Op IMPACT: CAF in the Iraq & Syria crisis

[Tuan]

we aren't the boots on the ground in this one, we are HELPING the boots on the ground in this one.

Also need to remember it's 2.7 of ALL sorts,  not just combat ones.  The great thing about a coalition?  Many hands make light work.

I was just wondering who is doing the tactical military intelligence collection in the region, which is extremely important in counterterrorism operations. If entire coalition is engaged in bombing missions why can’t the Canadian forces train the indigenous groups such as Kurds and Syrian rebels in "good human intelligence gathering” practices against the ISIS?

I completely understand that the tactics/techniques can often be considered classified information in many realms, so it's quite hard to discuss that without revealing/spreading information, which isn’t available in the open forum. Those who knows does not tell, and those who tells does not know, because you don't just kiss and tell, no true professional talks, (except beating around the bush) because after having spoken, he becomes a non-entity.

Having said that, from open source we can extract 95% of strategic intelligence, but for tactical intelligence we need to depend on the human intelligence (HUMINT). It is not news that the NATO forces have been trying to strengthen its HUMINT gathering capacity for a long time and the best way in my opinion is that they train and deploy the ISIS defectors and indigenous groups of the surrounding region.


Let me quote Professor Bruce Hoffman, a veteran American scholar on counterterrorism, whose writings I thought could be an a addition to our discussion in this topic:

The challenge that security forces and militaries the world over have faced in countering terrorism is how to obtain information about an enigmatic enemy who fights unconventionally and operates in a highly amenable environment where he typically is indistinguishable from the civilian populace. The differences between police officers and soldiers in training and approach, coupled with the fact that most military forces are generally uncomfortable with, and inadequately prepared for, counterterrorist operations, strengthens this challenge. Military forces in such unfamiliar settings must learn to acquire intelligence by methods markedly different from those to which they are accustomed. The most "actionable," and therefore effective, information in this environment is discerned not from orders of battle, visual satellite transmissions of opposing force positions, or intercepted signals but from human intelligence gathered mostly from the indigenous population.

http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2002/01/a-nasty-business/302379/

 

[Eye In The Sky]

Not going to discuss anything on here other than to say Int comes from many sources and means.

 

[Tuan]

Canada's new PM is right: Bombs won't beat ISIS
http://www.cnn.com/2015/10/23/opinions/canada-isis-trudeau/index.html

Justin Trudeau's campaign promise to end the bombing mission, while continuing to train Iraqis away from the front lines, represented a balanced approach to recognizing the complexity of the Syrian conflict and the limited options available to the West.

While counterterrorism is most often linked with the exercise of "hard power" (intelligence, law, policing, and military power), it must increasingly make use of "soft power" (political, social, and economic control, together with broader policy initiatives dealing with the environment, development, critical infrastructure, migration, and humanitarian intervention).

The Syrian conflict has its roots in a volatile mix of discriminatory practices by government, widespread corruption, chronic lack of opportunity for young people, lack of essential services, all combined to convince many that there is no alternative other than violent extremism and terrorism. A strictly military approach to such a complex situation is dangerously reductionist. As the great American psychologist, Abraham Maslow, wrote in 1966: "I suppose it is tempting, if the only tool you have is a hammer, to treat everything as if it were a nail."

The Sunni Arabs of Iraq and Syria support ISIS only because they have no other option in a divided and discriminatory environment where Shia governments favor their own, with support from Iran and Hezbollah, and Kurds enjoy the support of the U.S. and its allies (to Turkey's great chagrin).

Because ISIS is the only Sunni force capable of confronting the Shia forces in both Iraq and Syria, it receives varying degrees of support from neighboring Sunni states, particularly Saudi Arabia. The Syrian conflict is in many ways a proxy war between Iran and Saudi Arabia, and threatens to become a kind of proxy Cold War between Russia and the U.S.

Political, economic, social, humanitarian, and diplomatic initiatives are urgently needed if a long-lasting solution is to be found. With Russia entering the fray on the side of Bashar al-Assad, and supposedly moderate rebels less and less capable of sustained and effective combat, as well as increasing waves of desperate refugees fleeing rapidly escalating violence, with no end in sight, a comprehensive approach is all the more imperative.

Justin Trudeau's decision to end Canada's participation in the bombing campaign against ISIS is a step in the right direction.[Quote/]

 

[PuckChaser]

Canada's new PM is right: Bombs won't beat ISIS
http://www.cnn.com/2015/10/23/opinions/canada-isis-trudeau/index.html

Yep, bombs alone won't work. That's why Obama is sending more ground troops to expand the training mission into more OMLT tasks and SOF raids.

Go to Syria and ask to negotiate with ISIS. I'll wait here for the Al-Jazerra video.

 

[YZT580]

Bombs won't win but they will certainly slow down the advance to give time for other approaches to win.  Terrorists are not poor deprived children, but are often from middle and upper class backgrounds.  They are not underprivileged.  They are supported primarily because voting ISIS is preferable to losing your head or your children or your spouse.  These people are dangerous and handing out lollipops to the folks that are running from the gunfire is a feelgood but accomplish nothing approach. 

 

[McG]

Does pulling out fighters also mean pulling out refueling and surveillance capabilities? 

Could "continuing to train Iraqis" include more conventional force training capacity (as we had in Kabul)?

 

[Tuan]

While counterterrorism is most often linked with the exercise of "hard power" (intelligence, law, policing, and military power), it must increasingly make use of "soft power" (political, social, and economic control, together with broader policy initiatives dealing with the environment, development, critical infrastructure, migration, and humanitarian intervention).

The Syrian conflict has its roots in a volatile mix of discriminatory practices by government, widespread corruption, chronic lack of opportunity for young people, lack of essential services, all combined to convince many that there is no alternative other than violent extremism and terrorism. A strictly military approach to such a complex situation is dangerously reductionist. As the great American psychologist, Abraham Maslow, wrote in 1966: "I suppose it is tempting, if the only tool you have is a hammer, to treat everything as if it were a nail."

Above is a quote from the CNN article I just posted which reaffirms the same "soft power" concept I had argued in this forum during  Trudeau's campaign , if you'd go back and read. Point is "hard power" alone just won't work! What would work is "smart power", a combination of both soft power and hard power. Seems like somebody's listening.

 

[Harrigan]

Does pulling out fighters also mean pulling out refueling and surveillance capabilities? 

Could "continuing to train Iraqis" include more conventional force training capacity (as we had in Kabul)?

I would be absolutely shocked if the refuelling and surveillance capabilities are pulled out.  In fact, I could see the Hornets being replaced by air mobility assets, particularly if their "25,000 refugee" plan by the end of the year involves some RCAF assistance.

Harrigan

 

[The Bread Guy]

I would be absolutely shocked if the refuelling and surveillance capabilities are pulled out.  In fact, I could see the Hornets being replaced by air mobility assets, particularly if their "25,000 refugee" plan by the end of the year involves some RCAF assistance.

That bit in yellow may need more than just RCAF help, if one believes "sources" ....

A military airlift of the new Liberal government's promised 25,000 Syrian refugees would strain military resources and leave the air force largely unable to sustain operations around the globe, sources tell CBC News, suggesting contracted civilian airliners are a better option.

But the Liberal refugee proposal is also large and the logistics so intense, it's also unlikely the government could meet its obligations without relying heavily on the military and its network of bases and troops across the country.

These two realities are likely guiding planners inside the government and military as they prepare to meet prime minister-designate Justin Trudeau's campaign promise to welcome 25,000 refugees of the Syrian crisis by the end of the year ....

Much of the article covers how Canada dealt with Kosovar refugees in 1999 in OP Parasol.

 

[Eye In The Sky]

Above is a quote from the CNN article I just posted which reaffirms the same "soft power" concept I had argued in this forum during  Trudeau's campaign , if you'd go back and read. Point is "hard power" alone just won't work! What would work is "smart power", a combination of both soft power and hard power. Seems like somebody's listening.

The point has always been that hard power/military force ALONE won't work, but that it is a necessary piece of the puzzle.  So this is hardly any sort of an epiphany on anyone's part, right?

No one has ever suggested that the air task force et al was the 'one stop solution' to the conflict in the area.  As I and others have said many times, the job of ATF-I was to stop the advance and 'strike where able IAW ROEs", ISIS forces who were advancing.  That job was done.

The rest of the job, problem, whatever you want to call it, is not the mandate of an ATF.

Simple analogy;  if your house is on fire, the first thing you probably want to happen is for the fire fighters to show up, stop the spread and put out the fire.  The rebuilding of the home, investigation into the cause, etc is 'after the fire is out' actions and not ones the fire fighters themselves do.  They go back to the firehouse, service their gear, continue their training, and wait for the bell to go off again. 

Bombs alone won't stop ISIS, but 'soft power' also won't stop a technical who is engaging a friendly position.  In that instance, you'll want the 'bomb'.

 

[Tuan]

The point has always been that hard power/military force ALONE won't work, but that it is a necessary piece of the puzzle.  So this is hardly any sort of an epiphany on anyone's part, right?

No one has ever suggested that the air task force et al was the 'one stop solution' to the conflict in the area.  As I and others have said many times, the job of ATF-I was to stop the advance and 'strike where able IAW ROEs", ISIS forces who were advancing.  That job was done.

The rest of the job, problem, whatever you want to call it, is not the mandate of an ATF.

Simple analogy;  if your house is on fire, the first thing you probably want to happen is for the fire fighters to show up, stop the spread and put out the fire.  The rebuilding of the home, investigation into the cause, etc is 'after the fire is out' actions and not ones the fire fighters themselves do.  They go back to the firehouse, service their gear, continue their training, and wait for the bell to go off again. 

Bombs alone won't stop ISIS, but 'soft power' also won't stop a technical who is engaging a friendly position.  In that instance, you'll want the 'bomb'.

If that’s the case can you list the soft power initiatives parallel to hard power strategy that the Tories put forward since this operation has begun?

I seriously think that as a North American solution to the problem, while our giant neighbour to the south trying to respond to the conflict with hard power strategy, Canada on the other hand should approach it with its traditional soft power policy, a discourse that would redress the balance at the end.

 

[Eye In The Sky]

Or, more accurately, did you mean the Government of Iraq and other countries from the region?

You miss the point here, overall.  The Canadian government is not, has not been, nor will be, the nucleus of change in that region.  They can advise, assist, etc BUT the solutions for this will not be ones IMPLEMENTED by the Canadian Government, whether that government is formed by the Conservatives OR Liberals.

Iraq has a government in place (without getting into whether it is effective or not, let's just acknowledge that there is a government in place.  What concerns there may be about that government would be a totally separate thread).  As you've heard me say, the GOI is driving the bus.  There may be interested parties telling that bus driver which way to turn or stop, but the driver has the final decision.  Not his Canadian tourist 6 rows back from the front.

Trying the link the  assumed 'lack of soft power' in the region to PM Harper and the Tories is vacuous in my opinion.  :2c:

While I am not involved in the application of soft power, I ask how you KNOW there are no efforts in its application ongoing now, or before WRT to soft power?  No news stories on it?  No 'open source intelligence'?  I don't like to assume things, so I would like some sort of credible, tangible evidence that no one is applying 'soft power' while the necessary campaign to stop and degrade ISIS is ongoing.

 

[Tuan]

I haven’t come across any reports about the application of soft power initiatives vis-à-vis war on ISIS, to date. Have you? But, I read otherwise WRT the US approach that should be.....

The term "soft power" -- the ability of a country to persuade others to do what it wants without force or coercion -- is now widely invoked in foreign policy debates. This short book reintroduces the idea and argues for its relevance in forming post-September 11 U.S. foreign policy. Nye argues that successful states need both hard and soft power -- the ability to coerce others as well as the ability to shape their long-term attitudes and preferences. The United States can dominate others, but it has also excelled in projecting soft power, with the help of its companies, foundations, universities, churches, and other institutions of civil society; U.S. culture, ideals, and values have been extraordinarily important in helping Washington attract partners and supporters. Nye acknowledges the limits of soft power: it tends to have diffuse effects on the outside world and is not easily wielded to achieve specific outcomes. Indeed, societies often embrace American values and culture but resist U.S. foreign policies. But overall, Nye's message is that U.S. security hinges as much on winning hearts and minds as it does on winning wars.

Joseph Nye, former Assistant Secretary of Defense under the Clinton Administration and author of several books on smart power strategy, suggests that the most effective strategies in foreign policy today require a mix of hard and soft power resources. Employing only hard power or only soft power in a given situation will usually prove inadequate. Nye utilizes the example of terrorism, arguing that combating terrorism demands smart power strategy. He advises that simply utilizing soft power resources to change the hearts and minds of the Taliban government would be ineffective and requires a hard power component. In developing relationships with the mainstream Muslim world, however, soft power resources are necessary and the use of hard power would have damaging effects.

https://www.foreignaffairs.com/reviews/capsule-review/2004-05-01/soft-power-means-success-world-politics

 

[Eye In The Sky]

I haven't, no, but that doesn't mean I do not assume they aren't ongoing.  If they are, are they 'news worthy'?  Are they even in the open source domain?  The answer to the first question, IMO, is "no".  MSM wants juicy things on their sites/printed versions.  The answer to the second question is better left for SMEs in that area, I would just be offering a WAG.

Is there a potential opportunity for Canada to play a bigger role as an 'advisor' to the stakeholders in the region?  I think there could be, yes.  I just don't know how much 'soft power' we have to project as a nation. 

 

[Harrigan]

I don't think Tuan has 'missed the point', but he (or she) is just looking at it a different way.

From what I can see, much of the commentary in this thread is based on some assumptions:
1.  Our contributions is materially contributing to the overall mission goal
2.  Any change in that contribution would detract from the overall mission goal

I believe the answer to 1. is Yes, but I am not sure that a change in contribution would necessarily detract from the overall mission goal. 

If we pull out our 6 Hornets, it is not as though the entire ATF will collapse into a bubbling heap and ISIL will be in Baghdad tomorrow.  We have a small contributory role in the overall effort.  I would suggest that the relative impacts of the refuelling and particularly the ISR components are greater, though, and that is why I would be very surprised if the Auroras or tankers are sent home.  That is a niche capability that we are providing that is quite valuable.

The bottom line, though,  is that Canada's contribution to OP IMPACT, as with most of our 'coalition of the willing' deployments,  is not valued for the number of bombs it can drop in Syria or Iraq, or the number of planes refuelled, or the number of targets identified and prosecuted, as valuable in a tactical sense as those roles may be.  Our biggest contribution to the fight against ISIS is our flag - that is what the United States wants more than anything else.

I am quite certain that Obama was, as was reported, perhaps disappointed but understanding about Trudeau's position on Canada's combat role vs ISIS.  The removal of the Hornets fulfils a political promise by the incoming government that all Canadians were aware of and voted for.  However, as long as the US is confident that Canada's 'flag' is not being lowered from the fight against ISIS, I am sure they can live with the loss of 6 x Hornets from the ORBAT.  And I personally haven't heard anything from Trudeau suggesting that he intends to end the entire ISIS mission. 

We can argue against that decision, of course, but to do so requires us to ask these rather important questions:

1.  What does winning look like?
2.  Is our current strategy of aerial bombing of pop-up targets and providing training assistance to the GoI and Kurds making material progress towards achieving the answer to Q1?
3.  If the answer to Q2 is no, do we need to change our strategy or do we continue our current strategy indefinitely and hope that the results change?
4.  If the answer to Q1 has no obvious roadmap of 'how to get from here to there', what are the implications?
5.  If the answer to Q1 requires commitment and casualties that western powers are not prepared to take, see Q3.

My sense from this site is that the general consensus answer (mine too) to Q1 is something along the lines of 'ISIS is eradicated'. 

If we are well on our way to doing that, great.  I obviously missed that press conference then. 
If we are NOT well on our way to doing that, then perhaps "continuing the status quo" is not such a great COA.

Harrigan

 

[Eye In The Sky]

That is a niche capability that we are providing that is quite valuable.

That sounds good but it not based on reality.  Sorry, can't elaborate any more than that.  Also, the ATF is Canadian.  The MESF is the 'coalition'.  6 Hornets make up 66% of the ATF.

Here in lies the problem; it is a small op, involving aircrew only on the teeth end, most people don't know the facts or understand a lot of it and form opinions based on 'whats in the news'.

 

[Harrigan]

Apologies about the ATF/MESF mixup.  I meant that the loss of 6 x Hornets is not going to materially affect the operational goals of the coalition air effort.

As for the capabilities of the refuellers and tankers, my understanding is that the Auroras (in particular) are providing an excellent service that WOULD be missed by the coalition were they to be removed.  If that is not based on reality, that would be disappointing. 

Harrigan

 

[Good2Golf]

There is also an incorrect presumption in the discussion that Canada must also be exercising "soft power.' 

What is the answer to the question, "To whom should [Canada's or any other nation's] 'soft power' be focused?"   

GoI?  ISIS?  UN?  GCC?

 

[Tuan]

Supporting my opinion with Nye's notion, what I meant to say was, when combating terrorism, not only Canada but also other nations, would benefit if they apply "smart power" strategy, a combination of both soft and hard power.

 

[Good2Golf]

...and again I'll ask, "apply such 'smart power' against whom?"

You are espousing a methodology, and I don't necessarily disagree with the overall premise, but the intended recipient of such engagement is also an important factor. Should ME and/or Western nations attempt to work directly with ISIS? Or with nations directly affected by ISIS? or with regional organizations? (Hence GCC included in my previous list of potential engagees)

G2G