The Defence Budget [superthread]

[RCPalmer]

100% in agreement on your first point I feel both the Reg and Res need reform.  Your second part, I don't think we need first principles work, the works already been done, we've just never bothered following through on our words.  It's words without any action.  It's been articulated many times, General Purpose Combat Capability and Medium Weight Force.  A medium weight force is supposed to be able to do everything across th spectrum of conflict, though not as well at some tasks that would be more suitable to a light force or heavy force. 

We've got doctrine, we've got designs and future concepts, let's buy equipment and properly man and support our forces and align ourselves with doctrine, designs and future concepts.  The first question we should be asking ourselves whenever we buy a new piece of equipment is, does this support our doctrine at present and in the future.  We let equipment drive our doctrine when it should be the other way around.

Amen.  All I would note is that the PRes costs overall are very inexpensive and quite stable at around 1 Billion CAD/year which includes RSS, equipment, base support, etc..  It is the overall defence budget overall which grew so rapidly in the 2000s with virtually no readiness improvements, and relatively few capability enhancements.  One of the more interesting findings of Leslie's 2011 transformation report was most of the funding growth in the period went into increased personnel costs with questionable ROI.  By way of comparison, the Aussies do everything we do (and a number of things we don't) with a full time force of 55,000. 

With the PRes as such a resource starved organization, I would offer that there are plenty of opportunities for modest funding increases which could produce significant readiness enhancements.  Consider the retention implications of an adequate allocation of our relatively inexpensive vehicles, and weapons for example.  Clearly, both the PRes and RegF structures need reform, but if the question is "could the PRes gainfully use the additional resources if they received them", I think the answer is that they could. 

Things that make sense to me:

1.  Medium weight forces - We have a small Army so the medium weight concept makes sense to me, it also gives us flexibility.  A LAV based force is a potent weapon but we've opted to reinvent the wheel every time we buy a new piece of kit, none of it makes any sense.  e.g. Armoured Recce with a TAPV.

Yep-still trying to figure out who wanted that vehicle.  It doesn't seem to be meeting anyone's needs.

2.  The Brigade - Every Army in the world worth its salt works around the Brigade concept, why change what works? 

Agreed, and I think that the three brigade structure is correct for the current readiness model.  I would offer that the structure (i.e. number of units) in each brigade could be realigned to get more bang for our buck, or reduced if we accept that additional PYs are not forthcoming (which they certainly could find if worked on the HQ bloat).

3.  Readiness - We've got three Brigades but the idea that one Brigade is at High Readiness while the others are in Trg and Support is flawed.  Readiness should be managed at the Brigade level and tasks should be downloaded the Brigades to decide who/what to employ.  Each Brigade should maintain 1/3 of it's force at High Readiness.  Given our geographical spread, this makes the most sense, especially when you consider the domestic tasks we're frequently called upon to do.  The whole Lines of Operations concept is ridiculous, it's a staff officer wet dream and is micromanagement to the tenth degree.  We're a professional army, a military force should be able to rapidly re-roll itself to perform all tasks along the spectrum of conflict.

That works until we get a brigade sized mission, like we were required to sustain in Afghanistan. There is also a span of control question.  If we want to put every enabler into the fight, sometimes we will need a brigade HQ, even though we aren't necessarily deploying a brigade. DOMOPS are a bit of a different beast as the forces responding to them aren't (and probably don't need to be) in a high readiness cycle.  Is there any reason a unit outside of HR couldn't fill an IRU task for example? 

 

[TCM621]

I think the first step is getting the public and politicians to under that Canada does not "punch above it's weight". We are a large G7 country and we have a third world military. The CAF does punch above it's weight but we are basically lightweights in the light heavyweight division.

Second,  we need to maintain a continuous lifecycle program. We can't wait 10-20 years after the need has been recognized. If we accept that it takes a generation to procure more equipment we need to start the plans for the next piece of kit almost as soon as we receive the first piece.

We need to change our training from "just enough, just in time"  to the right amount as soon as possible to allow people to gain experience. Surges just result in a lowered standard of training, because we need boots on the ground now.

None of this stuff is revolutionary, it is stuff everyone knows and unless he lived in a bubble during his time in our MND knows it too. We used to be a medium sized military with very well trained and experienced people. Now we are a small military and have a lot of adequately trained people with a ok amount of experience (even the army is losing a lot of costly experience from Afghanistan and replacing it with minimally trained pers).  Give us the equipment we need,  and the people to use it then we can handle everything else.

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[Eland2]

I think the first step is getting the public and politicians to under that Canada does not "punch above it's weight". We are a large G7 country and we have a third world military. The CAF does punch above it's weight but we are basically lightweights in the light heavyweight division.

Second,  we need to maintain a continuous lifecycle program. We can't wait 10-20 years after the need has been recognized. If we accept that it takes a generation to procure more equipment we need to start the plans for the next piece of kit almost as soon as we receive the first piece.

We need to change our training from "just enough, just in time"  to the right amount as soon as possible to allow people to gain experience. Surges just result in a lowered standard of training, because we need boots on the ground now.

None of this stuff is revolutionary, it is stuff everyone knows and unless he lived in a bubble during his time in our MND knows it too. We used to be a medium sized military with very well trained and experienced people. Now we are a small military and have a lot of adequately trained people with a ok amount of experience (even the army is losing a lot of costly experience from Afghanistan and replacing it with minimally trained pers).  Give us the equipment we need,  and the people to use it then we can handle everything else.

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I agree, Canada doesn't consistently punch above its weight, not with the current force size and equipment that the CF have now. In limited circumstances where Canada's role and the ROE are clearly defined, and the mission is suited to the capabilities the CF have, then yes, we have been capable of punching above our weight every now and then. The problem is that because we have punched above our weight just often enough, some individuals, particularly politicians, assume that the CF are capable of doing a lot with very little

I also agree that Canada has a Third World military, but I would go one step further and argue that in many important respects, Canada has less than a Third World military. There are a few Third World countries that actually have more troops and equipment than Canada does. What they have may not be top-tier, but it may be capable of defeating a military force the size of Canada's through strength of numbers and raw firepower. To a certain extent we got lucky in Afghanistan and that was mainly because the relatively small force we contributed vastly overmatched what the Taliban could muster. That, and the deployment of tanks and APCs that could handle the job.

Our embarrassing lack is the end result of a persistent refusal to properly fund and equip the CF because we arrogantly assume Canada is too geographically large to be invaded and too peaceful, with absolutely no imperial ambitions; and if the shit really does hit the fan, the US will come to our rescue. Therefore we conclude that we need not concern ourselves with defence matters very deeply.

The biggest reason why Canada used to have a medium-weight military is because of the exigencies of the Cold War and because its allies forced the issue.

As to the issue of stop-and-start cycles of defence production, this has happened because we've laboured under the illusion (or maybe delusion) that somehow going down this route somehow saves money or prevents waste. The problem with this mindset is that it always costs more in the long run to rebuild and refurbish factories and other production infrastructure that have been left fallow before they can be spooled up to produce anything. It also causes delays that mean the military gets new kit years later than it should.

With respect to the defence budget overall, I think we should aim for a general-purpose force that is capable of the following:

• Defence of Canada (to the maximum extent possible given Canada's budgetary constraints and ability to generate combat-capable forces) and the advancement and maintenance of Canada's foreign policy aims
• Participation in NATO or UN missions, with the ability to match or closely approximate contributions made by Canada's peer allies, the ability to defeat enemy peer or near-peer forces and the ability to deploy anywhere in the world, with sufficient resources to carry out the missions

[*]Provision of search and rescue, aid-to-the-civil-power and disaster relief services in considerable depth, with equipment and resources pre-positioned so that they can rapidly reach trouble spots within a given radius of the location where the equipment and resources are pre-positioned
[/list]

MGen Lewis Mackenzie once opined that Canada should have armed forces totalling about 180,000 in all components. And being an army officer, he probably envisaged a force where a substantial proportion of that number would comprise the land component. Given Canada's wealth, I personally think that the number Mackenzie came up with isn't too far out of line. If the army alone represented 60% of that number, or 108,000, we could have the equivalent of a division-sized force in the most populous provinces. Or at least one or two brigades per province with additional weight situated on the east and west coasts. We'd also have a force that comes close to or exceeds what we had from 1945 until approximately 1965.

 

[FJAG]

Concur, FJAG.

It also goes back to something I have been saying throughout my career: If the reg force wants the reserves to meet a certain standard, then the reg force must assume full duty and responsibility for the training.

So long as the militia, or the naval reserve, or the air reserve "self-train" within their ranks, they cannot achieve readiness levels requested of them by the reg force. Basically: the reg force must be the one training the reserves.

However, to get there, the reserves must accept that the historical militia regimental system, or the local NRU's for the Navy, must be abandoned in favour of a more direct approach to training. And the reg force must understand that when not called out for ops, reservists should be under training, at their current level, by the reg force for every moment they are available, with no time whatsoever spent on paperwork, administration, etc.

Yup

:cheers:

 

[Humphrey Bogart]

Agreed, and I think that the three brigade structure is correct for the current readiness model.  I would offer that the structure (i.e. number of units) in each brigade could be realigned to get more bang for our buck, or reduced if we accept that additional PYs are not forthcoming (which they certainly could find if worked on the HQ bloat).

That works until we get a brigade sized mission, like we were required to sustain in Afghanistan. There is also a span of control question.  If we want to put every enabler into the fight, sometimes we will need a brigade HQ, even though we aren't necessarily deploying a brigade. DOMOPS are a bit of a different beast as the forces responding to them aren't (and probably don't need to be) in a high readiness cycle.  Is there any reason a unit outside of HR couldn't fill an IRU task for example?

I'll elaborate further on my point WRT high readiness.  I wouldn't call what we had in Afghanistan a Brigade sized force, it was more like a large Regiment.  We had a combined arms battlegroup, PRT and OMLT.  I often hear folks say, server had three maneuver units because we had those three elms in theatre, except the OMLT and PRT aren't really maneuver units, calling them so is a misnomer.

Reality is the Canadian Army is a task force Army.  Brigades, due to our size, are in all reality, a force generator as opposed to a force employer. 

The reason why every Brigade in the Army should have portions of their Brigades at a state of high readiness is to be able to respond to potential Domestic and Expeditionary operations at the same time. 

Readiness to me has nothing to do with training, rather, it has to do with the speed in which we can respond to a crisis.  It's units at 100% manning, rucksacks packed, kit and vehicles prepped and ready to roll. 

Nine infantry battalions in the Army, three (one per Brigade) should be available at any given time for immediate recall along with required enablers.  Ditto the Armoured Regiments, Guns, Sappers, etc...

Those Battalions in HR can potentially fill multiple tasks.  While in HR, no courses are run, all focus is on continuation training. 

 

[George Wallace]

I found the Vice President's comments on nations' contributions to NATO interesting, and his jabs at those who are not towing the line, including "some of its' largest members".  Just as interesting were Trudeau's comments that there were "other ways to contribute".  I found those to be rather naive and totally out of touch.

 

[Cdn Blackshirt]

I found the Vice President's comments on nations' contributions to NATO interesting, and his jabs at those who are not towing the line, including "some of its' largest members".  Just as interesting were Trudeau's comments that there were "other ways to contribute".  I found those to be rather naive and totally out of touch.

Uggghhh.  For a moment I was starting to hope Prime Minister Selfie was going to be a positive surprise, but that hope appears to be being extinguished quickly.  :facepalm:

 

[Rifleman62]

George Wallace on Today at 10:14:55

    I found the Vice President's comments on nations' contributions to NATO interesting, and his jabs at those who are not towing the line, including "some of its' largest members".  Just as interesting were Trudeau's comments that there were "other ways to contribute".  I found those to be rather naive and totally out of touch.

Are airhead comments by the PM considered as contributions by our Defence Allies?

 

[Oldgateboatdriver]

I believe that when it comes to determining if a NATO nation is pulling its own weight or not, where defence spending is concerned, the only contributions that will count are those that the US consider to be proper contribution, regardless of the point of view of every body else.

At least, that will be so as far as the current US administration is concerned. After all, they are the one that indicated they would curtail their own contribution accordingly, so who's to dictate to them what constitutes a contribution or not.

 

[Kirkhill]

Uggghhh.  For a moment I was starting to hope Prime Minister Selfie was going to be a positive surprise, but that hope appears to be being extinguished quickly.  :facepalm:

He got support from Angela Merkel.

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/02/18/us-pledges-unwavering-commitment-nato-munich-security-conference/

Merkel's pitch is that the US's allies do other stuff too and that the US needs allies.

I might suggest a counter might be that the EU, with US connivance admittedly, is the one that advanced more and more into the personal space of their "threat".  All the while relying at the big guy at the back to support them as they make their situation more precarious.  They are writing checks on someone else's bank.  They are expecting the US nuclear umbrella, of which one must not speak in polite company, to cover them as they provoke.

And as to friendship with Russia - it would get awfully cold in Berlin without Russian gas. 

It is easy to believe that Berlin wants US cover and a Polish no-mans land to allow them to make up all the money they lost in 1945 by trading with Russia and exploiting cheap Russian resources: Selling Beamers to Greeks and Yanks.

The Socialist International has no interest in helping the US.

 

[jmt18325]

I found the Vice President's comments on nations' contributions to NATO interesting, and his jabs at those who are not towing the line, including "some of its' largest members".  Just as interesting were Trudeau's comments that there were "other ways to contribute".  I found those to be rather naive and totally out of touch.

It's worth pointing out that this was the same position of the former Conservative prime minister as well - that Canada, though a laggard in spending (as a percentage of GDP, anyway) is has always stepped up to the plate to contribute. 

 

[Rifleman62]

Oldgateboatdriver:

At least, that will be so as far as the current US administration is concerned. After all, they are the one that indicated they would curtail their own contribution accordingly, so who's to dictate to them what constitutes a contribution or not.

It will be interesting how the US Trump Administration) sees our lack of contribution to NORAD. The US will protect Canada to protect the homeland, but they will want more from us.

IMHO, in the old days, shooting down a Soviet bomber with live nuclear weapons over Canada before it it US territory was a given.

 

[George Wallace]

It's worth pointing out that this was the same position of the former Conservative prime minister as well - that Canada, though a laggard in spending (as a percentage of GDP, anyway) is has always stepped up to the plate to contribute.

And I may find it worth pointing out that with Trump it may be more bombastic of him to pull off a "Reality TV Host act" that would be even more 'pointed' to young Justin, than what was forced upon his father in the 1970's.  Trump may pull off his own version of "Celebrity Apprentice" on NATO members and point out that they formed a Pact (NATO) and are not fulfilling their RESPONSIBILITIES as agreed upon when they signed on.  Their lack of commitment makes them UNTRUSTWORTHY as partners in such an organization.  "Stepping up to the plate" is not the same as fulfilling one's agreed OBLIGATIONS to the agreement.  "Stepping up to the plate" is only an attempt to pull the wool over everyone's eyes and make it seem that one is committed, but really will only RENEGE on fully fulfilling their OBLIGATIONS.  When, since 1992, have we really had a FULL-TIME commitment?  We have only made piecemeal commitments since closing down the CAD and CMBG in Europe.

 

[GR66]

Oldgateboatdriver:
It will be interesting how the US Trump Administration) sees our lack of contribution to NORAD. The US will protect Canada to protect the homeland, but they will want more from us.

IMHO, in the old days, shooting down a Soviet bomber with live nuclear weapons over Canada before it it US territory was a given.

Maybe the old days aren't the new days.  According to this article (http://www.strategic-culture.org/news/2016/10/19/russian-kh-101-air-to-surface-cruise-missile-unique-and-formidable.html), the Russian Kh-102 nuclear air-launched cruise missile has a range of 5,500km (with some claims of up to 10,000km...but possibly only 4,500km?) which would mean that they can be launched well outside Canadian airspace.  At 5,500km they could hit Washington from the far side of Iceland. 

Perhaps the increasing range of air-launched cruise missiles along with the existence of sub-launched missiles changes the reality of North American air defence.  In realistic terms what would it mean if large formations of Russian bombers were coming at us over the pole?  Regardless of what type of weapons they were carrying (conventional or nuclear...how would we be sure until they hit their targets?) or how many we were able to detect and shoot down either pre- or post-launch, would the US have ANY option but to assume that they are under massive, preemptive nuclear attack and have no choice but launch a full counter-strike with all available nuclear weapons? Could/would they trust that they detected ALL of the incoming aircraft and missiles and that NO incoming nuclear weapons remain undetected?  Would they be willing to absorb a limited nuclear attack from Russia without retaliating in kind?

As mad as MAD may be, it remains the ultimate deterrent to full-scale war between the nuclear-armed major powers.  Frankly, if we ever have to face waves of Russian (or Chinese) bombers penetrating our airspace it will not matter one bit whether we have 5th Generation or 4th Generation fighters in the RCAF.  It will be the least of our worries since it means the outhouse has collided with the windmill and VERY bad things are happening. 

Please don't take that to mean the I don't think that investment in the CF in general, and high-end equipment (like the F-35) in particular are not important.  They are.  They are vital for containing smaller conflicts and preventing them from becoming full-scale conflicts and for deterring other powers from making stupid assumptions about our will and capabilities.  However, "defence of North America" in my mind is a bit of a red herring.  If we ever get to the point that we actually have to directly militarily defend Canada/USA then it's probably too late anyway.

 

[jmt18325]

And I may find it worth pointing out that with Trump it may be more bombastic of him to pull off a "Reality TV Host act" that would be even more 'pointed' to young Justin, than what was forced upon his father in the 1970's.  Trump may pull off his own version of "Celebrity Apprentice" on NATO members and point out that they formed a Pact (NATO) and are not fulfilling their RESPONSIBILITIES as agreed upon when they signed on.  Their lack of commitment makes them UNTRUSTWORTHY as partners in such an organization.  "Stepping up to the plate" is not the same as fulfilling one's agreed OBLIGATIONS to the agreement.  "Stepping up to the plate" is only an attempt to pull the wool over everyone's eyes and make it seem that one is committed, but really will only RENEGE on fully fulfilling their OBLIGATIONS.  When, since 1992, have we really had a FULL-TIME commitment?  We have only made piecemeal commitments since closing down the CAD and CMBG in Europe.

You'll be surprised to know that I agree with you - we should spend what we promised.  There is a lot more capability that we could use.  Attacking Trudeau over it is the hollow part, as Harper was no better and made the same excuses (I supported him most of the way through his tenure).

 

[George Wallace]

You'll be surprised to know that I agree with you - we should spend what we promised.  There is a lot more capability that we could use.  Attacking Trudeau over it is the hollow part, as Harper was no better and made the same excuses (I supported him most of the way through his tenure).

Any reference to any failings of previous Prime Ministers have NOTHING to do with this.  This will be Trump and Trudeau.  Any references to previous Governments are really irrelevant, other than CANADA's trend of not living up to its' fiscal responsibility.

 

[Edward Campbell]

Any reference to any failings of previous Prime Ministers have NOTHING to do with this.  This will be Trump and Trudeau.  Any references to previous Governments are really irrelevant, other than CANADA's trend of not living up to its' fiscal responsibility.

Oh, for heaven's sake! It, reneging on our promises to allies, is a completely bi-partisan issue in Canada, and has been since 1967. The fact that Prime Minister Harper talked tough, used (and misused) the CF for partisan political purposes and cut the budget is at least as germane as what Prime Minister Trudeau may (or may not) want to do or be forced to do.

This is not a Conservative vs Liberal issue: it is all about ~ and only about ~ what the overwhelming majority of Canadians ~ our friends and neighbours and relatives, too ~ want their government priorities to be ... and defence is waaaaaaay down at the bottom of the list, wedged between spending on symphony orchestras and opera houses.

The comment about Harper was fair and on point; you are trying to make it partisan.  :facepalm:

 

[Kirkhill]

The comment was fair and on point.  And the issue is one of where our neighbours wish to spend their beer money.

 

[a_majoor]

If we ever get to the point that we actually have to directly militarily defend Canada/USA then it's probably too late anyway.

That day passed a long time ago. In the 1970's we had our own "Apprehended Insurrection" and the US had full scale riots in the street as the New Left tried out its Brownshirt act. In the 1980's we had the Indian Government and Sikhs fighting a proxy war on our soil (culminating in the Ari Inda bombing) and throughout the 1990s the LTTE (Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam) were recruiting people, raising money and using Canada as a safe haven in their war against Siri Lanka. Other groups were also active in Canada at various levels of mayhem ("Direct Action's" bombing of the Litton Industries plant, various eco terrorist groups) or supporting wars outside of Canada (think back to where many of the paramilitary groups in Yugoslavia were getting money and weapons, or for that matter, Somali warlords sending family members to Canada to collect welfare and send the money back to Africa).

While it is true these have never coalesced into anything larger, that may be more a matter of luck and circumstance than anything else. We certainly are very concerned about people who went overseas to fight for ISIS, and home grown radicals who are nurtured over the Internet may be an even greater problem in the future.

The real issue is we are facing what is sometimes called 4GW right here on the ground in Canada, the United States and Mexico. Currently, the actors are not numerous enough on the ground nor have they found the proper vehicle to harness, but the essential aim is to destabilize the current structures of governance and society and impose change on us all without consent, or in the words of Thomas X Hammes (USMC Ret.):

Fourth-generation warfare (4GW) uses all available networks — political, economic, social, and military — to convince the enemy’s political decision makers that their strategic goals are either unachievable or too costly for the perceived benefit. It is an evolved form of insurgency. Still rooted in the fundamental precept that superior political will, when properly employed, can defeat greater economic and military power, 4GW makes use of society’s networks to carry on its fight. Unlike previous generations of warfare, it does not attempt to win by defeating the enemy’s military forces. Instead, via the networks, it directly attacks the minds of enemy decision makers to destroy the enemy’s political will. Fourth-generation wars are lengthy — measured in decades rather than months or years.

So the real problem isn't if Canada or North America can protect itself from attack, but want sort of attack is likely to be encountered. If Russia considers the stakes high enough in Donbas they might not send bombers, but incite Canadians using the Russian Troll Army and getting CBC to repeat ideas first broadcast on RT, using the tenants of Hybrid Warfare. If the stakes in the South China Sea get high enough the Toronto Stock Exchange might see billions of dollars of trades driving Canada's economy down, or currency manipulation that makes the Canadian dollar uncompetitive (as per Unrestricted Warfare doctrine). It might not even be immediately obvious we are under attack.

So if *we* were ever to become serious about defense, then ramping up spending might be more than a matter of buying more tanks and airplanes (although we are certainly deficient in that regard as well), but looking at the modalities of modern warfare and where *we* are really deficient.

 

[Old Sweat]

As the officer who had the counter-terrorism "desk" in J3 at NDHQ, for a few years in the early 90s, I suggest you all read Thuc's post very carefully. We may be building an electronic Maginot Line, for example.