The Optimal Battle Group vs. the Affiliated Battle Group

[a_majoor]

Just a stray thought, but much of the criticism of concepts like DO and Gen Petreaus reorganization of the force to better reflect COIN ops is based around the idea we will be preparing to fight the "last war" (or Long War, if you prefer), but will no longer have the ability to fight the Heavy Metal war against China, resurgent Russia, the Martians or whoever else comes along.

It seems to me that if our forces evolve into ever lighter, more dispersable and leathal packages, then a Heavy Metal enemy will have a great deal of difficulty dealing with such a force (being almost in the same position as "we" were early in most insurgencies). However, our soldiers will have access to very sophisticated training, equipment, distributed C4I and logistics, as well as support from platforms like the B-2 or nuclear attack submarines with cruise missiles. Attacking such a force or defending against them will be akin to dealing with an infestation of fire ants, with all the problems that that entails.

 

[PhillyLost_1]

Just a stray thought, but much of the criticism of concepts like DO and Gen Petreaus reorganization of the force to better reflect COIN ops is based around the idea we will be preparing to fight the "last war" (or Long War, if you prefer), but will no longer have the ability to fight the Heavy Metal war against China, resurgent Russia, the Martians or whoever else comes along.

It seems to me that if our forces evolve into ever lighter, more dispersable and leathal packages, then a Heavy Metal enemy will have a great deal of difficulty dealing with such a force (being almost in the same position as "we" were early in most insurgencies). However, our soldiers will have access to very sophisticated training, equipment, distributed C4I and logistics, as well as support from platforms like the B-2 or nuclear attack submarines with cruise missiles. Attacking such a force or defending against them will be akin to dealing with an infestation of fire ants, with all the problems that that entails.

I don't mean to sound sarcastic or condescending but unless you just breezed over the whole article & every other article written about the SC MAGTF then you would have read that they retain all their Traditional capabilities, in fact training for Traditional Full Spectrum Warfare is part of Every 18mth Deployment Cycle.  Added to that towards the end of the PTP cycle is the SC training which would only build on the Traditional FS training.

Also as far as DO goes, all their DO training was in addition to their traditional, which is why the retained the same Platoon structure.  They could disperse when it was to their advantage to and take advantage of leveraged Fire Power, whether against a Conventional or Insurgent force.  Then reassemble when that was the best formation, it was a flowing formation.

A whole divisions worth of DO Capable BNs would still fight as a Traditional Div.  But have the Advantage of dispersing some Companies& BNs while consolidating others for a or multiple 1-2 punches.  Flooding one area w/ dispersed troops to slow a Conv. Enemy down while punching thru w/ a consolidated assault force or bypassing/leap frogging w/them.

That bypassing force can then disperse ahead flood the battlespace gather intel, call in CAS, stay on the move.  The formerly dispersed unit could then consolidate & become assaulting/bypassing or stay dispersed as rear a guard.

 

[TangoTwoBravo]

I don't mean to sound sarcastic or condescending but unless you just breezed over the whole article & every other article written about the SC MAGTF then you would have read that they retain all their Traditional capabilities, in fact training for Traditional Full Spectrum Warfare is part of Every 18mth Deployment Cycle.  Added to that towards the end of the PTP cycle is the SC training which would only build on the Traditional FS training.

The experiment sounds very interesting and seems to describe a reconnaissance platoon.  If you can train every line platoon in the skill sets of a recce platoon then go for it.  Just don't think that something entirely revolutionary has happened, no matter how many adjectives are used.  Training a task force in FSO and then conducting theatre-specific training to include language and culture is done by lots of organizations.  Building area-specific organizations that focus your language and culture assets does sound like a good idea if you can afford it in terms of PERSTEMPO if all your shooting wars are concentrated in one area.

 

[a_majoor]

It is not just the DO concept of the USMC but also the increasing emphasis on COIN (along with the earlier version of "Transformation" to lighter and smaller formations in the US Army) which has prompted the critics. I am not among them, BTW.

Even without the ability to reform as a conventional unit, modern training, weapons, C4I and logistics makes these smaller transformed formations as dangerous as traditional formation, maybe more so. This was the impetus behind the Stryker Brigade, breaking traditional Corps and Divisions into smaller UA/UE's and so on within the US Army. The critics need to adjust their frame of reference, and realise the Heavy Metal force is not the only tool that can take on another Heavy Metal force. The historical analogy that comes to mind for me are the development of mixed forces with substantial light elements to defeat the Greek and Macedonian Phalanx.

 

[Kirkhill]

The experiment sounds very interesting and seems to describe a reconnaissance platoon.  If you can train every line platoon in the skill sets of a recce platoon then go for it.  Just don't think that something entirely revolutionary has happened, no matter how many adjectives are used.  Training a task force in FSO and then conducting theatre-specific training to include language and culture is done by lots of organizations.  Building area-specific organizations that focus your language and culture assets does sound like a good idea if you can afford it in terms of PERSTEMPO if all your shooting wars are concentrated in one area.

T2B - our modern line infantry originally developed from light infantry.  The Battalion Light Company (Recce Pl/Coy) became  Light Battalions, became Rifle Regiments, then the Rifle Corps then everybody got issued a rifle and was trained to operate more freely on a dispersed battlefield.

It sounds to me like these MAGTF experiments are just continuing the push to find out how much terrain can be dominated by the Platoon and its Sections.  (18th and 19th Century Companies with a Captain and a Lieutenant were actually close to the size of a USMC Platoon and in a constabulary/COIN role were regularly independently deployed).

The Technology may be revolutionary but the change is evolutionary.

 

[PhillyLost_1]

T2B - our modern line infantry originally developed from light infantry.  The Battalion Light Company (Recce Pl/Coy) became  Light Battalions, became Rifle Regiments, then the Rifle Corps then everybody got issued a rifle and was trained to operate more freely on a dispersed battlefield.

It sounds to me like these MAGTF experiments are just continuing the push to find out how much terrain can be dominated by the Platoon and its Sections.  (18th and 19th Century Companies with a Captain and a Lieutenant were actually close to the size of a USMC Platoon and in a constabulary/COIN role were regularly independently deployed).

The Technology may be revolutionary but the change is evolutionary.

Exactly...

DO is not this one thing and another.  Or this capability or that, the Concept & the Experiments were simply this... 

  "How far can we push a Marine Infantry Platoon and still maintain all its capabilities.  How far can we push the Independent Leadership of our Small Unit Leaders & the Tactical abilities of our Small Units.  How many Additional Skills can be Performed at the Inf Plt Level & be done Effectively.  etc,etc"

What they found was the Present Inf Plt was capable of much more than even DO had pushed them to.  It was our structure that was not ready to be pushed past a certain point.

DO is not limited to COIN. 

A DO Plt is not a Recon Plt, even though they are trained to perform many of the basic Recon & Surveillance functions, they actually free up Recon Plts to concentrate on their more Advanced Missions. 

DO is not about or dependent on new technology, all the additional skills are taught w/out the aid technology, then the Marines are taught to use the techn to enhance the results.

There's going to come a Point when all this Additional Training is not going to be ADDITIONAL, it is already slowly becoming just part of basic training.  Young Marine Boots in the Inf Training BN are already being trained in Advanced Patrolling, Man Tracking, & Surveillance Techniques; Sqd Ldrs are already being trained to Call in Level II CAS w/out a JTAC & Level I w/ JTAC assistance.

 

[PhillyLost_1]

Just don't think that something entirely revolutionary has happened, no matter how many adjectives are used.  Training a task force in FSO and then conducting theatre-specific training to include language and culture is done by lots of organizations.  Building area-specific organizations that focus your language and culture assets does sound like a good idea if you can afford it in terms of PERSTEMPO if all your shooting wars are concentrated in one area.

No ones calling it revolutionary in the its sending units to do bi-lateral training to various foreign countries.  Other units do it/have done the USMC itself has a long history, both distant & recent, doing it. 

Before & During the GWOT I can fill pages w/ articles about Annual/Bi-Annual Deployments like UNITAS, a shipboard deployment around S Amer to like 15 countries doing FID & Bi-lateral using Reinforced Co size DETs; LF CARAT, same thing only to 15 or so countries in SE Asia; WATC to W Africa. etc

But thats not what the SC MAGTF is.  Its a much more deliberate & comprehensive strategy to keep the countries in these regions continuously engaged thru military & civil development to deny safehaven for extremist groups.  But not just through the USMC but all the Sea Services, various Gov't Agencies/Orgs, & NGOs.

There are really too many points to list you, really have to go thru a few different articles on the SC MAGTF to grasp the concept.

If the MEU(SOC) concept was unveiled on the Internet I'm sure it would have met the same if not more skepticism.  Most Non-Marines who have not personally witnessed its capabilities still have either a hard time understanding it or what makes it be able to operate so far beyond what its #s state. 

Same thing w/the SC MAGTF.

 

[Kirkhill]

A bit off topic here - but is that the difference between Armoured Soldiers and Infanteers?

The Infanteer is taught not to bunch up.  When engaging the enemy a dispersed unit is further dispersed into a fire base and a flanking force.  The only concentrating happening is concentrating fire on the objective.

For the Armoured Soldier, whose emblem is the clenched and mailed fist the watchwords seem to be mass and shock and keeping the heaviest armour to face the enemy.  When the enemy is confronted the Armoured Soldier seems to want to concentrate his force on the approach to the objective.

Is that a fair characterization of the two arms?  And if so, does early training leave a lasting impression on the way that Infantry and Armoured Commanders conduct operations?

 

[McG]

Is that a fair characterization of the two arms? 

It is not.  All arms employ fire bases and will manoeuvre sub-elements to get a position of advantage for the assault.  Everyone is taught not to bunch-up and everyone is taught that concentration of effects are important (while physical concentration is not typically good) ... If anything, my observations of armd suggests they have a better appreciation of the need to physically disperse the force while concentrating effects.  I've witnessed a few occasions where an infantryman has pointed to an area of ground where he'd want a squadron of tanks to fight from, only to be told by the Armd that the area would be tight for a single troop.  This perception of dispersion comes from each arm's influence reach and its mobility.  Tanks reach in thousands of metres while infantry reach in hundreds.  Tank movement is measured in km/h while dismounted infantry movement is in m/h.  Thus, infantry must be much closer for mutual support or to concentrate fire effects onto a common objective and so the infantry's perspective on dispersion is much different than the Armd.  The LAV crews will have another perspective on these distances while mounted.

 

[Old Sweat]

This may be an oversimplification, and I am straying outside of my lane.

It has been my belief based in part of training, in part on experience and in part on historical study that the two arms have different appreciations of ground. The infantry sees it as something to be fought for, occupied and held, while the armour sees ground as something without value in itself, but rather something to be crossed to engage the enemy.

 

[PhillyLost_1]

A bit off topic here - but is that the difference between Armoured Soldiers and Infanteers?

The Infanteer is taught not to bunch up.  When engaging the enemy a dispersed unit is further dispersed into a fire base and a flanking force.  The only concentrating happening is concentrating fire on the objective.

For the Armoured Soldier, whose emblem is the clenched and mailed fist the watchwords seem to be mass and shock and keeping the heaviest armour to face the enemy.  When the enemy is confronted the Armoured Soldier seems to want to concentrate his force on the approach to the objective.

Is that a fair characterization of the two arms?  And if so, does early training leave a lasting impression on the way that Infantry and Armoured Commanders conduct operations?

Are you asking me?  Are you asking as in reference to DO?  Or is this just a general question?

 

[Kirkhill]

As I said Philly_Lost1 - it was a bit off topic.

It just occured to me when I noted the progression of the line infantry from a concentrated mass to a dispersed force - the progression that you brought to the fore.  That got me to thinking that the opposite end of the spectrum seems to be the Armoured/Armored forces that work against that trend by focusing on concentration.  They generally seem to resist dispersal in penny packets.

I've also noticed that Armoured and Infantry soldiers often seem to come at problems from different points of view (not to use too broad a brush on that one as I would note that Armoured Recce also operates dispersed).


Just raised out of interest - maybe it is worth a split discussion. (If it can be done without flames  )

 

[TangoTwoBravo]

As I said Philly_Lost1 - it was a bit off topic.

It just occured to me when I noted the progression of the line infantry from a concentrated mass to a dispersed force - the progression that you brought to the fore.  That got me to thinking that the opposite end of the spectrum seems to be the Armoured/Armored forces that work against that trend by focusing on concentration.  They generally seem to resist dispersal in penny packets.

I've also noticed that Armoured and Infantry soldiers often seem to come at problems from different points of view (not to use too broad a brush on that one as I would note that Armoured Recce also operates dispersed).


Just raised out of interest - maybe it is worth a split discussion. (If it can be done without flames  )

I think that the USMC issues could be discussed separately from this thread except for any connection to whether the task forces are of a fixed composition or are task-organized according to the situation. 

For Philly, we have the ADO (Adaptive Dispersed Operations) concept up here when discussing future forces.  I am a buzz-word skeptic at the best of times, but I do see the value.  On operations I have seen widely dispersed "platoon groups" but I have then seen the same groups come back together into more traditional company-level groupings when heavy lifting had to be done.  I think that there is still an important place for the company HQ and having two or three platoons at hand really helps when things don't go all your way.

Back to Kirkhill,

Concentration and dispersion can be confusing terms since, as others have said, scale can be an issue.  I would argue that a tanker has a different scale when looking at battle space than a dismounted infantryman.  To me, if the elements of a company/squadron are all maneouvring towards a common objective and are within their weapon-effects range of each other then they are concentrated even if they have a large footpring on the ground.  A mounted combat team might have troops/platoons spread over a fairly wide area for a tactical task, but if they are manouvering under the command of single person towards the same objective then I would think that they are concentrated.  They might not all be able to see each other, but their effects are influencing the same objective.  A TUA platoon on a cut-off task might not see the objective and not see any of the maneouvre force but they would still be having their effects concentrated on the single combat team objective.

If, on the other hand, the same combat team had troop/platoon teams on widey separated axis of advance that cannot quickly come together then they would (to me) be dispersed.  They would really be dispersed if they could not be supported by the same indirect fire element (say 155mm battery).  Precise CAS and relatively precise surface to surface rockets have certainly increased the the fire support assets available to a dispersed force.

The point on indirect fire assets brings me back to the OBG issue.  Do you chop out your combat support and combat service support assets or keep them conentrated?  Its an old question.

Coming back to dispersed vs concentrated, given the same resources would you rather have a force with three fairly robust elements or nine smaller ones?  I suppose we would like to be able to do both.  Having more elements can certainly give an advantage in that it would be more flexible.  Having said that, if the nine agile elements were engaged one at a time by the more concentrated forces than I would give the advantage to the concentrated elements.  If I am a tanker having to face other tanks I would prefer to keep my tanks concentrated (although not necessarily side-skirt ot side-skirt).

 

[ArmyRick]

When talking concentrating resources, one should read the latest CAJ article on the Canadian Machine Gun Corps of WWI. It was interesting to note that at first, they concentrated them at Battalion level. Then some brilliant general decides to concentrate them as a brigade assett and eventually a Division asset. I gather from what I have read that as the MG moved into higher formations, the less involved they became and and less readily availible to fighting troops.

My point? I think we have to be careful how much concentration of force we do. Right now, we are in the counter insurgency fight and from our stand point now, it don't look like we are going to fight a large fighting force. Thats not saying it won't happen, just right now, unlikely.

In the same CAJ, I enjoyed reading about how Tanks are being employed in A-stan.

 

[TangoTwoBravo]

Good points, with the takeaway for me being that you can go too far in either direction and you should be flexible.

I was studying the use of machine guns from 1900 to 1918 last year as part of a paper.  One thing I found interesting was that the Germans approached the issue of centralization/de-centralization by having it both ways.  They had machine guns integral to battalions but also had independent machine gun units that were allocated by higher level headquarters as appropriate.  This meant that each battalion had the most important source (arguably) of the infantry's firepower under its own control while the higher level HQ could still mass to some degree. 

The same prinicple can be seen in how most armies organize their fire support.  Battalions have mortars which thus guarantees some level of indirect fire support for all units while concentrating artillery pieces at higher levels to allow a commander to mass effects at a given point.

 

[PhillyLost_1]

As I said Philly_Lost1 - it was a bit off topic.

It just occured to me when I noted the progression of the line infantry from a concentrated mass to a dispersed force - the progression that you brought to the fore.  That got me to thinking that the opposite end of the spectrum seems to be the Armoured/Armored forces that work against that trend by focusing on concentration.  They generally seem to resist dispersal in penny packets.

I've also noticed that Armoured and Infantry soldiers often seem to come at problems from different points of view (not to use too broad a brush on that one as I would note that Armoured Recce also operates dispersed).


Just raised out of interest - maybe it is worth a split discussion. (If it can be done without flames  )

I wasn't disagreeing or upset, I wasn't sure if your question was for me or not b/c it was so many topics going on previously. 

So yeah anything you want to ask go head, I just thought you may have been referencing something to someone fr/ earlier.

 

[McG]

When talking concentrating resources, one should read the latest CAJ article on the Canadian Machine Gun Corps of WWI. It was interesting to note that at first, they concentrated them at Battalion level. Then some brilliant general decides to concentrate them as a brigade assett and eventually a Division asset. I gather from what I have read that as the MG moved into higher formations, the less involved they became and and less readily availible to fighting troops.

A comparison could be made between the machine guns in the first half of the 20 century and heavier direct fire support in the later half (and to today).  Look at out concentration of TUA in the Armd regiments (arguably the organization which least requires that extra punch).  The Stryker Bn has its Stryker ATGM and Stryker MGS to provide that punch with platforms optimized for a supporting role.  Our infantry battalions completely lack some form of heavy close fire support. 

 

[PhillyLost_1]

For Philly, we have the ADO (Adaptive Dispersed Operations) concept up here when discussing future forces.  I am a buzz-word skeptic at the best of times, but I do see the value.  On operations I have seen widely dispersed "platoon groups" but I have then seen the same groups come back together into more traditional company-level groupings when heavy lifting had to be done.  I think that there is still an important place for the company HQ and having two or three platoons at hand really helps when things don't go all your way.

Back to Kirkhill,

Concentration and dispersion can be confusing terms since, as others have said, scale can be an issue.   I would argue that a tanker has a different scale when looking at battle space than a dismounted infantryman.  To me, if the elements of a company/squadron are all maneouvring towards a common objective and are within their weapon-effects range of each other then they are concentrated even if they have a large footpring on the ground.  A mounted combat team might have troops/platoons spread over a fairly wide area for a tactical task, but if they are manouvering under the command of single person towards the same objective then I would think that they are concentrated.  They might not all be able to see each other, but their effects are influencing the same objective.  A TUA platoon on a cut-off task might not see the objective and not see any of the maneouvre force but they would still be having their effects concentrated on the single combat team objective.

If, on the other hand, the same combat team had troop/platoon teams on widey separated axis of advance that cannot quickly come together then they would (to me) be dispersed.  They would really be dispersed if they could not be supported by the same indirect fire element (say 155mm battery).  Precise CAS and relatively precise surface to surface rockets have certainly increased the the fire support assets available to a dispersed force.

Great explanation and right on point.  Whether you were aiming to describe DO or not it is a very apt description of what a DO Plt is Capable of.

The point is to not change the compostion or mission of the Infantry Plt but to leverage it to the farthest extension of MAGTFs Combat Power; MAGTF being Combined Arms TFs utilizing all forms of Direct & Indirect Fire.  

Whether a Plts Squads are a block or a mile apart their actions are still being led & guided by the Plt Cmdr under the Mission Construct of his Comp Cmdr, which includes the 2 other Plts, whether he's 1mi or 50 fr/ the Plts.  & so on to the BN Cmdr to the TF Cmdr.

I have to agree & disagree w/ you on 1 pt, & thats agree w/the fact that it is important to have a Comp HQ, but disagree w/the fact that DO doesn't address this.  The 'ECO', "Enhanced Company Operations", is the Construct being developed to build a Comp Level HQ that can properly handle Overall Distributed Operations & be able to plug into a Larger TF & leverage DO towards that TFs Operational Goals.

Now Tango I'm not directing this to you b/c you seem to have a pretty firm grasp of DO Doctrine, but towards Joe Reader who will read this and say, "Well all the Marine Corps is trying to create is dispersed/distributed units that operate dispersed & can then come back together", as if thats what they are.  No, they are Traditional Inf Units that can disperse to Leverage the MAGTFs FirePower when its to their Tactical Advantage, not Dispersed Units that can come back together for missions.

Its like when the Marines started to train all Inf BNs headed to the MEU(SOC) in Urban Ops in '85, & Rangers began training all BNs in Urban Ops after the Mog' they didn't some how become new Urban Ops Units, it just became another part of their training; now all Personnel are trained in Urban Ops.

It will be the same w/ DO.  Marine Inf Ops will not change just have another Dimension---& since the Brits & Aussie's are also heavily invested in the development of this Program don't be surprised to see it in some form or fashion in their more Expeditionary Units.

 

[armyca08]

I think organization depends on "mission requiremnts" and the extent.

You can see the forces as a "total force" and potential capacity.

Contigency and operandii are then weighted in to determine force composition requirements for successful mission acheivement.

The brigade deployment level or company deployment etc.. may be an easier way of determining force capacity.

When dealing with special forces or squad level, platoon level operations and insertions, the application is likely cladestine, or a short term operation. Large compositions as the brigade level are broken down and spread out but still accounted for on a base of cost economy and logistics needs for supply chain.

Obviously there are times when specific skills can come in useful, and other times were broad specialization is useful. An engineering corps is specifically geared to needs of physics and engineering constrains, as far as I'm aware. While officers in the army may have the time as professional soilders to develop and learn basic skills of a specialist, and then can confer those abililities.

I think organizationally the rank, and organization are seperate from mission deployment. Part of joint task force operations is training to work with a diverse skill set, and having a unified capacity, as part of a joint task force. None the less all this bubble talk aside, I think that for logistics purposes for a defensive operation deploying only those forces you need is required. In a OBG I think it is more geared towards coordinated operations.

For Canada specifically the OBG makes more sense , but for logistics and training reasons it does not. So in this respect I think that having a "active duty" OBG rapid response for national defence could be useful, but  cycling people into active training operations and domestic MOC, specialty training periods would be useful. Obviously in Afghanistan this provides an opourtunity to live operations training.

SO ideally I would use both.

One for domestic skills, dress and regimental training. One for national defence operational training, and a slightly tweaked live operational training in the feild.

The only downside is cost for bringing together people from various units and running the war games.

Both are useful for various reasons.

I think stretching the usefullness of equipment and operational capacity needs to be taken into account when talking about operational composition. That can change from environment to environment.

 

[Infanteer]

Huh?