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Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis

My understanding is that apply the smart power concept directly against ISIS. By doing so, we (the NATO led coalition forces) would eventually be engaged in a PSYOPS project against ISIS. I believe that we can ultimately persuade some factions and/or members of ISIS to defect from the organization and thus turn this war on ISIS into a psychological warfare.
 
Tuan said:
My understanding is that apply the smart power concept directly against ISIS. By doing so, we (the NATO led coalition forces) would eventually be engaged in a PSYOPS project against ISIS. I believe that we can ultimately persuade some factions and/or members of ISIS to defeat from the organization and thus turn this war on ISIS into a psychological warfare.
WTF?  Buzzword bingo?
 
Tuan said:
My understanding is that apply the smart power concept directly against ISIS. By doing so, we (the NATO led coalition forces) would eventually be engaged in a PSYOPS project against ISIS. I believe that we can ultimately persuade some factions and/or members of ISIS to defect from the organization and thus turn this war on ISIS into a psychological warfare.

My apologies, there was a typo that I've corrected that instead of "defect" I wrote "defeat"
 
Tuan said:
My understanding is that apply the smart power concept directly against ISIS. By doing so, we (the NATO led coalition forces) would eventually be engaged in a PSYOPS project against ISIS. I believe that we can ultimately persuade some factions and/or members of ISIS to defect from the organization and thus turn this war on ISIS into a psychological warfare.

What is your definition of psychological warfare?  Why do you assume that isn't part of the current op?
 
Eye In The Sky said:
What is your definition of psychological warfare?  Why do you assume that isn't part of the current op?

Simply put, if you're really engaged in psychological warfare, you'd maximize the soft power and minimize the hard power, but what is happening in this operation is the other way around, don't you think?
 
Tuan said:
Simply put, if you're really engaged in psychological warfare, you'd maximize the soft power and minimize the hard power ...
So, you believe "hard" and "soft" techniques are mutually exclusive?
 
MCG said:
So, you believe "hard" and "soft" techniques are mutually exclusive?
With all due respect, I am not interested in discussing a logical argument from a probability theory, rather I compare two different counterterrorism operations in which one was successful and other is not, and what we did right and wrong, that's all!
 
I have not presented you a question of probability.  You have seemingly established your argument on the premise that we cannot exercise "hard power" if we are to exercise "soft power."  This false dichotomy may be inconvenient for you to address, but if you want to dialog then you can't just choose to avoid the questions that don't enable the conclusions desired by you.
 
Not at all, I am not trying to avoid questions or trying to win an argument here, that's not my purpose, rather I am interested in sharing my knowledge as a counterterrorism practitioner from Sri Lanka, where my countrymen with the support of rest of the world successfully obliterated one of the world most ruthless terrorist organization. Therefore my only argument is that if we can do that, why can't you and others?
 
What I see you doing is selling a false dichotomy, tossing around buzz words, and not really defining your alternate solution in detailed plain-speak.
 
Tuan, you do know that soft power is about applying political influence on other political (governmental and non-governmental) agencies that work in the same interactive context, right?  If ISIS had ambassadors or envoys to the UN, for example, soft power might be applicable.  They don't, so soft power's application towards them seems dubious, no?

Secondly, you said we apply 'smart power' which earlier you defined as a blend of both hard and soft power. 

How about the premise that Canada and other nations that can apply the hard power to directly intervene against hostile/in humane action by ISIS against others, and countries, such as those f the Middle East, provide the soft power, which arguably, M.E. countries using their significantly closer cultural ties could do with much greater effect.

G2G
 
I am sorry you see me that way but my intention is clear and concise; however as you would understand, I am reluctant to write everything on an open forum such as this one.
 
Soft power, the best soft power, is very, very difficult, usually impossible, for governments to "deploy" because, as Prof Nye pointed out the soft power weapons are, usually, not within a government's span of control.

If you want to see GREAT soft power, you need to look at:

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Samuel Goldwyn and Louis B Meyer and bunch of other Eastern European Jews created the American Dream and sold it all over the world. They probably did more to create and wield American soft power than did even George C Marshal and Dean Acheson.

 
Reproduced under the Fair Dealings provisions of the Copyright Act.

SMALL WARS JOURNAL
smallwarsjournal.com

August 27, 2010
What Sri Lanka Can Teach Us About COIN
by Lionel Beehner

...But Sri Lanka‘s successful victory one year ago stands all this conventional wisdom on its head. It was brute military force, not political dialogue or population control, which ended its brutal decades-long war with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), or Tamil Tigers, a
separatist group perhaps most notorious for popularizing the suicide bomb. The final military campaign lasted months, not years or decades. It was a gruesome finale, to be sure. The Sri Lankan government paid little heed to outside calls for preventing collateral damage. While humanitarian workers and journalists were barred from entering the war zone, as many as 20,000 civilians were killed in the crossfire and hundreds of thousands of internally displaced Tamils were corralled into camps after war ended1. It was, as one journalist I spoke to in Colombo put it,―a war without witnesses.‖ Hearts and minds took a backseat to shock and awe.

Still, the lesson from Sri Lanka‘s COIN experiment is that overwhelming force can defeat insurgents, terrorists and other irregular armed groups in relatively short order, but at a steep cost. Its model disproves the notion that counterinsurgencies must be drawn-out, Vietnamlike
campaigns. With U.S. forces bogged down in Iraq and Afghanistan, it also provides states fighting small wars with a different  counterinsurgency template. Not without reason did Pakistan and Thailand, which both face insurgencies on their peripheries, seek out Sri Lanka for military training and advice in recent months.

Soft power huh?

How to Defeat Insurgencies: Sri Lanka's Bad Example
By Bobby Ghosh / Washington Time Magazine Wednesday, May 20, 2009
 

The conflict in Sri Lanka has long provided lessons for militant groups around the world. The Tamil Tigers taught terrorists everywhere the finer (or more savage) points of suicide bombing, the recruitment of child soldiers, arms trafficking, propaganda and the use of a global diaspora to collect resources. The Tigers "were the pioneers in many of the terrorist tactics we see worldwide today," says Jason Campbell, an Iraq and Afghanistan analyst at the Brookings Institution.

But now that the Tigers have been defeated, governments and security forces around the world may try to learn from the success of the Sri Lanka government. President Mahinda Rajapaksa and his army have turned the conventional wisdom on fighting insurgencies on its head, adopting strategies and tactics long discredited, both in the battlefield and in the military classroom. Since they appear to have worked against the Tigers, other countries wracked by insurgencies — from Pakistan to Sudan to Algeria — may be tempted to follow suit. But Rajapaksa's triumph has come at a high cost in civilian lives and a sharp decline in democratic values — and he is no closer to resolving the ethnic resentments that underpinned the insurgency for decades. Perhaps Sri Lanka's success should come with a warning label for political leaders and military commanders elsewhere: Do not try this at home.

Rajapaksa's campaign has a bit in common with the one General David Petraeus deployed so successfully in Iraq, and is rolling out in Afghanistan. Just as the American general was able to use Sunni insurgents to fight al-Qaeda in Iraq, Sri Lanka's President turned a splinter group of Tigers into allies. Colombo and Washington (and other Western capitals) also cooperated in cutting off funding to the Tigers from a global network of sympathizers. Beyond that, however, the Rajapaksa counterinsurgency doctrine seems ripped from a bygone era. The main principles are:

Brute Force Works
Modern military wisdom says sheer force doesn't quell insurgencies, and that in the long run political and economic power-sharing along with social reconciliation are the only ways to end the fighting. But the Sri Lankan army eventually broke down the Tigers in an unrelenting military campaign, the final phase of which lasted more than two years. That sort of sustained offensive hasn't been tried anywhere, in decades.

Negotiations Don't
After numerous attempts at mediation — most notably by Norway — led to nothing, Rajapaksa basically abandoned the pursuit of a negotiated solution. Once the military had the upper hand, there was little effort to treaty with the Tigers.

Collateral Damage Is Acceptable
In the final months of fighting, the Sri Lankan military offensive hardly differentiated between civilian and Tiger targets. Refugees fleeing the fighting said thousands of innocents were being killed in the army's bombardments. Modern militaries typically halt hostilities when large numbers of civilians are killed. The Sri Lankan army barely paused. Reva Bhalla, director of analysis at Stratfor, a global intelligence firm, says Rajapaksa's "disregard for civilian casualties" was a key to the success of the military operation.

Critics Should Shut Up — Or Else
For a democracy, Sri Lanka's recent record on press freedom is an embarrassment. Journalists who dared question the government (and not just over the military campaign) have been threatened, roughed up, or worse. The Jan. 8 murder of Lasantha Wickrematunge, a crusading editor — and TIME contributor — was an especially low point. In recent months, as the fighting intensified, journalists and international observers were kept well away, ensuring very little reporting on the military's harsh tactics and the civilian casualties.

Lack of accurate reporting from the war front was one reason why the international outcry against the military's heavy-handedness was so muted — especially in the U.S. Rajapaksa also benefited from the post-9/11 global consensus that insurgent groups using terror tactics "can no longer call themselves freedom fighters," according to Daniel Markey, a South Asia expert at the Council on Foreign Relations. "The Tigers didn't understand this, and paid a significant price."

That may be one lesson insurgencies worldwide can learn from the Tigers' downfall.
 
Tuan said:
Simply put, if you're really engaged in psychological warfare, you'd maximize the soft power and minimize the hard power, but what is happening in this operation is the other way around, don't you think?

Not exactly an answer to the questions...

Eye In The Sky said:
What is your definition of psychological warfare?  Why do you assume that isn't part of the current op?
 
Tuan said:
Not at all, I am not trying to avoid questions or trying to win an argument here, that's not my purpose, rather I am interested in sharing my knowledge as a counterterrorism practitioner from Sri Lanka, where my countrymen with the support of rest of the world successfully obliterated one of the world most ruthless terrorist organization. Therefore my only argument is that if we can do that, why can't you and others?

Would you care to elaborate to what degree you were involved?  An outside observer?  A trigger-puller? 
 
Off to work right now, and respond to all queries promptly when I get back.
 
PPCLI Guy said:
Soft power huh?

The Roman/Mogul methods work just ask Carthage.  The west doesn't have the balls or hasn't been pushed over the tipping point of restraint yet.
 
Good2Golf said:
Tuan, you do know that soft power is about applying political influence on other political (governmental and non-governmental) agencies that work in the same interactive context, right?  If ISIS had ambassadors or envoys to the UN, for example, soft power might be applicable.  They don't, so soft power's application towards them seems dubious, no?

Not necessarily, because Nye, who coined the term “soft power”, doesn’t restrict/classify it to be only for state actors, rather in his book he recommends it to be applied against non state actors such as terrorist organizations.

Good2Golf said:
Secondly, you said we apply 'smart power' which earlier you defined as a blend of both hard and soft power. 

How about the premise that Canada and other nations that can apply the hard power to directly intervene against hostile/in humane action by ISIS against others, and countries, such as those f the Middle East, provide the soft power, which arguably, M.E. countries using their significantly closer cultural ties could do with much greater effect.

Much of the world’s Islamic extremists already view the Western nations as an enemy. As such, if the West continues to engage them in hostile manner, primarily by the use of hard power, while the Middle Eastern Muslim countries embrace the extremists/terrorist softly, the situation will exacerbate as the latter will perceive the Western nations as enemy intruders.  Is this what Nye trying to tell us by the U.S.’s success in world politics is best achieved through the use of smart power?
 
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