in a context and will be subject to inputs from things like tactical info and direct and indirect fire from sources outside the section.   We can't go TOO far down the road of enabling the sect as an independent entity, because a sect has very limited capabilities re SA, C2 and, in particular, sustainment.   Your quote from On Infantry even states "the pincer maneuvers of squads and platoons formed the arms of the pincer maneuvers of battalions and regiments".   That's the context piece I'm talking about.

Now, having said all of that, I still think that the basic philosophy underlying our smallest-scale inf tactics are flawed.   We have developed sect "tactics" as a series of stilted, predictable drills.   I think this is where we agree...there needs to be much more flexibility in the sect, with its soldiers and leaders being given the latitude to use their knowledge, experience and imagination.   I remember, for instance, learning as a young C2 gunner, to maneouvre the C2 group around separately from the riflemen, under the comd of the sect 2ic.   I've heard some discussion about using the C9s the same way (and they're much better suited for this, being belt-fed and not the clunky 30 rd mag monstrosity that was the C2), but I've never seen it tried (maybe it has been, in which case I'd be keen to hear some WES-enabled AAR)   Actually, the most innovative and interesting sect tactics I've seen are in FIBUA; sect comds in my coy on URBAN RAM came up with some weird and wonderful solutions to the tactical problems posed by the urban environment, all on their own.   But they still did so in concert with their fellows, when and how it was appropriate.

 

[Infanteer]

DGlad:

I think we are both arguing for the same thing here, we just hammered at it from a different angle.

We can't go TOO far down the road of enabling the sect as an independent entity, because a sect has very limited capabilities re SA, C2 and, in particular, sustainment.   Your quote from On Infantry even states "the pincer maneuvers of squads and platoons formed the arms of the pincer maneuvers of battalions and regiments".   That's the context piece I'm talking about.

I concur.   I do not argue that Infantry Sections will be out fighting their own battles a la Starship Troopers style.   I think you addressed the crux of this issue best with your questions of "Do we look at ways to break the battlefield into smaller, more manageable pieces, or do we simply hope for a flank or else resign ourselves to going "up the middle" (again)?   And do we really give adequate weight to things like deception and psychological fixing at sect, pl and coy levels?

The need for section training to train smart commanders who are flexible with the fighting tactics of their section is that the tactical situation may require the platoon commander to break his platoons up and have his sections fight independently (I can think of a few attacks in my time where this would have been the better way) while other situations may call for the platoon commander to dispense with section movement altogether and conduct a platoon infiltration.  Even within the context of a platoon attack, however, the terrain or the enemy disposition may leave the section without the support of it sister sections.  In this case, the section commander has to be smart, recognize that a full frontal will not generate the requisite amount of suppressive fire, and alter his tactics accordingly while keeping his commander's intent in mind.

The thrust of my argument is that we need to train section commanders to be prepared to do any and all of these, to think about the tactical situation he is entering.   Situations won't always be one section supports, two and three section flank; yet for some reason this is all I've done both platoon and company attacks.   As Ghost pointed out earlier these approaches fail quickly when casualties start to mount.

What I gather from our posts is that we are both trying to say that:

Yes, the frontal section attack is useful for training troops on the basics of fire and movement.
Yes, the frontal section attack is useful introducing leaders to the basics of section command.
Yes, the frontal section attack has applications to some sorts of tactical situations (sudden flank contact...dare we say, ambush?).
No, the frontal section attack isn't the only acceptable way of handling a section in battle, whether it be an isolated attack (section infiltration) or part of a company flanking.

Nicht ein Schema!

Now, having said all of that, I still think that the basic philosophy underlying our smallest-scale inf tactics are flawed.   We have developed sect "tactics" as a series of stilted, predictable drills.   I think this is where we agree...there needs to be much more flexibility in the sect, with its soldiers and leaders being given the latitude to use their knowledge, experience and imagination.   I remember, for instance, learning as a young C2 gunner, to maneouvre the C2 group around separately from the riflemen, under the comd of the sect 2ic.   I've heard some discussion about using the C9s the same way (and they're much better suited for this, being belt-fed and not the clunky 30 rd mag monstrosity that was the C2), but I've never seen it tried (maybe it has been, in which case I'd be keen to hear some WES-enabled AAR)   Actually, the most innovative and interesting sect tactics I've seen are in FIBUA; sect comds in my coy on URBAN RAM came up with some weird and wonderful solutions to the tactical problems posed by the urban environment, all on their own.   But they still did so in concert with their fellows, when and how it was appropriate.

If you have the time and energy (and if you haven't already), I would recommend reading Captain Michael O'Leary's two-part article on the section attack that I have linked to on the original post in this thread.   It covers in detail the points you have brought up here.


Anyways, let me formally welcome you to Army.ca.   You picked a good topic to make your entrance on.

Cheers,
Infanteer

 

[PPCLI Guy]

Great thread - and I will read Capt O'Leary's article in the next couple of days.  Having said that, I have observed that this discussion seems to have assumed that tactics at any level will be conducted in a contiguous battlespace - which I believe to be a false assumption.  In the complex non-contiguous battlespace, we will spend much less time worrying about frontages and the like, as we shift our focus from the ground to the effects that we will have on the enemy (a la Effects Based Operations, the mantra of the USAF).  Moreover, in a Krulak 3 Block War battlespace, I believe that tactical commanders at all levels (including the section) will need greater latitude in how they achieve their mission, and a much greater understanding of the higher commander's intent.  If we are to change anything about the way that we train, I recommend that we focus first on truly inculcating (vice institutionalizing the level of lip service that we pay to) the concepts of Mission Command.

 

[dglad]

I think part of the problem is that we really do consider the section attack to be a simple drill.  We don't, institutionally, give due consideration to creative tactical thinking at sect level (or pl, for that matter.  You should have seen the reaction I got as a coy comd when I suggested my pls experiment with putting the pl WO in the assault element, rather than in the firebase.  But we've always put him in the firebase...!)  Your point about pushing msn comd down to the lowest tactical level is well-taken.  I actively pushed msn comd thru professional devt in my unit, and always included the sect comds.  I think the result was more empowerment among my sect comds and more confident NCOs as a result.  I'm very pleased that some of those NCOs are now employed on ATHENA, doing things one wouldn't have expected from a Res F NCO even just a few years ago.

I also agree that the realities of the new sorts of security environment in which we'll likely be employing our forces include asymmetry, non-contiguity, uncertainty and a healthy dose of "non-traditional" elements (civilians, neutral combatants, "hands-off" buildings like places of worship and heritage sites, etc.)  Oh, and don't forget the media.  We talk a lot about the "strategic corporal"...now we have to start incorporating him/her into our training!

 

[PPCLI Guy]

Hmm.  I'm not so sure about assuming that drills are a bad thing, and would hate to through out the baby with the bath water.  Drills, like a plan, give you a "common basis for change".  Moreover, in a pinch, you can always fall back on a drill.  If you can activate a drill (or prearranged play for those who like sports analogies) quickly and efficiently, is it not just possible that you will get inside the OODA loop of the opposing Comd, who is busy trying to develop a detailed plan?

As to Mission Command, I had a lot of exposure to it when commanding a Coy in the Royal Green Jackets (who profess to have invented mission command style leadership - they call it the "Thinking Rifleman").  Translating the buzzword into action is difficult, and calls for a true culture shift.  If you can schedule a Regimental Parade for 1300 hrs, and at 1257 the parade square is empty, and at 1300 the Regiment is formed up - then you have a unit that truly understands mission command.

 

[dglad]

Hmm.   I'm not so sure about assuming that drills are a bad thing, and would hate to through out the baby with the bath water.   Drills, like a plan, give you a "common basis for change".   Moreover, in a pinch, you can always fall back on a drill.   If you can activate a drill (or prearranged play for those who like sports analogies) quickly and efficiently, is it not just possible that you will get inside the OODA loop of the opposing Comd, who is busy trying to develop a detailed plan?

Drills form a useful point of departure, I agree.  In some cases (Ambush right, charge!) they're definitely the way to go.  But my experience with sect tactics in the Cdn Army is that they rarely go beyond drills.  And that rote application of the section attack "recipe" is what often leads to the horrific casualties in WES-enabled exercises.

 

[Infanteer]

Having said that, I have observed that this discussion seems to have assumed that tactics at any level will be conducted in a contiguous battlespace - which I believe to be a false assumption.  In the complex non-contiguous battlespace, we will spend much less time worrying about frontages and the like, as we shift our focus from the ground to the effects that we will have on the enemy (a la Effects Based Operations, the mantra of the USAF).

 

I don't think that assumption is here, rather I think that is part of the reason why we are discussing this topic.  As I said previously, as firepower increases, infantry combat may be seen to increasingly move towards more dispersed fighting in complex terrain.  Command and Control and reliance on higher unit support will put more responsibility upon section commanders to think and act with regards to employment of tactics.

DGlen's example of Rommel's experience in Caparetto serves as an excellent example of this idea.  The German Fourteenth Army faced brutal terrain that did not support linear tactical and operational approaches.  As a consequence, initiative was pushed down (the German Army's development of the Stosstruppe tactics facilitated this) and units where given the notion that maneuvering to the next crest or peak was more important then throwing one's strength against the dug in Italian positions.

Moreover, in a Krulak 3 Block War battlespace, I believe that tactical commanders at all levels (including the section) will need greater latitude in how they achieve their mission, and a much greater understanding of the higher commander's intent.  If we are to change anything about the way that we train, I recommend that we focus first on truly inculcating (vice institutionalizing the level of lip service that we pay to) the concepts of Mission Command.

Agree with you 100%.  However I believe that in order to truly inculcate such principles, they must be viewed as part of the whole in which they originate from, Mission Command (Auftragstaktik) and its opposite, Order Command (Befehlstaktik), were two complex ideas from a whole framework which the German's referred to as Kampfkraft (Fighting Power).  As such, you can't cherry pick and take one without consideration of the others, you must consider the entire system, how it evolved and how it is applied, to see how each piece fits.

Hmm.  I'm not so sure about assuming that drills are a bad thing, and would hate to through out the baby with the bath water.  Drills, like a plan, give you a "common basis for change".  Moreover, in a pinch, you can always fall back on a drill.  If you can activate a drill (or prearranged play for those who like sports analogies) quickly and efficiently, is it not just possible that you will get inside the OODA loop of the opposing Comd, who is busy trying to develop a detailed plan?

Drills are good for techniques.  When we teach weapons handling, we teach drills so that soldiers acquire an automatic response to a stimuli.  Drills are effective in this case in that there is very little variation in the stimuli (bolt fully forward, bolt fully to the rear, bolt partially forward) so as to allow the drilled response to be an effective "catch-all".

Tactics demand more then drill.  Every tactical situation is unique based on factors such as terrain, enemy situation, friendly situation, mission, weather, etc, etc.  As such, the variation in stimulus and requirements for successful reaction is so varied that a clear thinking process is required.

Like I mentioned before, tactical drills have utility for elementary training purposes and basic field SOP's (seek cover under effective enemy fire), but I wouldn't want to go to far from there.  Even tactical drills that seem to make sense (Ambush Left!) can be dangerous, as any smart enemy can recognize a drill as a predictable automatic response devoid of thought and plan accordingly.  I've seen written accounts or Vietnamese forces, knowing full well how American ambush drills were carried out, would purposely set an ambush off to get Americans to charge in extended file into the ambush in order to funnel them into prepared killzones.

 

[Kirkhill]

don't think that assumption is here, rather I think that is part of the reason why we are discussing this topic.  As I said previously, as firepower increases, infantry combat may be seen to increasingly move towards more dispersed fighting in complex terrain.  Command and Control and reliance on higher unit support will put more responsibility upon section commanders to think and act with regards to employment of tactics

Infanteer, further to your notion of increased firepower, you might want to refer to current US Arty/Army thinking.  http://army.ca/forums/threads/19730/post-103085.html#msg103085.

This, from this months National defence magazine suggests that a UA-Heavy, with four infantry companies, will not only have 4 squadrons of Abrams (Cdn/UK usage, US troops/companies) in support but will also have on hand and in direct support two BATTALIONS of 155s and one BATTALION of MLRS Rockets.  Even if they are only two Company(Battery) battalions, that is an awful lot of firepower.  (This could be a misprint but the magazine seems to be well connected and has been accurate in the past).

It really does suggest the notion that infanteers primary role will be to protect the guy carrying the binoculars and the radio.  Back to your dispersed battle field right enough.  But - at least for the
UA-Heavy the intended operational protocol is locate the enemy, neutralize the enemy without having to fix him (get him on the move or while he is on a self-administered pause - rapid response) and then advance to occupy sterile ground.

UA-Lights by contrast, seem to be intended to be more infantry centric organizations designed to confront the enemy face-to-face, with less fire support.  Assuming an urban or close terrain environment for operations that suggests to me sections operating "independently" in close proximity to each other.  Not being aware of where the forces on their flanks are.  To prevent blue-on-blues, and also to prevent the enemy forces exploiting seams don't you need a high degree of centralized control?

I find it interesting to keep in mind that under the new thinking a US div can have a mix of light and heavy UAs.  Eg 3 light , 1 hvy for urban terrain, the reverse for open country.

 

[PPCLI Guy]

 Agree with you 100%.   However I believe that in order to truly inculcate such principles, they must be viewed as part of the whole in which they originate from, Mission Command (Auftragstaktik) and its opposite, Order Command (Befehlstaktik), were two complex ideas from a whole framework which the German's referred to as Kampfkraft (Fighting Power).   As such, you can't cherry pick and take one without consideration of the others, you must consider the entire system, how it evolved and how it is applied, to see how each piece fits.

Fair enough, as an analytical approach.   I have to be honest though, I have an allergic reaction to continual references to the Holy Grail of German Operational thought - must be from all that time I spent at the knee of "Cougar Chuck" (a play on Panzer Guderian) at Staff College.   Mission Command has become a brand name in many ways.   I was unclear in my use of the term.   What I am referring to is adoting a manoeuvrist approach to fighting in a complex battlespace, that will perforce mean that commanders at all levels have a deep understanding of higher commanders intents - in effect, a command-centric approach.

 

[Infanteer]

I have to be honest though, I have an allergic reaction to continual references to the Holy Grail of German Operational thought - must be from all that time I spent at the knee of "Cougar Chuck" (a play on Panzer Guderian) at Staff College.

I will admit, I've developed a keen view of their style of doing things.   I've been reading alot of literature that looks highly upon their successes.   I believe that it is not so much that they invented a better method of approaching some things (at the cost of others of course), but that their organizational culture allowed them to put theory into practice alot better.

If you have any recommendations on books that attempt to reign in the "Germanophile" outlook, I'm all ears.

I was unclear in my use of the term.   What I am referring to is adoting a manoeuvrist approach to fighting in a complex battlespace, that will perforce mean that commanders at all levels have a deep understanding of higher commanders intents - in effect, a command-centric approach.

Quite clear on what you were trying to say with your reference to mission command.   I was just trying to say that an Army will run into difficulties if it attempts to cherry pick doctrine.   Do you think "a deep understanding of commanders intents" will be as truly effective as it could if we did not, as an institution, adopt other practices such as going against orders as the tactical situation dictates (read PBI's sig line   ) and reducing much of the details out of the orders process so as to give junior commanders a better opportunity to use their initiative.

 

[robmika]

Does anyone have a link to either a CF or other document on the net, which outlines the step by step drills that are the latest and greatest for the CF... as opposed to some PAM written in 1979?

I would like to review the source of our current teaching, so as not to confuse it with what some members maybe teaching right now and maybe either "mutated" or simply not current.

Thx
R

 

[Michael OLeary]

From the Army Electronic Library (http://armyapp.dnd.ca/ael/main-acceuil.asp):

B-GL-392-002/FP-001 
VOLUME 3 - THE INFANTRY SECTION AND PLATOON IN BATTLE
96/08/16 
Publication not available online

B-GL-392-002/FP-Z01 
Infantry, Section and Platoons Commander Aide Memoire 
Not Yet Published 
Publication not available online

 

[PPCLI Guy]

"reducing much of the details out of the orders process so as to give junior commanders a better opportunity to use their initiative."

Infanteer:

I believe that we are already getting there - mostly due to the fielding of a true digital capability, complemented by the changes in the Military Education curricula that have taken place at both Kingston and Toronto's Staff Colleges.

I will give you an example:  As G3 of BTE 03, I was responsible for generating the orders that would put 2 CMBG HQ through its paces during the 5 day FTX portion of the Ex.  We issued a formal set of orders to start off the deiberate OPP cycle (as an aside, after completing the orders (the basic building blocks were provided by CALLIAN), I decided that we should translate them into US staff formats, to avoid a cut and paste capability at the Bde level.  That decision cost me (and especially my staff) much gnashing of teeth and many man-hours of work - and I'm not sure that I would do it again).  The second OPP cycle was initiated using Div Radio Orders, and the third and fourth cycles were intiated with one page graphic orders - and there was a fifth one-pager graphic that I was not allowed to issue that initiated the move into Post Conflict posture).

All of that to say that we can, and do, issue less detailed orders than in the "so called good old days".  Add in the fact that the Bde was able to use Athene as a collaborative planning and SA tool, and SAS to issue graphic orders to the section level, and I beleive that we may be well on our way to acheiving a true knowledge based command centric Army, down to the lowest level of command.