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"O'Connor has $8B military 'wish list"

http://www.sfu.ca/casr/id-antonov-3.htm

Strategic Airlift Capability  –  Procurement  –  February 2006

Strategic Airlifters: a Comprehensive Comparison between the Boeing C-17 and the Antonov An-124-100  [Part 3]

Herman A. Kurapov,  Candidate,  Master of Engineering in Logistics, MIT


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
[ NB :  for details on how Herman Kurapov arrived at his costing of An-124-100s,  see:  Average and Median Historic  An-124-100 Acquisition / Purchase Costs.]
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Summary of  C-17 / An-124-100 Cost Comparison:

Using the experience of Britain’s Royal Air Force as a model, we see that a similar 7-year lease of six C-17s for the Canadian Forces would cost at least US $1.725B – or Cdn $2.0B (assuming a 0.8584 exchange rate).  If the An-124-100 were selected instead, this initial $2.0B estimate for CF strategic airlift capability would drop to:

  •  $87.0M for the purchase of three (3) An-124-100s
  •  $76.5M for the full lease of three (3) An-124-100s
  •  $12.7M for the partial lease (based on assured chartering hours).

The three An-124-100 options listed correspond to costs that are 25 to 150 times cheaper than the comparable purchase or lease of the C-17.

Of course, these are only rough estimates.  There are other expenses  –  such as  training, certification  ( if required ), etc.  –  but,  such  costs  are  too  small  to effect dramatically the main thrust of the comparison.

The cost difference between choosing the C-17 and An-124 would be significant to Canadian taxpayers. But this is not the end of the strategic airlifter story.

Operational Aspects

So far, we have compared direct options without taking into account the various operating concepts / models, which make the An-124-100 even more appealing.

Volume of Operations

Historically, the Canadian Forces’ strategic airlifts  –  whether procured through commercial chartering or through ‘friendly forces’ – are not required year round. Strategic airlift is required for a maximum of  about a one-month period  at a time. Normally, 250-300 flight hours (to a maximum up to 500 flight hours) of heavy air freighter operations are used per year.  The operations are intense but limited in time  –  which brings up the issue of equipment idleness.

Individual An-124-100s have an average operating performance of  roughly 1000 hours per year (to a maximum of 1500 hours).  However, any acquired aircraft will be idle, on average, more than 80% of its potential operating time. In other words, in reality, an An-124-100 will average 300 hours of actual use versus its potential of 1000 hours. Aircraft are most expensive when idle –  they bring value or profit only while in operation.

Civil Aircraft versus Military Transports

The C-17 is a military plane. [Ed: McDonnell Douglas designed a civil derivative, the BC-17X, years ago but this aircraft has never been sold to any customer.]

By definition, the usage of any military aircraft, like the C-17, is very limited. Such aircraft mostly fly their military missions,  sometimes filling governmental roles or relief requests. But a military transport does not have the full operational freedom and flexibility of a civilian aircraft in so far as traffic rights, overflight permits, and licenses are concerned. Thus, by its very nature, a CF C-17 will be restricted in its potential operations other than purely military flights. That is, a CF C-17 would be destined to be idle most of the time  –  without the possibility to utilize it for profit because of its military ownership and regulatory restrictions.

The An-124-100, on the other hand, is a civil commercial aircraft (albeit one which evolved from a strategic military airlifter). This civil Antonov was customized and optimized through the demands of more than 10 years of very intense commercial operations. An An-124-100 can do whatever military aircraft can do and more. As such, the An-124-100 has become an integral part of the global air cargo industry, familiar at many of the busiest airports in the world.

The military nature of  the C-17 means that this aircraft will stand  idle  for at least 80% of its operating potential. A purely military An-124-100 would be idle just as much. However, the civilian certification of the Antonov presents an opportunity. When not needed by the CF for strategic airlift, an An-124-100 offers tremendous possibilities for substantive ‘cost-recovery’ by the Government of Canada.

‘Idle’ An-124-100s could be operated on a capacity loan basis for  friendly forces and / or for commercial flights.[2] Unlike the hopelessly idle military C-17, a “dual purpose” An-124-100 represents a vast opportunity, selling its immense capacity to the lucrative outsized air cargo transportation market. In other words, a fleet of An-124-100s owned by the government could provide the CF with strategic airlift while, at the same time, also providing a genuine Canadian civil airlift capability.

Canadian Civil Air Cargo Industry - Overview

A lack of civil airlift capability is one of the biggest problems facing the Canadian air transport industry and Canadian international trade in general. Thus, the civil- certified An-124-100 can meet other vital Canadian national interests besides the long-standing military requirement.

Canada’s Peculiarity  –  Lots of Geography,  No Heavy Airlift Capability

Canada is the second biggest country in the world, with many locations which can only be reached by air. The country’s economy is very much export/import- oriented and highly dependant on international trade. Located, as it is, between Asia and Europe, Canada is also the natural gateway to the US and Mexico.

The ‘blood system’ of  the trade is air transport.  A significant portion of goods manufactured for export are high-value and time-sensitive products  (up to 30% for some markets)  –  these are the staple commodities of  the airfreight business. Canada is dotted with modern airports with state-of-the-art infrastructure. Despite this, Canada lacks the ‘main deck freighter’ capacity [ ie:  aircraft using their main decks for freight, as opposed to underfloor cargo compartments]  to carry all this aircargo (produced or consumed) and no large long-range transport aircraft at all.

So, who does fly all  that  airfreight ?  US industry gets most of  the business,  which makes Canada even more dependent on its southern cousin. As a result, the bulk of Canadian-produced  – or consumed –  aircargo goes to/comes from Chicago, New York, Boston or even Los Angeles.  There is a single Air Canada ‘combi’ service [combining passengers and cargo on the aircraft’s main deck] from Toronto only.

Civil airlift is a part of  the national transport infrastructure  –  just as are airports, railways, and highway systems.  As such,  civil airlift  needs  federal government support and attention. The benefits of civil airlift (or detriments, if neglected) will have a comprehensive effect on the competitiveness of our national economy. If a fast, reliable transportation system exists, overall competitiveness is increased. Civil airlift is as strategic and important for the national interests as a military one. Possibly even more so.  Fortunately,  miltary and civilian airlift can be combined.
 
Strategic Airlifters: a Comprehensive Comparison between the Boeing C-17 and the Antonov An-124-100  [Part 2]

Herman A. Kurapov,  Candidate,  Master of Engineering in Logistics, MIT


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
[ NB :  for details on how Herman Kurapov arrived at his costing of An-124-100s,  see:  Average and Median Historic  An-124-100 Acquisition / Purchase Costs.]
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Dispelling Myths About the Antonov An-124-100

There is a very serious misconception about the An-124-100  –  namely, that it is an old, inefficient, clumsy, Soviet-built military aircraft.  [Ed:  the original An-124 Condor, which first flew in Dec 1982, was a military transport but it was anything but clumsy or inefficient.]  In fact, the An-124-100 is a fully commercial derivative ( the world’s largest commercial air freighter ) with more than 14 years experience of intensive, global commercial operations. The civil An-124-100 was certified in 1992, a year after the supposedly super-modern Boeing C-17 first flew. [1]

The An-124-100 meets all current civil standards, including ICAO Stage/ Chapter III noise limits and modern navigational equipment requirements. It has improved performance engines, Western avionics, and is equipped with VHF radios, TCAS [or Traffic alerting and Collision Avoidance System] and RNAV [aRea Navigation which computes actual aircraft position/speeds relative to a selected flight route].

The estimated service life for the An-124-100, both in terms of its operational life and in the anticipation of the obsolescence of its technology and design, is fifty years.  It is projected to have at least twenty-five years of operation without any major repairs. The An-124-100 is a truly unique plane with unique capabilities  – that is why it has become such an unrivalled success in the international market.

As a conclusion, the An-124-100 out-performs the C-17. Much of the Antonov’s technology is on par with that of the “state-of-the-art” Boeing C-17 aircraft, lying within the strictest technological requirements of modern aviation.

Financial Aspects: Acquisition versus Guaranteed Access to Capability

[Ed: All figures are given in US dollars. Note that, for accounting reasons, prices for USAF C-17As are usually quoted in constant, Fiscal Year 1998 US dollars.]

We will compare the costs of different acquisition models:  lease, purchase, and assured chartering.

Boeing C-17 Globemaster III

How much does it actually cost to purchase or to lease a C-17?  We have some historical evidence about C-17 unit costs.  In 2000, the UK’s Ministry of  Defence  (MoD)  signed a ‘lease-and-support’  agreement with  Boeing and the United States Air Force for the use of  four  Boeing C-17s  ( three + one “active reserve” ) for the period 2001 to 2007.

The price was  US $750M  for the lease and  US $400M  for support arrangements (maintenance, training, services etc).  The total cost was thus US $1.15B.

Based on this British precedent, a 7-year lease of  six  (6)  C-17s for the Canadian Forces would cost at least US $1.725B [US $1.15B ÷ 4 = US $287.5M per aircraft x 6 aircraft = US $1.725B] or  Cdn $2.0B. Thus, Canada would pay about $333M per aircraft in total, or $47.6M per aircraft, per year (assuming a 0.8584 exchange rate).

This is, of course,  if we are talking about a 7-year lease only  –  not the purchase price.  In the case of an outright purchase, the price would be higher.  According to Boeing data, USAF C-17 purchase prices range from  US $175M  to  US $232M.

[Ed:  the USAF cite unit costs of  FY1998 constant US $236.7M.  A 2002 contract for 60 more C-17s dropped  to US $161M  per aircraft  due to order size and cost- controlling measures. Note that the USAF costs generally do not reflect complete aircraft  –  the US government furnishes some C-17 components and equipment.]

Antonov An-124-100

Only 2 An-124-100s are required to carry the loads of 4 C-17s, or 3 An-124-100 to carry loads equivalent to 6 C-17s.  Thus, we see an economy of scale advantage.

The purchase price for the An-124-100 is about US $25M  –  approximately 15% of the  C-17  purchase price (at an averaged US $185M ).  But,  the CF will need fewer An-124s  than  C-17s.  So,  based on cost and capacity,  or a value comparison,  the An-124-100 price is equivalent to 7.5% of the purchase price of  a new Boeing C-17.

[Ed:  Boeing now seems to have fixed the C-17’s price at US $220M per aircraft .]

A conventional ‘standby lease’ for one An-124-100  ( 1000 hours a year  –  at full standby option) is US $5M per year or 12% of the C-17 aircraft lease price. Based on the above capacity-for-value reasoning, an An-124-100 lease price amounts to only 6% of the C-17 lease price.

A third option is the so-called ‘assured chartering’ or ‘partial lease’. This is based on a maximum of 500 hours per year  –  a more realistic upper limit to annual needs for strategic airlift by the Canadian Forces. This lease arrangement would amount to approximately US $2.5M per year, or only 3% of the C-17 lease price.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
[1] Ed: Design work on the C-17  (originally the C-X ) began in 1980.  The concept was derived from the 1970s-vintage McDonnell Douglas YC-15 prototype airlifter.
 
Strategic Airlifters: a Comprehensive Comparison between the Boeing C-17 and the Antonov An-124-100  [Part 3]

Herman A. Kurapov,  Candidate,  Master of Engineering in Logistics, MIT


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
[ NB :  for details on how Herman Kurapov arrived at his costing of An-124-100s,  see:  Average and Median Historic  An-124-100 Acquisition / Purchase Costs.]
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Summary of  C-17 / An-124-100 Cost Comparison:

Using the experience of Britain’s Royal Air Force as a model, we see that a similar 7-year lease of six C-17s for the Canadian Forces would cost at least US $1.725B – or Cdn $2.0B (assuming a 0.8584 exchange rate).  If the An-124-100 were selected instead, this initial $2.0B estimate for CF strategic airlift capability would drop to:

  •  $87.0M for the purchase of three (3) An-124-100s
  •  $76.5M for the full lease of three (3) An-124-100s
  •  $12.7M for the partial lease (based on assured chartering hours).

The three An-124-100 options listed correspond to costs that are 25 to 150 times cheaper than the comparable purchase or lease of the C-17.

Of course, these are only rough estimates.  There are other expenses  –  such as  training, certification  ( if required ), etc.  –  but,  such  costs  are  too  small  to effect dramatically the main thrust of the comparison.

The cost difference between choosing the C-17 and An-124 would be significant to Canadian taxpayers. But this is not the end of the strategic airlifter story.

Operational Aspects

So far, we have compared direct options without taking into account the various operating concepts / models, which make the An-124-100 even more appealing.

Volume of Operations

Historically, the Canadian Forces’ strategic airlifts  –  whether procured through commercial chartering or through ‘friendly forces’ – are not required year round. Strategic airlift is required for a maximum of  about a one-month period  at a time. Normally, 250-300 flight hours (to a maximum up to 500 flight hours) of heavy air freighter operations are used per year.  The operations are intense but limited in time  –  which brings up the issue of equipment idleness.

Individual An-124-100s have an average operating performance of  roughly 1000 hours per year (to a maximum of 1500 hours).  However, any acquired aircraft will be idle, on average, more than 80% of its potential operating time. In other words, in reality, an An-124-100 will average 300 hours of actual use versus its potential of 1000 hours. Aircraft are most expensive when idle –  they bring value or profit only while in operation.

Civil Aircraft versus Military Transports

The C-17 is a military plane. [Ed: McDonnell Douglas designed a civil derivative, the BC-17X, years ago but this aircraft has never been sold to any customer.]

By definition, the usage of any military aircraft, like the C-17, is very limited. Such aircraft mostly fly their military missions,  sometimes filling governmental roles or relief requests. But a military transport does not have the full operational freedom and flexibility of a civilian aircraft in so far as traffic rights, overflight permits, and licenses are concerned. Thus, by its very nature, a CF C-17 will be restricted in its potential operations other than purely military flights. That is, a CF C-17 would be destined to be idle most of the time  –  without the possibility to utilize it for profit because of its military ownership and regulatory restrictions.

The An-124-100, on the other hand, is a civil commercial aircraft (albeit one which evolved from a strategic military airlifter). This civil Antonov was customized and optimized through the demands of more than 10 years of very intense commercial operations. An An-124-100 can do whatever military aircraft can do and more. As such, the An-124-100 has become an integral part of the global air cargo industry, familiar at many of the busiest airports in the world.

The military nature of  the C-17 means that this aircraft will stand  idle  for at least 80% of its operating potential. A purely military An-124-100 would be idle just as much. However, the civilian certification of the Antonov presents an opportunity. When not needed by the CF for strategic airlift, an An-124-100 offers tremendous possibilities for substantive ‘cost-recovery’ by the Government of Canada.

‘Idle’ An-124-100s could be operated on a capacity loan basis for  friendly forces and / or for commercial flights.[2] Unlike the hopelessly idle military C-17, a “dual purpose” An-124-100 represents a vast opportunity, selling its immense capacity to the lucrative outsized air cargo transportation market. In other words, a fleet of An-124-100s owned by the government could provide the CF with strategic airlift while, at the same time, also providing a genuine Canadian civil airlift capability.

Canadian Civil Air Cargo Industry - Overview

A lack of civil airlift capability is one of the biggest problems facing the Canadian air transport industry and Canadian international trade in general. Thus, the civil- certified An-124-100 can meet other vital Canadian national interests besides the long-standing military requirement.

Canada’s Peculiarity  –  Lots of Geography,  No Heavy Airlift Capability

Canada is the second biggest country in the world, with many locations which can only be reached by air. The country’s economy is very much export/import- oriented and highly dependant on international trade. Located, as it is, between Asia and Europe, Canada is also the natural gateway to the US and Mexico.

The ‘blood system’ of  the trade is air transport.  A significant portion of goods manufactured for export are high-value and time-sensitive products  (up to 30% for some markets)  –  these are the staple commodities of  the airfreight business. Canada is dotted with modern airports with state-of-the-art infrastructure. Despite this, Canada lacks the ‘main deck freighter’ capacity [ ie:  aircraft using their main decks for freight, as opposed to underfloor cargo compartments]  to carry all this aircargo (produced or consumed) and no large long-range transport aircraft at all.

So, who does fly all  that  airfreight ?  US industry gets most of  the business,  which makes Canada even more dependent on its southern cousin. As a result, the bulk of Canadian-produced  – or consumed –  aircargo goes to/comes from Chicago, New York, Boston or even Los Angeles.  There is a single Air Canada ‘combi’ service [combining passengers and cargo on the aircraft’s main deck] from Toronto only.

Civil airlift is a part of  the national transport infrastructure  –  just as are airports, railways, and highway systems.  As such,  civil airlift  needs  federal government support and attention. The benefits of civil airlift (or detriments, if neglected) will have a comprehensive effect on the competitiveness of our national economy. If a fast, reliable transportation system exists, overall competitiveness is increased. Civil airlift is as strategic and important for the national interests as a military one. Possibly even more so.  Fortunately,  miltary and civilian airlift can be combined
 
Strategic Airlifters: a Comprehensive Comparison between the Boeing C-17 and the Antonov An-124-100  [Part 4]

Herman A. Kurapov,  Candidate,  Master of Engineering in Logistics, MIT


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
[ NB :  for details on how Herman Kurapov arrived at his costing of An-124-100s,  see:  Average and Median Historic  An-124-100 Acquisition / Purchase Costs.]
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
The US Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) Concept  –  a Flexible Operating Model

An efficient and innovative concept for increasing airlift capability already exists  –  the Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) which is a part of the US National Airlift System (NAS consisting of both military and civilian airlift assets). The CRAF concept is straightforward  – it is simply a method of mobilizing the airlift potential represented by the large numbers of aircraft operated by American civilian air carriers.

Selected large aircraft from US airlines are contractually committed to  CRAF  and support  Department  of  Defense  (DOD)  airlift  requirements  in  emergencies  – that is,  whenever  the  need  for airlift exceeds  the  capability  of  military  aircraft. In turn, CRAF participants receive preference in  bidding  on  US  government  air transportation business.

CRAF can provide as much as  40% of the US  military’s capacity  to  airlift  cargo meaning that the DOD doesn’t need to purchase additional aircraft itself or incur the cost of operating them during peacetime. This allows the USAF Air  Mobility Command to focus on C-17 procurement and a C-141 SLEP Life Extension project. [Ed: The weak point of CRAF is its complete lack of out-sized cargo capabilities.]

Thus, US national defence interests are flexibly combined with the needs and purpose of business. In this ‘win-win’ situtation, the  US  Government  receives a cost effective and  guaranteed contingency carrying capacity while, simulateously, optimizing the US  transport infrastructure.  Defence interests are satisfied while  giving a boost  to the  United States’  international  trade and increasing the competitiveness of their national economy.

Applying the CRAF Model to a Distinctly Canadian Operating Environment

Developing an  all-cargo  air transport  industry in Canada would require support from the government. This is about strategic infrastructure, logistics and trade at the national level as well as defence capabilities. Strategic government backing is the reason why air cargo industries were developed  in the US and  former Soviet  Union.  Both industries were started for the sake of defence (and remains partly so, in the case of the US). Now Canada has an opportunity to add a major advantage competitive edge to trade and its national economy  through a reliable air trans- port system. But, only if civilian-certified An-124- 100s were to be selected as our strategic airlifter.

So what is the market for the An-124-100?

Size and Segmentation of the An-124-100 Market

In 2002, the global out-sized air cargo market amounts to about US$250M in annual sales (14600 flight hours flown 5300t of cargo carried). [1]  During the ’90s, the market grew 12% per year on average, compared to 5-6% growth for regular airfreight. By 2002 the business had quadrupled compared to the previous 10 years. Projections showed it reaching US $ 500M by 2010 and becoming worth US $ 2B within 30 years – but it grew even faster. By 2005, the annual An-124-100 market exceeded US $550M.  Global sales more than doubled in those three years.

More than 52% of this market  (or US$ 115M per year )  is US and Canada-related (35-40% of total sales in the US market, 11-12% in Canada).  The biggest sector in the combined US/Canada An-124-100 market is aerospace industry.  [Ed: eg , the An-124-100 is the only aircraft capable of  carrying the huge, 3.43m diameter GE90 engines which power the Boeing 777 airliner.] Aerospace accounts for 60% of the global aircargo contracts (approximately US$ 38M per year, or 2700 flight hours).

About US$ 25M is currently spent  annually by the Government of Canada and  Canadian businesses  for the services of  An-124-100s. Two major Canadian industries  –  aerospace and  the oil and gas industry – are very much dependent on out-sized An-124-100 services.

For example, Bombardier Aerospace uses 800 hours of An-124-100 operations per annum [mostly delivering wing structures from suppliers to their assembly plant]. This averages out to mean weekly flights  –  mainly from Shorts Brothers, Belfast to Montreal but also from Kansai (Mitsubishi Heavy Industries) to Toronto.

Mackenzie Delta oil and gas fields development and the Alaskan Pipeline Project will both require additional An-124-100 capacity in the future. The aircraft would be profitable in the rapidly developing outsize commercial market while simultan- eously fulfilling the Canadian Forces strategic airlift requirements.

Beyond air transport’s general boost to an economy in general, there is also a so- called air transport multiplier. The multiplier represents the combined indirect and direct benefits from air transport services – generally said to equal 7.5 . That is, if An-124-100 sales in Canada generated US$ 28M a year , say, then the aggregated benefit to the Canadian economy would amount to 28 x 7.5 = US$ 210M per year.

[Ed:  see Appendix A for Some Practical Details on An-124-100 Operations.]

Conclusion & Summary

By comparing the relevant data for the Boeing C-17 Globemaster III and Antonov An-124-100 Ruslan, we can conclude safely that  –  by performance, capacity and financial factors – the An-124-100 is dramatically superior to the C-17 as a military strategic airlifter. The An-124-100 is also a well-established civil freighter, much in demand and well-utilized by Canadian business. As a result, the big Antonov can serve two major national interests – providing both Canadian military and civilian airlift capacity and capability at the same time. The latter is desperately lacked by the Canadian air transport infrastructure and needs the immediate solution.

The difference between two equipment options –  An-124-100 or C-17 –  amounts to Cdn $5.23B for only 7 years operation. Employing An-124-100s would result in Cdn $2.64B in direct cost savings plus $2.59B in additional economic benefits.
 
I can't wait to see new airframes flying around, I am sure that the NAVIGATOR and THE FLIGHT ENGINEER trades are panicking about their futures. J modles and C-17 don't require either. Just pilot co-pilot and a loadie.

I hope that the varoius trade steering comitties don't screw things around by delving jobs out of trade (IE making a Nav or an FE into a laodmaster) just to keep themselves with a set of wings on their breasts.

 
Quagmire said:
Strategic Airlifters: a Comprehensive Comparison between the Boeing C-17 and the Antonov An-124-100   [Part 4]

Herman A. Kurapov,  Candidate,  Master of Engineering in Logistics, MIT


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------  etc.

The one thing that strikes me about all this clapping for the AN-124 is what has been quoted in this and other threads....the cost of Canadianizing them and then getting the parts and service might outweigh any potential benefits, and still leave us with Airlift that requires a long runway, thus also limiting our access to certain areas.
 
http://www.cbc.ca/story/canada/national/2006/06/21/military21062006.html

Harper has a $15b shopping list including at least 4 C-17's.
 
GAP said:
The one thing that strikes me about all this clapping for the AN-124 is what has been quoted in this and other threads....the cost of Canadianizing them and then getting the parts and service might outweigh any potential benefits, and still leave us with Airlift that requires a long runway, thus also limiting our access to certain areas.

You bring up a very good point. The Russian aircraft would not only have to be fitted with Canadian avionics but also military comms and an Electronic Warfare protection suite [Missile Approach Warning System (MAWS), Laser Warning Receivers, IR jammers, chaff and flares). Most of this equipment we use is U.S. designed so I imagine they would have some concerns about installing it on a Russian aircraft, especially considering anytime you do upgrades Russian techs will likely be require to work on the aircraft, thus giving them access to the systems. If the EW suite is not installed, than you will not be able operate in an operational theatre where there is a threat from shoulder-fired anti-aircraft missiles or an EW threat, which pretty well negates any military advantages. 
 
That CASR crap really makes me physically ill.  80% idleness of a military fleet?  What utter nonsense.

CASR and the folks at SFU insist that they are big CF supporters but then they go and post ignorant crap like that - they obviosuly have no clue as to how a military works.

They comment on how we would only use strat-lift for about one month a year - hmmm, really?
 
Ahhhh Zoomie you're beginning to sound bitter.

I think CASR has some points, if even only to throw in off the wall options. A while ago I posted on this thread about the IL-76 ( a CASR Modest Proposal), and I got back several answers from folks who clearly knew more about it.

So now we're all clear on that: Globemasters are the way to go .... and new J's as well ??

Set yer RSS news feeds up right away folks, in the next few days we may actually see that we get new kit.

Betcha won't be so bitter when you have to trade that Buff in for a Spartan eh???

 
As someone else pointed out, CASR's love-in with Soviet (er, Russian) equipment is getting annoying.    Much of what they post/publish is complete rubbish - this being a good example.
 
Check out some of the comments on the globeandmail site.

http://www.theglobeandmail.com/servlet/story/RTGAM.20060622.wmilit0622/CommentStory/National/home
You'll need to either register for free, or you can try one of the logins from here: http://www.bugmenot.com/view/globeandmail.com

Some highlights
Rey Dunca from Toronto, Canada writes: This is great news! We have a big country to defend so we need a big enough and appropriately equipped military to do the job well.

Brian Sexsmith from Toronto, Canada writes: We could have free post-secondary education and a significant increase in seniors pensions with this money and the lost to coporate tax cuts, but I guess military equipment is a more intelligent investment for Canadians.

L W from new york, United States writes: If Canadians are involved with any military missions overseas or at home, we need to ensure that they have adequate equipment. Our soldiers deserve the best..

Michael Soft from Bloc Ontario, Canada writes: Good! We need to build WMD to defend us from american attacks.
Uhhhhh.....ok.

lenny jones from Bangkok, Thailand writes: This government's priorities are clear. Not enough cash for day care spaces but enough to create future spaces for the cannon fodder those neglected children may well become one day.
So anyone raised by their parent(s) is neglected?  ::)

 
2B checked the flight line last night and still no Canadian CH-47s.  2B will check again this morning.

2B

p.s.  Beware.  Most analysts only know enough to be dangerous and they probably failed Phase II anyway.
 
Try this one on.

Michael Gismondi from Vancouver, writes: 500 bucks for every man, woman and child in this country. What a waste of money. What of waste of time. What a waste of resources. What a disgrace. Right-wing zealots (I say that only because you would label me a liberal-lefty-commie) should be ashamed of yourselves for applauding such a ridiculous decision. There is nothing more disgraceful than the idea of men wearing matching hats and shirts armed with guns, rockets and missiles set out to kill other humans in order to reproduce the North American lifesytle. Organized sports with killing...what could be better? Not long until UFC allows killing and not long until War becomes a reality TV show. War is pathetic -- so is spending on a Canadian 'war machine'.
Posted 22/06/06 at 12:13 PM EDT
 
Quagmire said:
Try this one on.

Michael Gismondi from Vancouver, writes: 500 bucks for every man, woman and child in this country. What a waste of money. What of waste of time. What a waste of resources. What a disgrace. Right-wing zealots (I say that only because you would label me a liberal-lefty-commie) should be ashamed of yourselves for applauding such a ridiculous decision. There is nothing more disgraceful than the idea of men wearing matching hats and shirts armed with guns, rockets and missiles set out to kill other humans in order to reproduce the North American lifesytle. Organized sports with killing...what could be better? Not long until UFC allows killing and not long until War becomes a reality TV show. War is pathetic -- so is spending on a Canadian 'war machine'.
Posted 22/06/06 at 12:13 PM EDT

WOW !!!

This is the country i live in ?
 
Quagmire said:
Try this one on.

Michael Gismondi from Vancouver, writes:

Garbage...

I read through all the G&M comments today and they were overwhelmingly negative. It was saddening to read comments from people who, by their comments, clearly showed they had no clue what it was all about. More often than not, I found the comments tended to have a media orientated thread, and they were parroting their interpretation of the stories.

If you look at the count of the comments, you find that the G & M cut them off pretty early
.
 
How strange it is that not one of the pieces of equipment reported to be on tap actually kills anyone directly.  Why don't  these people get upset about the purchase of LAV IIIs?.  Or machine guns?  Or weapons for the RCMP?  Or...

Mark
Ottawa
 
I wouldn't put too much stock in what some chump from Vancouver has to say on the Globe and Mail website. It's probably part of an orchestrated peacenik campaign anyway.

Not that I'm not totally riveted by what "Lenny from Bangkok" has to say about Canadian military affairs and the world situation.  ;)

 
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/servlet/story/RTGAM.20060622.wmilit0622/CommentStory/National/home

Actually G&M seems to have a second discussion going.  That may be the reason the closed the other one down.  The count is now up to 248 and overwhelmingly positive - at least from a random sample.  Can't be bothered reading most of it. 
 
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