Time to invest in more CAF logistics?

[Kirkhill]

Chris:

I apologize for not quoting the specifInc parts of your post that I am responding to:

When suggesting that we buy off the shelf and then modify via a second contractor you fail to take into account that this no necessitates two procurement process from RFP through to purchase and delivery one for the truck and another for the modifications, and also two separate instances of producers mark up being applied.  There is also more work on the part of PWSGC to ensure that the vehicles are phased from the manufacturer to the modifier. To give you a simple realize example a unit I recently worked with procured five 3/4 ton trucks, some modifications were require in order to make them more suitable for driving on unimproved roads and ice roads.  It took a year before all five of those vehicles were kitted in accordance with the required specifications because of the legal requirements of the contracting system

Apologies unnecessary.

I take your point of the complications of process - but isn't that the issue?  The process?  When the paperwork takes longer than the time necessary to deliver a solution then the problem, in my view, is with the paperwork and the process.

 

[Colin Parkinson]

If we want vehicles that soldiers can use to practice military things like blackout drive, and use of radios (and yes, there's a disconnect due to ongoing shortages of radios) then we have to get some minor customization.  That is the point of MilCOTS - it's almost off the shelf and therefore should be cheaper and faster to buy.  Manufacturers will charge an arm and a leg (instead of just one leg below the knee) to mod small numbers of vehicles each year, rather than have the line do it for a fleet buy (even one as small as 1300), thus the inclination to buy a fleet all at once.  I do think that a cyclical buy could work; it might be worthwhile to mod the vehicles in-house through 202 Workshop (though I'd have to see a cost/benefit and business case analysis to determine the best method).  That could also provide flexibility to grow or shrink fleets as requirements change over the life of the fleet.

As for the length of time for MSVS MilCOTS: I don't have the timeline handy, but often delays are due to aligning a purchase with when funds will be available.  There was only one bidder due to DND's checkered past in some procurements.  I suspect other potential bidders weighed the cost of bidding against the probability of success, and figured out that the potential profit did not outweigh the potential PITA.

The 5/4 tons were a mix of commercial and tactical. Likely we could repeat them, although it was imperfect.

 

[dapaterson]

The 5/4 tons were a mix of commercial and tactical. Likely we could repeat them, although it was imperfect.

Same as the LUVW and MSVS MilCOTS - commercial trucks, painted green, with added electrical systems and radio mounts, and gun racks.  It's a viable model to follow; the "militarization" is fairly minimal and permits dealer maintenance (and dealer supply chain for parts).


As for the MSVS MilCOTS timeline Chris was asking about: First Approval of omnibus project (including MilCOTS and SMP variants, shelters and kitting of shelters) : Mid 2006. MilCOTS RFP issued: Late 2007. MilCOTS contract issued: Early 2009.  Final delivery for 1300 MilCOTS trucks: Late 2012.

 

[Bird_Gunner45]

From CFJP 4-0, the four lines of support are:There have been discussions about where commercial service providers can inject services to deployed operations or which is the most forward line of support that civilians can deliver.  From an Army perspective (maybe not from a navy or air perspective), the cut-off is the operational to tactical divide.  The divide is at third line by the definitions above, and it will probably always be at the JTFSC.

• For a BG deployment with an FSG that is a sub-unit of the JTFSC, the operational divide is internal to the JTFSC with the FSG reaching into the tactical level while the remainder of the unit is operational.  In this case, civilian delivery could go direct to the second line (JTFSC).
• If Canada deployed a land formation, the operational divide would be between the service battalion and the JTFSC.  In this case, civilian delivery could go direct to the third line (JTFSC).
• In the improbable event of a major conflict with a deployed Canadian Corps, the Corps could be an operational level HQ and civilian delivery might bypass the JTFSC for delivery to the Corps Support Command (COSCOM) ... but don't expect we will ever see that.

Generally, I agree.  Any changes to CAF logistics must support all environments.  But, change should not be contingent upon unanimity across the L1s.  The CDS and VCDS can give orders to move in a direction that is best for the CAF, even if it leaves someone a little grumpy because new ways of support are not that person's comfort zone.


I think it might be easier to understand the problem if you try to answer (and quantify) what is a Day of Supply.  The question has been asked before including by Col Conrad (who has already been referenced in this thread).  Some things are easy to quantify.  If you know the number of soldiers, then you know the number of breakfast, lunch and supper required.  But for most everything else (including consumption requirements of spare and replacement parts to equipment casualties) the enemy gets a vote.  For ammo, 1 DOS must be greater than the average day's consumption because, if your unit only carries what it will consume on an average day, you can expect to run-out often.  Is your 1 DOS based on the 95th percentile, so you only expect to run out of ammunition about five days in every three months?  That still seems too often to accept.

We need our supply system to have the capacity to meet the spike demand and the surge demand (a spike with endurance) that we were unable to predict on a calendar.  We cannot consume ammunition at a rate to sustain war time production levels without a war, but the multi-year stockpiles gives us a large quantity of nebulously defined DOS so that we can fight while industry ramps itself to wartime production.  At a national level, we could reduce the age of our stock and increase capacity of our peace time ammo production by doing more range training with live ammo (less simulation), but I don't think we should start shooting at our trucks to increase the demand for peace time parts production.

I agree that the operational divide in support is between third line and second line. Second line should by definition be a solely military function, while third line can be a mix of civilian and military, possibly heavier on the civilian side to take advantage of their inherent organizational and technological advantages. For all intents and purposes, third line is the divide between the services as well.

Asa for defining a day of supply, it should in theory be the amount of materiel needed to support the supported unit for 1 day based on the estimated quantities of use. The Staff Data Handbook (B-GL-331-002-FP-003) provides general planning figures that would be used (for example, fresh rations are calculated on a basis of 2KG/Pers/Day). As you say, it is a nebulous number. However, third line should be maintaining significant amounts of DOS to maintain ops even if there are delays. On Jointex 15 most RPs were stocked with 14-21 DOS.

Finally, when discussing third line I think it is useful to break down third line into garrison and operational functions. For garrison, there is an argument to be made that third line (Base supplies, base transports, Base foods, etc) would be more efficient if civilianized. Third line IS functions don't deploy, and we don't have enough Sup Techs, MSE Ops, etc to provide second line and third line functions. So centralizing all PY's into Service Battalions, Replenishment Squadrons, and fleet support has some merit. For a deployable, operational, third line, we will always be with a larger partner so our deployed third line should be focussed on integrating into a multi-national third line and providing Canadian specific support (which is where doing things like buying stand alone systems hurts- it limits our ability to piggy back on larger nations for support. For more info, see System, Air Defence Anti Tank). So, there could be some value in maintaining an operational third line that focusses on provision of third line support in ops rather than IT.

 

[Kirkhill]

As for the MSVS MilCOTS timeline Chris was asking about: First Approval of omnibus project (including MilCOTS and SMP variants, shelters and kitting of shelters) : Mid 2006. MilCOTS RFP issued: Late 2007. MilCOTS contract issued: Early 2009.  Final delivery for 1300 MilCOTS trucks: Late 2012.

Thanks DAP.  I guess I allowed myself to get lost in the discussion and intermixed the MilCOTS and the SMP procurement timelines.

The good news, for me, is that there are a lot of process "tools" out there that can be used.  The frustration might be that they are not used as often or as beneficially as I, me, myself, would like.

:cheers:

 

[MilEME09]

Shower thought I had, what ways do we have to speed up our own logistical system? for example 7 CFSD in Edmonton is sitting right next to a now dilapidated airfield, how benefitcial to our supply system would it be if Hercs or C-17's could be loaded at depot rather then hauling it to the airport via a contractor and shipping it off?

 

[GK .Dundas]

Shower thought I had, what ways do we have to speed up our own logistical system? for example 7 CFSD in Edmonton is sitting right next to a now dilapidated airfield, how benefitcial to our supply system would it be if Hercs or C-17's could be loaded at depot rather then hauling it to the airport via a contractor and shipping it off?

Look ,you've been warned before about talking sense if this keeps up I would not be surprised if the mods get involved .
All joking aside why aren't we doing this  ?

 

[OldSolduer]

Shower thought I had, what ways do we have to speed up our own logistical system? for example 7 CFSD in Edmonton is sitting right next to a now dilapidated airfield, how benefitcial to our supply system would it be if Hercs or C-17's could be loaded at depot rather then hauling it to the airport via a contractor and shipping it off?

Because it wouldn't benefit the local trucking firm

 

[MJP]

Shower thought I had, what ways do we have to speed up our own logistical system? for example 7 CFSD in Edmonton is sitting right next to a now dilapidated airfield, how benefitcial to our supply system would it be if Hercs or C-17's could be loaded at depot rather then hauling it to the airport via a contractor and shipping it off?

Zero benefit

99.9% of material that leaves the depot goes on the national freight run which is managed by/through the National Material Distribution System NMDS using a mixture of CAF and civilian resources.  It goes this way because most stuff is routine replenishment (max/min thresholds) or low(er) priority demands and it costs significantly less.

Older article but still relevant

http://www.logisticsquarterly.com/issues/7-3/article4.html

The airfield alone would cost in the ten to more likely the hundreds of million to bring it to full operational status and would impact all base training.  Using our tac and strat lift in that manner is an opportunity cost, if they are doing that then what comes off the table?  Those fleets are already pretty damm busy doing mission sustainment, training and support to domestic things.  Adding sustainment flights for routine crap is not more efficient nor a good use of limited funds......we have badges to pay for.

 

[Happy Guy]

I used to work at CMSG (this org owns to the supply and depot depots).

The use of RCAF or commercial aircraft to support regular domestic sustainment ops is not viable for the fol reasons besides for what MJP already stated:

- exorbitant cost of air transport as compared to road.  In general compare how to travel by car / bus as compared by air.

- unpredictability of RCAF to provide aircraft for this type of ops.  RCAF have limited airframes and requirement to sp many type of forecasted and unforecasted ops.

- how much time will you save in comparison to the cost incurred for air travel?  Depending on where you are and where the item needs to go, perhaps two day?  Unless it is an HPR required for an operation / critical aircraft readiness / critical warship readiness / critical A veh readiness does two days really matter?  More of the materiel delivered on the NFR arrives on time.

- multi-modes of transportation: ground transport to aircraft; transport on aircraft; and ground transport from aircraft to depot. The more you handle cargo there is an increased chances of breakage / lost and more subsequently more cost and time lost. 

- substantial higher cost for preparing (time) and packing materiel for air transport.  Requirement for highly trained teams, packing materials and aircraft pallets. The depots do not maintain these types of specialized skills.  If needed, they will ask for MAMS sp from the RCAF.

As for trucking firms making huge profits and influence on how we deliver materiel - nope.  With the downturn in the Oil Industry there is cut-throat competition now.  Anecdotal information is that many small and medium size firms are barely surviving.

All of this is balanced by the following:

- is it an ops or not?  This determines mode of transportation and cost.
- when does it have to get there as listed on the CARF / WBSL.  This determines the mode of transportation which determines cost. 

Hope this answers your questions.

 

[Happy Guy]

Some confusion on your part there - MSVS and LUVW MilCOTS were very open-ended to industry, with a minimum of customization, and are maintained by dealer networks that also stock parts.

You can best view army vehicles as three families:

Blue fleet.  Off the dealer lot.  No customization.  Managed like any other commercial fleet.  Maintained on warranties, disposed of in a normal lifecycle.

Semi-green fleets.  Bought from a manufacturer of civilian vehicles, largely a civilian pattern vehicle, but with minor customizations (power systems for radios, blackout drive for example).  Maintained by dealer network.  Support training, but cheaper than green fleet.  For example, MSVS and LUVW MilCOTS.

Green fleets.  Bought from defence contractors.  Maintenance can either be in-house or via contract.  Vehicles that can be uparmoured if necessary, and perform a variety of roles.  Focus is on expeditionary uses.


Thus, there's already an attempt to leverage best too for best job.  Different fleets for different purposes, at different cost points, with different maintenance methods.

Not wishing to sound pedantic, but you have used the incorrect terminology.

Green fleet is commercial pattern fleet which in this case you are calling it a blue fleet.  I'm not sure where this blue fleet terminology is coming from.  Think of the tractor trailers, buses and cars that you normally find on a base.

MILCOTS.  This is what you are calling semi-green fleet.

Standard Military Pattern (SMP).  These vehs are all mil specs like the US HUMMV.  This does not include A vehs.

Cheers

 

[Kirkhill]

As the instigator of the problem I thank both of you for clarifications.

Ultimately, thinking about the situation further, I believe that my suggestion is that more use be made of civilian pattern utility and off-road vehicles to supply capability.  Once it has been determined what the limitations of those vehicles are then Military Standards kick in and vehicles built to the higher, more rugged standard, purchased to fill the capability gap.  I am guessing/hoping that the same rationale applies when transitioning from soft wheeled to soft tracked and from soft wheeled to armoured wheeled and soft tracked to armoured tracked.

Do we/you fully exploit the least cost solutions before moving up to higher cost solutions?

 

[McG]

Green fleet is commercial pattern fleet which in this case you are calling it a blue fleet.  I'm not sure where this blue fleet terminology is coming from.  Think of the tractor trailers, buses and cars that you normally find on a base.

I have never seen this.  "Blue Fleet" is the term used to describe government owned civilian pattern vehicles.  It makes sense because the government seems to prefer buying vans and pick-up trucks in the same shade of dark blue.  Conversely, militarized vehicles (both SMP and MilCOTS) are usually bought in a shade of olive green.

Do we/you fully exploit the least cost solutions before moving up to higher cost solutions? 

Probably yes.  There are aspects of this equation that are harder to quantity though.  Every new fleet adds a unique training burden to a unit, so an additional SMP or two can be worth the cost as opposed to a few orphan MilCOTS.  First line maintenance should be happening far enough forward to hear the shots of the battle, and more fleets means more parts have to be carried in the MRTs and on the back of the SPSS elements; in this case more types of trucks means more total trucks required to support them. 

Much as we determined there is a cut-off line for civilians in the battle space, there is a cut-off line below which only SMP should be allocated.

 

[Kirkhill]

...

Much as we determined there is a cut-off line for civilians in the battle space, there is a cut-off line below which only SMP should be allocated.

No argument on that.  And I cheerfully accept that there is a cut off line for civilians in the battle space.  A cut of line that is situational depending on the needs and nature or the battle space.  Some times it might be Third Line but rarely Second Line.  Fourth Line seems a definite civilian opportunity.

WRT the vehicles

Situations, Estimates and Intents isn't it?

If the Government wants only a small, highly buffed and capable prestige force that intervenes internationally forcefully but only occasionally then that suggests one set of expectations and kit. 
On the other hand if the Government wants a general duties force of odd job men for domestic employment then that might suggest a different set of kit.

In one instance Leos and HIMARs may be the order of the day.  In the other instance Ford Pickups and beasts like the Bv206/Beowulf may be acceptable given the low risk of running into anything more lethal than hail.

In both instances, in my opinion, there is no excuse for not having a strong government fleet of helicopters, airlifters and logistics vessels.

 

[Daidalous]

Interesting read.

http://www.truth-out.org/article/item/76:troops-or-private-contractors-who-does-better-in-supplying-our-troops-during-war

A good cut and paste.

"There is an inherent authority problem. The contractor must perform according to the scope of work in the contract and not in accordance with the military commander's directions. This relationship is outside of the Army command and control structure. The Army and the contractor have inherently different interests. The managers of the contractor have a fiduciary responsibility to shareholders to maximize profits or minimize losses. This may conflict with providing the Army exactly what they want or need, when the contract is ambiguous about the requirement. Use of a contractor will not ensure that that the military commander gets the performance he wants in the same manner as placing an organic Army unit under his control, especially during times of hostile actions."



The problems I have seen over the years with using a private logistics companies over seas are:

The local commander loses troop strength,  no LOGS for guard duty, GD's or to augment depleted sections.  This has to be picked up by the Cbt arms. Unless you hire contractors to do guard duty and GD duties.

Domestically and deployed:

The contractor will only provide what is stipulated in the contract, if the contract states they need to provide up to 8 LAV tires within 1 hour and up to another 8 available in 24 hrs.  You will not get tires 9-16 until the end of the 24hr window, even if you can see the tires on the shelf.  (Just ask 450 how they are doing with Boeing and the parts contract)

 

[MilEME09]

One thing I think we need to see more of is like with the MSVS SMP programs up armour kits, more protection when the situation requires it rather then two fleets, one armoured, one not. In our CSS ability though, we need the ability to transport and transfer a lot of supplies quickly. Hydraulic cranes are bulky, and loud, in a tactical situation we need something a bit faster I think.

 

[Colin Parkinson]

As the instigator of the problem I thank both of you for clarifications.

Ultimately, thinking about the situation further, I believe that my suggestion is that more use be made of civilian pattern utility and off-road vehicles to supply capability.  Once it has been determined what the limitations of those vehicles are then Military Standards kick in and vehicles built to the higher, more rugged standard, purchased to fill the capability gap.  I am guessing/hoping that the same rationale applies when transitioning from soft wheeled to soft tracked and from soft wheeled to armoured wheeled and soft tracked to armoured tracked.

Do we/you fully exploit the least cost solutions before moving up to higher cost solutions?

Each reserve unit had at least 1 truck and 1 van for day to day usage, straight civy pattern. This reduced wear and tear on the deuces and the 3 ton stake didn't bulk out as fast as the tactical trucks. Parts were easy to find and we did most repairs at our own unit. Keep these trucks for 7-10 years and replace, use the existing purchase agreements and keep the training simple (Truck, civilian pattern), if they already have tactical truck on their 404's make it automatic addition to their vehicle list.