The general was seated in the first row, coffee cup in hand. But before the briefer could begin, a lieutenant colonel in the seventh row of horseâ ‘holders stood up. "General Forrest, before this brief starts, I have something I'd like to say."
Every head swiveled. Who was this guy interrupting the brief?
"Colonel, I apologize, but I'm so new here I'm afraid I have to ask who you are," General Forrest replied.
"I'm Lt. Col. Ed Burke, sir, commander of 3rd Battalion, 13th Armored Division. Hattin is in my sector. Sir, I apologize for interrupting the briefing, but I've got something I have to get off my chest."
â Å“Don't worry about the damn briefing," General Forrest replied. "Personally, I hate Power Point." The staff's sphincters tightened in unison. "What have you got to say?"
"Sir, I respectfully request that Operation Goliath not be carried out in Hattin."
"Why not?"
"Because it will make the situation there worse, sir, not better. I'm not saying we don't have problems in Hattin. We do. But while we don't have a 100% solution to the insurgency there, we have maybe a 51% solution. Operation Goliath represents the opposite of everything we've been doing. In my personal opinion, if operation Goliath hits Hattin, it will make our job there impossible. It will work for the resistance, not against it."
"This guy's toast" whispered one colonel on the staff to another.
"Well, I tend to think 51% solutions may be the best we can do against insurgents," said General Forrest. "Why don't you tell us what you're doing? Come on up front here and take over. The staff can just give me the briefing text and I'll read it over in my spare time."
"Thank you, sir," said Lt. Col. Burke. "We call what we're doing in Hattin â Å“Operation David.â ? â Å“Sir, may I begin by asking the division staff how many casualties we have suffered in Akaba?"
The Division Gâ ‘3 glared at Burke, but General Forrest looked like he expected an answer. "We have suffered five KIA since yesterday morning, with 23 wounded, 18 of which had to be evacuated. Resistance is continuing for the moment, so I cannot say this will be the final casualty total. I expect all resistance will be crushed sometime tomorrow."
"Don't count on that," said General Forrest. "Lt. Col Burke, please continue.""In Hattin, since my battalion took over four months ago, I have had two KIA and five wounded, all in two incidents. I have had only three successful attacks on American convoys in my whole sector, all by IEDs. As you know, General, metrics are pretty worthless in this kind of war. But as best we can tell, only 1% of the population in my sector is actively hostile. We believe we have caught everyone responsible for planting the IEDs that hit our convoys. We have captured over 1000 insurgents. Most important, we have not killed a single Inshallan civilian."
"Excuse me, Lt. Col. Burke," interrupted the Gâ ‘3. "My records show you forwarded only 237 captured insurgents, not 1000."
"That is correct, sir," replied Lt. Col. Burke. "All locals whom we capture we release. But first, we keep them with us for a while to show them what we are doing. They see with their own eyes that we are treating people with respect and trying to help. They also get to know my soldiers, whom I have ordered to treat detainees as guests of the battalion. Only if we capture someone a second time or if they are not from Hattin do we forward them to division as prisoners.
"Is this a 'hearts and minds' strategy, Colonel?" asked General Forrest.
"Not exactly, sir. We don't expect the locals to love us. We're foreign invaders and infidels to them. Our goal is to keep them from hating us so much that they fight us. I think we've done that pretty well, sir."
"Colonel, why don't you start from the beginning and tell us the whole story of Operation David," said General Forrest .
"Yes, sir. Well, when we knew where our sector was going to be I gathered all my officers and senior NCOs, and some junior NCOs and troops as well, and told them the result I wanted. The result was what I just told you, sir. I wanted to operate so that the locals would not hate us enough to fight us. Then I asked how we could do that. They talked, and I listened. I had an advantage in that we have a company of National Guardsmen attached. A lot of them are cops. I think cops understand this kind of situation better than a lot of soldiers do."
"The cops made one very important point right at the beginning. They said the key to keeping the peace is to deâ ‘escalate situations rather than escalate them. Soldiers are taught to escalate. If something isn't working, bring in more firepower. Cops don't do that, because it enrages the community. So that was one piece of the puzzle."
"Another came from our battalion chaplain. He opened the Bible and read the story of David and Goliath. Then he asked how many of us were rooting for Goliath? My light bulb went on at that point, and I said what we want is Operation David.â ?
"An NCO said that if we want to be David, we should just carry slingâ ‘shots. Everybody laughed, but I saw his point. I said we won't go in with M-1s and Bradleys. Just HMMWVs and trucks. A private said let's ditch the helmets, armor and sunglasses. They just make us look like Robocop. I said, â Å“He's right, so we'll do that too."
â Å“Are you saying you aren't using all your assets?" the Gâ ‘3 asked.
"That is correct, sir," Lt. Col. Burke replied. "One of our first rules is proportionality. A disproportionate response, like using an Mâ ‘l tank against a couple lightlyâ ‘armed mujaheddin, turns us into Goliath. It is a great way to make the locals hate us so much they will fight us. It also makes us look like cowards."
"That sounds like you are taking unnecessary risks with American lives" the Gâ ‘3 responded.
"Sir, how do we lose more American lives, by using our own light infantry against their light infantry, or by turning on massive firepower that serves as our enemies' best recruiting tool? Sir, I have to wonder if you are missing the forest for the trees."
"Personally, I am more interested in the forest," said General Forrest. "Please continue, Lt. Col. Burke."
"Yes, sir.â ?
â Å“One of my National Guard officers said that in Bosnia, where he served, the Europeans and the locals all laughed at us for hunkering down in fortified camps and seeming scared all the time. It's the old Force Protection crap. So I said, â Å“Can it.â ? No Fort Apaches. We'll live in the towns. We will billet with the people, paying them well for the quarters we occupy. We'll shop in the local markets, drink coffee in the local cafes. In Hattin, my headquarters is over a row of shops, right down town. We protect the shopkeepers, but they also protect us. They don't want their shops blown up. I have troops living that way all over town. I let my captains, lieutenants and sergeants work their areas the way they see fit, blending in as much as possible.
â Å“With that kind of dispersion, how do you control your men?" asked the pissed-off G-3.
"I don't," Lt.Col. Burke shot back. "I believe in command, not control. I give my subordinates mission orders. They know the result I want, and I leave it up to them how to get it. If they need help, they come see me and we talk. Otherwise, I trust them to get the result. If one of them can't, I relieve him."
"Tell me about your KIA,â ? General Forrest interjected.
"Yes, sir. It happened within the first couple weeks. A suicide bomber in a car hit one of my patrols. I lost two KIA and three wounded, all with limbs blown off. But 11 Inshallans were also killed and 32 wounded. I immediately ordered that we treat their wounded just like our own. We sent them on helos to Americanâ ‘run hospitals, not the crummy local ones. We transported their families to the hospitals to see them, and when they were well enough we brought them to their homes. We also gave money to the families that had lost wageâ ‘earners."
"Moslems bury their dead immediately, and I and my men went to all the funerals. Then I had memorial services for my two KIA and invited the townspeople. Many came, including three imams who offered prayers. That had a huge impact locally. I then asked the imams if they and their colleagues would give classes on Islam to me and my troops. That also had a huge impact, and it helped build my guys' cultural intelligence."
"Sir, my other two wounded happened like this. A couple kids with AKâ ‘47s jumped one of my patrols. They couldn't really shoot, it was just pray and spray. Despite two men down, my guys did not shoot the kids. My patrol leader charged them and they dropped their weapons and ran. When he caught them, he brought them back to the ambush site, pulled their pants down and spanked them. The crowd loved it, and the kids were humiliated in front of their buddies instead of being heroes. Both of my guys have since returned to duty and the kids' parents have apologized to us. They were very grateful we did not shoot their sons."
"How did you train for this?" General Forrest asked.
â Å“Well, sir, as one example, when I took my battalion through the 'local village' training stateside before we deployed, I reversed roles. I had my guys play the villagers, and I had troops who didn't speak their language sweep through on a typical cordonâ ‘andâ ‘search mission. I made sure the troops treated my villagers like we too often treat locals â ‘ screaming at them in a language they did not understand, throwing them around, detaining them in painful positions, and so forth. The result was just what I wanted â ‘- a lot of fights. My guys got so angry they started throwing punches. Then in the debrief I asked them, 'If we don't want the locals to fight us, how should we treat them?' The fact that they had been on the receiving end helped them see themselves in a whole new light."
"I think I might want to do that with my other units," General Forrest said. "Please continue."
"Yes, sir.â ?
"From day one, our message to the people of Hattin was, 'We're not here to take over. You are in charge. You tell us what to do that will help you.' We helped them bring in NGOs to set up clinics and distribute food. We put our troops to work under the local Inshallan engineers and technicians to improve the infrastructure. I made my HQ a "go to" point for the Inshallans when they needed parts or equipment. Over and over, we made the point that we are there to serve. On security, we let the mayor and the local police set policy. We only help when they ask us. They want order, which is what we want too, only they know a lot better than we do how to get it in their society."
"We understand that real psyops are not what we say but what we do, and God help us if the two are different. The people of Hattin now understand that we are not there to change the way they live, or to make them live by our rules. Hattin is a fundamentalist Islamic city, and some of their practices bother us. But this is their country, not ours. I've had signs put up in all our buildings, in Arabic and in English, that say, 'When in Inshallahland, do as the Inshallans do.' We go out of our way to make it clear that we do not see our way of life as superior to theirs. We are not somehow 'better' than they are. In cultures like this one, honor and pride are very important. If we seem to lord it over them, they have to fight us because their honor demands it."
"Stop for one minute, Colonel," interrupted the Gâ ‘3 "We have similar humanitarian assistance programs as part of Operation Goliath. After we have secured a town, we bring in NGOs too. Do you know what the insurgents do to them? They capture them, hold them for ransom and then cut their heads off! Are you telling me that does not happen in Hattin?â ?
"Well, that brings us to the next level," replied Lt. Col. Burke. "Life is harder for insurgents in Hattin than in the towns where Operation Goliath has left its heavy footprint. It is easy for insurgents in your towns to gain the people's support because Operation Goliath has made Americans hated, hated bad enough that lots of people want to see them killed. That is not true in Hattin. Why would people want to capture aid workers when they are just helping?"
"You are not answering my question," barked the Gâ ‘3. "Have any of your aid workers been captured?â ?
"Yes. Unfortunately, there will always be some people that we refer to as 'bad apples.' Operation David has kept their number small, but they exist. We have to deal with them in a very different way. We have to capture or kill them."
"That's no different from what we do," said the Gâ ‘3.
"Yes it is, because how we do it is different," Burke replied. "We never do cordonâ ‘andâ ‘ search. We never kick down doors. We never terrorize civilians or call in heavy firepower. If we have to take someone out, our preferred option is to take out a contract on them. Locals do the dirty work, and we leave no American fingerprints."
"If there is an insurgent cell that is too tough for locals to handle, we send in our Nighthunters, our equivalent to Delta Force. They are experts in lowâ ‘impact combat. They specialize in being invisible. Local citizens never see them or deal with them. That enables us to keep the locals from seeing the average American soldier as a threat. Our cops put the Nighthunter concept together. It is like a SWAT team. People don't confuse SWAT with their local cop on the beat. Every time we've had an aid worker taken hostage, the Nighthunters have rescued them within 24 hours.â ?
â Å“Lt. Col. Burke, I'm the PAO on the 13th Armored Division staff,â ? said a reservist. â Å“How are you working the press problem in Operation David?â ?
â Å“By playing one media operation off against others,â ? Lt. Col. Burke replied. â Å“I thought from the beginning that we would get favorable media coverage of what we are doing in Hattin, and on the whole I've been right. 90% of what we do is open to any reporter who wants to come along. That includes al Jazeera.â ?
â Å“Just once, early on, al Jazeera did an unfair and inaccurate story on one of our operations. In response, instead of kicking them out of Hattin, I invited al Arabiya in. I knew they were competitors. I encouraged al Arabiya to do an investigative report on the operation al Jazeera had portrayed negatively, and I opened all our records up to them. Their report showed that al Jazeera had been wrong. Since then, al Jazeera has been very careful to get their facts right in Hattin. And that's all I ask. If we do something wrong and they report it, that's our fault, not theirs.â ?
"It sounds to me as if Operation David requires superb local intelligence," General Forrest said. "How do you obtain that intelligence?"
"The same way cops do, by talking to the local people all the time," Lt. Col. Burke answered. "Remember, we haven't made ourselves hated. We buy from locals all the time. Good customers become friends, and friends pass information to other friends."
"The real problem is the language barrier. We've worked on that a number of ways. Of course, we've hired as many locals as interpreters as we can. I have them give classes each day to all my troops, so they learn at least some phrases and common courtesies in the local language. Each of my men has a pack of flash cards with basic phrases in English and Arabic, the Arabic spelled phonetically and also in script. If he can't say it right, he can point."
"Again, our Guardsmen have been a tremendous help. They come from Cleveland, Ohio, which has a large Arabicâ ‘speaking population. With the support of and funding from the State of Ohio, when they knew they were deploying here, they offered special oneâ ‘tour enlistment packages, with big bonuses, to anyone in Cleveland who could speak Arabic. It didn't matter how old they were, there was no PFT, all they wanted was translators who they knew would be loyal to us. Those guys are terrific."
"Finally, I've told the locals that anyone who works for us will be eligible for a Green Card when American forces leave Inshallahland. Frankly, General, I've gone out on a limb here. That promise has done more than anything else to give us the language capability we need, but I don't know how I am going to keep it.â ?
"Let me work on that one," replied General Forrest. "I think that is a great idea, and I have some friends back in Washington who may be able to help us do that."
The Division Gâ ‘2 had been listening intently to the discussion. "Have any of our intelligence systems been useful to you, Colonel?" he asked Burke.
"Yes and no," Burke replied. "I have to say that virtually all the intel we've received from higher has been either too late or wrong or both."
"That's no surprise to me," replied the Gâ ‘2. "Our systems were all designed to collect and analyze data on other state militaries. What are our satellites supposed to do in this kind of war, watch a twelveâ ‘year old boy pick up a stone?"
"But we have used technology effectively on the local level,â ? Burke continued. â Å“ We use our superb night vision capability to cover virtually all of Hattin at night. I have night OP's everywhere. With rare exceptions, all they do is observe and note patterns. We don't hassle people for being on the street at night. As any cop will tell you, safe streets have people on them, day and night. It is empty streets that are dangerous. If my guys see something going down, it's usually street crime, so they call the local cops. Of course, the locals know we are doing this -- the locals know everything we do, often before I know it â ‘â ‘ but because we don't hassle them, it's OK. Remember, they want safety and order."
"We have also emplaced small, camouflaged cameras and listening devices in some key places. I'd rather not go into too much detail as to how many and where. But I can say that there aren't many phone conversations in Hattin, or meetings in large spaces, that we are not aware of. All this information is available to any of my leaders who want it, right down to the squad level. It is an openâ ‘architecture intel system. We do not hoard intelligence in my HQ. I'm not a dragon who wants to sleep on a pile of gold."
The Gâ ‘2 smiled. "If I could trade my eagles for captain's bars, I think I'd enjoy being your Sâ ‘2," he said.
"Why don't you do that?â ? asked General Forrest. "See how they are making it work, then come back here and try to do the same thing for me.â ?
â Å“Roger that, sirâ ? said the Gâ ‘2. "Gee, I'll really miss all my computers. I might even get to see the sun."
"You are welcome to come back with me and stay as long as you want," Burke said to the Gâ ‘2. "Just be aware that our intel system, like everything else, is a flat network, not a hierarchy. My units pass intel laterally and down, not just up a chain. It's like Germanâ ‘style armor tactics, in that we are more reconnaissanceâ ‘driven than intelâ ‘driven."
"That's how the tactical level has to work," said the Gâ ‘2.
"Can you give me an example?" asked General Forrest.
"Easily, sir,â ? Burke replied. "Let me come back to the Gâ ‘3's question about kidnapping. The first time that happened, we immediately tapped our whole human intel network. The main way we did that was by having our guys go to the cafes and tea rooms and put out the word, which included a lot of cash for intel that proved good. Then I gathered all our squad and platoon leaders and asked them to game the situation. In a matter of hours we were sure we had the location, and when the Nighthunters went in, we were spot on. Of course, the fact that we were able to do that and do it fast sent a message to the insurgents and to the whole town, so the rescue had strategic as well as tactical meaning. It played on the physical and mental levels of war, and I think perhaps on the moral level as well, because even though we had to use violence no innocents were harmed. In fact, as is usually the case in Nighthunter ops, no one was killed."
"You didn't kill the enemy?" the Gâ ‘3 interjected.
"No, sir, we try not to. Sometimes we can't avoid it, but in a clan and tribeâ ‘based society like this one, if you kill somebody you have a blood feud with his relatives. Because the insurgents don't have gas masks, the Nighthunters usually flood the place with CS, then just walk in and round people up. We treat all the captives with respect, and when we do kill someone, we pay blood money to his family, clan and tribe. Remember, sir, we are always trying to deâ ‘escalate, not to escalate. We don't want to create martyrs for the other side."
"Of course, there are situations where we do want bloodshed. We constantly try to identify factional divisions among the insurgents. When we find one, we try to escalate it, to ramp up friction within the other side. We use lies and deceptions to bring one faction to the point where it wants to whack another, then we find discreet ways to help them do that. We do it in such a way that they all start blaming each other. Often, the insurgents do our most difficult jobs for us, killing their own leaders out of fear of being stabbed in the back. Remember, this isn't a culture that has much trust in it,"
"One time, we planted someone to get kidnapped. He was a Nighthunter disguised as an NGO worker. We had implanted a tracking device in his body. During his captivity he was able to learn a lot about our enemies. It was easy to rescue him because we knew exactly where he was."
"We often spot people who are trying to bring weapons into Hattin or hide them there. We do not interrupt those operations. We don't try to capture or destroy those weapons. Instead, one of our Guardsmen knew of some stuff we could spray on their ammunition that they would not readily notice but would cause it to jam in the weapon. I had cases of the stuff in spray cans shipped in from Cleveland. We sneak in and spray their ammo stocks, then when they try something, their weapons don't work. That really undercuts their morale. If we seized or blew up their weapons, they could fight us by bringing in more or learning to hide them better. But they can't fight us because they don't know what we are doing. Their operations fall apart and they don't know why."
"They cannot ambush us because we follow no predictable patterns. They cannot surprise us because we are always watching, and they don't know when or where they are being watched. They cannot fight back without alienating their own people. All they see is the smiling faces of my men, who have now become part of their neighborhoods and communities."
â Å“Anyway sir, that's operation David. It's working in Hattin and in the rest of my sector. All I'm asking, sir, is please don't destroy everything we've worked so hard to build by having Goliath stomp on Hattin. There are plenty of other towns out there to wreck. Let Goliath go somewhere else."
"Well, Colonel, I think that is a reasonable request," said General Forrest. "I can tell you where Operation Goliath is going next. It is going in the wastebasket. Colonel Burke, I suspect Operation David could continue in Hattin without you for a while."
"Yes, sir, it could," Burke replied. "I didn't create Operation David and I don't run it. My men created it and they run it.â ?
"Good, because I want you to come here, take over the Gâ ‘3 shop for a while and expand Operation David to the whole 13th Armored Division. Can you do that?"
Lt. Col. Burke thought for a few moments. "I think so, sir, if you will allow the men in the other battalions to do what mine have done."
"I will," said the general. "Meanwhile, I would like to ask my Gâ ‘3 to go back to Hattin with your battalion, as an observer.
"Aye, aye, sir," responded the Gâ ‘3, with a distinct lack of enthusiasm. He sensed that his moment might have come, and gone.
"One final request, Colonel Burke," said General Forrest. "Do you think you might present the division's Operation David to me without Power Point?"
"Yes, sir!" said Burke, grinning. "With your permission, I'd like to do with the division's Power Point stuff what I did with my battalion's."
"What is that, Colonel?â ? General Forrest asked.
"I let the insurgents capture it. It's slowed their OODA Loop down to a crawl."
"Another good idea, Colonel," Forrest replied. "I always knew Power Point would be useful for something."