Light Infantry - a definition, roles, requirements, capabilities, and a vision for the future

[paracowboy]

Sounds good, I look forward to riding a horse into battle one day....

I start every attack by adrepping a cattle stampede. Got it from a WO. His logic was impeccable: "Always worked for John Wayne."

 

[Bartok5]

"Roll'in roll'in roll'in, though them streams are swollen, keep them doggies roll'in, rawhiiiiiide".....

I'm with Paracowboy - This light infantry stuff ain't frigging rocket-science.  Soldier as hard as you can in all facets of the job, inculcate initiative, and encourage everyone to "step up" (with appropriate mentorship) whenever the opportunity presents itelf.  Do that, challenge each other, explore every tactical situation for a new way of doing business (where possible), and above all - have fun soldiering. 

If you can do all of the above?  My own humble experience suggests that everything good will follow.....

 

[a_majoor]

"Roll'in roll'in roll'in, though them streams are swollen, keep them doggies roll'in, rawhiiiiiide".....

I'm with Paracowboy - This light infantry stuff ain't frigging rocket-science.  Soldier as hard as you can in all facets of the job, inculcate initiative, and encourage everyone to "step up" (with appropriate mentorship) whenever the opportunity presents itelf.  Do that, challenge each other, explore every tactical situation for a new way of doing business (where possible), and above all - have fun soldiering. 

If you can do all of the above?  My own humble experience suggests that everything good will follow.....

Any openings in your unit?

Everyone has zeroed in on the obvious: we really are talking about the SAS in the "Green" role. Slipping into an area, dropping the rucks in a central patrol hide, meeting and working with the natives, this is right out of the Borneo and Yemen campaigns. I suppose we can put together pages of arguments on the pros and cons of using terms like "section" or "brick", I would be satisfied with a straight 1:1 convergence between an SAS squadron and a Light Infantry company.

PPCLI Guy made the most pertanent remark in the first page of this thread, highlighting the idea that if we only need a discontinuous dominance of limited areas, then the company organization is sufficient at the tactical level (or words to that effect). So the question becomes; what about higher formations, and what about operational and strategic issues with using light Infantry?

 

[McG]

Uhhh.....how do I vote for "all of the above", with the requisite resources to do so?   Because that is truly the range of capabilities that I believe our light forces ought to be capable of....  

I've changed the poll to give you that option, but I think it falls short of reflecting the full dynamic of light infantry.

In light of recent guidance by the CDS what do you think for the roles of our 3 LIB's.

You may need add some depth to your vision of light forces while revisting your question.

According to the Light Forces Working Group light forces are principally foot borne forces optimized for military operations in complex environment, rapidly deployable through a variety of means, yet not tied to any one platform.

All Arms Light Forces

 

[McG]

Everyone has zeroed in on the obvious: we really are talking about the SAS in the "Green" role.

Is this not the sphere of the JTF2?  If we want a model for our light forces, should we not be looking more to USMC MEU-SOC, US Rangers, the Brit Paras, or our former Airborne Regiment?

 

[KevinB]

I think it is too hard to differentiate roles between Tier1 and their support (the LI-SOC unit)

Some missions (eg SR in the green role) could be done by either or a mixture.

Personally I'd rather see an integration of JTF operational squadrons with LI-SOC BN's
You could have 3 comapnies to a squadron - and mix and match deployment setups for the role required.

I THINK we should create ODA's capability organically in the Joint LI-SOC-SF BN
(taken from Global security - it does mesh 100% with how buddies have described their team (and I know WO's who ran teams during Officer shortages)

ODA "A-Team" Structure
A captain leads the 12-man team. Second in command is a warrant officer. Two noncommissioned officers, or NCOs, trained in each of the five SF functional areas: weapons, engineer, medical, communications, and operations and intelligence comprise the remainder of the team. All team members are SF qualified and cross-trained in different skills, as well as being multi-lingual.

DETACHMENT COMMANDER
(1 per "A Team")
Rank: 0-3, Captain
First In Command. The Detachment Commander is responsible for ensuring and maintaining the operational readiness and all other aspects of the A-Team. He may command or advise an indigenous combat force up to battalion size.

DETACHMENT TECHNICIAN
(1 per "A-Team")
Rank: W0-1 & up
He commands in the absence of the detachment commander; serves as technical and tactical authority in all aspects of Special Forces operations; supervises all staff activities; is the psychological operations (PSYOPs) and Civil Affairs authority; has cultural, regional, and linguistic abilities; manages the mid-term and long-term planning. He can recruit, organize, train, and supervise indigenous combat forces up to battalion size.

18 Zulu - SPECIAL FORCES OPERATIONS SERGEANT
(1 per "A Team")
Team Sergeant (Rank: E-8, Master Sergeant)
The Team Sergeant is the senior enlisted man on the Team. He is responsible for overseeing all Team operations and managing all enlisted personnel on the Team. Sometimes known as the "Team Daddy", he is usually the person who actually runs the Team. He can recruit, organize, train, and supervise indigenous combat forces up to battalion size.

18 Fox - ASSISTANT OPERATIONS SERGEANT
(1 per "A Team")
O&I Sergeant (Rank: E-7, Sergeant First Class)
Assists the Team Sergeant in operating the Team. Plans, coordinates, and directs the A-Team's intelligence, collection, analysis, production and dissemination. He field interrogates and processes enemy prisoners of war. He briefs and debriefs friendly patrols. He can train, advise, or lead indigenous combat forces up to company size.

18 Bravo - SPECIAL FORCES WEAPONS SERGEANT
(2 per "A Team")
Weapons Sergeant (Rank: E-7, Sergeant First Class)
Asst. Weapons Sergeant (Rank: E-6, Staff Sergeant)
The weapons experts. Capable of firing and employing nearly every small arm and crew served weapon in the world; such as pistols, rifles, machine guns, mortars, anti-tank guns, and grenade launchers. They also train detachment members and indigenous combat forces in the use of these weapons. The two weapons sergeants employ conventional and unconventional tactics and techniques as tactical mission leaders. They are responsible for the tactical security of the A-Team. Each can train, advise, or lead indigenous combat forces up to company size.

18 Charlie - SPECIAL FORCES ENGINEER SERGEANT
(2 per "A Team)
Engineer Sergeant (Rank: E-7, Sergeant First Class)
Asst. Engineer Sergeant (Rank: E-6, Staff Sergeant)
The demolitions experts. He can build as well as destroy almost any structure. The SF "Demo Man" is capable of constructing everything from an outhouse to a schoolhouse. A key player in any civic action mission. Each can train, advise, or lead indigenous combat forces up to company size.

18 Delta - SPECIAL FORCES MEDICAL SERGEANT
(2 per "A Team")
Medical Sergeant (Rank: E-7, Sergeant First Class)
Asst. Medical Sergeant (Rank: E-6, Staff Sergeant)
The life-saver. Not your average "medic". The SF medic employs the latest in field medical technology and limited surgical procedures. He is capable of managing any battlefield trauma injury, as well as administering preventative medicine. The SF Medic is in an integral part of civic action programs in bringing medical treatment to native populations. SF medics also become "paramedics" upon completion of their SF medical training. Their capabilities include: Advanced Trauma Life Support, limited surgery, dentistry, and even veterinarian procedures. Each can train, advise, or lead indigenous combat forces up to company size.

18 Echo - SPECIAL FORCES COMMUNICATIONS SERGEANT
(2 per "A Team")
Communications Sergeant (Rank: E-7, Sergeant First Class)
Asst. Communications Sergeant (Rank: E-6, Staff Sergeant)
The "Commo Guy" - The lifeline. His responsibility is to establish and maintain communications. He employs the latest FM, multi-channel, and satellite communications devices (he also carries the heaviest rucksack on the Team). The SF Commo sergeant is an invaluable and vital part of all SF missions. Each can train, advise, or lead indigenous combat forces up to company size.

Despite Globals fluff - it is a capabiltiity that we need to have, 

 

[McG]

KevinB,
100% agreement on the need for inter-operability, integrated trg, and permanent affiliations between SF elements and the LiFor-SOC elements that support them.

 

[DELTADOG13]

Most of the jobs and capabilities are already found in most LI officers and NCO's. When we deployed to TF Phoenix on Op Athena Roto 0 we pretty much had most of these capabilities covered off. We however didn't have alot of scope to split the team. We had a Cpl medic, a Signals WO(also a Humint Op), 2 Arty NCO's and alot of Inf O and NCO's with varied backgrounds. We could have used an Engr however they are in high demand and could not be spared. This has since been rectified. the team has since been cut about 14 to reflect there new role. I don't believe we need to have A teams ready to deploy as so far we have been able to gather, train and deploy with a minimum of fuss. if we go back to training an Indiginious force again then scope of training time and abilities need to be extended. Our experiences proved on short notice we could perform to completion the only combat op that ETT's have participated.

My two cents!

waiting for rebuttal................

 

[DELTADOG13]

Sorry about that guys it was late. I should have stated what has been corrected. Thanks and I will try not to make stupid surveys again.

 

[DELTADOG13]

................. No rebuttal yet so I will add some more on LI SOC.
i believe the people with gold on their shoulders are trying to make what we pretty much do all the time into doctrine. I believe the way ahead has been proven by other nations actually in the arena. We need to take what they have learned and put our  spin on things. Such as LI bn becoming truly SO capable. With current trends a whole bn needs to be alotted to this task and all LIB need to be on line for org and manning as we may have to rotate for tours and potential ops. Most LIB's have been feeding the boys in black anyways. our methods of delivery(Para/Helo/Boat/Fastcast/Oversnow or TALO/etc) and inherent skills(AMO/PPF/UOpsI/RM/etc). In order for us to truly realise this we need to get off the tasking brick so we can train and get back our fitness. increase the units qual's in all areas, formalise our TO&E, train with the people we are supposed to support and find out what roles and tasks we are to fullfill.
Most of the tasks in the SOC community can be filled by regular LI pers. CIMIC/PSYOPS/HUMINT have been either given to the reserves or indiv augmentees for deployment. These could be better defined by LFWG or disregarded for the SOC unit.
DA/SR/Tac Cordons/etc tasks can be and have been already carried out by LI pers.
Other Tasks defined by the boys in black could also be carried out as long as the LI pers were trained for it.

my two cents

 

[KevinB]

I think it is too hard to differentiate roles between Tier1 and their support (the LI-SOC unit)

Some missions (eg SR in the green role) could be done by either or a mixture.

Personally I'd rather see an integration of JTF operational squadrons with LI-SOC BN's
You could have 3 comapnies to a squadron - and mix and match deployment setups for the role required.

I THINK we should create ODA's capability organically in the Joint LI-SOC-SF BN
(taken from Global security - it does NOT mesh 100% with how buddies have described their team (and I know WO's who ran teams during Officer shortages) but it close enought for gov't work.
Despite Globals fluff - it is a capabiltiity that we need to have,  

 

[a_majoor]

Our old friend Kirkhill (where is he now, I wonder?) had an interesting article posted on the "Infantry of Tomorrow" thread which ties into what is being said here. The article and my take on it are here:

http://forums.army.ca/forums/threads/23394/post-152788.html#msg152788.

I wonder just how "Special Forces" the true LI needs to be. The examples of the SAS in Borneo and Yemen are more "Infantry plus", extended patrolling was the core of the mission, and "Chesty" Puller was doing the same thing in Central America in the 1920s. Having language specialists, medical trained personell and so on is a potent force multiplier, but as the Marines demonstrated in the Banana Wars, not absolutely necessary.

The linked article also highlights the exploits of a National Guard unit, which suggests these capabilities do not require supermen to achieve, simply a high level of training and a focus on the units mission (I doubt anyone in the 173rd Long Range Surveillance Detachment would ever seriously consider a "Ranger" style assault on an enemy position).

They would certainly be able to work on their own in a discontinuous environment, supplying local domination against enemies in a low or even medium level environment so long as they had direct access to more potent firepower (either a QRF, orbiting airpower, artillery fire or some combination of means), and would certainly give the "true" SOF units more flexibility, either as direct support or keeping the enemy disoriented so the SOF can seek out and attack key players or nodes of the enemy operation. Even in high intensity operations, they can provide the long range recce, or rear area security (depending on the circumstances), and be a potent force multiplier in all situations.

 

[tomahawk6]

Military organizations require balance between its light, medium and heavy forces. Too much of a tilt in one direction might make your force unsuitable for a particular combat environment. As our smaller allies are reducing the size of their standing forces maintaining balance is even harder, unless you balance short comings in the standing force with additional capability in the reserve force. For example, if Canada due to budget considerations decide [as they have] to eliminate its heavy force then this capability should be incorporated in the reserve force. Similarly if the active force decides to eliminate its light force then this capability must be maintained in the reserve forces.

That said I think there is some confusion what light forces are and what special forces are. Some want to equate light infantry with some kind of special operations force. The mission and training determine the difference between special forces and light forces. A true light infantry force has minimal vehicles usually Hummer type vehicles and perhaps enough trucks to support the battalion. A light infantry force is suitable for jungle/mountain operations but not an environment with MBT's.

A US Ranger battalion is capable of seizing an airhead ahead of the main force. A US light infantry battalion could be a follow on force after an airfield has been taken but is not suitable for performing the seizure due to its lack of airborne capability. US light infantry battalions [or company] could perform a C-130 assault landing but lets face it an Entebbe style op is very tricky and requires luck and preparation. Much better to drop in special ops forces to clear the airfield then bring in the C-130's. A US ODA is designed to work with indigent forces either as a whole or by splitting the ODA into 2 elements. The ODA is not equivalent to an infantry squad because its mission is quite different.

The UK recently decided to convert a para battalion into a special operations force designed to support the SAS. Australia
has done this as well. I think both countries plan to use these battalions like we use a Ranger battalion. Once again the difference is training/mission and the quality of personnel. Ranger training is demanding and isnt for everyone. But all infantrymen should be able to be trained as light infantry. US airborne training is tough but the Ranger battalion training is anotch higher. Not all paratroopers are suitable to be a Ranger. Those that can cut the training and love the tempo serve in the Ranger battalions.

I think the best light infantry battalion organization has an airborne company as part of its TO&E. This gives the commander an added dimension for performing any assigned mission. Within the US Army there are enough aviation assets
to support light infantry operations, but this is generally not true in allied armies. Helicopter's give the light infantry great mobility and reach. Any modernization of the Land Force should include closing this gap in CF capability.

 

[Kirkhill]

I wonder just how "Special Forces" the true LI needs to be. The examples of the SAS in Borneo and Yemen are more "Infantry plus", extended patrolling was the core of the mission, and "Chesty" Puller was doing the same thing in Central America in the 1920s. Having language specialists, medical trained personell and so on is a potent force multiplier, but as the Marines demonstrated in the Banana Wars, not absolutely necessary.

He's here, much to your everlasting regret no doubt.

I am of the school that believes that infantry are first and foremost "light" infantry, not panzergrenadiers and not super secret commandos.  They have their place and are necessary on the field of battle but the real shortage seems to be the man/woman in muddy boots with rifle capable of fitting into any organization and fulfilling any task. 

I was interested in mdh's aside about the Chindits.  Curious fact about the Chindits is that they were a one trick pony.  They went in too light, with too little support and stayed too long.  Those troops that came out of the jungle were so used up they were useless for the rest of the duration.  By contrast the regular army divisions that followed them had much greater success.

Four really good sources are:

Field Marshall Slim - Defeat into Victory: Battling Japan in Burma and India (Excellent - the commander of 14th Army in Burma and no fan of Special Forces)
E.D. Smith - Battle for Burma (Fair)
John Masters - Brigade Major (Excellent - lost my copy but Masters - author of Man of War an all time favourite of mine - was Brigade Major for a Gurkha Brigade in the Jungle with Mules post Chindits)
George MacDonald Fraser - Quartered Safe Out Here: A Recollection of the War in Burma (A great first hand account of the campaign from the point of view of a private)

Fraser (Author of the Flashman and MacAuslan books) served in Burma as a private in the Borderers before going on to get his commission and serving in Palestine with the Gordons after the war.

Here are some of his observations on necessary kit (he describes himself as a reactionary )

".....Burma was a barebones war; in many ways we were like soldiers of the last century in that our arms and equipment were of the simplest; it was so because it was largely a close-contact, hand-to-hand war in which, while tanks and aircraft and artillery played an important part, it was first and foremost AN INFANTRYMAN'S BUSINESS (emphasis added CJP), and actions tended to be on a small scale compared with the battles in Europe.  By today's standards we were sparsely equipped.  Thank God."

I'll summarize his full kit list:

2 Shirts
2 pr Trousers
1 pr Puttees (protect legs from leaches and "other crawlies"
1 pr Boots (Brit or captured Japanese with crepe rubber soles)
1 Bush Hat (light, sun protection, water scoop - no tin helmets worn)

Standard web gear - cross braces with two pouches in the front (contents to follow)
                          - small pack - 2 mess tins
                                              1 one pint tea/shaving mug
                                              KFS
                                              Housewife with needle and thread
                                              Water Purification Pills
                                              Mepacrin (anti-malarial - didn't work)
                                              Personal Effects and Rations
                          - one pint water bottle,
                          - entrenching tool (pick axe with a mattock head and a detachable handle - the end that went into the head was steel shod the resulting two foot weighted club, I am                     
                            reliably informed, was ideal for crowd control and clearing recalcitrant passengers from the holds of ships with cargoes of illegal immigrants - but back to Fraser's list)
                          - a log line (5 yards or 5m of thin rope - if this follows the custom of my father's regiment then there was a loop on one end and a toggle on the other so that all the lines in a section
                            or platoon could be quickly joined together to clear obstacles)
                          - 2 field dressings ( 1 issued for use - the other personally acquired as a sweat rag/kerchief)

Weapons - ".... a few Tommy guns (Thompson sub-machine guns)....none of the hate Stens, the plumber's nightmare....standard arm was the most beautiful firearm ever invented, the famous short Lee Enfield....."  Fraser's weapon, with which he seems well satisfied was a 30 year old WWI rifle (10 round magazine, 0.303 bolt action) complete with sword bayonet - in the book he describes how he had the option of a Thompson as section leader but preferred his SMLE - interesting choice considering the close terrain in which they operated - primary beneft? "...it never jammed"

"Nowadays the automatic rifle, and concentrated firepower are the thing, spraying rounds all over the place - which must give rise to hideous supply problems, I imagine.  We had it drummed into us that each round cost threepence (paratroopers got paid about 2 shillings and 6 pence a day or about 10 bullets if you like); "one bullet, one Jap" was proverbial, if obviously impractical.  I know I sound like a dinosaur, but I doubt if the standard of marksmanship is what it was - it can't be, except at short range -......"

Kirkhill commentary:  When 2 Para took Goose Green in the Falklands in 1982 there was some kerfuffle about the paras committing war-crimes because too many Argentinians died with wounds to the head.  It seems that the young conscripts in their round helmets skylined themselves over the lip of their trenches.  The paras picked them off with aimed fire.  Marksmanship and fire discipline still seem to have their place.  Iraq and Afghanistan examples abound I am sure.

Ammunition: 50 rounds in a cotton bandolier
                  2 36 grenades in one pouch on web gear
                  2 30 round magazines in the other pouch for the section Bren LMG (reliable and conserved ammunition but slow and too tight a pattern)


Other weapons: personally acquired Kukri (some carried machetes) and a Sikes-Fairbairn commando knife

Protection from the elements consisted of a blanket and a rubberized cape (think poncho and poncho-liner)

Final piece of kit - the prototype camel back - a canvas water bag known as a chaggle - used on long marches and on silent approaches - it didn't slosh

Fraser doesn't like the modern helmets - cramp movement, impairs hearing and vision, doesn't like modern loose fitting battle dress (snags too easily making too much noise) and "the poor infantryman is festooned with more kit than would start a Q.M. store.  I'm sure it's all necessary; I just can't think what for.....I'm old-fashioned and ignorant.....Perhaps if those who design the Army's equipment had to do (the job themselves), they'd come up with something better.

So there you have the kit of a well-satisfied jungle warrior - 1 bolt action rifle/pike with sword bayonet and 50 rounds,  2 grenades, 1 kukri utility knife, 1 fighting knife, 1 entrenching tool cum club, a change of clothes, a poncho and lots of water.  The other thing he doesn't mention but bears consideration is a good aerial resupply system -  the allies owned the skies over Burma and could resupply the troops on the ground by air.  Extraction was a problem with no helicopters but delivering supplies was relatively simple.

Light Infantry - lightly equipped, well supported, well supplied, well informed.

Comments specific to the Chindits "They took heavy casualties, and by the last year of the war few specialist units of this kind were being employed: there was certainly a strong feeling, said to be shared by Slim himself, that well-trained infantry could do anything that so-called elite or special troops could do, and that it was a waste of time and manpower to train units for particular tasks".


Slim's own comments echo this thinking: "...I came firmly to the conclusion that such formations, trained, equipped and mentally adjusted for one kind of operation only, were wasteful.  ....they attracted the best men.....lower(ing) the quality of the rest of the Army, especially of the infantry, not only by skimming the cream off it, but by encouraging the idea that certain of the normal operations of war were so difficult that only specially equipped corps d'elite could be expected to undertake them......another disadvantage - they can be employed actively only for restricted periods.  Then they demand to be taken out of the line to recuperate, while normal formations are expected to have no such limits to their employment.  In Burma, the time spent in action by special forces was only a fraction of that endured by the normal divisions, and it must be remembered that risk is danger multiplied by time."

Slim does allow as how Long Range Patrol types, small parties of men and women (Slim's word), operating behind or in proximity to enemy lines to supply recce and conduct sabotage. 

Beyond that the infanteer is a generalist with a rifle, capable of delivery by mule, truck, helicopter, parachute or boat, capable of working with or without tanks and APCs, in jungle, desert, arctic, mountain or urban environment,  killing, controlling, pacifying, assaulting or holding ground.

And if that isn't enough to keep your average new recruit interested perhaps he or she SHOULD join the Armoured Corps and become a panzergrenadier.

Cheers.

 

[a_majoor]

He's here, much to your everlasting regret no doubt.

Ambush Left! Charge!  ;D

Actually, you have brought the discussion back on track, I think. The opening post by Infanteer clearly stated the requirement to dump much of the non-essential gear as possible to improve the tactical mobility of the soldier (no longer a beast of burden after 2,500 years where the average load on a Western soldier was 30 Kg), and the concurrent increase in operational and strategic mobility by severing the long and heavy logistics tail.

The Burma campaign is not well known, so the observations about the type and amount of equipment carried by the soldier there was very interesting indeed (a sword bayonet!?). Since these were "regular" soldiers, and not in any way proto or pseudo special forces, then it suggests the ability to create light infantry forces is effectively unlimited.

What interests me is not so much the composition of these light forces (although I'm sure a comparison of "Chesty" Pullers Marines vs British soldiers in Burma would be interesting), but rather their employment. Is the Light Infantry Battalion a "Force Generator" or "Force Employer"? LI units cannot interface directly with mechanized formations due to speed, mobility and logistical issues, so how do they interact? What is the best way to transition an AOR form Mech to Light forces or Light to Mech, and so on.

 

[KevinB]

In some area - albiet not jungle or mountain - the Mech troops could be used as QRF for the light forces.  For "complex" terrain it is a an all light force role.

Question we get now is what is TOO LIGHT TO FIGHT?

Personally I think ALL Infantry should be Light - augmented with vehicle from Cavalry Units for certain missions and roles - which woudl allow the LI to fight seperate and the Cav to fight the vehicle with no dependance upon each other IF the situation demanded.

To muddy waters (need to be a Lightfighter member)
Sgt is a Sheik[url]

 

[McG]

That said I think there is some confusion what light forces are and what special forces are. Some want to equate light infantry with some kind of special operations force.

...  Ranger training is demanding and isnt for everyone. But all infantrymen should be able to be trained as light infantry.  ...

Generally, I think the distinction between li inf & SOC li inf is understood.  However, in the Canadian context, do we have enough manpower for both?  I think for many, the solution is to make the regular force li inf all SOC.  If a mbr of the infantry finds the Ranger style trg is not for him, he remains in the mech bns.

I'd previously addressed this same idea here: http://forums.army.ca/forums/threads/28736/post-238248.html#msg238248

 

[a_majoor]

Question we get now is what is TOO LIGHT TO FIGHT?

Kevin, you are probably the best person to take a crack at this question, since you apparently have an entire QM in your basement to experiment with  . Infanteer should also weigh in with the examples from the "Small Wars Manual", we will make allowances for extra IMPs for the mules.

Once we have an LI company organized and kitted out, we still need to find the best way to integrate it into the larger organization. Mechanized QRF is probably the most practical integration between the different natures of forces, but how would a TF be best organized to take advantage of the LI? Do we want to see an LI battlegroup for example?

 

[KevinB]

I'm the Light Heretic 

If it was me I'd also have a ATV or SUV... as well
Worst case we cant bring or use it - but a tool in the tool box approach.

I'll be sunning myself offline for the next week but I will give this some though.

 

[Kirkhill]

I agree with both McG and Kevin.  Leave the vehicle borne tactics to the Armoured Corps/Cavalry.  If Slim was so short of Infanteers in WWII with the whole of the Empire (including Indians, West Africans and others) that he felt he couldn't afford to create specialists how much more challenged is the Canadian army these days?  By allocating the mounted infantry role to the Armoured Corps that increases the number of "infanteers" available and increases the general utillity of the Armoured Corps.  The Cavalry could then indeed become the QRF for a deployed force.

The sword bayonet is shown below Arthur as is the entrenching tool handle - note the iron fitting at the head of the shaft the engages the mattock head.

http://arms2armor.com/Bayonets/brit1907.htm
http://blindkat.hegewisch.net/lrdg/knives.html

The bayonet is 21 inches overall, 17 inch blade, or just about the same length as a Roman Gladius, primary weapon of Caesar's legions.

It seems to me that these "obsolete weapons"  should be as familiar to a modern infantryman as the use of NVGs, GPS, LRF and Radio.

One of the maxims that I seem to remember picking up along the way was "The most powerful man on battlefield is the one with the radio". That seems to be truer today than ever. With a cell phone an otherwise unarmed infant can designate a target allowing massive destructive power to be applied within minutes, eliminating the target.  The infanteer doesn't need to carry massive amounts of ordnance if he/she can be assured of reliable, on-time, on-target delivery of an appropriate weight of high explosive geared to eliminating a threat.

However HE isn't the answer to all problems.  Just as the nuclear option was largely taken off the table by both public opinion and the fact that it created more damage than even the military found helpful so HE in a crowd, or for that matter even 5.56 mm in a crowd, is not a useful or acceptable option.  General Dyer found that out to his chagrin and shame at Amritsar in 1919. When confronted with a crowd of Sikhs seeking political action and becoming a threat to public order he chose to open fire and killed hundreds.  This did not pacify India.

I have no doubt that some days Kevin and his mates will be best able to do their jobs with a radio and "optronics" protected from threats by distance and concealment.  In such circumstances no armour and a C7 for personal defence are probably suitable to the task.  

At the other end of the spectrum he is likely to be confronting crowd control in the face not just of students with rocks and puppets, but also nasty folks with rifles firing from the middle of the crowd.  In Vancouver, for a fireworks display the police had to herd 200-300,000 people out of the city centre safely.  Some 100,000 attended the Pope's funeral recently and there was still room within St. Peter's square for more, an oval actually that seems to be 150 to 200 m across.  The prospect of people firing from the middle of such a mob - peaceful, angry or just outright panicked - must cause a few sleepless nights.  Might not such a situation be better managed by a large number of bodies in armour, with shields and entrenching tool handles, employing close order drill and backed by cavalry and snipers than a small number of bodies armed with rifles?

This certainly seemed the case recently in Edinburgh during the G8 summit.  I have lost the article but rioters were greeted by small bodies of police employing tactics that Caesar and Cromwell would both have recognized.  Form two's, form fours, open order march, left and right wheel, passage of cavalry, cavalry charge, foot charge, cavalry screen - you name it, they did it.  Apparently it worked.  Just as it worked for Caesar, the Greeks and countless others - discipline allowed a smaller force to impose its will on a larger, disorganized but aggressive mob.  In this instance with minimal casualties and little outcry from the press.

In between these two extremes are every other situation and combination of weapons and tactics - body armour and pistols with a sniper or even a "tack driver" of a machine gun like the Bren or the Brits much abused LSW might be appropriate for other situations.

The point is, I guess, that there are no "obsolete weapons or tactics".  If an army gears itself to fight and win one type of battle the enemy will resort to other tactics.  If the army has forgotten how to employ older tactics effectively then it leaves an opening for its enemies.  And it is easier to look up a history book for advice than it is to develop something new entirely.

The infanteer, the generalist, needs to be capable of adapting to the full spectrum of operations - especially where numbers and discipline still count over technology and numbers are in short supply.

The infanteer works on his/her feet and confronts people face to face - the most dangerous and unpredictable of situations, and completely unavoidable if order is to be imposed.

It seems to me that mastering the skills described above, from club and shield, through pistol and rifle, to radio and optronics, would result in a sufficiently full slate that there would be little time left to master "cavalry" skills as well.

But like Fraser, I am ignorant of many current realities.

Cheers.