Thinking about the Infantry Attack

[c4th]

Next, give this article a read - very good stuff ...

http://www.defence.gov.au/army/AbstractsOnline/AAJournal/2003_W/AAJ_w_2003_04.pdf

My overall impression is that the article does a great job of summing up the nuts-and-bolts of the tactical battle the Infantry will face.   To sum it up:

2) Suppression is the key to winning the tactical battle.

4) Maneuver remains essential before and after the battle - it is required to "set up" a tactical victory by finding the right points and to secure the tactical victory by properly exploiting the gains of the battle.

Anyways, that's it for now,

I agree with infanteer that Col Kilcullen's article is a good read and highlights some of the basics that we as Canadians due to largely ineffectual training are apt to forget.

Why does suppression work?  Soldiers don't kill soldiers, bullets kill soldiers. 

I had a similar experience last summer in an Urban Coy attack using simunition and miles.  Our fire base could not ssuppressthe enemy because miles does not shoot through walls.  7.62 will. The result of lack of suppression was utter failure.

It makes sense that if we could have created enough fire support in order to inflict casualties on the enemy with miles gear, live rounds would have been even more successful.

The lesson here seems to be don't move until you have located the enemy and won the fire fight.  Section battle drills 3 and 4.  Anything less will result in lots of our soldiers dying.

Col Kilcullen does not advocate changing doctine and I agree.  In 12 Coy Attacks the Colonel refined small unit tactics within a doctine framework to achieve the mission. 12 Coy rehearsals is a pretty small investment in order to save lives, accomplishthe mission, and end up with top to bottom a better trained coy.

The Canadian Infantry at all levels should train allot more with miles gear or any other simulation system.  Until we see the effect of ignoring common sense and doctrine we are wasting our time ever going into the field.

In principle I agree with the employment of observer/controllers but what may be of more use is including SME's who can guide the commanders thought process to a method such as Col Killcullen's that works for his unit or sub-unit down to the section level.

Lastly we must have the discipline and perseverance to keep hammering away at it until it works.  "End Ex" is not the main effort.  The main effort is training the unit to be an effective fighting force.  If the mission takes six, twelve, twenty or a hundred attempts so be it.  Of any time, peace time affords us the luxury of training until we get it right.

Soldier on.

 

[TangoTwoBravo]

The bit on bayonets and 1944 reminded my of something I read a few years back in English's "Failure in High Command."  He quotes an 8th Army divisional commander, who, remarking on battles in the Western desert, states that "The British, reckoning that their infantry should  be able to take on anything with the bayonet, kept on setting theirs out for Rommel's combine harvester."  I'll add that the Germans also had more integral machineguns and a coherent combined arms doctrine.

I had a debate with some infantry officers one day about "support" weapons.  They stated that the purpose of machineguns and mortars was to support the rifleman.  I felt that the purpose of the rifleman was to support the crew served weapon.  Perhaps a silly argument in the end, but it did reveal to me the depth of emotion felt about the concept of the "rifleman with the bayonet" and the thin red line.  My side of the arguement was taken to the extreme somewhat, and I think the real anwer is that all the pieces must work in close conjunction.  I'll shut up now about machineguns and go back to the Armour threads. 

c4th,

Good points.  You raise some of the flaws of simulation with WES/MILES.  Since nobody actually dies there is little value in suppressive fire.  As you point out, with MILES cover from observation equals cover from fire.  Still, more MILES/WES training is needed and is coming.

Cheers,

2B

 

[c4th]

I had a debate with some infantry officers one day about "support" weapons.   They stated that the purpose of machineguns and mortars was to support the rifleman.   I felt that the purpose of the rifleman was to support the crew served weapon.  

You're both right depending on the type of operation.

 

[Pikache]

c4th,

Good points.  You raise some of the flaws of simulation with WES/MILES.  Since nobody actually dies there is little value in suppressive fire.  As you point out, with MILES cover from observation equals cover from fire.  Still, more MILES/WES training is needed and is coming.

Cheers,

2B

The solution seems to be simple to me. Have refs walk around, and if they judge that the firebase is doing a good job of suppressing an area, he tells the enemy force in that section that they're dead.

 

[TangoTwoBravo]

Umpires with god-guns are indeed the usual way around.  The problem is that we are then back to "judging" effects.  That is not necessarily a bad thing, but we still need to be a little careful when analysing lessons learned in simulation.  In addition, I think that most people will act a little different when the stakes are real.  That being said I do think that we are going the right direction with WES.  Live fire exercises on their own can also teach bad lessons and habits.  I think that the work being done with WES at CMTC will do great things for our training.  I guess I'm taking this down a tangent so I'll sum up.

 

[c4th]

The solution seems to be simple to me. Have refs walk around, and if they judge that the firebase is doing a good job of suppressing an area, he tells the enemy force in that section that they're dead.

I doubt I've ever seen a ref do anything other than kill off the biggest guy on an attack so the troops have to litter him to the CAP.

Not saying they have all been a waste of rations (and coffee) but if the shoe fits...

 

[TangoTwoBravo]

The book The March Up has some good accounts of small unit actions conducted by the USMC during the drive to Baghdad in Mar/Apr 03.  One interesting chapter that has some relevance here describes a drill that the units developed after a few engagements.  The drills seems to flow along the lines of establishing contact and then sending a flanking force to shoot up the contact some more.  M1s are included in both elements, and it is found that the flanking M1s end up killing many of the enemy with machinegun fire.  This goes along with the concept of using manoeuvre to get to a better fire position, as opposed to setting up for a charge.

There are engagements, however, where the Iraqis hold onto trench lines and the infantry go in and clear them out at close range.  Still, as noted earlier in the thread the ratio of firebase to assault force was certainly in the favour of the firebase.

This also brings out the value of combined arms groupings at the lowest levels.

2B

 

[a_majoor]

I wonder if anyone at the Infantry, Armoured or Artillery schools is contemplating this?

If the basic assumption behind this is true (and I suspect it is), then the load outs of LAVs will have to change to incorporate a much larger amount of ammunition for the turret mounted weapons, the MGS concept has to be rethought at the basic level (a vehicle with only 18 rounds of ammunition won't be providing a lot of supressing fire) and any artillery weapon will also have to be able to carry a large basic load, or go over to FOG-M and other "magic bullet" types of rounds. (The Swedish FH-70 6X6 SP carries a 155 on a modified Volvo articulated truck chassis, and has 24 rounds in the magazine, and I think another 24 ready rounds. It is fast, mobile and using the automatic loader, can attain a high rate of fire: an excellent supression weapon)

The section will be perched uncomfortably on even more ammunition containers, and perhaps one man will have to be left in the section compartment to assist the gunner in serving the weapons by passing up extra belts. Stowage must be protected, or some pretty spectacular "brew-ups" are a distinct possibility.

In the short term, organizational and TTP changes are needed to ensure there is enough firepower and mobility (perhaps an overstrength platoon structure with a 3 car Coyote DFS section to supply the extra firepower); while in the longer term, LAV SLEP programs and eventual LAV replacements need to address the need for extra firepower.

 

[a_majoor]

Cross threading back from the Armoured forum, if tanks or future DFSVs need to be modified or designed from the ground up to carry extra MGs and main gun ammunition in order to carry out their part of the supression battle, both as the firebase and acting as mobile cut offs, then should this be an "Armoured" task at all, or should the Infantry get some sort of "assault gun" such as the WWII German army had (or the proper role of the MGS: attached directly to the infantry company)? In the short run, the only platform which we have available in the CF is the unmasted Coyote, which can supply extra 25mm and gpmg fire, and can be more mobile in the supression battle, since they don't have to drop or pick up troops but are free to move to supporting or flanking fire positions as the battle evolves.

Certainly some sort of Infantry "gunship" could be optomized for short range fights against a more restricted range of targets; Matt Fisher's "CAT" modification of the Leopard is one way to go http://www.sfu.ca/casr/id-fisher1-bio.htm or other ideas could be explored, such as a weapons platform bristling with GPMGs and AGLs, or even  assault guns like the "Hetzer" or Sturmgeschutz III. This could be  an addition to the mechanized battalion in the form of a "fire support company", down to fire support sections in each platoon, depending on the layout you choose. If this is recognized as an Infantry function, then the Armoured Corps can be optomized with more specialized DFSV and Recce vehicels, and be able to take on a wider range of tasks as well.

 

[Infanteer]

should this be an "Armoured" task at all, or should the Infantry get some sort of "assault gun" such as the WWII German army had (or the proper role of the MGS: attached directly to the infantry company)?

Plus ca change, plus ca le meme chose

Funny that we are debating the utility of things that the Brits, Germans, Americans and Soviets were debating about in 1942....

Anyways, it seems that this is what the Americans are doing with the Stryker IBCT - pushing direct and indirect support down to the company level - a true "all-arms" small unit optimized for the combined arms battle.

We one the other hand, have consolidated everything into one unit, ruining it as a 12th maneuver unit of the CF (it now serves as a support function) and relying on it to back the rest of the Army in a "reach-back" role, despite the fact that the Aussies have rightfully pointed out in their "Complex Warfighting" document that "reach back" shouldn't be relied upon by small, combined-arms teams in a complex environment.

 

[c4th]

We one the other hand, have consolidated everything into one unit, ruining it as a 12th maneuver unit of the CF (it now serves as a support function) ....reach back" shouldn't be relied upon by small, combined-arms teams in a complex environment.

With armoured assets consolidated into a reach back role how does this affect the ability to field multiple cbt teams?  Is this encoraging planners to cook our capability books?

 

[ArmyRick]

I think the yanks are to on to something.

I do beleive (checking out their FCS and brigade combat team re-restructuring program) they are aiming to form combined arms units (Down to the company level).

 

[mo-litia]

There's been rumblings of combined arms units at the reserve level for quite some time now.  IMO, this MAY be an effective solution for small centres that have major personnel retention issues...one strong unit instead of three weak ones.  On the other hand, it has the stench of more fiscal cutbacks adding to the CF's 'death of a thousand cuts'.  :-\

 

[a_majoor]

There's been rumblings of combined arms units at the reserve level for quite some time now.  IMO, this MAY be an effective solution for small centres that have major personnel retention issues...one strong unit instead of three weak ones.  On the other hand, it has the stench of more fiscal cutbacks adding to the CF's 'death of a thousand cuts'.  :-\

The "Army of the West" is somewhat ahead of us in this regard, but for "Vigalent Guardian 06", instead of Brigade wide composite units (31 LIB, 4ARR, 41RCA etc.) the plan is to have one or more "Task Forces". My personal guess, based on logic and the types and numbers of units in the brigade (yes, I know, poor planning choices when making this sort of decision) is there can be "Task Force 31 East" with Infantry components drawn from the Lincoln and Welland Regt, RHLI and ASH of C, combined with an armoured squadron from the 1rst Hussars, an artillery or mortar battery from 11 or 56 Fd Regt, and a FSG/CSS hard point centered on 23 SVC BN. "Task Force 31 West" would then be built around the remainder of the 31 CBG units, with 31 CER centrally located in the "MNBHQ" structure to provide engineer support to the Task Forces as required.

Naturally, any number of premutations can happen (what task force gets the band, for example  ) More details to follow.

 

[vonGarvin]

Suppressing the Enemy is the key to victory.  Not necessarily killing him, but convincing him to "tap out".  And MGS with 6 rounds ready, 12 more "stowed" can do little in this regard.  In a fight vs a "peer army" (eg: vs another nation state), the so-called "cold war" model is king, IMHO.  A true infantry battalion with a full complement of "old school" combat support company (used to find the enemy with recce, and fix him in place with TOW and Mortars) and then strike with 2 or 3 coys with Pioneers.  Tanks are also needed, as the battalion, no matter how "robust", just can't do it all alone.  And let us not forget 155's coming down on "the bad guys".  I acknowledge that the current ops in Afghanistan are the focus; however, let us not forget the mandate to be able to fight and defeat other nation states.
Let us also not forget that we are in Afghanistan ONLY because JC and the boys didn't want to play in the sandbox in Iraq.  Remember in summer 02 how we couldn't replace 3VP because we were stretched thin?  Remember how some six months later we pledged 1800 (!) for Kabul?  Also don't forget that GW and his lads were planning OIF at that time.

OK, that's off topic, but anyway, the point is that had we gone in on OIF (or even Desert Storm in 91), our army would look a WHOLE LOT different today (and please don't say "we WERE there in 91", because we weren't: a coy on hospital defence duties, PWs, and some token CF18s isn't "being there")
*rant mode off*

Go Argos!

 

[a_majoor]

The MGS as currently planned is a non starter for this type of fight (in fact, almost any type of fight... ), but a technical solution can be found by replacing the dreadful LPT with the CT_CV turret. Interested readers can follow the various arguments in the "Future Armour" thread starting with http://forums.army.ca/forums/threads/28961/post-281321.html#msg281321.

This would work well as an Infantry DFSV integrated into the company in the same fashion that the MGS is supposed to be in the SBCT. The bustle holds 16 ready rounds, feeding into the 105mm cannon's autoloader. The gun can elevate up to 420, allowing the team to deal with those annoying RPG gunners and snipers up on the rooftops. In the Infantry DFSV role, the ammunition loadout should be heavily biased towards HE or HESH, alternatively HEAT-MP is said to have a salutory effect on everything from enemy bunkers to troops in open (provided there is a hard surface to detonate the round). If that dosn't work, the crew can fall back on the co-ax and roof mounted OWS.

If both the Infantry and Armoured community were to make a concerted "push", perhaps we could receive a fire support vehicle with the ability to move with the LAVs and still pack a real punch when needed.

 

[twentyand1]

As von garvin said, the enemy must be fixed. once he is fixed and supressed any type of workable move to his position, preferably covered by fire will work. once there take him with what ever is required for the objective. but he has to be "fixed". the proverbial winning of the fire fight.



" on the 30/ 30 plan"

 

[a_majoor]

Since tanks, assault guns and other protected fire support vehicles are not going to be available to us in the short to medium term, being able to perform parallel engagements might provide the type of high speed high impact (sorry) supression needed to carry the fight in complex terrain. Parallel engagements were demonstrated by the HMMVW/LOSAT, but it isn't the ideal combination (the vehicle having protection and moblity issues with the extra kit, and each LOSAT was like a section of telephone pole; a bit unweildy to handle in the field), but it gives a taste of the idea.

Most of the time, the crew would only have to deal with serial engagements (i.e. one at a time), but in an overwatch position or firebase, they will have a better ability to discover and lay on multiple targets. Target designation can come from outside sources, and the FCS could have software filters built in to prevent the system from being overwhelmed by multiple calls for fire. Some of the ramifications would be a bit hard to work out, but a LAV DFS vehicle with this capability should be a bonus when shooting in an attack (Possibly a modifies LAV-TOW, with high levels of situational awareness and advanced fire and forget missiles). With conventional weaponry (according to the Australians), up to 3/4 of an Infantry company must act as the fire base to assure success. Being able to hit four enemy bunkers or strongpoints within miliseconds of each other would tear a big hole in their coverage, and make the supression of the remainder and the actual assault much easier and more likely of success.

 

[vonGarvin]

With conventional weaponry (according to the Australians), up to 3/4 of an Infantry company must act as the fire base to assure success. Being able to hit four enemy bunkers or strongpoints within miliseconds of each other would tear a big hole in their coverage, and make the supression of the remainder and the actual assault much easier and more likely of success.

Funny that you mention that.  In the MAIS trial report, they noted that the best outcome in terms of friendly cas/enemy cas was 2 pl in firebase vice 1 pl. 
Funny thing that MAIS trial.  The report came out just in time for the former MND to announce the purchase of the MGS (2.5 years, still in concept mode!)
Oh, for those of you who don't know: the MAIS trial was a field trial conducted in Gagetown using 2 RCR  and RCD troops, validating the TTPs for LAV III/Leopard C2.  It was conducted in autumn 2001.  It determined some funny, well, hilarious stuff, like "infantry company with no tanks does not survive", etc.  Man, I laughed and laughed when they got the MGS! ;D

 

[a_majoor]

It seems lots of people have come to the same conclusion, I am looking for the ref. but I remember reading the USMC used up to 2/3 of their company strength in the firebase during OIF.

A fire support system capable of parallel engagements could provide the commander with a means of getting that volume of fire in a more compressed time frame. This could save valuable time over shaking out the fire base (or allow the fire base to get set, depending on the situation). Even without such a system, we will need to examine such things as the soldiers basic load (They will need to carry a lot more ammunition both individually and as a platoon), vehicle load outs (troops sitting on more ammo crates), new and improved ways of working the echelon to keep the guns and rifles supplied, and perhaps different layouts for the section, platoon and even company to provide firepower in many and varied situations.