Thinking about the Infantry Attack

[a_majoor]

Fighting the supression battle with hand held weapons is a tough proposition, weapons that a soldier can easily man pack tend to lack penetrating power and range, while weapons which can deal with bunkers and improvised fortifications are large, bulky and heavy, and usually require a lot of large bulky and heavy ammunition. (A WW II American .50 cal required an entire section to move around in its dismounted role, with the 3 man gun crew carrying the body, barrel and tripod, while the remainder packed the ammo and acted as bodyguards for the gun on the move and while it was being assembled or taken down.) Given this reality, armoured fighting vehicles have to be looked at carefully in order to asses their utility in a supression battle.

Tanks and heavy AFV's have lots of intrinsic advantages, but a LAV-25 or LAV III is able to engage targets from beyond the range of most light anti-armour weapons. This advantage drops away in complex terrain, where you need to close in on the target in order to engage it due to the short sight lines. The MGS is depressing due to its poor armour protection and gun performance, but more importantly, its limited on board ammunition. Even if we intend to use the MGS in a close fire support platoon attached to the infantry company as per the SBCT model; it only carries 18 rounds, and will not be able to supply the volume of fire required. From what I have read, trying to improve things by using "magic bullets" like smart shells or through tube missiles is not even possible. The MGS simply cannot fight the supression battle!

If the MGS program is dying in the US, then we have an opportunity to try to specify a different fire support vehicle, going from a simple solution like putting a different turret on a LAV-III, to advocating a new wheeled platform (Centurio comes to mind), to making a stand for a tank (even a light tank like the CV 90120 or M-8). The key thing is whatever is chosen, it needs to carry a LOT more rounds than the 18 contemplated in the MGS in order to fight the supression battle in concert with the infantry.

 

[TangoTwoBravo]

Please excuse this intrusion by a blackhat, but I've been thinking about the same issue that is in three threads right now and this one seemed to be the closest fit.  The article above by LCol Kilcullen is a very interesting piece and certainly an excellent piece of professional development to read.  While I agree with most that he writes, I am a little confused about his point regarding "firing to support manouevre" vs his preferred  "manouevre supporting fire."  If he is saying that the aim of movement is to get into a better firing position then I guess I am with him, but the catch phrase can be a little misleading.

It reminds me of a conversation I had down south with my US instructor about fire and movement.  My DS stated that some people "shoot to move" and others "move to shoot."  While I got his point, to me it is a false dichotomy.  Manouevre to me incompasses both fire and movement.  It is a cycle.  We shoot, someone moves to a new spot with an advantage and shoots some more.

That being said, I think that he is right that we need more firepower for our attacks (in all types of terrain).  I was reading a book last year (The March Up) that described USMC actions during OIF.  It appears that roughly 2/3 of a given USMC Coy conducting an attack was in a firebase role, while the manouevre element often moved to a new fire position as opposed to sweeping the position (although some attacks did end up in classic trench clearing ops).  This is the inverse of our peacetime combat team attacks with one Tp in the fire base and the rest of the combat team assaulting. 

One potential problem could occur, however, if facing a peer enemy with mobile reserves.  A small assault force could find itself in a bad spot if immediately counter-attacked.  Good cut-off positions can mitigate this, but perhaps the assault force has to be closely followed by a consolidation/exploitation force with support weapons.  The author alludes to this with his exploitation force, but the threat of counter-attacks must be a primary consideration in offensive planning (something that our Army had problems with in Normandy).  We also may find that some large scale urban battles might still be somewhat more linear than we suppose.

I agree wholeheartedly about infiltration.  I would argue that even our mounted forces can employ this technique whereby we sneak around in the gullies and low-ground in order to reach good fire positions.  This was the meat and potatoes of Phase III Armour with tanks.

Please excuse my straying from my lane and I regret any tank ruts that I have left behind.

2B

p.s. I like his support for tanks!

 

[a_majoor]

The way I understand LCol Kilcullen's article; manoeuvre happens before contact (i.e. getting there "firstest with the mostest", prefferably before the enemy is aware of your presence or intentions), but once you bump the bad guys, tactical manoeuvre is difficult and dangerous. At that point you engage the enemy with all available fire assets (CF= win the firefight) before you engage in tactical manoeuvre, in his examples, to the next point of observation and engagement. This reflects the point you made from the book "The March Up", where 2/3 of the company assets were engaged in supressive fire (vs 3/4 of the company in LCol Kilcullen's experiments).

Hopefully the way to deal with peer or near peer opponents with mobile reserves is DF and IF assets in the fire base, the LAV TOW and MMEV in our futures. Hopefully sanity will break out and a more capable fire support asset will be developed to replace the other 2/3 of the "troika" (See MMEV and Combat Team of Tomorrow for that debate).

The infantry soldier's best weapons in the scenarios described by LCol Kilcullen would be a good radio; a tank or other capable fire support vehicle and some sort of tactical UAV and local down-link to assist in seeing targets and shooting in the attack. The next best things would be powerful and light-weight support weapons; a lightened GPMG, a Carl G M-3 with "bunker busting" rounds or a modified AT-4, mortars and perhaps an AGL. Tabbing to battle festooned with all that firepower and ammunition won't be a treat...

 

[Joint Service Guy]

Not a big fan of the FN Minimi? please elaborate...

Correct, I'm an C9/LMG sceptic.

The LMG is less accurate, heavier, and more expensive than an LAR, using 100-round C-MAG or even 30 round magazine. C-MAGS work just fine. The the Royal Dutch marines use a Diemaco C-7/LAR with a C-MAG.
The LMG short barrel puts less energy into the target, than a C-7, so 5.56mm from a LMG does no more than 5.56mm from a C-7.
Rate if fire does not suppress. Suppression is fear of harm, so merely fast spraying does not suppress any better than accurate fire. 790 rounds per minute suppress no better or efficiently than 200 rounds per minute.

Belt bags or boxes take longer to changer than a 30 round magazine for a weapon crewed by one man.

S4 wise, you now have two types of 5.56mm in the platoon, and you need some specialist LBE to carry the 200 round box, and adds weight to overall amunition load carried by the platoon, for no increased effect. (still 5.56mm with no extra energy!)

Having the GPMG instead, cures all, using 7.62mm that can degrade cover and suppress at greater distance. OK, it needs to be crewed by 2-3 men, but it just does everything better.

Not a popular opinion I know, but I was a big fan of the Minimi, until logic and experimentation educated me.

JSG

 

[Joint Service Guy]

The article above by LCol Kilcullen is a very interesting piece and certainly an excellent piece of professional development to read.   While I agree with most that he writes, I am a little confused about his point regarding "firing to support manouevre" vs his preferred   "manouevre supporting fire."   If he is saying that the aim of movement is to get into a better firing position then I guess I am with him, but the catch phrase can be a little misleading.

I know Dave Kilcullen and that's exactly what he meant, as we discussed it some detail. It's an excellent explanation of what actually make an attack effective, and very like the UK's 1919 "Soft spots" TD Note.

The problem is that Fire and Manoeuvre does not adequately explain what is going on in the attack or even defence. Talking about Fire, Manoeuver observation and Communication is far more useful. F&M is pretty simplistic is the ways that it's most commonly expressed.

JSG

 

[TangoTwoBravo]

JSG,

Seen.  I understand his point that the aim of moving should be to get into a better fire position.  I guess he is one of the "move to shoot" folks!

I've only dabbled in infantry tactics, but to me the hardest part is finding the enemy (with the detail to actually engage) and also getting that information passed around.  I feel that is the reason why we need so much in the "firebase/bases".  Rifle mounted thermal sights (if they get developed, perhaps they already are?) will certainly help in the rural context but detecting in the urban fight will still have to be done the old fashioned way.  I really liked his part about complex terrain being where you can see less than you can shoot.

The ideas in the article can also be applied to mounted operations.  On various exercises I have found that the best "attacks" were launched after the enemy had been clearly defined by two tank Troops who were in contact.  The worst ones were launched off information gained from other sources without first getting "eyes on" by the lead tanks.  The way we liked to "charge" with tanks and LAVs makes we wonder why we haven't tried to attach bayonets to the gun barrels.  In simulations I have found more success with winkling around positions and picking them apart with long range fires (although the ground does not always allow this).

I do wonder, however, if this might take us down the path to the "methodical battle" due to the emphasis on the application of firepower? 

Cheers,

2B

 

[Joint Service Guy]

The ideas in the article can also be applied to mounted operations.   On various exercises I have found that the best "attacks" were launched after the enemy had been clearly defined by two tank Troops who were in contact.   The worst ones were launched off information gained from other sources without first getting "eyes on" by the lead tanks.   The way we liked to "charge" with tanks and LAVs makes we wonder why we haven't tried to attach bayonets to the gun barrels.   In simulations I have found more success with winkling around positions and picking them apart with long range fires (although the ground does not always allow this).

2B

There is a very valid body of opinion that suggest that there is no difference between the "mounted attack," and the "dis-mounted." Having studied it in some detail, I subscribe to this view. Fire can come from any weapon, be that on a vehicle or not. Common sense really. You need to get the weapon to a point in time and space where it can cause the most damage. Anything involving a bayonet is a screw up.

Fire is what breaks the enemies will to fight, most of the time, and the "Assault" is a figment of the imagination caused by mis-understanding how humans act in combat, or rather poor teaching of the core functions.

Sorrry to sound like a heretic!  8)

JSG

 

[TangoTwoBravo]

JSG,

While I was usually a participant, I was struck watching one combat team attack with the impression that we were doing little more than assaulting in successive waves.  Its hard to make judgements on peacetime exercises, but I never felt quite right about our urge to sweep across the enemy position.  I know that we can shoot on the move, but why not have the flanking Tp manouevre into a second firebase to shoot up the enemy position some more instead of just bashing through his obstacles and rolling over his trenches?  I also figure that we could incorporate our infantry into our firebases a little more (both 25mm and some certain support weapons).

Nobody was shooting at me, but I have been able to work a Leopard up quite close to an "enemy" position and bring fire on him from an unanticipated direction (you need some gullies and hills but it can be done).  Infantry can employ this tactic even more effectively.  Perhaps we dispense with advancing in platoon arrowhead and finding the enemy by having him shoot at us.  Instead, sneak up with "scouts" and infiltrate up close before shooting the heck out of the enemy with some C6s and 60mms.

Cheers,

Iain

p.s. Several parts of the article struck me as familiar.  I really liked the "blobs" bit.  One US instructor I had said that there is only one tactical formation: the Blob.  I suggested that there are two: the Close Gaggle and the Open Gaggle (or Blobs in US army doctrine).

 

[a_majoor]

I am not entirely convinced that "anything involving a bayonet is a screw-up". Although I certainly subscribe to the view of gaining fire superiority is the best way to win battles, there is a history of 5000 years of warfare when firearms did not exist and you really had to "close with and destroy" with the thrust of a spear or sword.

Even in the age of "black powder" warfare, the bayonet charge had a terrible effect on enemy morale (read "Forward into Battle" for a description of British bayonet use during the Penninsular campaign, turns out the "thin red line" was mostly a myth). Bayonet charges died in WW I since they were mostly delivered into the teeth of unshaken defenses (i.e. machine gun positions in concrete bunkers that were not neutralized by artillery, or fresh German troops rushing from deep shelters as the artillery barrage passed over them), but have been used sporadicly since then, including recently in Iraq, collapsing the enemy morale. (Details seem scarce, but most examples I can find the charge is usually the last straw for an enemy already pummeled by other fire).

We need to have a big toolkit of tactics in order to respond to the wide variety of possible threats we face in today's security environment. Blasting a building with 2/3 of the company delivering fire might be appropriate in many cases, but if the enemy is occupying a mosque or hospital, a sniper team may be more appropriate. I have heard many stories from British soldiers who served in Northern Ireland that "Fixing" bayonets was usually sufficient to deter crowds in "block two" scenarios. The main difference in my mind between mounted and dismounted involves speed and the weight of available fire-power rather than any intrinsic difference.

 

[Joint Service Guy]

I am not entirely convinced that "anything involving a bayonet is a screw-up". Although I certainly subscribe to the view of gaining fire superiority is the best way to win battles, there is a history of 5000 years of warfare when firearms did not exist and you really had to "close with and destroy" with the thrust of a spear or sword.

Yes, this is always highly contentious. My points are basically this:

1. If you are RELLYING on the bayonet to break the enemies will, you are taking a vast risk. - especially an enemy with a functioning assault rifle.

2. I don't believe the aim of close combat is to "close with and destroy". It is merely to defeat. Defeat, means the other guys gives up the fight and surrenders, runs or dies. I'm not being semantic or pendantic. I just don't believe that close combat is well characterised or explained.

3. No encounter with ancient weapons could have lasted more than 6-8 minutes, before exhaustion set in, so defeat had to be a product of things other than mere close combat.

4. You mention "Forward into battle" by Paddy Griffith, who is also a close combat sceptic. Basically the will to fight is lost in most men long before a physical encounter. Watch tapes of crowd or football violence. It shows the actual combat is done by very few, with others only joining in once they are sure they can do harm with little risk to themselves.

Essentially, i ask the question, Lbs for Lbs, would you rather take a bayonet or another 30 round magazine?

JSG

Maybe we should start another thread, "Is the bayonet useless?"

 

[Infanteer]

Correct, I'm an C9/LMG sceptic.

The LMG is less accurate, heavier, and more expensive than an LAR, using 100-round C-MAG or even 30 round magazine. C-MAGS work just fine. The the Royal Dutch marines use a Diemaco C-7/LAR with a C-MAG.
The LMG short barrel puts less energy into the target, than a C-7, so 5.56mm from a LMG does no more than 5.56mm from a C-7.
Rate if fire does not suppress. Suppression is fear of harm, so merely fast spraying does not suppress any better than accurate fire. 790 rounds per minute suppress no better or efficiently than 200 rounds per minute.

Belt bags or boxes take longer to changer than a 30 round magazine for a weapon crewed by one man.

S4 wise, you now have two types of 5.56mm in the platoon, and you need some specialist LBE to carry the 200 round box, and adds weight to overall amunition load carried by the platoon, for no increased effect. (still 5.56mm with no extra energy!)

Having the GPMG instead, cures all, using 7.62mm that can degrade cover and suppress at greater distance. OK, it needs to be crewed by 2-3 men, but it just does everything better.

Not a popular opinion I know, but I was a big fan of the Minimi, until logic and experimentation educated me.

JSG

You aren't the only one - a Marine CWO recently wrote of USMC experimentations which utilized AR's and LMG's in different roles.  His conclusion - that Marine rifle teams are better served by a beefed up AR while the LMG's are in the third fire team for support (or given to the platoon commander).

In your context, getting rid of 2 LMG's for a GPMG team and 2 AR's would probably work well.

Here is a link to the articles:

Right now there is some discussion being done in the Marine Corps regardig reorganizing the rifle squad, a big proponent of change is CWO 3 Jeffrey Eby, Marine Gunner for the 7th Marine Regiment.  He's published several pieces in the Marine Corps Gazette on the subject:
http://www.mca-marines.org/gazette/2004/04eby1.html
http://www.mca-marines.org/gazette/2004/04eby2.html

One of the things that he argues for is consolidating the M-249 at the squad/section or even platoon level to lighten up the squad/section.

Maybe we should start another thread, "Is the bayonet useless?"

Already have 11 pages of fun on that, Joint Service Guy....

http://forums.army.ca/forums/threads/28762.0.html

 

[Britney Spears]

Maybe we should start another thread, "Is the bayonet useless?"

Woohoo, a new member of the bayonet hater's club.

 

[Pikache]

I've only dabbled in infantry tactics, but to me the hardest part is finding the enemy (with the detail to actually engage) and also getting that information passed around.  I feel that is the reason why we need so much in the "firebase/bases".  Rifle mounted thermal sights (if they get developed, perhaps they already are?) will certainly help in the rural context but detecting in the urban fight will still have to be done the old fashioned way.  I really liked his part about complex terrain being where you can see less than you can shoot.

Well, I am a proponent of deadliest weapon combo in modern warfare is Human Eyeball, Mk I and a radio.

I find it that a lot of troops do not get enough practice at calling GRIT and therefore when they have to call out an enemy position, they either forget, or get it wrong, or stumble over it, losing precious seconds that the sect comd needs to make his decisions.
Also I don't know if it's just me, but I find it that because I don't hear GRITs often enough, it gets hard sometimes to hear a GRIT and see the target that is being called out simply because I don't get enough practice. If you don't practice it enough, you don't become proficient at it. *shrug*

As for radio, I think I've said it on this thread before, but I think every member of the platoon should have a radio, simply because passage of information should be quick and precise. Instead of a relay of information which can take long, a quick transmission ensures that everyone gets the info and orders performed more quickly.

The sect comd should have a radio in contact with the pl comd, while alpha team member has a radio set to sect frequency. Needless chatter is eliminated by radio discipline.

Esp. during FIBUA and other ops when a sect comd has hard time controlling his section because they are scattered everywhere, I don't see why a modern infantry platoon is not well equipped with radio.

 

[TangoTwoBravo]

RHF

Radios for all could certainly ease communications when not next to each other.  PRRs (Personal Role Radios) might help out here, although I'm not sure if an en masse 1 to 1 ratio of issue will be possible.  Intra-section comms can certainly be a problem in the "empty battlefield."  As a tanker I am used to having everybody "on net" and having to be in three conversations at once.  It would take some training and net discipline for eight or so riflemen to have a workable net with the section commander on another.  Having enough freqs might also be an issue.  Perhaps some Sig types reading can help me out here.

I think that you are bang-on about the importance of the individual soldier with the Mk 1 eyeball and a radio. 

All,

I'll throw my black hat in the ring and go with the C6 as a section/team weapon.  Easy for me to say not having to carry it except from the vault to the vehicle!  Sorry, I'll get back in my lane.

Cheers,

2B

 

[Pikache]

RHF

Radios for all could certainly ease communications when not next to each other.  PRRs (Personal Role Radios) might help out here, although I'm not sure if an en masse 1 to 1 ratio of issue will be possible.  Intra-section comms can certainly be a problem in the "empty battlefield."  As a tanker I am used to having everybody "on net" and having to be in three conversations at once.  It would take some training and net discipline for eight or so riflemen to have a workable net with the section commander on another.  Having enough freqs might also be an issue.  Perhaps some Sig types reading can help me out here.

I think that you are bang-on about the importance of the individual soldier with the Mk 1 eyeball and a radio. 

I don't see how radio discipline would be a big problem. I was taught that if you don't have anything important to add, you keep your mouth closed and listen. Granted, it'll take some training and hand on with the radios to ensure smooth working section net.

All,

I'll throw my black hat in the ring and go with the C6 as a section/team weapon.  Easy for me to say not having to carry it except from the vault to the vehicle!  Sorry, I'll get back in my lane.

Cheers,

2B

Gents (and ladies if any),
New doctrine has this support platoon with a section (3-4 GPMGs) for a company.

Is it possible that there may be *too* much firepower, esp. with platoon wpns det also having now 2x C6, instead of 1 as before. Also having to take into effect that for light infantry guys, you have to hump everything and I don't enjoy the prospect of carrying my share of ammo of 5x C6 plus whatever else kit I have to carry.

I guess the question is how much do we want a section worth of troops to do.

 

[Britney Spears]

I've nothing to add to the Machine-gun-shuffling game you guys are droning on about, but I should point out that radios have a rather limited use in Fibua enviroments, since buildings absorb radio signals.

One idea from G2mil that I'm partial to is the <a href=http://g2mil.com/bullhorns.htm>Combat Bullhorn</a>

I've seen pictures of Chinese PLA  commisars run around the battlefield on excercises with (no joke) bullhorns mounted on helmets. Probably not the best way to stay un-shot, but I think a small rugged bullhorn for every other soldier would be better than everyone yelling themselves hoarse. If the idea of some kind of ultra-sonic frequency could be incorporated to make the bullhorns secure it would be even better.

 

[Joint Service Guy]

British Infantry are now all issued PRR. Works fine, once folks know when and when not to use it. Urban terrain cuts down the 500m LOS but so much as to cause chaos. It's doing well in iraq.

Machine Guns: RHF is right. What is the sections and Platoons most likely task? It sure as hell isn't the dismounted attack, and even if it was, the Platoon is not going to ever act in isolation.

There needs to be some honest work on training and capability, that recognises that things have moved on since 1944, and even back then, we weren't very good - or as good as we think.  :-[

JSG

 

[TangoTwoBravo]

RHF,

I do think that PRRs are your answer, I am just mentioning that it will take some training and net discipline to implement properly.  As an aside, our Iltis/SUV drivers overseas used PRRs to talk to each other in town and it worked very well.

JSG,

What is the section's and Platoon's most likely task?  Is it to act as a firebase?

Cheers,

2B 

 

[Pikache]

I've seen pictures of Chinese PLA  commisars run around the battlefield on excercises with (no joke) bullhorns mounted on helmets. Probably not the best way to stay un-shot, but I think a small rugged bullhorn for every other soldier would be better than everyone yelling themselves hoarse. If the idea of some kind of ultra-sonic frequency could be incorporated to make the bullhorns secure it would be even better.

During the Korean War, the Chinese used whistles to communicate basic orders and to a degree, it worked well. Considering how... fickle 521s can be, I've seen officers using whistles as back up communication method to ensure that an attack goes well.

Funy how keep it simple, stupid works well even in modern days.

 

[Joint Service Guy]

JSG,

What is the section's and Platoon's most likely task?   Is it to act as a firebase?

Cheers,

2B  

The sections most likely task is patrolling, and the platoon is just a bigger patrol, for exploiting complex or close terrrain. Depends on context, but you can't do anything with out infantry, but infantry are just part of the solution.

JSG