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Interesting take on the nature of the evolution that Light Doctrine should take when confronting a "Fourth Generation War". Discussed in William Lind's "FMFM1-A Fourth Generation War" (which is discussed here: http://forums.army.ca/forums/threads/32574/post-239205;topicseen#msg239205)
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Appendix B: Toward a True Light Infantry
Current Marine infantry is â Å“lightâ ? only in the sense that it does not have its own medium or heavy armored vehicles. However, it has a superabundance of everything else. In the field, our â Å“lightâ ? infantrymen routinely carry more than 50 kilograms of body armor, weapons, ammunition, radios, field equipment, etc. They must depend heavily on motor vehicles. These vehicles, in turn, tie them to roads and open terrain, expose them to mines and ambush and diminish their ability to operate in urban terrain. Reducing our motor vehicle dependence and making our infantry light will require some hard choices, including a reduction in the number and size of crew-served weapons. Not only are the weapons themselves heavy, each one requires several times its own weight in ammunition. Although modest firepower levels are enough to defeat most Fourth Generation foes, we still arm our â Å“lightâ ? infantry as if for conventional combat against heavily armed opponents who fight as we do. Excessive firepower not only hurts our mobility but also is more likely to cause collateral damage and alienate the local population. We need to rethink and retool to fight a very different enemy.
If light infantry must augment its firepower to meet a particular situation, it can do so in any of three ways. The way least likely to cause collateral damage is to temporarily increase its ammunition allowance. This will reduce mobility but only until the excess ammunition is consumed. Extra ammunition should include rockets with disposable launchers such as the AT-4 antitank weapon or the Russian RPO-A flame weapon.
A second way is with artillery or air strikes. Although physically powerful, this is also likely to cause a level of damage that turns physical success into moral disaster.
A third way is to reinforce the light infantry with heavier combat units. These can be tank or other armored fighting vehicle units or they can be motorized weapons units armed with mortars, antitank weapons, heavy machineguns or other weapons too heavy to hand-carry. With all these options available there should be no reason for the light infantry not to have the firepower it needs (when it needs it) to deal with any conceivable foe.
However, the job of transforming our infantry into true light infantry is much more than just reducing the load it must carry. Other tasks include:
1. Light infantry must have a full tactical repertoire. It cannot be accustomed merely to holding positions, or calling for fire support whenever it contacts the enemy. It must be expert at ambushes, penetrations and encirclements in both rural and urban settings. Light infantry tactics are above all hunting or stalking tactics. They must rely heavily on stealth, invisibility and trickery. To real light infantry, ambush is a mentality, not merely a technique. To make this a reality there must be a complete overhaul of our troops' training. Although total training time must increase, the emphasis should shift away from specific techniques and technical skills. Instead, it should be placed on tactical concepts, the inculcation of a â Å“hunter mindsetâ ? and the ability to make rapid but sound decisions, based on the (necessarily limited) information at hand.
2. In Fourth Generation war, most light infantry combat will occur at the company level or below. Shifting the tactical focus to company-sized and smaller units will probably mean a major force reorganization in favor of a â Å“flatterâ ? command structure. To flatten a command structure is to have fewer echelons control the same number of troops. For example, a conventional command structure would divide a dozen maneuver companies among three or four battalion headquarters. The battalions, in turn, report to a regimental or brigade headquarters. A flatter version of this might eliminate the battalion headquarters and have the regimental or brigade headquarters control all companies directly. (If one prefers to be less radical this regiment might have only eight companies. Prior to 1914, during an era that often presented similar challenges to what Fourth Generation war currently presents, the standard British battalion had eight rifle companies. This gave the battalion great flexibility in irregular warfare because it enabled it to create numerous detachments while still retaining a tactically viable force under its own control.) Conventional wisdom has it that a given command element cannot tactically control more than four maneuver elements. However, on a Fourth Generation battlefield tactical control above the company level is seldom needed. When it is needed, it is likely to be for only a limited time and to involve limited forces. Instead of worrying about tactical control, a higher headquarters should focus on administration, logistics, operational and strategic objectives, intelligence analysis and dissemination and relations with the local rulers. It should usually leave tactical matters to its platoons and companies.
3. In addition to a flatter command structure, combat companies need greater logistical independence. Although this requires additional manpower, a company should have its own administrative, mess and supply echelons (as it did before 1960). Centralizing logistics at battalion level or higher ties the companies much more closely to their higher headquarters than is desirable in Fourth Generation war. Barring heavy combat, companies should be able to subsist on one to three supply deliveries (LOGPAC) per week. They should be able to store and distribute supplies of all classes and prepare hot rations using their own assets and without diverting personnel from their fighting elements.
4. Although every effort should be made to trim â Å“fatâ ? from headquarters, logistics or other support units, combat companies should have an allowance of â Å“basicâ ? or â Å“other dutyâ ? privates (as they did prior to 1960). Such privates have no specific duties and are there to maintain the company's strength in the face of the normal attrition (accidents, absences, sickness etc.) that affects any organization. Until needed to fill vacancies they would familiarize themselves with the unit and do odd jobs not otherwise provided for in the unit's table of organization. This deliberately programmed â Å“fatâ ? enables combat units to better maintain themselves despite attrition and unexpected contingencies.
5. Light infantry should not have organic transportation (other than their boots and maybe bicycles and/or disposable handcarts made of plastic tubing). Their missions and mobility requirements are so many and varied that no single set of transport vehicles could possibly meet more than a fraction of them. In helicopter operations or in close or mountainous terrain (where light infantry is most useful and effective), current infantry units with organic motor vehicles would have to leave most of their vehicles and many heavier weapons behind. On the other hand, light infantry in open terrain might need more (and heavier) vehicles than would ever be organic to it. Motor vehicles need parts, fuel, maintenance man-hours and dedicated drivers and/or crewmembers. Organic vehicles also increase the infantry's logistical â Å“footprintâ ? and reduce its strategic mobility. The best way to avoid these problems is to place what were formerly the infantry's organic vehicles in transportation units that support the infantry on an â Å“as neededâ ? basis only. Marines are already doing this with their aircraft, armored amphibian vehicles and heavier trucks but they must also do it with the light trucks that the infantry currently â Å“owns.â ?
6. Weapons should be simple and, above all, they and their ammunition must be light and portable, even over long distances. Weapons requiring motorized transportation (even if only for their ammunition) should be issued only to weapons units. Light infantrymen must learn to depend on their own weapons rather than supporting arms.
7. Light infantry should be able to "live off the land" for prolonged periods and in almost any part of the world. It should be trained and equipped to use cash to draw on the local infrastructure for most of its needs.
This type of true light infantry, or Jaegers, is very different from what Marines now know as light infantry. Our Marine Corps needs a program to develop true light infantry as quickly as possible, making full use of the extensive literature on the subject. To the degree our Fourth Generation opponents can field better light infantry than we can, our ability to prevail over them is greatly diminished .
---------
Appendix B: Toward a True Light Infantry
Current Marine infantry is â Å“lightâ ? only in the sense that it does not have its own medium or heavy armored vehicles. However, it has a superabundance of everything else. In the field, our â Å“lightâ ? infantrymen routinely carry more than 50 kilograms of body armor, weapons, ammunition, radios, field equipment, etc. They must depend heavily on motor vehicles. These vehicles, in turn, tie them to roads and open terrain, expose them to mines and ambush and diminish their ability to operate in urban terrain. Reducing our motor vehicle dependence and making our infantry light will require some hard choices, including a reduction in the number and size of crew-served weapons. Not only are the weapons themselves heavy, each one requires several times its own weight in ammunition. Although modest firepower levels are enough to defeat most Fourth Generation foes, we still arm our â Å“lightâ ? infantry as if for conventional combat against heavily armed opponents who fight as we do. Excessive firepower not only hurts our mobility but also is more likely to cause collateral damage and alienate the local population. We need to rethink and retool to fight a very different enemy.
If light infantry must augment its firepower to meet a particular situation, it can do so in any of three ways. The way least likely to cause collateral damage is to temporarily increase its ammunition allowance. This will reduce mobility but only until the excess ammunition is consumed. Extra ammunition should include rockets with disposable launchers such as the AT-4 antitank weapon or the Russian RPO-A flame weapon.
A second way is with artillery or air strikes. Although physically powerful, this is also likely to cause a level of damage that turns physical success into moral disaster.
A third way is to reinforce the light infantry with heavier combat units. These can be tank or other armored fighting vehicle units or they can be motorized weapons units armed with mortars, antitank weapons, heavy machineguns or other weapons too heavy to hand-carry. With all these options available there should be no reason for the light infantry not to have the firepower it needs (when it needs it) to deal with any conceivable foe.
However, the job of transforming our infantry into true light infantry is much more than just reducing the load it must carry. Other tasks include:
1. Light infantry must have a full tactical repertoire. It cannot be accustomed merely to holding positions, or calling for fire support whenever it contacts the enemy. It must be expert at ambushes, penetrations and encirclements in both rural and urban settings. Light infantry tactics are above all hunting or stalking tactics. They must rely heavily on stealth, invisibility and trickery. To real light infantry, ambush is a mentality, not merely a technique. To make this a reality there must be a complete overhaul of our troops' training. Although total training time must increase, the emphasis should shift away from specific techniques and technical skills. Instead, it should be placed on tactical concepts, the inculcation of a â Å“hunter mindsetâ ? and the ability to make rapid but sound decisions, based on the (necessarily limited) information at hand.
2. In Fourth Generation war, most light infantry combat will occur at the company level or below. Shifting the tactical focus to company-sized and smaller units will probably mean a major force reorganization in favor of a â Å“flatterâ ? command structure. To flatten a command structure is to have fewer echelons control the same number of troops. For example, a conventional command structure would divide a dozen maneuver companies among three or four battalion headquarters. The battalions, in turn, report to a regimental or brigade headquarters. A flatter version of this might eliminate the battalion headquarters and have the regimental or brigade headquarters control all companies directly. (If one prefers to be less radical this regiment might have only eight companies. Prior to 1914, during an era that often presented similar challenges to what Fourth Generation war currently presents, the standard British battalion had eight rifle companies. This gave the battalion great flexibility in irregular warfare because it enabled it to create numerous detachments while still retaining a tactically viable force under its own control.) Conventional wisdom has it that a given command element cannot tactically control more than four maneuver elements. However, on a Fourth Generation battlefield tactical control above the company level is seldom needed. When it is needed, it is likely to be for only a limited time and to involve limited forces. Instead of worrying about tactical control, a higher headquarters should focus on administration, logistics, operational and strategic objectives, intelligence analysis and dissemination and relations with the local rulers. It should usually leave tactical matters to its platoons and companies.
3. In addition to a flatter command structure, combat companies need greater logistical independence. Although this requires additional manpower, a company should have its own administrative, mess and supply echelons (as it did before 1960). Centralizing logistics at battalion level or higher ties the companies much more closely to their higher headquarters than is desirable in Fourth Generation war. Barring heavy combat, companies should be able to subsist on one to three supply deliveries (LOGPAC) per week. They should be able to store and distribute supplies of all classes and prepare hot rations using their own assets and without diverting personnel from their fighting elements.
4. Although every effort should be made to trim â Å“fatâ ? from headquarters, logistics or other support units, combat companies should have an allowance of â Å“basicâ ? or â Å“other dutyâ ? privates (as they did prior to 1960). Such privates have no specific duties and are there to maintain the company's strength in the face of the normal attrition (accidents, absences, sickness etc.) that affects any organization. Until needed to fill vacancies they would familiarize themselves with the unit and do odd jobs not otherwise provided for in the unit's table of organization. This deliberately programmed â Å“fatâ ? enables combat units to better maintain themselves despite attrition and unexpected contingencies.
5. Light infantry should not have organic transportation (other than their boots and maybe bicycles and/or disposable handcarts made of plastic tubing). Their missions and mobility requirements are so many and varied that no single set of transport vehicles could possibly meet more than a fraction of them. In helicopter operations or in close or mountainous terrain (where light infantry is most useful and effective), current infantry units with organic motor vehicles would have to leave most of their vehicles and many heavier weapons behind. On the other hand, light infantry in open terrain might need more (and heavier) vehicles than would ever be organic to it. Motor vehicles need parts, fuel, maintenance man-hours and dedicated drivers and/or crewmembers. Organic vehicles also increase the infantry's logistical â Å“footprintâ ? and reduce its strategic mobility. The best way to avoid these problems is to place what were formerly the infantry's organic vehicles in transportation units that support the infantry on an â Å“as neededâ ? basis only. Marines are already doing this with their aircraft, armored amphibian vehicles and heavier trucks but they must also do it with the light trucks that the infantry currently â Å“owns.â ?
6. Weapons should be simple and, above all, they and their ammunition must be light and portable, even over long distances. Weapons requiring motorized transportation (even if only for their ammunition) should be issued only to weapons units. Light infantrymen must learn to depend on their own weapons rather than supporting arms.
7. Light infantry should be able to "live off the land" for prolonged periods and in almost any part of the world. It should be trained and equipped to use cash to draw on the local infrastructure for most of its needs.
This type of true light infantry, or Jaegers, is very different from what Marines now know as light infantry. Our Marine Corps needs a program to develop true light infantry as quickly as possible, making full use of the extensive literature on the subject. To the degree our Fourth Generation opponents can field better light infantry than we can, our ability to prevail over them is greatly diminished .
