The Optimal Battle Group vs. the Affiliated Battle Group

[George Wallace]

Actually, my fears are not unfounded.  I have seen so called "Tankers" advancing on a Trace in Suffield with a frontage of 100 m per Troop, where they should have had a frontage of approx 2 km.  I have seen Infantry Coys bring up twenty Jerry Cans of Diesel to replenish a Troop of Tanks that were attached to them.  These are common problems of people who do not train on or with tanks.  It was one of my greatest fears when they announced that the Leo 1 was to be replaced by a MGS.  These fears and problems are not as frivolous as you may seem to think.

As for tanks not deploying.  Where have you been?  They are deployed right now in Afghanistan, and if the next people rotating in do not get the experience of working with them, and the knowledge of their capabilities and what they are not capable of doing; then it is pure arrogance on the part of the Leadership and dooms many to failure.

 

[Infanteer]

Actually, my fears are not unfounded.  I have seen so called "Tankers" advancing on a Trace in Suffield with a frontage of 100 m per Troop, where they should have had a frontage of approx 2 km.  I have seen Infantry Coys bring up twenty Jerry Cans of Diesel to replenish a Troop of Tanks that were attached to them.  These are common problems of people who do not train on or with tanks.  It was one of my greatest fears when they announced that the Leo 1 was to be replaced by a MGS.  These fears and problems are not as frivolous as you may seem to think.

The competence of a Tank Troop or their training relationship with other arms is predicated by training time and opportunity, not unit organization.  I'd argue that maybe we see a decline in tank skills when a regiment becomes diluted more than one task (Armoured Recce and Armoured) in a regiment?

As for tanks not deploying.  Where have you been?  They are deployed right now in Afghanistan, and if the next people rotating in do not get the experience of working with them, and the knowledge of their capabilities and what they are not capable of doing; then it is pure arrogance on the part of the Leadership and dooms many to failure.

Tanks have deployed 3 times since WWII.  Korea, Kosovo, and Kandahar.  There are many deployments where we did not employ tanks and there are many potential deployments where we will not employ them, either due to terrain or political/strategic reasons.  An infantry battalion will go everytime and anywhere.  It's "optimized" assets should be those ones that it expects to take with it everytime and anywhere - the rest can be husbanded at a higher level and "affiliated" as needed.

 

[TangoTwoBravo]

We should not confuse the issue of the utility of the Cougar as a tank trainer with organization and structure.  Bringing MGS into the debate can only lead to more tangents (it was never intended as a tank trainer).  In addition, if a tank Sqn has an integral echelon (as it should) then whether the tanks sqns are centralized in one Regiment or put in three Regiments is a bit moot.  Having balanced armoured regiments is, perhaps, another debate entirely from the OBG, although it plays into the ABG issue.  There are indeed good reasons for having a tank squadron in each Regiment to support the force generation of battle groups.   

I would argue that if you marry a tank squadron up with an infantry battalion for three months of collective training then they will get slick even if they came from opposite coasts and never worked together before.

 

[vonGarvin]

When considering what to "optimize" and what to "centralize", I guess you want to look at what needs to deploy and what is mission specific.  Tanks, in my opinion, are not going to be deployed on every operation.  Mortar Platoons are, as they can be transitioned into a variety of other enablers.  Optimize mortar platoons and affiliate tank squadrons.

*pssst*  We don't have mortar platoons anymore, so the verb you seek may be "recreate"

Anyway, this "experiment" is just rubbish.  If you want PYs, I have a solution: gut the bloated HQ's we have, ESPECIALLY the TWO levels of command we have in theatre for ONE battlegroup!  OK, two battlegroups, now that 2-2 is on board.  HUNDREDS of PYs in there, just waiting to get cut.

And there's nothing wrong with the CMBG model.  Remember, the "G" was for group, in that certain divisional assets were added to the bde, right?  Anyway, I digress...

 

[dapaterson]

At the end of the day we are in a resource constrained situation.  We are buying 100 new MBT hulls.  Full stop.  Take away 19 for the deployed sqn; another 19 for CMTC's training fleet; another 19 to be undergoing refit/refurb at any one time; say another dozen or so for ARVs and AEVs (and ingoring any need for AVLBs)... and we're down to 31 available for distribution to the line units.  If we decide the Armd school should have some (say a dozen), we have one sqn of tanks to assign to a single unit.

So don't expect an Armd Regt in every CMBG any time soon...

 

[George Wallace]

Well.  100 is only 28 less than we bought in 1970 during the Cold War Days.  Then we had a full three Tank Sqn Armd Regiment in Germany with an Independent Tank Sqn in Gagetown.  28 less would account for that Independent Tank Sqn and the Sqn in War Reserve in Germany leaving us with the 100. 

 

[vonGarvin]

Get rid of CMTC for starters.  "Laser Tag" may be nice, but it detracts from the training events/lessons that we aim for.  As well, 19 tanks sitting there, awaiting serials to show up is a disgusting waste of resources. 
The sqn here doesn't have four troops: only three.  Assume 19 anyway (spares)
Maybe it's time for a Bde Tank Squadron, and a full up Recce Regiment per brigade group?
So, four squadrons (56), one in each brigade, and one deployed.
That leaves 44 for 'other uses', including a squadron at CTC (if you have none at CTC, then forget about having any in the brigades).  Now down to 25.
So, the three armour regiments have say two recce squadrons and a tank squadron.  The tank squadron is a brigade asset and the recce squadrons can pair up with each of the infantry battalions as required, or centralised if needed.  (Yes, only two infantry battalions per brigade).  Coupled with an Artillery Regiment of two gun batteries per brigade, it's smaller than what we have, but it's enough for our deployments, if stewarded properly. 
So, in the end, each brigade looks like this:
Bde HQ and Signal Squadron
Armour Regiment (1 tank, 2 recce squadrons)
Artillery Regiment (2 gun batteries)
Engineer Regiment
Service Battalion
Infantry Battalion x 2
Now, assume for a moment that we are deployed "somewhere" in the world where we need a battlegroup.  Suppose infantry battlegroup, with tanks and recce.
(I know this is a stretch, but hold on, I'm going somewhere with this)
Assume further that the brigades are numbered 1st, 2nd and 5th (don't ask about 3 and 4: they were bad, just leave it at that!)
So, army commander rings up 2 bde comd and says "I say, Dean my boy, you are next up in the hopper.  I'll need an infantry battlegroup with a gun battery, engineer squadron, recce sqn and tank squadron attached OPCOM.  As well, I need a Bde HQ, a Service Battalion (*cough* "NSE" *cough*) and an OMLT.  The Infantry battlegroup only needs three companies, so that fourth company, they can be the OMLT.  The rest of the bde, well, they can assist with your training.  You deploy in 6 months and you'll be gone for 9.  Questions?"
(Assume again that the infantry battalion has four rifle companies and a skeleton Cbt Sp Coy of recce and sigs). 
I don't need an experiment to see if this would work.  It's what we used to do, but there are fewer infantry battalions (by four) from say 1990.  But instead of people deploying, returning, going on leave, and starting training AGAIN, this time there are six fully functional battalions that can deploy for BG and for OMLT.  With tweaking, of course.  But a hell of a lot better than what we're doing. 

Just my two pence worth...

 

[Old Sweat]

I am going to poke a stick in a few eyes here, for I feel we are in one of our spirals. If this is such a good idea, like unification, why haven’t other western militaries done it? There is, to my tiny mind at least, one overriding reason to go this route, and that is to free up manpower spaces. By posting the sub-units of the armoured, field artillery and engineers units into the infantry battalions, theoretically we can free up almost a unit’s worth of people from the disbanded headquarters and CSS organizations. Do you realize how many new headquarters we can staff with that?

It has already been pointed out that there are not enough tanks to go around, so what do we post in lieu - light armour, reconnaissance or something else? In the case of the guns there are not enough field batteries to fill the slots as well. Which battalion in each brigade gets the STA battery instead? To reach back many years ago, during a summer concentration in 3 CIBG in Gagetown the commander decreed that the affiliated squadrons and batteries would join their battalions in the field. It soon became apparent that the infantry were only interested in having the BC and FOOs with them. Moreover the battalion commanders were neither willing nor able to take on the task of training the gun end of the battery.

I suggest that the training load has not been fully appreciated. Nor, I submit has the requirement for arms advisors at brigade headquarters, let alone the need for a FSCC there. The engineers would probably have something to say about the fragmentation of a very scarce resource, especially if a river crossing or an obstacle breaching was to be conducted.

To return to the manpower spaces, a very senior retired officer told me a few months ago that back in the mid-nineties the land staff had to convince the senior department management that it was not a good idea to reorganize the army on precisely this concept. He did not share his logic with me at the time. However one reason against it that has occurred to me is that the unit command slots in the army are reduced by half, thus halving the gene pool of potential senior commanders. It seems to me that a case could be made that the remaining nine (leaving 4 AD Regt out of the discussion) slots should be shared across the armoured, artillery, engineers and infantry. It probably would work our on a ratio of 5/4 infantry to the others, perhaps flipping to 4/5 from time to time.

Now, since units such as the RCD and the RCHA will disappear from the order of battle, it seems only fair that we maintain consistency. Thus the nine battle groups would be named 1/1, 2/1, 3/1, 1/2, 2/2, 3/2/ 1/5, /25 and 3/5 Battle Groups and the command slots all become combat arms instead of infantry.

 

[ArmyRick]

I think mortarman rock painter has a very realistic model of CMBG if we do decide on a serious re-org. It seems most workable solution.

 

[Infanteer]

I am going to poke a stick in a few eyes here, for I feel we are in one of our spirals. If this is such a good idea, like unification, why haven’t other western militaries done it?

They are.  The first major proponent of such an idea was LCol Douglas MacGregor and his "Breaking the Phalanx".  We are seeing his theories come out (perhaps not directly due to his writings) with both the Stryker Bde, Batt, and Coy and with the "Unit of Action" Light and Heavy Maneuver Battalions that are being created throughout the US Army - they are, clearly, optimizing.

The USMC, on the other hand, remains wedded to the idea of "affiliated" and continues to build MAGTF's from "branch-pure" battalions and regiments.

I suggest that the training load has not been fully appreciated. Nor, I submit has the requirement for arms advisors at brigade headquarters, let alone the need for a FSCC there. The engineers would probably have something to say about the fragmentation of a very scarce resource, especially if a river crossing or an obstacle breaching was to be conducted.

That is what I had in mind when I mentioned "husbanding" the tanks into a single "divisional" regiment.

To return to the manpower spaces, a very senior retired officer told me a few months ago that back in the mid-nineties the land staff had to convince the senior department management that it was not a good idea to reorganize the army on precisely this concept. He did not share his logic with me at the time. However one reason against it that has occurred to me is that the unit command slots in the army are reduced by half, thus halving the gene pool of potential senior commanders. It seems to me that a case could be made that the remaining nine (leaving 4 AD Regt out of the discussion) slots should be shared across the armoured, artillery, engineers and infantry. It probably would work our on a ratio of 5/4 infantry to the others, perhaps flipping to 4/5 from time to time.

My guess is that the training system would have to adjust to ensure that once an officer becomes a LCol, he is a "Maneuver" or a "Support" trade, not a branch trade.  Is this possible?  I think we are doing a decent job of covering that off now - any recent staff college grads want to address this?

 

[McG]

They are [moving to a model of permanent standing OBGs]. 

They are not.  Take a look at the scale.  A SBCT is a move from Div centric operations to Bde Gp centric.  Effectively, SBCT brings the US closer to what we already have in CMBGs with recognized ABG.  SBCT is not an OBG.

 

[Infanteer]

They are not.  Take a look at the scale.  A SBCT is a move from Div centric operations to Bde Gp centric.  Effectively, SBCT brings the US closer to what we already have in CMBGs with recognized ABG.  SBCT is not an OBG.

Sure it is; look at what a Stryker Infantry Company has.  Snipers, Direct Fire Support LAVs, Mortar LAVs, it own Ambs.  If that ain't optimized, then I don't know what is.

 

[McG]

Sure it is; look at what a Stryker Infantry Company has.  Snipers, Direct Fire Support LAVs, Mortar LAVs, it own Ambs.  If that ain't optimized, then I don't know what is.

It is an infantry battalion.  We used to have that ...

Snipers -> still there with Recce Pl
DFS -> used to have TUA
Mortar -> used to have Mor Pl
Ambs -> also used to find these in the Bn.

The OBG concept is far more than just having Bn assets that can be grouped into the companies for operations/training.  SBCT does not put cavlry type armour into the infantry battalions.  Engineers and guns are still a Bde asset.  SBCT is CMBG without the removal of past capabilities from battalions. 

 

[Infanteer]

It is an infantry battalion.  We used to have that ...

Snipers -> still there with Recce Pl
DFS -> used to have TUA
Mortar -> used to have Mor Pl
Ambs -> also used to find these in the Bn.

Well, maybe Rockpainter's point about reinventing the wheel is apt then.

The OBG concept is far more than just having Bn assets that can be grouped into the companies for operations/training.

What is it then?  The way I see it, it is pushing combined arms functions down to lower and lower levels on a permanent level; irregardless of trade or branch.  This is clearly what the Americans are doing by moving from the Division to the Brigade Combat Teams and by pushing combined arms teams down to a lower level such as the Stryker Company and Battalion and the Combat Maneuver Battalions (assets which used to belong to a Regimental and/or Divisional level).  These aren't assets that are grouped - they are integral.  Perhaps "Integral" would have been a better word than "Optimized"?

Mind you, the Americans have always been better at this due to not being blessed/cursed by a Regimental System.

 

[McG]

The OBG puts everything into the BG (Tk, Arty, Engr).  SBCT does not do this.  The Stryker Bn only includes the type of functions and capabilities that we have traditionally associated with a Mech Bn (except that they've swapped MGS in place of TUA). 

When these traditional assets are integral to the Bn, then I think the structure is adequate.  Permanently plugging them into a rifle coy can serve to reduce the BG Comd's flexibility.  In a stability operation with "non-contiguous" AOs it would make perfect sense to attach these assets to companies.  When the day comes that we're called on to invade Sudan, it might be better to aggregate these assets to focus on a main effort or guard a flank ... but we can't do this if the Pl and Coy level HQs don't exist because they were dissolved when the sub-elements were blended into the rifle coys.

 

[Infanteer]

The OBG puts everything into the BG (Tk, Arty, Engr).  SBCT does not do this.

Well, I'm looking at things in terms of capability.  Sure, an SBCT doesn't have MBTs and 155s, but they have 81mm (and potentially 120mm) mortars and 105mm guns, so they have much of the same capability.  This is not what a US TO&E Company had before, so they've made changes along the same vein as we are looking at.  Again, their "Combined Arms Battalions" as part of the heavy UA are probably a better example of the trend - either way, it is very similar to what we are playing around with.

When the day comes that we're called on to invade Sudan, it might be better to aggregate these assets to focus on a main effort or guard a flank ... but we can't do this if the Pl and Coy level HQs don't exist because they were dissolved when the sub-elements were blended into the rifle coys.

Roger - which is why I agree with you (I think we had this initial debate and I conceded to you about 4 years ago).  I am all about husbanding our slim resources and "Affiliating" them where needs be.  The only "Optimizing" I'm interested in seeing is expanding at Company (Squadron) level and below to make them more capable and independent for the "everytime and always" scenarios.

 

[dangerboy]

The best resupply we had on TF 3-06 were ran by the LDSH.  The Infantry in my view could take some lessons from the Armoured on the Echelon and how to do DP's.

 

[Kirkhill]

I seem to recall reading many years ago that the 82nd Airborne Div, which was tasked with being the US Army's Strategic Quick Reaction Force had a policy of maintaining a Ready Brigade (essentially a Brigade Group) and within that a Ready Battalion (a Battle Group) and, as far as I recall a Ready Combat Team.

The Div rotated assets through the slots so that they were taken out of unit training and grouped for readiness training.  

The concept seemed to work for them.

I believe that we used to work on a similar concept but geography (3 independent brigade groups requiring 3 support lines and training facilities) and manpower (not enough bodies to get the job AND the training done) work against us.

Trying to have three equal Brigade Groups doesn't help if all the Groups are to have an equal smattering of all the heavy assets that are expensive to maintain.

Perhaps the problem was in disbanding 4 CMBG where all the heavy assets were maintained.  

Maybe it would have been better to reform 4 CMBG in Canada at a reduced level as a Divisional Support Group with Tanks and Arty and create 3 Light Brigades (Infantry and LAVs and 2 Battalions each) to minimize the regional training burden.   As well the lighter forces are the types of forces more likely to be suitable for both domestic and international rapid intervention.

Gagetown would have been the best choice for the Div Spt Group with its combination of Ranges and access to salt water.  The DSG would be most likely used on long stay foreign interventions, like Korea, Kosovo and Kandahar.

 

[Old Sweat]

Kirkhill,

I don't know if I'm talking out of my butt, but having a divisional support group with the tanks and arty in Gagetown pretty well ensures an even lower level of knowledge of all arms operations than we had at the end of the decade of force cuts and the financial and intellectual poverty we went through. (I keep saying 'we' but I was happily spending my pension while the rest of you soldiered on.) I don't really want to debate the number of battalions or the organization of CMBGs or whatever.

I have yet to hear a compelling argument for the optimized brigade battle group.

 

[vonGarvin]

The best resupply we had on TF 3-06 were ran by the LDSH.  The Infantry in my view could take some lessons from the Armoured on the Echelon and how to do DP's.

I have 19 years in the reg force infantry (+5 in reserves).  Nobody does the Echelon as well as the Armour Corps.  As a young'un when we did cbt tms all over gagetown, we were "okay" at it, but C Sqn RCD were tops.  Same with 12e RBC.  Never worked with LdSH (RC) (until now), but I can only assume the same.