The Defence Budget [superthread]

[suffolkowner]

That's great but will those "new investments" be in more serving members (other than admirals and colonels), in ships, tanks, aircraft, boots and logistics vehicles? or will they come from Professor Michael Byers' list?

The last paragraph by Byers is reasonable, but the preceding was just an attempt to justify the abandonment of our responsibilities

 

[MarkOttawa]

A letter I sent to the Globe and Mail:

"Prof. Michael Byers, in his article "Canada doesn’t deserve its reputation as a defence laggard" (Feb. 16), makes an heroic effort to exaggerate the scale of Canada's defence spending by claiming that spending should include elements of the budgets of the RCMP, Canadian Border Services Agency and Canadian Coast Guard.

I am shocked to note that in this effort he failed to included monies allocated to Fishery Officers of the Department of Fisheries and Oceans.  These enforcement personnel are uniformed, often armed, and work on land, freshwater and the oceans; their funding would have helped to raise his supposed defence dollars even higher."

Reference (scroll down to "Conditions of Employment"):
http://www.dfo-mpo.gc.ca/career-carriere/enf-loi/conditions-eng.htm

When I was with CCG at DFO HQ in Ottawa one would sometimes see a Fishery Officer in uniform in the building carrying a Heckler & Koch machine pistol.

As for the perniscious peacenik prof.:

The Canadian Forces, or, The Byers Disarmament Plan
https://cgai3ds.wordpress.com/2015/07/08/mark-collins-the-canadian-forces-or-the-byers-disarmament-plan/

Mark
Ottawa

 

[Cloud Cover]

When I was with CCG at DFO HQ in Ottawa one would sometimes see a Fishery Officer in uniform in the building carrying a Heckler & Koch machine pistol.

Shooting fish in a barrel? (sorry, couldn't resist).

 

[MarkOttawa]

At least not us bureaucrats .

Mark
Ottawa

 

[FJAG]

That's great but will those "new investments" be in more serving members (other than admirals and colonels), in ships, tanks, aircraft, boots and logistics vehicles? or will they come from Professor Michael Byers' list?

Actually the article gave me food for thought. If NATO considers some of these items as part of a country's overall defence spending, then with some tweaking such as Byer's suggests one could move up the ranking list with no additional spending and no real change in budgets or responsibilities of the various departments.

That would mean that one wouldn't then need a tremendous amount of new spending to create both a more credible force and achieve the target 2.0% figures.

One mustn't forget that while the US spends 3.6% of its GDP on defence, only a small fraction of that is committed to NATO while most NATO members' spending (excluding Canada) is almost 100% committed to NATO. There's a bit of an apples and oranges situation going on in this debate when one compares US and other NATO members' spending.

:cheers:

 

[Kirkhill]

OK -  I feel better now.

An opportunity to disagree.  [

The US is contributing 3.6% of GDP to its defence.  IN ADDITION it provides all the other services that Byers describes to its citizens.

If the US (and NATO) agree to the Byers model then the US will claim a budget of 5? 6? 10%? of GDP.  So, will 2% still be the standard?

And, indeed, while not all of the 3.6% of GDP is committed to NATO, NATO has access to all of the capability that that 3.6% of GDP buys.

Meanwhile, in Canada, we get covered not only by the NATO committed budget (of 2%) but also the NORAD committed budget.  Arguably we should be committing MORE than 2%.

Sir.  :nod:

 

[FJAG]

OK -  I feel better now.

An opportunity to disagree.  [

The US is contributing 3.6% of GDP to its defence.  IN ADDITION it provides all the other services that Byers describes to its citizens.

If the US (and NATO) agree to the Byers model then the US will claim a budget of 5? 6? 10%? of GDP.  So, will 2% still be the standard?

And, indeed, while not all of the 3.6% of GDP is committed to NATO, NATO has access to all of the capability that that 3.6% of GDP buys.

Meanwhile, in Canada, we get covered not only by the NATO committed budget (of 2%) but also the NORAD committed budget.  Arguably we should be committing MORE than 2%.

Sir.  :nod:

I think we generally agree (and I think that the US Coast Guard is already part of the US Armed Forces and therefore within the 3.6% - not sure if they count Border Security)

I quite frankly think that we can and should put more into the defence budget but it needs to be for a meaningful use and not to create bigger and fatter headquarters.

I'm still a big believer that we do not need a larger regular force. What we need is a bigger and fully equipped reserve force that translates into more deployable field force which would allow us to meet commitments. How that's legislated, recruited, organised, trained, equipped and deployed are details. What we need first of all is a commitment which takes us away from the fiction that only full time personnel will do the job.

If we're letting the US dictate our GDP numbers then maybe we should look at the US active component to reserve (NG and AR) ratios:

Army: Active 487k, NG/AR 660k;

Navy: Active 323k, NR 111k;

Air Force: Active 307k, ANG/AFR 211k;

Marines: Active 183k, MR 111k;

Coast Guard: Active 39k, CGR 8k

Our numbers are:

Army: Reg 23k, Res 17k, Rangers 5k;

Navy: Reg 8.5k, Res 5.1k

Air Force: Reg 14.5k Res 2.6k

Other: Reg F 22k, Res 1.8k

With the exception of the navy, our reg to Res ratios are all skewed significantly in favour of the Reg F. This is especially true for the army where much of the US heavy combat power and sustainment organizations (those forces primarily required for major operations) are contained in the ANG and AR respectively while lighter rapid deployment and special forces are in the Active componenet. On the other hand our Army reservists have no equipment (much less heavy equipment) to speak of.

The same holds true (even more so) for the US Air Force where significant war fighting equipment is in the hands of the AirNG and Air Res.

Long story short, while I favour an increased defence budget, in my humble opinion we should not give one more nickle to the defence budget until the senior command comes up with a plan to first create significant and fully equipped and deployable war fighting formations predominantly staffed by the Res F.

:tank2:

 

[MilEME09]

Long story short, while I favour an increased defence budget, in my humble opinion we should not give one more nickle to the defence budget until the senior command comes up with a plan to first create significant and fully equipped and deployable war fighting formations predominantly staffed by the Res F.

For this to Occur, we need a well trained Res Force, right now we have officers that couldn't lead a company out of a paper bag because they have no real experience once they leave course.

 

[Humphrey Bogart]

I fundamentally disagree with the notion that we should invest more money in the Reserve Force.  We would need a significant change in organization, leadership and policy governing the Reserve Force before I'd consider investing one more dime into the organization. 

What's really needed is a fully staffed and funded Regular Force.  We've got three Brigades which are only Brigades on paper, we don't properly equip the formations we do have and our doctrine is 30 years out of date in some cases.  I've heard certain folks say that we wouldn't know how to spend additional money, even if we did get it.  I agree with this and until the institution itself changes, no further money should be allocated to the Defence portfolio.

For the Army:

1.  Increase manpower and funding to form three fully staffed and equipped brigades, not paper ones.
2.  Get rid of the Divisions as a level in the command structure.
3.  Significantly reduce the number of pers Involved in administering the IT monster and download a lot of IT to the units (exception being advanced courses and office training).
4.  Invest in the "Brains" of the Army (Doctrine, Lessons Learned, Simulation, Future Concepts and Designs)
5.  Performance Management to become a Standards Driven initiative as opposed to Funds Driven.  Money folks should have input but shouldn't be responsible.
6.  A fundamental rethink of the Managed Readiness Plan, staff officers in Army HQ should not be dictating to Bde Comds which units do what. 
7.  Align Readiness with the fiscal year and posting cycle.  Right now none of the plans are linked.

Right now, the Regular Force spends most of its time simply trying to administer itself, never mind conducting actual operations.  We talk a big game but it's one thing to talk its another to walk the walk.

 

[dapaterson]

The question you seem to be asking is which oversize beast to feed and reform.

Maybe some first principles work is in order : what do we want the army to be able to deliver, and thus what structure - reg and res - do we require to accomplish it?  We can't presuppose that the three CMBGs are what we need / where we need / how we need things to be.

 

[FJAG]

For this to Occur, we need a well trained Res Force, right now we have officers that couldn't lead a company out of a paper bag because they have no real experience once they leave course.

That creates an infinite chicken and egg loop: We need a well trained Res F before we structure an expanded defence force based on reservists however we'll never have a well trained Res F without properly training and equipping it.

Plans have to come first. Build the plan for a force that integrates a large deployable Res F and then implement it with the appropriate legislation, doctrine, recruiting, staffing, training, equipping, etc.

I can't see that happening when NDHQ couldn't even make the modest past proposals work. A radical change in attitude is needed. If all we do is throw more money at Defence without a comprehensive plan/policy we'll just be throwing more money into the black hole of a bureaucracy that is DND.

:cheers:

 

[Journeyman]

Ah, so you're suggesting....a Defence White Paper?      Crazy talk;  we just did one of those in 1994!

Sure, the government has since produced the masturbatory cheerleading A Role of Pride and Influence in the World  (2005) and the delusional shopping list Canada First Defence Strategy (2008), which went to the shredder before the ink was dry.  But an actual Defence White Paper -- a clearly annunciated, realistic, and affordable defence policy -- hasn't been seen in almost a quarter of a century.

And I'm not referring to the still dragging-out Defence Policy Review.  :  Travelling the country and seeking enough opinions (again, informed or otherwise was apparently irrelevant), until the government gets enough to say "yep, peacekeeping is the way ahead -- says so right here...right after 'we don't actually know the fighter aircraft needs for Canada, but it is anything but the F-35'," does not remotely resemble an actual Defence White Paper.

 

[Humphrey Bogart]

The question you seem to be asking is which oversize beast to feed and reform.

Maybe some first principles work is in order : what do we want the army to be able to deliver, and thus what structure - reg and res - do we require to accomplish it?  We can't presuppose that the three CMBGs are what we need / where we need / how we need things to be.

100% in agreement on your first point I feel both the Reg and Res need reform.  Your second part, I don't think we need first principles work, the works already been done, we've just never bothered following through on our words.  It's words without any action.  It's been articulated many times, General Purpose Combat Capability and Medium Weight Force.  A medium weight force is supposed to be able to do everything across th spectrum of conflict, though not as well at some tasks that would be more suitable to a light force or heavy force. 

We've got doctrine, we've got designs and future concepts, let's buy equipment and properly man and support our forces and align ourselves with doctrine, designs and future concepts.  The first question we should be asking ourselves whenever we buy a new piece of equipment is, does this support our doctrine at present and in the future.  We let equipment drive our doctrine when it should be the other way around.

Things that make sense to me:

1.  Medium weight forces - We have a small Army so the medium weight concept makes sense to me, it also gives us flexibility.  A LAV based force is a potent weapon but we've opted to reinvent the wheel every time we buy a new piece of kit, none of it makes any sense.  e.g. Armoured Recce with a TAPV.
2.  The Brigade - Every Army in the world worth its salt works around the Brigade concept, why change what works? 
3.  Readiness - We've got three Brigades but the idea that one Brigade is at High Readiness while the others are in Trg and Support is flawed.  Readiness should be managed at the Brigade level and tasks should be downloaded the Brigades to decide who/what to employ.  Each Brigade should maintain 1/3 of it's force at High Readiness.  Given our geographical spread, this makes the most sense, especially when you consider the domestic tasks we're frequently called upon to do.  The whole Lines of Operations concept is ridiculous, it's a staff officer wet dream and is micromanagement to the tenth degree.  We're a professional army, a military force should be able to rapidly re-roll itself to perform all tasks along the spectrum of conflict.

 

[Oldgateboatdriver]

Concur, FJAG.

It also goes back to something I have been saying throughout my career: If the reg force wants the reserves to meet a certain standard, then the reg force must assume full duty and responsibility for the training.

So long as the militia, or the naval reserve, or the air reserve "self-train" within their ranks, they cannot achieve readiness levels requested of them by the reg force. Basically: the reg force must be the one training the reserves.

However, to get there, the reserves must accept that the historical militia regimental system, or the local NRU's for the Navy, must be abandoned in favour of a more direct approach to training. And the reg force must understand that when not called out for ops, reservists should be under training, at their current level, by the reg force for every moment they are available, with no time whatsoever spent on paperwork, administration, etc.

 

[Blackadder1916]

Actually the article gave me food for thought. If NATO considers some of these items as part of a country's overall defence spending, then with some tweaking such as Byer's suggests one could move up the ranking list with no additional spending and no real change in budgets or responsibilities of the various departments.

For an brief explanation of what NATO considers defense spending see page 10 of this document. http://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2016_07/20160704_160704-pr2016-116.pdf

 

[Kirkhill]

I think we generally agree (and I think that the US Coast Guard is already part of the US Armed Forces and therefore within the 3.6% - not sure if they count Border Security)

I quite frankly think that we can and should put more into the defence budget but it needs to be for a meaningful use and not to create bigger and fatter headquarters.

I'm still a big believer that we do not need a larger regular force. What we need is a bigger and fully equipped reserve force that translates into more deployable field force which would allow us to meet commitments. How that's legislated, recruited, organised, trained, equipped and deployed are details. What we need first of all is a commitment which takes us away from the fiction that only full time personnel will do the job.

If we're letting the US dictate our GDP numbers then maybe we should look at the US active component to reserve (NG and AR) ratios:

Army: Active 487k, NG/AR 660k;

Navy: Active 323k, NR 111k;

Air Force: Active 307k, ANG/AFR 211k;

Marines: Active 183k, MR 111k;

Coast Guard: Active 39k, CGR 8k

Our numbers are:

Army: Reg 23k, Res 17k, Rangers 5k;

Navy: Reg 8.5k, Res 5.1k

Air Force: Reg 14.5k Res 2.6k

Other: Reg F 22k, Res 1.8k

With the exception of the navy, our reg to Res ratios are all skewed significantly in favour of the Reg F. This is especially true for the army where much of the US heavy combat power and sustainment organizations (those forces primarily required for major operations) are contained in the ANG and AR respectively while lighter rapid deployment and special forces are in the Active componenet. On the other hand our Army reservists have no equipment (much less heavy equipment) to speak of.

The same holds true (even more so) for the US Air Force where significant war fighting equipment is in the hands of the AirNG and Air Res.

Long story short, while I favour an increased defence budget, in my humble opinion we should not give one more nickle to the defence budget until the senior command comes up with a plan to first create significant and fully equipped and deployable war fighting formations predominantly staffed by the Res F.

:tank2:

Unfortunately, I find no opportunity to disagree here. 

 

[Kirkhill]

Re Reg Res:

I continue to argue that Res is not the same as Militia and that a proper Res is an integral part of the Reg Force and needs to be planned as such from the get go. 

The basic position has to be that when shooting starts we need lots of Privates and we need them fast. 
On the other hand Privates tend to clog up the works in Garrison, expect accommodations for wives and pensions, and generally go Bolshie when not making loud bangs.

The Reserve should be a place where trained Privates, from the Regular force, retire for 7 years after 3 years with the colours.  They need a cadre of Junior Officers and a strong NCO force of all ranks to both oversee continuation/refresher training and to supply a body of leaders that will take their Privates and amalgamate them into the Regs at short notice (maybe a tiered response of 72 hrs NTM and 14 days NTM).

The Militia - the defence of Canada volunteer force - is a separate discussion entirely and should be treated entirely separately.  What you can expect from volunteers and how, or if, they should be compensated, is all moot (as in debatable).

 

[MilEME09]

Concur, FJAG.

It also goes back to something I have been saying throughout my career: If the reg force wants the reserves to meet a certain standard, then the reg force must assume full duty and responsibility for the training.

So long as the militia, or the naval reserve, or the air reserve "self-train" within their ranks, they cannot achieve readiness levels requested of them by the reg force. Basically: the reg force must be the one training the reserves.

However, to get there, the reserves must accept that the historical militia regimental system, or the local NRU's for the Navy, must be abandoned in favour of a more direct approach to training. And the reg force must understand that when not called out for ops, reservists should be under training, at their current level, by the reg force for every moment they are available, with no time whatsoever spent on paperwork, administration, etc.

I've been saying for awhile not, especially in CSS that to fix what we have, we need the reg force to take control. I am glad others share my view, however to achieve this, we need institutional change, something I don't see coming over night, or any time soon for that matter.

 

[Kirkhill]

Courtesy of Blackadder's Link Above.

NATO defines defence expenditure as
payments made by a national government
specifically to meet the needs of its armed
forces or those of Allies. A major component
of defence expenditure is payments on Armed
Forces financed within the Ministry of Defence
(MoD) budget. Armed Forces include Land,
Maritime and Air forces as well as Joint
formations such as Administration and
Command, Special Operations Forces,
Medical Service, Logistic Command etc. They
might also include "Other Forces" like Ministry
of Interior troops, border guards, national
police forces, customs, gendarmerie,
carabinierie, coast guards etc. In such cases,
expenditure should be included only in
proportion to the forces that are trained in
military tactics, are equipped as a military
force, can operate under direct military
authority in deployed operations, and can,
realistically, be deployed outside national
territory in support of a military force. Also,
expenditure on Other Forces financed through
the budgets of ministries other than MoD
should be included in defence expenditure.

Pension payments made directly by the
government to retired military and civilian
employees of military departments should be
included regardless of whether these
payments are made from the budget of the
MoD or other ministries.

Expenditures for peacekeeping and
humanitarian operations (paid by MoD or other
ministries), the destruction of weapons,
equipment and ammunition, and the costs
associated with inspection and control of
equipment destruction are included in defence
expenditures.

Research and development (R&D) costs are to
be included in defence expenditures. R&D
costs should also include those for projects
that do not successfully lead to production of
equipment.

Expenditure for the military component of
mixed civilian-military activities is included, but
only when this military component can be
specifically accounted for or estimated.

That would seem to suggest that for Dr. Byer's prescription to be accepted then the RCMP, the CBS and the CCG would all need to be trained in Platoon/Troop level tactics and be deployable over seas in that capacity as part of a Canadian Expeditionary Force.

 

[jmt18325]

Reading further, that's not really what he said.  He said that a portion of each of their budgets (with some changes in the case of the CCG) already meet the definition of NATO spending, but aren't counted as such by Canada.  In the case of the CBSA and CCG, it's only a very small part of their budget that would be counted.  He came up with something like $5B more with no changes whatsoever, and proposed spending more money on training and equipment.  I like the idea of spending more on training and equipment.