The Optimal Battle Group vs. the Affiliated Battle Group
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To reiterate the comment it is very simple:
For logistics purposes, use miminalized supply need groupings, when domestic (in canada on operation specific bases - ect. a CFB airbase would be best supplied along airforce logistics with minimal carry over for non airforce supply needs) If you base smaller core units together, eg, a Navy Port Facility with an airbase. If there is centralization cost diffence may be negligable, however in the case of smaller groupings of mixed units wth different supply needs costs would be larger in shiping mixed units, due to a little overhead on sorting, and depot shipping.
While for an operational setting you may have fixed expectances, and develope a supply chain simply for the mission requirements, on a more short term basis, rather than a more regularized supply line. That is makeshift supply during an operation,vs. the ongoing running of a military facility which would need enhanced security inbedded if protection of equipment and assets was a priority. In an operational setting you may have recon or armed movements of supplies. This is not to say that this wouldn't happen domestically, however I don't know, however I am under the impression that paper and other goods arn't under armed gaurd when they arrive on base.
The point of that was, in a mixed deployment or training scenario there is more overhead in logistics needs, be it uniforms, replacement kit, if not streamlined for all forces.
In regard to mixed light and mobile infantry, by putting the two together, you combine the logistics needs, but if you spread this out, you may be adding split sorting on th supply side. That is if you have two smaller units of mixed mobile then you will need to split the shipment at some point. While there is sorting, it adds a little more sorting, also you add to the need for sorting and unpacking, in the slightest way.
So while having two modes of training, regular MOC focused training, and Joint Operations Training. With Joint Operations focused on mission capacity building. The MOC focused training and specialization would for reasons of skill development with centralization of specialist trainers, unless there was an excess of trainers to be deployed to all the smaller working groups.
Traning supplies and materials, and facilities can likewise be spread. The other alternative is to build duplicate infrastructure, and enhance the logistics to create more supply depots, and more regular shipments or larger shipments, as cost overhead would likely be larger for a smaller shipment.
The key point from my earlier post is each mission and environment may have a different ideal composition. You can think of knights in france, or blitzkreig or latin american geurilla warfare. Each environment and technology collage will offer different weakenesses and advantages. Having mixed forces can be benificial when you are not sure what you will face, while being able to have the proper equipment for the operation and knowing it can help with logistics needs. Obviously it isn't clear cut; however, for each mission be it peace keeping, war in afghanistan, Iraq or Georgia, the forces and development of order of battle engagement may differ, it all depends on the short term and long range needs from a tacticle to a strategic basis.
To simplify, a single type of force will not always be ideal alone, attachments can be benificial, however for logistic purposes it is a hastle. In the case of embedded specialists, insuring that universal training mechanisms exist to prime joint operations is of tremendous importance. It really depends on a case by case basis.
I'm not sure if this explains the two face training, and deployment strategy or not, however the concept is very simple.
For logistics purposes, use miminalized supply need groupings, when domestic (in canada on operation specific bases - ect. a CFB airbase would be best supplied along airforce logistics with minimal carry over for non airforce supply needs) If you base smaller core units together, eg, a Navy Port Facility with an airbase. If there is centralization cost diffence may be negligable, however in the case of smaller groupings of mixed units wth different supply needs costs would be larger in shiping mixed units, due to a little overhead on sorting, and depot shipping.
While for an operational setting you may have fixed expectances, and develope a supply chain simply for the mission requirements, on a more short term basis, rather than a more regularized supply line. That is makeshift supply during an operation,vs. the ongoing running of a military facility which would need enhanced security inbedded if protection of equipment and assets was a priority. In an operational setting you may have recon or armed movements of supplies. This is not to say that this wouldn't happen domestically, however I don't know, however I am under the impression that paper and other goods arn't under armed gaurd when they arrive on base.
The point of that was, in a mixed deployment or training scenario there is more overhead in logistics needs, be it uniforms, replacement kit, if not streamlined for all forces.
In regard to mixed light and mobile infantry, by putting the two together, you combine the logistics needs, but if you spread this out, you may be adding split sorting on th supply side. That is if you have two smaller units of mixed mobile then you will need to split the shipment at some point. While there is sorting, it adds a little more sorting, also you add to the need for sorting and unpacking, in the slightest way.
So while having two modes of training, regular MOC focused training, and Joint Operations Training. With Joint Operations focused on mission capacity building. The MOC focused training and specialization would for reasons of skill development with centralization of specialist trainers, unless there was an excess of trainers to be deployed to all the smaller working groups.
Traning supplies and materials, and facilities can likewise be spread. The other alternative is to build duplicate infrastructure, and enhance the logistics to create more supply depots, and more regular shipments or larger shipments, as cost overhead would likely be larger for a smaller shipment.
The key point from my earlier post is each mission and environment may have a different ideal composition. You can think of knights in france, or blitzkreig or latin american geurilla warfare. Each environment and technology collage will offer different weakenesses and advantages. Having mixed forces can be benificial when you are not sure what you will face, while being able to have the proper equipment for the operation and knowing it can help with logistics needs. Obviously it isn't clear cut; however, for each mission be it peace keeping, war in afghanistan, Iraq or Georgia, the forces and development of order of battle engagement may differ, it all depends on the short term and long range needs from a tacticle to a strategic basis.
To simplify, a single type of force will not always be ideal alone, attachments can be benificial, however for logistic purposes it is a hastle. In the case of embedded specialists, insuring that universal training mechanisms exist to prime joint operations is of tremendous importance. It really depends on a case by case basis.
I'm not sure if this explains the two face training, and deployment strategy or not, however the concept is very simple.
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MCG said:
It wasn't an argument which may be why you don't see the argument. It was opinion, and coming from a self made armchair junkie, not someone with actual real life strategic command experience, so it is geuss work, it just seems the logical end.
The point really was there are two key elements of structural design and development for combat forces. 1. Is the Logistic -Supply and Management of a large combat force that intersects with the military industrial complex as a whole, as well as any civilian counter parts that produce war materials. 2. Is the effectiveness of the fighting force from a strategic standpoint - that is how can the training and deployment 'bloom' into a optimal force given the materials and personnel available.
In the case of taking a direct approach to the OBG ABG people already are working with what is at hand, using Artillary and Infantry in Coordination and how it is best to contain the working elements of the forces. My comments were more generalized and not specific, because there is no absolute to the equipment or personnel or materials, in a developmental framework.
My ideal battle group from an armchair perspective is likely nothing like your ideal, as I have a very fantastic and non engrained viewpoint of the military, current and past military, and the future fighting forces.
I think that protection and fire support are heavy, with mobility an engagement capacity, cost and image and cultural interface are all key elements in modern warfare. The roles and costs are also key, not to start ranting again.
So really I was more saying neither and both. There is a need to position your forces to provide for their needs, and efficiently
As for your perhaps rhetorical comment. Neither. I've read and thought about international logistics, most of my past reading was based on US logistics, however civilian logistics (business management) and history - ancient to modern warfare, reading about different modes of war, role playing etc..
I'm very much light weight and left field here Just my opinion. And finally - it depends on what you are fighting and under what circumstances. However I think training should both insure effective warriors and adapatable soilders. I can only imagine.
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Army08; You've gone off the plot mate. Very difficult to follow your line of reasoning. Perhaps filling out a bit more of your profile would help us understand where yo are coming from?
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army08 said:
If that is your ideas speaking for ya mate, you should perhaps tell 'em to ease off the redbull and coffee! In or out of context, that post is just a wee bit cryptic, savvy?
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He is talking about very large pie in the sky concepts that academics like to talk about in a classroom or at the conference table. I am going through some of this pain in my masters degree right now... Not without its merit but not directly applicable to the OBG vs ABG debate. Regardless of which model one prefers, strategic level logistics are an issue, but that issue is a constant, therefore not much of a factor here.
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ArmyRick said:
I think its important to define what we mean by dispersal vs concentration of force. These two conceps are born from larger scale conventional operations. Dispersal was something that the Canadian Corps created in WW1 to deal with high casualties resulting from machine gun and artillery fire. In simple terms that meant spreading the troops out and avoiding choke points where they could be effectively mowed down, but it also meant that the Platoon Commander became the central figure on the battlefield stemming from the idea of decentralized command and control. The Platoon Commanders needed the authority and ability to make decisions in the heat of battle to deal with local situations as they popped up that the Company comander or higher could not deal with. Of course giving Platoon Commanders the ability to deal with said problems meant giving him assets like machine guns, rifle grenades and grenadiers at his direct disposal hence dispersal of your assets. Having a large amount of machine guns under a brigade commanders control when he has limited ability to communicate and react proved innefectual. At higher levels they were learning how to get the artillery to work with the infantry to create fire and movement capabilities instead of just firing and rushing which wasnt working too well for them. Dispersal was essentially one very key ingredient to combined arms operations.
Dispersal however does not negate or overule concentration. Consider two large armies of 500,000 men each squaring off against each other. No side has a numerical superiority but when on the attack the commander would almost always create a local superiority of numbers by concentrating his forces in an attempt to create and exploit a break through of enemy lines. Dispersal will still occur within this concentration of force. The Platoon Commander will still be the central battlefield commander and he will still have support assets available to him.
In a manner of speaking, dispersal and concentration are always happening simultaneously.
In Afghanistan the context is completely different. There is not necessarily a need to concentrate forces to create local superiority the way one would in a conventional setting so the idea of dispersal takes on a completely different definition entirely. Now you are looking at the possibility of geographically dispersing your forces over a greater area which causes logistical problems that I would argue we have not yet properly accounted for as our training system is built around a conventional scenario.
OBG vs ABG would both encounter those same problems.
However for the sake of this thread I beleive that assuming we can solve our manning issues OBG is the way to go. Combined Arms tactics and doctrine will defeat a numerically and technologically superior force that is not using Combined Arms.
This is an area that I think Canada is exceptionally weak in. I think we do an excellent job with individual training but a lousy job with collective training. Budget is the major culprit here no doubt, but assuming your budget issue is fixed, what then to do with it? Collective training is what will make the difference in a large scale battle at the end of the day. OBG allows for the best possible collective training in my opinion. The more effective collective training we conduct the more effective we will be on the battlefield.
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ltmaverick25 said:
Are you implying that any force not organized along OBG lines is incapable of using combined arms doctrine? How does an OBG set up facilitate a better approach to combined arms training?
At what level? From where I'm standing, we're doing better than we ever have at putting combined arms assets together at levels 2 to 4 for training.
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Infanteer said:
No that is not what I am implying, I do think however that an OBG would help us improve our collective training to an even better degree than what we see now which would increase our combined arms ability. There is more then one way to go about combined arms training, I just think the OBG is a stronger model. If you have an organic group that is used to working with each other as opposed to pieces of a puzzle constantly being thrown together it stands to reason there would be better cohesiveness over the long run. This of course all rests on us having enough manning slates to begin with, otherwise its moot as we will have to beg borrow and steal constantly anyway.
You are right, we are doing it better now then we did 10 years ago, even better then we did it 5 years ago. There is no question that we are moving in the right direction but in my opinion we are not there yet and still have a long way to go. If we keep at it and maintain the collective focus and get better funding to do it more often, combined with what I am suggesting above we will be even better, but for sure, things are moving forward instead of backwards.
McG
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I heard the CLS speak a little over a week ago. He seems to disagree with you.ltmaverick25 said:
After two and a half years of actual combined arms fighting, the Army's ability in combined arms fighting is not even a concern these days. We get it, we've got it, and we are doing very well at it.
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Just read through the 17 pages of posts to date on this thread and I apologize in advance if I am opening old wounds but I have one issue. The elephant in my room is the fact that we are not just fighting a BG in theatre right now, so what happens to the other units who need the support of the enablers grouped with the BG/Bn? The OMLT, PRT and yes even the NSE require Arty/FAC, Engineer, ISTAR etc. support. By grouping all assets as part of an OBG/ABG these units literally have to beg the BG for support. The TF HQ has no additional assets of its own and is limited in how it can solve problems. If it owned the guns, TACP, Recce Sqn, Engineers etc. it would be able to determine and accept risk, set priorities and allocate resources to its main effort whatever that is on a day to day basis. So IMO (as someone mentioned in a much earlier post) I think the best solution would be to return to a Bn from a BG and give the TF HQ (which is nesc with multiple units) the enablers. This would also free PYs (by reducing the Bn HQ)because you would no longer have duplicate coord centers at different levels with only one of those levels actually having assets. Agreed that for a roto 0 or 1 the BG/Bn needs all the support pieces in place as it crosses the LoD but as the mission evolves and units like the OMLT stand up, they are also going to be looking for help as well. It's nice to think we are all Canadians who can play nicely together, but when it comes down to reality and it is my guys vs. yours, generally it takes a higher HQ to make the "right" decision. I have many more opinions on this but as I am coming in rater late I will wait, besides, I have to go put my asbestos suit on. ;D
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MCG said:
Fair enough, but that does not necessarily make it so. Dont get me wrong, I am not trying to rag on the army, I have been a soldier myself up until last month when I went Navy. I have the utmost respect for what the army does but I still do not think we are doing as good a job on combined arms training as we can be, and I am not the only one that shares that opinion. When I was still working as an Int Op in Toronto the higher ups there would talk about it all the time. Two years of combined arms training is better then what we had before, but compare that to other armies that have been doing it much longer... There is absolutely no taking away from the very positive strides made in the past few years by the army but there is also absolutely no taking away that we still have a good way to go.
As has been mentioned in this thread and in others, alot of our combat arms brothers still dont fully understand what the others role is or how they do it, how they fit into the picture. Intelligence generation has come a long long way but the dissemination and sharing of it leaves little to be desired at times. The logistical networks and frameworks still need some work too. There is always more to be done, I would submit the CLS knows this too.
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LtMaverick25
While we are getting off the thread topic a bit I have to disagree. We do a very good job at combined arms training, i.e. Inf, Arty, Eng, Armd. What we don't do well is integration of non-combat arms support trades (like Int which is probably why you heard your superiors complaining). What we also don't do well is joint training but that's another debate. As for combined arms though, we have basically been doing it for ever and do it well. Admittedly, however, lately we have been focusing at lower levels like BG which is why some are concerned with skill fade and a loss of corporate knowledge. That being said we have had Bde training events in 2003, 2005 and I believe at least one more since then (5 Bde). The CLS loves big training events and I am willing to bet someone will have another BTE very soon.
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While we are getting off the thread topic a bit I have to disagree. We do a very good job at combined arms training, i.e. Inf, Arty, Eng, Armd. What we don't do well is integration of non-combat arms support trades (like Int which is probably why you heard your superiors complaining). What we also don't do well is joint training but that's another debate. As for combined arms though, we have basically been doing it for ever and do it well. Admittedly, however, lately we have been focusing at lower levels like BG which is why some are concerned with skill fade and a loss of corporate knowledge. That being said we have had Bde training events in 2003, 2005 and I believe at least one more since then (5 Bde). The CLS loves big training events and I am willing to bet someone will have another BTE very soon.
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I think the BG combined arms training is the most realistic and practical you are going to get right now anyway due to our relatively small size and budget. Its good to know the combat arms are doing alot of training together. I heard the higher ups complaining, but they were not Int guys, these were officers in the HQ, one (G2) had a few things to say but alot of the feedback was coming from the G1 and G3. You may be right about the issue being integrating your support network, but then again, that is one of the single most important factors to consider.
How often are you guys running combined arms excercises now? Is this widespread throughout the army or just the area that is supplying the next TF to Afghanistan?
Anyway back to the original thread, I think the issues you are raising here are another good indicator as to the strength of the OBG system. I like the idea of bringing elements under one HQ and one system of accountability.
How often are you guys running combined arms excercises now? Is this widespread throughout the army or just the area that is supplying the next TF to Afghanistan?
Anyway back to the original thread, I think the issues you are raising here are another good indicator as to the strength of the OBG system. I like the idea of bringing elements under one HQ and one system of accountability.
TangoTwoBravo
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ltmaverick25 said:
Whether units that are not deploying can or cannot do combined arms training does not have anything to do with OBG. TFs that are going to Afghanistan have the priority for resources.
I was a tank troop leader in the late 90s when training opportunities were pretty scarce. We still conducted a fair amount of combat team and battle group (Level 5 and 6) training with our RCR, CER and RCHQ neighbours across the street. I would argue that we cut Troop/Squadron training to allow for combat team training. In 2002 as a tank squadron Battle Captain we did oodles of combined arms training up to Level 7 (Brigade). Since then Afghanistan has focused the training opportunties onto the deploying battle group, but that is a resource issue and not an organizational one.
I am not sure I understand the bit about accountability. Units are accountable. Every CO has a Commander who is accountable in turn to a superior commander.
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The accountability factor is more related to cooperation. I have witnessed that break down and without strong direction from higher to settle things so to speak. Albeit I have seen this far more on the reserve side of the house, I have still seen some examples on the reg force side. I think really alot of it comes down to manning though. Just not enough resources for everyone and thats where things start to break down. At the end of the day I will concede you guys will have far more insight into alot of this stuff then I will. When on the army side of things I was an NCM and alot of my feedback comes from some things I have seen while working the HQ side of things. I realize that is not always the whole picture, but from the piece of the picture I was able to see, the above few posts are my impressions.
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