Thinking about the Infantry Attack
- Thread starter Infanteer
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" most likely be holed up in some sort of structure, and section and platoon attacks will resemble reducing a series of fortified bunkers. The support group needs something between a M-72 and a Carl G in terms of size, weight and effectiveness to help shoot in attacks or reduce fortified positions and kill the occupants. I believe FFV once offered a sort of alternative Carl G; one 84mm round packaged in a disposable launcher. If there was a way to really increase the power of the 40mm M-203 grenade, or issue a special "bunker buster" grenade, that might work as well."
One word: Thermobarics.....
One word: Thermobarics.....
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TCBF said:
Don't forget we may also be working in a restricted ROE environment. Thermobarics would be great in the "third block", but the guys in blocks one and two might not apprieciate dealing with the overpressure effects. I was thinking along the lines of the 84mm HEDP (High Explosive Dual Purpose) round, which can be fired as a wall breaching round (load it with the "immediate" side up), or used to clear/neutralize bunkers (load it with the "delay" side up). Given the size/weight issues, perhaps a disposable launcher with a larger warhead (>66mm, <100mm ) and "programmable" with the flip of a switch would fit the bill.
As an aside, HEDP rounds work just fine against APC/IFV class vehicles as well.
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US Breaching PDF
Thx to Jd the Israeli Simon round is what I was refering too. I don't like the way it need a special blank to fire...
Thx to Jd the Israeli Simon round is what I was refering too. I don't like the way it need a special blank to fire...
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On the issue of using armour for breaching, the USMC told us about a new cannister round that is being developed for the Abrams. It is filled with tungsten balls, and will demolish brick, cement and cinder block houses at 1km or less, along with an incendiary "effect"
J
Joint Service Guy
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Gentleman, I have read into this thread as best I can, but I feel there is one crucial element of information missing.
What follows may be uncomfortable or even unacceptable to some but it's not intended to be.
1. The section attack (in commonwealth armies from 1941-2003) was a teaching tool developed by the UK, to reveal Officer or NCO potential in recruits. IT WAS NEVER TO BE USED ON OPERATIONS.
2. The gun group rifle group scheme of manoeuvre was to get the Bren gun as close to the enemy as possible, as part of the PLATOON attack.
3. Due to the fact that this was never explicitly stated, it began to be taught as minor tactics, and persisted from 1941 (first draft of the Battle School manual) until nearly the present day.
The UK still makes the same mistake today in focussing on section organisation, instead of group range capabilities across the platoon and company. If you want constructive discussion in this area, then focussing on the section, just become a doctrinal straight jacket. â Å“How do I best organise for operationsâ ? is a far better question, than â Å“How big should a section be.â ?
Hope this helps
JSG.
What follows may be uncomfortable or even unacceptable to some but it's not intended to be.
1. The section attack (in commonwealth armies from 1941-2003) was a teaching tool developed by the UK, to reveal Officer or NCO potential in recruits. IT WAS NEVER TO BE USED ON OPERATIONS.
2. The gun group rifle group scheme of manoeuvre was to get the Bren gun as close to the enemy as possible, as part of the PLATOON attack.
3. Due to the fact that this was never explicitly stated, it began to be taught as minor tactics, and persisted from 1941 (first draft of the Battle School manual) until nearly the present day.
The UK still makes the same mistake today in focussing on section organisation, instead of group range capabilities across the platoon and company. If you want constructive discussion in this area, then focussing on the section, just become a doctrinal straight jacket. â Å“How do I best organise for operationsâ ? is a far better question, than â Å“How big should a section be.â ?
Hope this helps
JSG.
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First of all, I changed the title of the thread to be more reflective of the content - we have lurched out of the realm of the Section and it is clear that their is a sense of continuity between Section-Platoon-Company. May as well broaden the thread.
Next, give this article a read - very good stuff that supplements much of what we have touched on here.
http://www.defence.gov.au/army/AbstractsOnline/AAJournal/2003_W/AAJ_w_2003_04.pdf
Here are a few highlights.
- First, the principle of an very non-linear and disjointed tactical battle is highlighted. This seems to be the general trend in modern combat, especially against an asymmetric foe. We should build our training around the fact that tactical engagements are blobs of fighting rather than a set-piece engagement.
- Second, the notion seems to be that suppression is the key to the tactical battle. This has certainly been demonstrated in recent times with the primacy of the M1A1 Abrams in close combat in Iraq - the behemoth would essentially act as a suppressive firebase for the infantry. I would bet that the German Infantry Platoons of WWII, which are highlighted in English's On Infantry, utilized the same principle by building their strength around the high-volume (ie: suppressive) capabilities of the MG-42.
- Thirdly, the notion of flexibility is demonstrated - this has been a favorite of mine in this entire thread, and the article only serves to strengthen it. The Infantry should change its motto from Ducimus to Semper Gumby (Alway Flexible
). Commanders should be highly flexible with their units, organizing them around sound tactical principles (suppression, primacy of points, advantageous maneuver, etc, etc) in a manner that is relevent to the unique tactical situation.
- Finally, the primacy of suppression does not disqualify maneuver. Tactical maneuver is essential for setting the scene and finding the best points to win the battle.
My overall impression is that the article does a great job of summing up the nuts-and-bolts of the tactical battle the Infantry will face. To sum it up:
1) Battle is a non-linear and disjointed process - the unit moves like a "flock of birds".
2) Suppression is the key to winning the tactical battle.
3) Commanders must be flexible with their soldiers, organizing them in a way that is determined by the requirements of the tactical scenario.
4) Maneuver remains essential before and after the battle - it is required to "set up" a tactical victory by finding the right points and to secure the tactical victory by properly exploiting the gains of the battle.
Anyways, that's it for now,
Cheers,
Infanteer
Next, give this article a read - very good stuff that supplements much of what we have touched on here.
http://www.defence.gov.au/army/AbstractsOnline/AAJournal/2003_W/AAJ_w_2003_04.pdf
Here are a few highlights.
- First, the principle of an very non-linear and disjointed tactical battle is highlighted. This seems to be the general trend in modern combat, especially against an asymmetric foe. We should build our training around the fact that tactical engagements are blobs of fighting rather than a set-piece engagement.
- Second, the notion seems to be that suppression is the key to the tactical battle. This has certainly been demonstrated in recent times with the primacy of the M1A1 Abrams in close combat in Iraq - the behemoth would essentially act as a suppressive firebase for the infantry. I would bet that the German Infantry Platoons of WWII, which are highlighted in English's On Infantry, utilized the same principle by building their strength around the high-volume (ie: suppressive) capabilities of the MG-42.
- Thirdly, the notion of flexibility is demonstrated - this has been a favorite of mine in this entire thread, and the article only serves to strengthen it. The Infantry should change its motto from Ducimus to Semper Gumby (Alway Flexible
). Commanders should be highly flexible with their units, organizing them around sound tactical principles (suppression, primacy of points, advantageous maneuver, etc, etc) in a manner that is relevent to the unique tactical situation.- Finally, the primacy of suppression does not disqualify maneuver. Tactical maneuver is essential for setting the scene and finding the best points to win the battle.
My overall impression is that the article does a great job of summing up the nuts-and-bolts of the tactical battle the Infantry will face. To sum it up:
1) Battle is a non-linear and disjointed process - the unit moves like a "flock of birds".
2) Suppression is the key to winning the tactical battle.
3) Commanders must be flexible with their soldiers, organizing them in a way that is determined by the requirements of the tactical scenario.
4) Maneuver remains essential before and after the battle - it is required to "set up" a tactical victory by finding the right points and to secure the tactical victory by properly exploiting the gains of the battle.
Anyways, that's it for now,
Cheers,
Infanteer
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Forgot to add, Lt Col David Kilcullen's follow up article to the one above in which he expands on his analysis of close-quarters tactics.
http://www.defence.gov.au/army/lwsc/AbstractsOnline/AAJournal/2004_S/AAJ_s_2003_08.pdf
I like how he introduces the concept of infiltration.
More to follow,
Infanteer
http://www.defence.gov.au/army/lwsc/AbstractsOnline/AAJournal/2004_S/AAJ_s_2003_08.pdf
I like how he introduces the concept of infiltration.
More to follow,
Infanteer
J
Joint Service Guy
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Infanteer said:
I know Dave Kilcullen, and correspond with him. His main point is that Manoeuvre enables Fire, and not Fire enabling Manoeuvre, which is useful. He does some good work. The problem is that the loss of the 51mm and GPMG from the Platoon has screwed the engagement geometry for the UK Platoon attack. All we have now is the LMG/C9, which is failing to deliver, in my opinion.
Lt Col Jim Storr, from the British Army, has done excellent work on infiltration, which has been trialled by the Royal Marines and the Swedish Army combat school, with some success, however trying to progress useful discussion on minor tactics here in the UK, is a steep up hill struggle, so anything from an Australian helps!!
J
Joint Service Guy
Guest
baboon6 said:
Correct, but plan is that the Manoeuvre support section has/is going to be dropped, when we get rid of the 51mm mortar. We only got the MSS as an interim measure, because of the opinion that the Section lacked the abiliity to suppress. It was an excellent idea, poorly executed.
JSG
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This is interesting in the context of the light infantry company organizing in a four platoon organization with a heavy weapons platoon. I also advocated a more asymetrical breakdown of the platoon (although I was going in the opposite direction with more troops (14) commited into the assault group and the remainder split between the cutoffs and fire base).
My concern with this concept is the ability of the supression group to provide the volume and depth of supression in complex terrain, since the enemy will be masked in depth by buildings or folds in the ground (think of the "Tet offensive" scene in "Full Metal Jacket". Joker's squad unloads a massive amount of firepower against the structures, yet continue to take casualties from enemies hidden in little pockets and cul de sacs). In a more conventional setting, a platoon in a reverse slope position can inflict horrific casualties since they will be unmasked at very short range without the opportunity to supress them. Clever plans to play hide and seek with UAVs and other high tech devices will provide some relief, but the enemy will make every effort to develop tactics and techniques to defeat these means. (Blackhawk down is a good primer, even complete air control and the presence of a PC-3 Orion providing camera support to the JOC did not identify the enemy AA threat or allow the rescue collumns to close on the crash sites).
I am thinking some sort of hybrid system where sections "infiltrate" from point to point, but have enough on board firepower to act as effective fire bases when bumped might be what we need. As the contact is prosecuted the other sections can see if they can fire from their location, move in support of the lead section or manoeuvre. The platoon should be laid out differently, with the lead section followed by the 2I/c and the firebase so heavy fire can be brought to bear quickly, and the trail sections following along the path cleared by the lead section (rotating positions as required) so the Pl commander can decide to supress or engage.
This article also has implications for our armoured friends, since light vehicles with limited on board ammunition will not have very much ability to supress. Direct fire weapons like TOW, ADATS and 105mm will also need to be supplimented by smart rounds or FOG-M type weapons which can be used aginst hidden targets. We will need well protected DF platforms which can provide intimate support (Tanks, anyone?), and some very impressive IF (FOG-M and lots of mortars) support as well.
My concern with this concept is the ability of the supression group to provide the volume and depth of supression in complex terrain, since the enemy will be masked in depth by buildings or folds in the ground (think of the "Tet offensive" scene in "Full Metal Jacket". Joker's squad unloads a massive amount of firepower against the structures, yet continue to take casualties from enemies hidden in little pockets and cul de sacs). In a more conventional setting, a platoon in a reverse slope position can inflict horrific casualties since they will be unmasked at very short range without the opportunity to supress them. Clever plans to play hide and seek with UAVs and other high tech devices will provide some relief, but the enemy will make every effort to develop tactics and techniques to defeat these means. (Blackhawk down is a good primer, even complete air control and the presence of a PC-3 Orion providing camera support to the JOC did not identify the enemy AA threat or allow the rescue collumns to close on the crash sites).
I am thinking some sort of hybrid system where sections "infiltrate" from point to point, but have enough on board firepower to act as effective fire bases when bumped might be what we need. As the contact is prosecuted the other sections can see if they can fire from their location, move in support of the lead section or manoeuvre. The platoon should be laid out differently, with the lead section followed by the 2I/c and the firebase so heavy fire can be brought to bear quickly, and the trail sections following along the path cleared by the lead section (rotating positions as required) so the Pl commander can decide to supress or engage.
This article also has implications for our armoured friends, since light vehicles with limited on board ammunition will not have very much ability to supress. Direct fire weapons like TOW, ADATS and 105mm will also need to be supplimented by smart rounds or FOG-M type weapons which can be used aginst hidden targets. We will need well protected DF platforms which can provide intimate support (Tanks, anyone?), and some very impressive IF (FOG-M and lots of mortars) support as well.
J
Joint Service Guy
Guest
baboon6 said:
Oh, it gets better! We're getting rid of the 51mm bbecausethe so-called experts say that the 40mm UGL does the same job! 40mm illum and smoke are near useless in my opinion, and only shoot to 350m. We now also think that rifle grenades are bad, because we managed to buy the wrong rifle grenade, as a result of our last trials. This is all aresult of concentrating on SECTIONS and not PLATOONS.
I guess if they were smart they'd have good jobs.... :-[
JSG
J
Joint Service Guy
Guest
Infanteer said:
Who indeed. Why did we buy the FN-Minimi? Why did we buy the 40mm UGL? Essentially we bought weapons systems that don't work that well, or worse, weapons systems we don't understand how to use (and nor do most other armies).
The whole new weapons set screw up, is very sensitive over here, so the best we can do is suck it up and try and make it work, but that's not helped by the fact that the great and the good still seem to be asking the wrong questions.
JSG
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