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Light Infantry - a definition, roles, requirements, capabilities, and a vision for the future

What roles should Light Infantry Battalions have?

  • Parachute Only

    Votes: 5 9.1%
  • Airmobile Only

    Votes: 3 5.5%
  • Motorised Only

    Votes: 0 0.0%
  • Mountain Only

    Votes: 2 3.6%
  • Amphibious Only

    Votes: 0 0.0%
  • Commando Unit Only

    Votes: 2 3.6%
  • All the Above & More

    Votes: 43 78.2%

  • Total voters
    55
Of course one thing "Hack" always emphasized was the incredible amount of firepower US forces could get access to. The "Out G the G"  crowd were also fighting with FOO and FACs, which the real "G" did not have.

The 21rst century version of this model is the SOF operators wandering around in Afghanistan with a GPS, a laser designator and a satellite phone pre programmed to speed dial F-15 and B-2 pilots orbiting overhead. For local muscle and protection they hired on local Northern Alliance forces ("Out spend the G"?), but any Taliban or Al Qeada forces located by these guys would suddenly discover the sky really can open up and rain death.

This is not to say that light infantry do not have utility on their own. So long as they have access to good intelligence they should be able to move with much greater freedom of action than a conventional force with its logistics tail. The "recce Platoon" model cited near the start of the thread has a reasonable balance between "sense" and "act", and coupled to outside assets like strike aircraft, naval gunfire or attack helicopters (depending on the circumstances), should be able to deal with virtually any range of threat scenario. Israeli snipers often target and kill terrorist suspects in the West Bank and Gaza through meathods similar to the ones we are discussing, and when the terrorists make themselves harder targets, the recon teams can call on attack helicopters with HELLFIRE or IAF F-16s with 1000 lb bombs to do the deed.

The future model of war where these light Infantry would be most relevant would resemble stalking and hunting wild animals, rather than open warfare as we think of it now.

 
a_majoor said:
Of course one thing "Hack" always emphasized was the incredible amount of firepower US forces could get access to. The "Out G the G"   crowd were also fighting with FOO and FACs, which the real "G" did not have.

Yes, but this is only one aspect of what "Jaeger" should be able to do.  We don't need some fancy Special Forces soldiers to drop bombs on bad guys - hell, we could get our Arty guys to do that.

I'm looking more to the "big picture" - instead of moving up and mowing down a conventional enemy and then sitting in a hard point and weathering the storm from the G while seeking an elusive body count, we need to utilize the "hunter/stalker" approach (as you termed it).  In many regions, this means dropping much of our "conventionality" in order to "meld" our forces into the conflict.  None of this precludes being able to call in "reach back" capabilities to drop a bomb on a bad guy camp; that's simply another tool in the belt, one that is at times appropriate and at times inappropriate - the point is that we need a new belt, not the handy leather one Dad gave us that got us through the Cold War.
 
I certainly understand your point Infanteer, our new and improved "Light Infantry" should be able to infiltrate into "Indian Country" like the SAS did in Borneo or Yemen, or BGen Frank Kitson's troops did with their phony "Mau Mau" gangs in Kenya.

This model breaks down a bit if our guys aren't able to blend in with the natives in a convincing way (Who are those tall white guys in the shamags?), so I am a little less concerned about that sort of issue than you may be. If they have good enough fieldcraft skills to move and observe without detection, can contact the local CIMIC/HUMINT cell by sat phone, have the shooting skills to "snipe" high value targets and also have reliable means to contact and direct greater amounts of firepower against the enemy when required, then I think we have the basis of a high value light infantry unit.
 
I hearby motion we form a working group company cell we could name Boland's Bandits  :P to test this out...


Seriously I agree with both of you.  I'd much prefer not to pack two guns - I'd go with the foreign weapons in a pinch - but it sells off one of our better tech advantages (rnage and lethality of our weapons and the integration of a full spectrum of warfare kit - suppressor/laser optic etc.)

Do we want ODA type capabilities or more Ranger oreinted?  Or walk (Ranger) first then perhaps make 1 coy later out of a LIB into a full fledged (and tabbed) SF Compnay with B and A OD's?...

 
Ok, we are getting a little side-tracked with talk of US Special Forces.

Here is something I see the "Jaegers" as good for - infiltrating local communities and setting up shop to defeat the enemy on the moral plane (kinda hard to do that with a tank or a LAV parked on their mosque):

(This is another excerpt from the Lind piece mentioned at the top)

"Operation Davidâ ?


For General Braxton Butler's 13th Armored Division, the invasion of Inshallahland had been a cakewalk. Inshallahland's small air force had been destroyed on the ground in the first few hours. Apaches had knocked out most of the Inshallan tanks before his Mâ ‘1s even saw them. Virtually all had been abandoned before they were hit. It seemed the Inshallan army just didn't have much fight in it. The 13th Armored Division swept into Inshallahland's capital in less then a week, suffering only a handful of casualties in the process. The local government skipped the country, taking the treasury with them, and an American proâ ‘consul now governed in their place. Americanâ ‘imposed secular democracy and capitalism would soon give the people a better life, or so General Butler thought.

But that is not quite how it turned out. Within days of the decisive American victory, graffiti began showing up, posting the message, "Now the real war starts." It seemed those Inshallan soldiers who skedaddled so fast had taken their light weapons with them. Some analysts said that was the Inshallan strategy from the outset, although General Butler didn't pay much attention to eggheads like that. His job was just to put steel on target.

So as the insurgency spread, that is what General Butler did. He called it "Operation Goliath." He knew no enemy on earth could stand up to American firepower. All that was necessary was killing anyone who resisted and scaring everyone else into cooperating with the Americans. Methodically, in town after town in the 13th Armored Division's sector, his troops launched cordon-and-search operations. He kept his casualties down by prepping each town thoroughly, using air and artillery to take out any likely targets. Then, his tanks and Bradleys swept through. He was killing a lot of bad guys, he was certain; that much firepower had to do something. It made a mess of the towns, but fixing them was someone else's problem. Anyway, he was rotating home next week. In the meantime, Operation Goliath would clean out the town of Akaba.

Mohammed lived in Akaba. He was a poor man, like almost everyone in Akaba. But his tea shop across from the mosque allowed him to feed his family. He was even able to save some money so that some day he could go on the Hajj.

When the troops of the 13th Armored Division first came through Akaba, months before, Mohammed had watched. There wasn't any fighting, thanks be to Allah, but the American tanks had ripped up some roads, crushed sewers and water pipes and even knocked down a few buildings. An American officer had promised they would pay for the damage, but they never did. Still, life went on pretty much as before. No one collected taxes now, which was good. Some foreigners, not Americans Mohammed thought, had set up a clinic; they were welcome. The electricity was on more often, which was also good. Anyway, the Americans would leave soon, or so they said.

Of course, the mujaheddin were now active in Akaba, as they were everywhere. Mostly, they set bombs by the sides of roads, targetting American supply convoys. He had watched an American vehicle burn after it was hit. Mohammed felt sorry for the American soldiers in the burning truck. They were someone's sons, he thought. War was bad for everyone.

When the bombing started in the night, Mohammed did not understand what was happening. Huge explosions followed, one after another. Quickly, he got his family out of the rooms over the tea shop where they lived and into the mosque across the street. He did not know who was doing the bombing, but perhaps they would not bomb a mosque.

At daybreak, the bombing stopped and American tanks came down his street. This time, they did not just pass through. American soldiers were kicking in the doors of every building and searching inside. The Americans were attacking the mujaheddin. He knew some of the mujaheddin. They were poor men, like himself. They had few weapons. The Americans had on armor and helmets. Their tanks were enormous, and from the door of the mosque he could see their helicopters overhead, shooting anyone on the streets. Butchers! Murderers! How could human beings do this?

An American tank stopped near his tea shop. Suddenly, two mujaheddin, just boys, ran out from the ally by his shop. They had an RPG. Before they could fire, the Americans' machine guns cut them down. By God, what an awful sight! Then the tank swiveled its enormous gun. It fired right through his shop into the ally. His business and his home were destroyed in an instant. â Å“God curse them! God curse them!â ? Mohammed wailed. In less than a minute, he had lost his home and his livelihood.

American soldiers came into the mosque. They kept their boots on, defiling the holy place. They were screaming in a language Mohammed did not understand. His wife and children were terrified of the soldiers. In their helmets and armor and sunglasses, they looked like jinn, not men. Quickly, Mohammed pulled his family into a corner and stood in front of them to protect them. He was a small man and had no weapon, but his honor demanded he defend his family. He could do nothing else.
Three American soldiers came up to him, still screaming. He did not know what they wanted. Suddenly, two of them grabbed him and threw him on the ground. One put his boot on Mohammed's head to hold him. Enraged by the terrible insult, the humiliation in front of his own family, Mohammed struggled. Another soldier kicked him in the groin as he lay on the ground. Retching with pain, he watched as the Americans ran their hands over his wife and daughter. They did something with his hands too. He did not know what. Then they let him go and moved on.

Back in the 13th Armored Division's headquarters, General Butler's replacement had arrived. Major General Montgomery Forrest was invited by General Butler to join the brief on the progress of Operation Goliath. "Yesterday was another major success," General Butler told his replacement. "We pacified the town of Akaba, killing at least 300 muj and capturing 17. We've got a pretty good template for how to handle these places, and I don't think you'll have any problem picking up where I've left off."
That same day, Mohammed and his family were approached by Rashid. Mohammed knew Rashid was a mujaheddin. "We are sorry for what the American devils did to you yesterday," Rashid said. "My cousin said you and your family are welcome to live in his home. Here are 5000 dinars to help you. We will also help rebuild your home and shop when the Americans have been driven out, God willing."

"Praise be to God for your generosity," Mohammed replied. "I want to fight the Americans too. But I am not a soldier. I saw how the American tank killed those two boys by my shop. The dogs even ran the tank over their bodies. You must have suffered many dead yesterday."

"Actually, praise be to God for his protection, we only had eleven men killed. The two you saw martyred were new to us. We told them to run away, to be safe until we could train them. But they took a weapon and attacked anyway. Now they are with God. But if you will join us, Mohammed, we will not throw your life away. We will train you well, so that when you fight the Americans you will kill many of them before you are made a martyr yourself. And we take care of our martyrs' families, so you will not need to worry about them. Thanks to the faithful, we have plenty of money, and weapons too."

"Do you know what the American dogs did?" Mohammed said. â Å“They put their boots on my head, in front of my family. By God, I will fight them. I will be a suicide bomber myself."

Mohammed's son, who had just turned 13, had been listening to the conversation. "Father, I want to avenge our family's honor, too. I want to be a suicide bomber also. Once I took candy from the Americans. Now I hate them more than I fear death."

"My son, if you had said this to me the day before yesterday, I would have beaten you. Now I give you my blessing. Go with Rashid and do whatever he tells you. Perhaps God will allow us to be martyrs together."

A week later, General Butler had departed for his important new job at TRADOC, where he would oversee the development of counterinsurgency doctrine. The division staff had worked hard on their first brief for the new CG. With 714 Power Point slides, they would show him how Operation Goliath would pacify its next target, the town of Hattin.
 
cont....

The general was seated in the first row, coffee cup in hand. But before the briefer could begin, a lieutenant colonel in the seventh row of horseâ ‘holders stood up. "General Forrest, before this brief starts, I have something I'd like to say."

Every head swiveled. Who was this guy interrupting the brief?

"Colonel, I apologize, but I'm so new here I'm afraid I have to ask who you are," General Forrest replied.

"I'm Lt. Col. Ed Burke, sir, commander of 3rd Battalion, 13th Armored Division. Hattin is in my sector. Sir, I apologize for interrupting the briefing, but I've got something I have to get off my chest."

â Å“Don't worry about the damn briefing," General Forrest replied. "Personally, I hate Power Point." The staff's sphincters tightened in unison. "What have you got to say?"

"Sir, I respectfully request that Operation Goliath not be carried out in Hattin."

"Why not?"

"Because it will make the situation there worse, sir, not better. I'm not saying we don't have problems in Hattin. We do. But while we don't have a 100% solution to the insurgency there, we have maybe a 51% solution. Operation Goliath represents the opposite of everything we've been doing. In my personal opinion, if operation Goliath hits Hattin, it will make our job there impossible. It will work for the resistance, not against it."

"This guy's toast" whispered one colonel on the staff to another.

"Well, I tend to think 51% solutions may be the best we can do against insurgents," said General Forrest. "Why don't you tell us what you're doing? Come on up front here and take over. The staff can just give me the briefing text and I'll read it over in my spare time."

"Thank you, sir," said Lt. Col. Burke. "We call what we're doing in Hattin â Å“Operation David.â ? â Å“Sir, may I begin by asking the division staff how many casualties we have suffered in Akaba?"

The Division Gâ ‘3 glared at Burke, but General Forrest looked like he expected an answer. "We have suffered five KIA since yesterday morning, with 23 wounded, 18 of which had to be evacuated. Resistance is continuing for the moment, so I cannot say this will be the final casualty total. I expect all resistance will be crushed sometime tomorrow."

"Don't count on that," said General Forrest. "Lt. Col Burke, please continue.""In Hattin, since my battalion took over four months ago, I have had two KIA and five wounded, all in two incidents. I have had only three successful attacks on American convoys in my whole sector, all by IEDs. As you know, General, metrics are pretty worthless in this kind of war. But as best we can tell, only 1% of the population in my sector is actively hostile. We believe we have caught everyone responsible for planting the IEDs that hit our convoys. We have captured over 1000 insurgents. Most important, we have not killed a single Inshallan civilian."

"Excuse me, Lt. Col. Burke," interrupted the Gâ ‘3. "My records show you forwarded only 237 captured insurgents, not 1000."

"That is correct, sir," replied Lt. Col. Burke. "All locals whom we capture we release. But first, we keep them with us for a while to show them what we are doing. They see with their own eyes that we are treating people with respect and trying to help. They also get to know my soldiers, whom I have ordered to treat detainees as guests of the battalion. Only if we capture someone a second time or if they are not from Hattin do we forward them to division as prisoners.

"Is this a 'hearts and minds' strategy, Colonel?" asked General Forrest.

"Not exactly, sir. We don't expect the locals to love us. We're foreign invaders and infidels to them. Our goal is to keep them from hating us so much that they fight us. I think we've done that pretty well, sir."

"Colonel, why don't you start from the beginning and tell us the whole story of Operation David," said General Forrest ­.

"Yes, sir. Well, when we knew where our sector was going to be I gathered all my officers and senior NCOs, and some junior NCOs and troops as well, and told them the result I wanted. The result was what I just told you, sir. I wanted to operate so that the locals would not hate us enough to fight us. Then I asked how we could do that. They talked, and I listened. I had an advantage in that we have a company of National Guardsmen attached. A lot of them are cops. I think cops understand this kind of situation better than a lot of soldiers do."

"The cops made one very important point right at the beginning. They said the key to keeping the peace is to deâ ‘escalate situations rather than escalate them. Soldiers are taught to escalate. If something isn't working, bring in more firepower. Cops don't do that, because it enrages the community. So that was one piece of the puzzle."

"Another came from our battalion chaplain. He opened the Bible and read the story of David and Goliath. Then he asked how many of us were rooting for Goliath? My light bulb went on at that point, and I said what we want is Operation David.â ?

"An NCO said that if we want to be David, we should just carry slingâ ‘shots. Everybody laughed, but I saw his point. I said we won't go in with M-1s and Bradleys. Just HMMWVs and trucks. A private said let's ditch the helmets, armor and sunglasses. They just make us look like Robocop. I said, â Å“He's right, so we'll do that too."

â Å“Are you saying you aren't using all your assets?" the Gâ ‘3 asked.

"That is correct, sir," Lt. Col. Burke replied. "One of our first rules is proportionality. A disproportionate response, like using an Mâ ‘l tank against a couple lightlyâ ‘armed mujaheddin, turns us into Goliath. It is a great way to make the locals hate us so much they will fight us. It also makes us look like cowards."

"That sounds like you are taking unnecessary risks with American lives" the Gâ ‘3 responded.

"Sir, how do we lose more American lives, by using our own light infantry against their light infantry, or by turning on massive firepower that serves as our enemies' best recruiting tool? Sir, I have to wonder if you are missing the forest for the trees."

"Personally, I am more interested in the forest," said General Forrest. "Please continue, Lt. Col. Burke."

"Yes, sir.â ?

â Å“One of my National Guard officers said that in Bosnia, where he served, the Europeans and the locals all laughed at us for hunkering down in fortified camps and seeming scared all the time. It's the old Force Protection crap. So I said, â Å“Can it.â ? No Fort Apaches. We'll live in the towns. We will billet with the people, paying them well for the quarters we occupy. We'll shop in the local markets, drink coffee in the local cafes. In Hattin, my headquarters is over a row of shops, right down town. We protect the shopkeepers, but they also protect us. They don't want their shops blown up. I have troops living that way all over town. I let my captains, lieutenants and sergeants work their areas the way they see fit, blending in as much as possible.

â Å“With that kind of dispersion, how do you control your men?" asked the pissed-off G-3.

"I don't," Lt.Col. Burke shot back. "I believe in command, not control. I give my subordinates mission orders. They know the result I want, and I leave it up to them how to get it. If they need help, they come see me and we talk. Otherwise, I trust them to get the result. If one of them can't, I relieve him."

"Tell me about your KIA,â ? General Forrest interjected.

"Yes, sir. It happened within the first couple weeks. A suicide bomber in a car hit one of my patrols. I lost two KIA and three wounded, all with limbs blown off. But 11 Inshallans were also killed and 32 wounded. I immediately ordered that we treat their wounded just like our own. We sent them on helos to Americanâ ‘run hospitals, not the crummy local ones. We transported their families to the hospitals to see them, and when they were well enough we brought them to their homes. We also gave money to the families that had lost wageâ ‘earners."

"Moslems bury their dead immediately, and I and my men went to all the funerals. Then I had memorial services for my two KIA and invited the townspeople. Many came, including three imams who offered prayers. That had a huge impact locally. I then asked the imams if they and their colleagues would give classes on Islam to me and my troops. That also had a huge impact, and it helped build my guys' cultural intelligence."

"Sir, my other two wounded happened like this. A couple kids with AKâ ‘47s jumped one of my patrols. They couldn't really shoot, it was just pray and spray. Despite two men down, my guys did not shoot the kids. My patrol leader charged them and they dropped their weapons and ran. When he caught them, he brought them back to the ambush site, pulled their pants down and spanked them. The crowd loved it, and the kids were humiliated in front of their buddies instead of being heroes. Both of my guys have since returned to duty and the kids' parents have apologized to us. They were very grateful we did not shoot their sons."

"How did you train for this?" General Forrest asked.

â Å“Well, sir, as one example, when I took my battalion through the 'local village' training stateside before we deployed, I reversed roles. I had my guys play the villagers, and I had troops who didn't speak their language sweep through on a typical cordonâ ‘andâ ‘search mission. I made sure the troops treated my villagers like we too often treat locals â ‘ screaming at them in a language they did not understand, throwing them around, detaining them in painful positions, and so forth. The result was just what I wanted â ‘- a lot of fights. My guys got so angry they started throwing punches. Then in the debrief I asked them, 'If we don't want the locals to fight us, how should we treat them?' The fact that they had been on the receiving end helped them see themselves in a whole new light."

"I think I might want to do that with my other units," General Forrest said. "Please continue."

"Yes, sir.â ?

"From day one, our message to the people of Hattin was, 'We're not here to take over. You are in charge. You tell us what to do that will help you.' We helped them bring in NGOs to set up clinics and distribute food. We put our troops to work under the local Inshallan engineers and technicians to improve the infrastructure. I made my HQ a "go to" point for the Inshallans when they needed parts or equipment. Over and over, we made the point that we are there to serve. On security, we let the mayor and the local police set policy. We only help when they ask us. They want order, which is what we want too, only they know a lot better than we do how to get it in their society."

"We understand that real psyops are not what we say but what we do, and God help us if the two are different. The people of Hattin now understand that we are not there to change the way they live, or to make them live by our rules. Hattin is a fundamentalist Islamic city, and some of their practices bother us. But this is their country, not ours. I've had signs put up in all our buildings, in Arabic and in English, that say, 'When in Inshallahland, do as the Inshallans do.' We go out of our way to make it clear that we do not see our way of life as superior to theirs. We are not somehow 'better' than they are. In cultures like this one, honor and pride are very important. If we seem to lord it over them, they have to fight us because their honor demands it."

"Stop for one minute, Colonel," interrupted the Gâ ‘3 ­ "We have similar humanitarian assistance programs as part of Operation Goliath. After we have secured a town, we bring in NGOs too. Do you know what the insurgents do to them? They capture them, hold them for ransom and then cut their heads off! Are you telling me that does not happen in Hattin?â ?

"Well, that brings us to the next level," replied Lt. Col. Burke. "Life is harder for insurgents in Hattin than in the towns where Operation Goliath has left its heavy footprint. It is easy for insurgents in your towns to gain the people's support because Operation Goliath has made Americans hated, hated bad enough that lots of people want to see them killed. That is not true in Hattin. Why would people want to capture aid workers when they are just helping?"

"You are not answering my question," barked the Gâ ‘3. "Have any of your aid workers been captured?â ?

"Yes. Unfortunately, there will always be some people that we refer to as 'bad apples.' Operation David has kept their number small, but they exist. We have to deal with them in a very different way. We have to capture or kill them."

"That's no different from what we do," said the Gâ ‘3.

"Yes it is, because how we do it is different," Burke replied. "We never do cordonâ ‘andâ ‘ search. We never kick down doors. We never terrorize civilians or call in heavy firepower. If we have to take someone out, our preferred option is to take out a contract on them. Locals do the dirty work, and we leave no American fingerprints."

"If there is an insurgent cell that is too tough for locals to handle, we send in our Nighthunters, our equivalent to Delta Force. They are experts in lowâ ‘impact combat. They specialize in being invisible. Local citizens never see them or deal with them. That enables us to keep the locals from seeing the average American soldier as a threat. Our cops put the Nighthunter concept together. It is like a SWAT team. People don't confuse SWAT with their local cop on the beat. Every time we've had an aid worker taken hostage, the Nighthunters have rescued them within 24 hours.â ?

â Å“Lt. Col. Burke, I'm the PAO on the 13th Armored Division staff,â ? said a reservist. â Å“How are you working the press problem in Operation David?â ?

â Å“By playing one media operation off against others,â ? Lt. Col. Burke replied. â Å“I thought from the beginning that we would get favorable media coverage of what we are doing in Hattin, and on the whole I've been right. 90% of what we do is open to any reporter who wants to come along. That includes al Jazeera.â ?

â Å“Just once, early on, al Jazeera did an unfair and inaccurate story on one of our operations. In response, instead of kicking them out of Hattin, I invited al Arabiya in. I knew they were competitors. I encouraged al Arabiya to do an investigative report on the operation al Jazeera had portrayed negatively, and I opened all our records up to them. Their report showed that al Jazeera had been wrong. Since then, al Jazeera has been very careful to get their facts right in Hattin. And that's all I ask. If we do something wrong and they report it, that's our fault, not theirs.â ?

"It sounds to me as if Operation David requires superb local intelligence," General Forrest said. "How do you obtain that intelligence?"

"The same way cops do, by talking to the local people all the time," Lt. Col. Burke answered. "Remember, we haven't made ourselves hated. We buy from locals all the time. Good customers become friends, and friends pass information to other friends."

"The real problem is the language barrier. We've worked on that a number of ways. Of course, we've hired as many locals as interpreters as we can. I have them give classes each day to all my troops, so they learn at least some phrases and common courtesies in the local language. Each of my men has a pack of flash cards with basic phrases in English and Arabic, the Arabic spelled phonetically and also in script. If he can't say it right, he can point."

"Again, our Guardsmen have been a tremendous help. They come from Cleveland, Ohio, which has a large Arabicâ ‘speaking population. With the support of and funding from the State of Ohio, when they knew they were deploying here, they offered special oneâ ‘tour enlistment packages, with big bonuses, to anyone in Cleveland who could speak Arabic. It didn't matter how old they were, there was no PFT, all they wanted was translators who they knew would be loyal to us. Those guys are terrific."

"Finally, I've told the locals that anyone who works for us will be eligible for a Green Card when American forces leave Inshallahland. Frankly, General, I've gone out on a limb here. That promise has done more than anything else to give us the language capability we need, but I don't know how I am going to keep it.â ?

"Let me work on that one," replied General Forrest. "I think that is a great idea, and I have some friends back in Washington who may be able to help us do that."
The Division Gâ ‘2 had been listening intently to the discussion. "Have any of our intelligence systems been useful to you, Colonel?" he asked Burke.

"Yes and no," Burke replied. "I have to say that virtually all the intel we've received from higher has been either too late or wrong or both."

"That's no surprise to me," replied the Gâ ‘2. "Our systems were all designed to collect and analyze data on other state militaries. What are our satellites supposed to do in this kind of war, watch a twelveâ ‘year old boy pick up a stone?"

"But we have used technology effectively on the local level,â ? Burke continued. â Å“ We use our superb night vision capability to cover virtually all of Hattin at night. I have night OP's everywhere. With rare exceptions, all they do is observe and note patterns. We don't hassle people for being on the street at night. As any cop will tell you, safe streets have people on them, day and night. It is empty streets that are dangerous. If my guys see something going down, it's usually street crime, so they call the local cops. Of course, the locals know we are doing this -- the locals know everything we do, often before I know it â ‘â ‘ but because we don't hassle them, it's OK. Remember, they want safety and order."

"We have also emplaced small, camouflaged cameras and listening devices in some key places. I'd rather not go into too much detail as to how many and where. But I can say that there aren't many phone conversations in Hattin, or meetings in large spaces, that we are not aware of. All this information is available to any of my leaders who want it, right down to the squad level. It is an openâ ‘architecture intel system. We do not hoard intelligence in my HQ. I'm not a dragon who wants to sleep on a pile of gold."

The Gâ ‘2 smiled. "If I could trade my eagles for captain's bars, I think I'd enjoy being your Sâ ‘2," he said.

"Why don't you do that?â ? asked General Forrest. "See how they are making it work, then come back here and try to do the same thing for me.â ?

â Å“Roger that, sirâ ? said the Gâ ‘2. "Gee, I'll really miss all my computers. I might even get to see the sun."

"You are welcome to come back with me and stay as long as you want," Burke said to the Gâ ‘2. "Just be aware that our intel system, like everything else, is a flat network, not a hierarchy. My units pass intel laterally and down, not just up a chain. It's like Germanâ ‘style armor tactics, in that we are more reconnaissanceâ ‘driven than intelâ ‘driven."

"That's how the tactical level has to work," said the Gâ ‘2.

"Can you give me an example?" asked General Forrest.

"Easily, sir,â ? Burke replied. "Let me come back to the Gâ ‘3's question about kidnapping. The first time that happened, we immediately tapped our whole human intel network. The main way we did that was by having our guys go to the cafes and tea rooms and put out the word, which included a lot of cash for intel that proved good. Then I gathered all our squad and platoon leaders and asked them to game the situation. In a matter of hours we were sure we had the location, and when the Nighthunters went in, we were spot on. Of course, the fact that we were able to do that and do it fast sent a message to the insurgents and to the whole town, so the rescue had strategic as well as tactical meaning. It played on the physical and mental levels of war, and I think perhaps on the moral level as well, because even though we had to use violence no innocents were harmed. In fact, as is usually the case in Nighthunter ops, no one was killed."

"You didn't kill the enemy?" the Gâ ‘3 interjected.

"No, sir, we try not to. Sometimes we can't avoid it, but in a clan and tribeâ ‘based society like this one, if you kill somebody you have a blood feud with his relatives. Because the insurgents don't have gas masks, the Nighthunters usually flood the place with CS, then just walk in and round people up. We treat all the captives with respect, and when we do kill someone, we pay blood money to his family, clan and tribe. Remember, sir, we are always trying to deâ ‘escalate, not to escalate. We don't want to create martyrs for the other side."

"Of course, there are situations where we do want bloodshed. We constantly try to identify factional divisions among the insurgents. When we find one, we try to escalate it, to ramp up friction within the other side. We use lies and deceptions to bring one faction to the point where it wants to whack another, then we find discreet ways to help them do that. We do it in such a way that they all start blaming each other. Often, the insurgents do our most difficult jobs for us, killing their own leaders out of fear of being stabbed in the back. Remember, this isn't a culture that has much trust in it,"

"One time, we planted someone to get kidnapped. He was a Nighthunter disguised as an NGO worker. We had implanted a tracking device in his body. During his captivity he was able to learn a lot about our enemies. It was easy to rescue him because we knew exactly where he was."

"We often spot people who are trying to bring weapons into Hattin or hide them there. We do not interrupt those operations. We don't try to capture or destroy those weapons. Instead, one of our Guardsmen knew of some stuff we could spray on their ammunition that they would not readily notice but would cause it to jam in the weapon. I had cases of the stuff in spray cans shipped in from Cleveland. We sneak in and spray their ammo stocks, then when they try something, their weapons don't work. That really undercuts their morale. If we seized or blew up their weapons, they could fight us by bringing in more or learning to hide them better. But they can't fight us because they don't know what we are doing. Their operations fall apart and they don't know why."

"They cannot ambush us because we follow no predictable patterns. They cannot surprise us because we are always watching, and they don't know when or where they are being watched. They cannot fight back without alienating their own people. All they see is the smiling faces of my men, who have now become part of their neighborhoods and communities."

â Å“Anyway sir, that's operation David. It's working in Hattin and in the rest of my sector. All I'm asking, sir, is please don't destroy everything we've worked so hard to build by having Goliath stomp on Hattin. There are plenty of other towns out there to wreck. Let Goliath go somewhere else."

"Well, Colonel, I think that is a reasonable request," said General Forrest. "I can tell you where Operation Goliath is going next. It is going in the wastebasket. Colonel Burke, I suspect Operation David could continue in Hattin without you for a while."

"Yes, sir, it could," Burke replied. "I didn't create Operation David and I don't run it. My men created it and they run it.â ?

"Good, because I want you to come here, take over the Gâ ‘3 shop for a while and expand Operation David to the whole 13th Armored Division. Can you do that?"
Lt. Col. Burke thought for a few moments. "I think so, sir, if you will allow the men in the other battalions to do what mine have done."

"I will," said the general. "Meanwhile, I would like to ask my Gâ ‘3 to go back to Hattin with your battalion, as an observer.

"Aye, aye, sir," responded the Gâ ‘3, with a distinct lack of enthusiasm. He sensed that his moment might have come, and gone.

"One final request, Colonel Burke," said General Forrest. "Do you think you might present the division's Operation David to me without Power Point?"

"Yes, sir!" said Burke, grinning. "With your permission, I'd like to do with the division's Power Point stuff what I did with my battalion's."

"What is that, Colonel?â ? General Forrest asked.

"I let the insurgents capture it. It's slowed their OODA Loop down to a crawl."

"Another good idea, Colonel," Forrest replied. "I always knew Power Point would be useful for something."
 
Which is exactly what ODA's do.

The setting used is remarkable to what has happened in certain sectors in Iraq - areas where the ODA's have been able to get out and active in the communities and have LIGHT Inf patrols interact witht he locals have a MARKED decrease in hostile activity.

The ones running Bradley's and Abrams around are MUCH less effective -- I might parallel using LAV's and Coyote's in Afghan...
 
To clarify, my ideas aren't looking to rebuild the Light Infantry in the image of the USSF, rather to look to a new paradigm for fighting (and thus organizing and training) to win in an asymmetrical, unconventional environment.  It is acknowledged that Light Forces shall excel in complex environments - environments with complex physical terrain, complex human terrain, and complex informational terrain and this is what any ideas would be working towards.

Arthur's "Recce" model seems to be the right direction to look at (or as Kevin called it, "Ranger") - take for instance the focus on austerity; could a Light Force company group more efficiently "stalk/kill" the bad guys in the mountains if it packed a small mule-train and went on a strict logistical austerity principle rather than depending on loud, vulnerable, resource-demanding, large-footprint creating helicopters to air-assault them in and out and provide supplies?

Just one of the examples I am thinking of when considering how to "out G the G".  Of course, this is nothing new, one only has to look to the USMC Small Wars Manual to figure out much of this stuff.
 
True - but the SF is A template that encompasses all of what you've mentioned.

IF we break it down to low section/det/brick level we need a number of specialties to make decentralization feasible.

 
Lots to think about here. The "Nighthunters" in the story sound a lot like what I was thinking of, the locals and enemies should not be aware of their presence until a round (or a HELLFIRE) passes through a target's head.

Conceptually, I might segment the "Operation David" model a bit more; the town is specifically "occupied" by a "Town commander" leading CIMIC teams coordinating with local authorities and NGOs (and concealing HUMINT and PSYOPS assets as well), with a conventional QRF force known to be in the region (sometimes, even with the best intentions, things will go wrong); while the Light Infantry force conducts patrols around the region, looking for infiltration routes, arms and equipment caches, staging areas and so on. In day to day ops they also keep in contact with the "town commanders", who pass on intelligence about locals, suspects and so on. They would also work to interdict the outside support for the enemy, so Light Infantry companies would be very active in the border areas of Iraq and Syria, Iran and Saudi Arabia in today's context. Most arms smugglers are in it for the cash, and might not be so inclined to do business if they are suddenly being gunned down.

The QRF force supplies the extra firepower the Light Infantry cannot carry, and need not even be an Army unit, a warship cruising off the coast in range of Naval gunfire might do just fine, or a direct line to orbiting aircraft. An Artillery unit with "smart" rounds is another possibility.

Perhaps our little task force should examine the what and whys before getting into the "we need 6.45 men per brick, each one who can speak Farsi and 2.2 regional dialects arguments  :D
 
I do agree with most of what has been dicsussed here, and have read it with fascination. If I may, allow me a couple of comments. First, animal transport has some good and some not so good points. After all, you can always eat the vehicles. However, animals are prone to sickness, need a lot of care and are relatively inefficient load carriers. I think one horse or mule can carry 30 days worth of animal feed. At least that was the Boer War figure. Perhaps there has been a breakthrough in horse IMPs.

Second, ref A_Majoor's comments about naval gunfire, orbiting air or artillery precision guided munitions. All are very weather and terrain dependent and may not be available. Check the artillery forum for a post by Observer 23 re te last weapon.

Has any studied Captain Emmett Crawford's force which eventually ran Geronimo down circa 1885? It is well worth examining.
 
Inf, what you are envisioning seems to me, to be a LOT like the US SF and the UK's SAS. In fact, it seems to BE the SF and the SAS.
 
paracowboy said:
Inf, what you are envisioning seems to me, to be a LOT like the US SF and the UK's SAS. In fact, it seems to BE the SF and the SAS.

I agree with you there Para, but in my mind whats wrong with a US SF/UK SAS unit here in Canada? Leave the JTF at what they were created for in the black role and stand up green SOF/LIB unit. Keep talking Inf I think you won yourself a supporter of your idea in me  ;D
 
HitorMiss said:
I agree with you there Para, but in my mind whats wrong with a US SF/UK SAS unit here in Canada?
absolutely nothing. I've been saying we need one for years. What I'm pointing out to Infy, is that he's trying to re-invent the wheel, and could save himself a lot of time and effort by blatantly ripping off the afore-mentioned units.

By the way, he loves it when you call him "Infy".
 
Well now that we got that out of the way..."Infy" the stage is your please pontificate upon us with your massive brain LOL.
 
paracowboy said:
Inf, what you are envisioning seems to me, to be a LOT like the US SF and the UK's SAS. In fact, it seems to BE the SF and the SAS.

Perhaps - what I'm dancing around is that we don't need to turn the Light Forces into 12 man ODAs, but rather that some of the capabilities being done by SOC units are probably worth "transferring" onto our more conventional units (the LIB's).  This movement of "special" tasks to conventional units would be inline with a historical trend over the last couple hundred years, starting from when Riflemen went ahead of the line to skirmish (I loved reading Rifleman Dodd).

Just building off of the discussion of topic covered in the original link for the sake of yakking,

Infy
 
could a Light Force company group more efficiently "stalk/kill" the bad guys in the mountains if it packed a small mule-train and went on a strict logistical austerity principle

Sounds a lot like Wingate's first Chindit expedition against the Japanese in 1943...sorry I couldn't resist the historical analogy - please carry on,

cheers, mdh
 
I think this is where we are currently heading with the LI-SOC BN's...

Give it a few years.
 
Infanteer said:
Perhaps - what I'm dancing around is that we don't need to turn the Light Forces into 12 man ODAs, but rather that some of the capabilities being done by SOC units are probably worth "transferring" onto our more conventional units (the LIB's).  
no, we certainly don't need to turn ourselves into carbon copies of either the 12 man A Team (they love it when you still use that term), or the however-many Squadron. But, by taking their skills sets and teaching them to our lightfighters, adding Jimmies, Echo, medics, and making them integral to the section level, we accomplish very much the same aim. Which is, I believe your point. And is also what we have been doing at the 2 different light infantry units I've played in. I think that many of your ideas have actually been happening in both 3 Chicken and 3 Pickle, just not in any sort of official, "now you troops try this, straight from NDHQ" capacity. More at the "Hey Boss, what if we did it this way, it's how the Brits did it in Basra, and I think we can make it work", level. Followed by the "Wow, I can't believe it worked. Maybe you should write that up and submit it to the CO".
This movement of "special" tasks to conventional units would be inline with a historical trend over the last couple hundred years, starting from when Riflemen went ahead of the line to skirmish
so, I think this is happening, both officially, and more quickly, unofficially.
(I loved reading Rifleman Dodd).
sorry, ya lost me.
 
mdh said:
Sounds a lot like Wingate's first Chindit expedition against the Japanese in 1943...sorry I couldn't resist the historical analogy - please carry on,

...and we know he was a hit in the Officer's Mess.... :)

paracowboy said:
no, we certainly don't need to turn ourselves into carbon copies of either the 12 man A Team (they love it when you still use that term), or the however-many Squadron. But, by taking their skills sets and teaching them to our lightfighters, adding Jimmies, Echo, medics, and making them integral to the section level, we accomplish very much the same aim. Which is, I believe your point. And is also what we have been doing at the 2 different light infantry units I've played in. I think that many of your ideas have actually been happening in both 3 Chicken and 3 Pickle, just not in any sort of official, "now you troops try this, straight from NDHQ" capacity. More at the "Hey Boss, what if we did it this way, it's how the Brits did it in Basra, and I think we can make it work", level. Followed by the "Wow, I can't believe it worked. Maybe you should write that up and submit it to the CO".  so, I think this is happening, both officially, and more quickly, unofficially.

Sounds good, I look forward to riding a horse into battle one day.... :warstory:

sorry, ya lost me.

I think you'd like it.
 
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