Artillery Logistics Lessons.

[SeaKingTacco]

Since the CF-5 was usually at Bingo fuel at the end of the runway on a takeoff roll, its effective payload was usually zero…

 

[KevinB]

Comparing lifecycle costs 155s to Phantoms/F35s would be interesting. You might want to include the costs of building and maintaining the airfields, including the costs of shipping the engineers and their plant to build the fields and hardened structures as well as the costs of defending and repairing them.

It wasn't a lifecycle costing, it was a straight logistics tally - of Bty requires X Ammo, plus Y troops, Z Security etc -- it was clearly an Air Force study, as where a few other ones I read.

A modern take would have to look at the middle ground, as you suggest, rocket/missile artillery. It would also have to consider the rato/jato class of ground launched long range drones that can launch an F5 Freedom Fighter class aircraft from any flat surface.

Agreed

 

[Halifax Tar]

In terms of Arty and trying to figure out how much we need, if I was the RQ putting this together I would err on the far side more than we need.

I would want to be sure my guns have all ammo needed. I can always return what I don't use, but its always harder to get things when you need them.

But this is the guy who also believes we need decentralized depots all over country filled with stuff just in case. Why ? Because when the ball drops its too late to source material.

 

[FJAG]

To me there is a clear case for long range rocket/missile artillery regardless of AF levels of involvement, as well as for heavier armored SPA, as the type of missions that would require larger artillery presence are ones that are going to see limited ability/availability of the AF to conduct ground strikes either due to AD or Enemy Air itself. Which is turn requires the ability to support the Artillery in volumes much higher than currently alllocated for.

I see problems with the continued reliance on air force weapons delivery.

The air forces ability to deliver close air support (and I mean really close) in a permissive AD environment was firmly confirmed in Afghanistan. But AD is getting better by the minute. Ukraine is showing that routine air force missions are limited to stand-off weapons delivered on strategic targets. Close air on tactical level targets is basically too high-risk for the very few and very valuable aircraft now in operation.

Conversely, there has been a surge in the development of long-range, ground based precision weapons. I'm particulalry interested in the area denial, anti-ship systems being introduced in the Marines. Effectively there is little risk in attacking strategic targets with high speed unmanned rockets and missiles which are significantly less costly than a complete and complex air force system. Both precision gun launched projectiles and OWUAVs are becoming cheaper, more plentiful and more versatile. The USAF's opposition to the army's development of these systems clearly shows that the USAF sees the threat to a significant part of their raison d'etre.

One thing is clear. Regardless of strategic targeting, direct support of ground forces will continue to rely on dedicated tactical artillery units which can react in all weather and conditions with intimate close in support. Whether that is by guns or OWUAS (but more probably by both) is immaterial. Supplying them with the appropriate basic loads will continue to be an army and national production chain logistics issue.

Bottom Line: close air support in peer-to-peer warfare is a dying proposition. Prepare for the alternatives.

 

[Kirkhill]

The Lockheed Martin containerized system compatible with everything the Mk 41 VLS can launch - new additions are the NSM, JAGM, CAMM family and the RIM 116 missiles.




The MLRS Family of Munitions plus the Boeing SAAB GLSDG plus the Chun Moo Family of Munitions - all compatible with an existing Norwegian containerized system

The system is launcher independent, enabling it be fired from any launcher capable of using the M26 launch pod container including HIMARS, M270 and ChunMoo. The containerized solution tested can also be used onboard ships.

Kratos UAV Concept being considered by USAF - a Valkyrie in a seacan. (A version of the WW2 Hurricat - a catapult launched Hurricane carried on merchant ships for defence - single shot. Pilot ditched or jumped when he ran out of fuel. This could be used offensively for Q-ships)



Rheinmetall's containerized SAM system =

A Skynex battery can include up to four Oerkikon Revolver Guns and four SkyKnight launchers, a total of 240 missiles being thus available.

Halcon proposes a 20-foot container as launcher, 60 missiles being hosted in a 6×10 cells matrix, one section of the container hosting the power supply system, the secure data-link to keep communications with the Skymaster, and the electronics to sequence fire the missiles.

Each container can launch in sequence up to 20 missiles, the system being able to handle up to 80 missiles in flight at the same time. According to data provided by Halcon, the SkyKnight can cope with rotary wing aircraft and UAVs up to 10 km, against fixed wing aircraft at 8-10 km, against precision guided munitions and cruise missiles at 6 km, and against rocket-artillery-mortar threats at 4 km range. At shorter ranges it is the turn of Revolver Guns to take over the burden, these being capable to operate against fixed and rotary wing aircraft up to 4 – 4.5 km, and against mortars and small UAVs at 1.5 km, generating a wall of tungsten thanks to their 1,000 rounds per minute rate of fire and the use of AHEAD 35 mm ammunition.

Containerized EW / C-UAS Jammers




And the Locust/Coyote Swarm is another candidate for containerization. Add Hero-120s and Switchblade 600s to the mix as well.

From the factory to the front in one container and launch from the container.

Edit - Interesting to note that the containerized munitions are ready to fire throughout their entire transit - in the factory yard, on the back of the trucks and rail cars, at sea, in BMAs and FOBs.

 

[KevinB]

@Kirkhill i would re-read the fine print on ‘ready to fire’. All the mobile container systems I am aware of require a static position -i.e. not on the back of a moving truck. The only ones that can do mobile engagement are the maritime systems that need to be tethered to the ship’s CMS.

Now I’m sure the container and contained munition is capable of firing on the move - I’m not sure the vehicle is…

 

[FJAG]

@Kirkhill i would re-read the fine print on ‘ready to fire’. All the mobile container systems I am aware of require a static position -i.e. not on the back of a moving truck. The only ones that can do mobile engagement are the maritime systems that need to be tethered to the ship’s CMS.

Now I’m sure the container and contained munition is capable of firing on the move - I’m not sure the vehicle is…

I wouldn't consider fireable on the move as a key criteria. Rapid emplacement, on the other hand as is already viable for MLRS and HIMARS, is quite sufficient.

 

[KevinB]

I wouldn't consider fireable on the move as a key criteria. Rapid emplacement, on the other hand as is already viable for MLRS and HIMARS, is quite sufficient.

Agreed. I just wanted to clarify what Ready to Fire meant in BD terms

 

[Kirkhill]

@Kirkhill i would re-read the fine print on ‘ready to fire’. All the mobile container systems I am aware of require a static position -i.e. not on the back of a moving truck. The only ones that can do mobile engagement are the maritime systems that need to be tethered to the ship’s CMS.

Now I’m sure the container and contained munition is capable of firing on the move - I’m not sure the vehicle is…

Didn't say they were moving trucks. Said they were ready to fire. Stop the train or the truck. On the other hand they can be fired from a ship or any lay down site in a maintenance area or airfield.

 

[Colin Parkinson]

I see problems with the continued reliance on air force weapons delivery.

The air forces ability to deliver close air support (and I mean really close) in a permissive AD environment was firmly confirmed in Afghanistan. But AD is getting better by the minute. Ukraine is showing that routine air force missions are limited to stand-off weapons delivered on strategic targets. Close air on tactical level targets is basically too high-risk for the very few and very valuable aircraft now in operation.

Conversely, there has been a surge in the development of long-range, ground based precision weapons. I'm particulalry interested in the area denial, anti-ship systems being introduced in the Marines. Effectively there is little risk in attacking strategic targets with high speed unmanned rockets and missiles which are significantly less costly than a complete and complex air force system. Both precision gun launched projectiles and OWUAVs are becoming cheaper, more plentiful and more versatile. The USAF's opposition to the army's development of these systems clearly shows that the USAF sees the threat to a significant part of their raison d'etre.

One thing is clear. Regardless of strategic targeting, direct support of ground forces will continue to rely on dedicated tactical artillery units which can react in all weather and conditions with intimate close in support. Whether that is by guns or OWUAS (but more probably by both) is immaterial. Supplying them with the appropriate basic loads will continue to be an army and national production chain logistics issue.

Bottom Line: close air support in peer-to-peer warfare is a dying proposition. Prepare for the alternatives.

So will rocket artillery types be wandering around in Bomber Jackets and mirror sunglasses now, that pilots are obsolete?

 

[KevinB]

I see problems with the continued reliance on air force weapons delivery.

The air forces ability to deliver close air support (and I mean really close) in a permissive AD environment was firmly confirmed in Afghanistan. But AD is getting better by the minute.

Well so far Russian AD seems to be only good at shooting down unarmed civilian jets, or VKS aircraft

Ukraine is showing that routine air force missions are limited to stand-off weapons delivered on strategic targets. Close air on tactical level targets is basically too high-risk for the very few and very valuable aircraft now in operation.

Well, both Ukraine and Russia are doing some CAS, but I generally agree that in a high AD threat area that few AF’s are going to be willing to risk it.

Bottom Line: close air support in peer-to-peer warfare is a dying proposition. Prepare for the alternatives.

Agreed.

I mean Canada already found the savings on cutting back its Air Force, but just didn’t translate that to increased Artillery assets

 

[Kirkhill]

@Kirkhill i would re-read the fine print on ‘ready to fire’. All the mobile container systems I am aware of require a static position -i.e. not on the back of a moving truck. The only ones that can do mobile engagement are the maritime systems that need to be tethered to the ship’s CMS.

Now I’m sure the container and contained munition is capable of firing on the move - I’m not sure the vehicle is…

I am not sure about having to tether to the ship's CMS. Perhaps it might be better to say tethered to the Task Force's CMS. The SM6 was launched from a container on the back of an Offshore Supply Vessel that was also carrying a containers fitted with additional comms systems. I assumed that tied the OSVs cargo into the Task Force's CEC system.

Description Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC) is a real-time sensor netting system that enables high quality situational awareness and integrated fire control capability. It is designed to enhance the anti-air warfare (AAW) capability of U.S. Navy ships, U.S. Navy aircraft and U.S. Marine Corps (USMC) Composite Tracking Network (CTN) units by the netting of geographically dispersed sensors to provide a single integrated air picture, thus enabling Integrated Fire Control to destroy increasingly capable threat cruise missiles and aircraft.

In similar fashion both the NASAMs and SkySabre AD systems permit launchers to be separated from sensors and FCS by 20 to 25 km (in keeping with the USMC requirement for a 50 km rifle company in the MLR to defend their missile assets.

The System​

A standard NASAMS unit has a modular design comprising a command post the FDC, an active 3D radar Raytheon AN/MPQ-64F1 Sentinel, a passive electro-optical and infrared sensor and a number of missile canister launchers with AMRAAM missiles. Normally, a number of NASAMS fire units are netted together in a uniquely designed ”hard-realtime” communication network to ensure minimum latency over large distances for maximum system performance utilizing the unique capabilities of the AMRAAM missile.

Defends a large geographical area​

The radar and launcher elements can be deployed over a large area separated by more than 20 kilometres from the FDC, providing extended coverage with few elements. Dispersed elements increase their survivability against enemy air and ground attacks.

About Sky Sabre​

Sky Sabre has replaced Rapier, which served the UK Armed Forces for more than 40 years. It is composed of three main elements: “the brain”, “the sensor” and “the missile system”.

“The brain”, supplied by Rafael, refers to the Surface to Air Missile Centre (SAMOC) command and control system. This includes the Link 16 tactical datalink that allows Sky Sabre to communicate with Royal Navy and Royal Air Force ships and aircraft, as well as UK allies.

“The sensor”, supplied by Saab, is the Giraffe Agile Multibeam (GAMB) radar, which provides 360-degree coverage over a range of up to 1,200km.

The Land Ceptor launcher and missile system is supplied by MBDA and fires Common Anti-Air Modular Missiles (CAMM) missiles.

Containerization seems to be a logical means of building a force. Lego blocks.

 

[KevinB]

Fair but something needs to tie into the CMS’s CEC/LinkXX and just as important have the host platform be aware that it is going to be firing.

You don’t want LS Bloggins out tanning and all of a sudden vaporized by a launching missile.

 

[KevinB]

I mean it would be funny - but not ideal

 

[Kirkhill]

I mean it would be funny - but not ideal

If Bloggins is tanning on the deck of an autonomous ship like Mariner he probably deserves it.

 

[CBH99]

Theatre Logistics

Poland,

Japan, Philippines, Australia - marries up with the proposal for 3 Marine Littoral Regiments.

The Philippines kind of surprises me. As does Indonesia and Vietnam. - my biases I guess - I can't see any of them as reliable partners - but would I have said that about Poland, or even France, 20 years ago.

Army readies for record-setting logistics exercise in Pacific

The US Army is preparing to conduct one of the largest logistics exercises in recent history at Talisman Sabre in Australia.

www.defensenews.com

New U.S. warehouse center in Poland to store tanks, Bradleys for future fights

American military troops responding to a future crisis in Eastern Europe will now have enough combat-ready equipment waiting for them in Poland to supply a U.S. armored brigade.

www.washingtontimes.com

I realize this is a bit late to reply to your comment, but just to put things in perspective - the pre-deployed kit in Poland is in addition to their pre-deployed kit in Norway

They have more kit in storage in Europe than we do across our entire field force...and before we start ragging on ourselves for not having enough (we're all well aware!) I think they have more pre-deployed kit than the British Army fields across its entire force also

 

[KevinB]

FWIW there are POMCUS depots in Europe for 2 Corps, and 180days of combat stores, munitions etc. Mandated by Congress, and can’t be touched (other than maintenance/upgrades) unless the balloon goes up.

 

[FJAG]

FWIW there are POMCUS depots in Europe for 2 Corps, and 180days of combat stores, munitions etc. Mandated by Congress, and can’t be touched (other than maintenance/upgrades) unless the balloon goes up.

Sometimes Congress is worth its pay but my guess is this was ordered by a Congress that was still coherent and functional.

 

[Kirkhill]

I love the Aussies.

What about solid rocket motor production?

Again, that’s part of that ecosystem the GWEO group is starting to develop. We know some of the rate limiting factors to some of our long-range strike capabilities is access to motors.

So that’s something you think is important to have domestic production of?

Bloody oath it does.

Australian Maj. Gen. Richard Vagg on domestic weapons production and new vehicles - Breaking Defense

"What characterizes war, it's a battle of will and magic bullets don't exist. There is certainly a need for precision and really high-end weapon systems, but there's also a need for mass, relatively inexpensive weapon systems." Australian Maj. Gen. Vagg told Breaking Defense.

breakingdefense.com

You’re an artillery guy by training. Are there lessons that are coming out of Ukraine and to a lesser extent Gaza that you feel are being successfully incorporated into your planning, or is there not as much relevance to those takeaways, because it’s such a different situation in Australia?

There’s some really strong lessons that are coming out of out of all those theaters you’ve mentioned. And I think it underpins that what characterizes war, it’s a battle of will and magic bullets don’t exist. There is certainly a need for precision and really high-end weapon systems, but there’s also a need for mass, relatively inexpensive weapon systems.

A few years ago, people were starting to draw down their stocks. Now you can’t buy 155 [shells] in the world, and we can’t produce enough 155s. You can’t produce enough propellant or explosive fill for those types of systems now. So I think some of those hard learned lessons from last conflicts are definitely coming forward in terms of us drawing those lessons into our theater, the Indo-Pacific, of what it means for us.

We as an army, need to be prepared to conduct close combat. And we need to have all the capabilities that come with close combat.

You mentioned 155s. How important is it for Australia to get a domestic capability for insensitive explosives?

I think our government’s been really clear. You just look at the investment they put into guided weapons and explosive ordnance in Australia. Air Marshal Leon Phillips is the chief of our Guided Weapons and Explosive Ordinance, very active in terms of establishing domestic capabilities. And look at some of the announcements that have been made recently in terms of the domestic production of NSM in Australia. I know we’re looking at 155; it’ll be crawl, walk, run. I don’t need to say it’s important — I think the government’s actions, the amount of money and effort they’ve invested in that area makes that pretty clear.

 

[Kirkhill]

I am all about least cost formulations.

But least cost doesn't necessarily mean cheapest bullet. As far as I am concerned it is the least number of dollars necessary to achieve a kill - including R&D, production, distribution and maintenance costs.

Gun parks and airfields cost money too.