Light Infantry - a definition, roles, requirements, capabilities, and a vision for the future

[a_majoor]

I am with Kirkhill most of the way here, Infantry soldiers should be adaptable to almost any task. My comment on the Sword Bayonet was prompted by the idea that sword bayonets had limited utility in WWI and I had thought they were withdrawn after that conflict. Using a 17" bayonet in the jungle seems like a recipe for trouble given the tight quarters in general (the same reason sword bayonets were a hindrance in WW I, not enough room in the trench.) Bayonets are still useful on the modern battlefield (or not, see the Equipment forum http://forums.army.ca/forums/threads/28762.0.html).

Light Infantry modeled after the 173rd Long Range Surveillance Detachment would have the ability to deal with threats in complex terrain such as the shooter concealed in a crowd scenario by virtue of the combination of recce training (to identify likely targets) and shooting skills (to deal with them by a quick "double tap" engagement). In my mind, I would see the crowd being confronted by the local police or perhaps a mech Cavalry unit, with the Light Infantry concealed in the rooftops scanning the crowd, providing situational awareness to the CCO QRF (also concealed behind a building or something) and other deployed units and prepared to identify and neutralize hostile targets. The Light Infantry company will be able to employ more shooters than a conventional unit with a sniper det, so even a large crowd becomes a more manageable problem.

The overlap of Light Infantry and dismounted cavalry is another interesting discussion (to differentiate the two I will use the term Dragoons for the dismounted element of the Cavalry Arm, although other terms like "Tank Marines" or "Panzergrenadier" could also be adopted if desired).  Dragoons will need infantry skills like patrolling and heavy weapons, and they will be in intimate support of their support weapons, so need the skills to call fire on the enemy not only by communicating with artillery or orbiting aircraft, but also directing fire via tank telephone or guiding engineer vehicles into position to reduce obstacles as well. You might make the case that it is the Dragoons who will have such a skill set and training load that they could not possibly convert to Light Infantry.

 

[Kirkhill]

Arthur, the thing about the crowd situation is surely to control the crowd as much as it is to eliminate shooter surely.  If an enemy shooter shoots first isn't the crowd likely to panic?  If "own force" shooter shoots first isn't the reaction the same?  Dropping a potential shooter with sound suppressed fire might delay the panic but the end result would still be a frightened crowd less likely to obey orders, I believe.

Putting guns on the ground at street level, even in armoured cars, leaves you hoping that the crowd will disperse peacefully if sullenly.  If they don't and you have to start firing then it's back to plan A, and dealing with a frightened, panicked and unresponsive crowd, not to mention a real propaganda coup for the IRA (oops did I really say that, just sort of slipped out).

I believe that people are more easily controlled by people, not by things, and especially not by the fear of things.  Fear prompts irrational responses and control demands keeping or restoring rational thought as far as possible.

Also putting guns at street level, even in vehicles, runs the risk of the guns being overwhelmed, denied to "own forces" and put in the hands of the opposition.  A problem that has resulted recently in Americans strafing Bradleys in Sadr City that were lost to insurgents.

By all means put guns on the roofs in overwatch, or even guns in helicopters on overwatch, but put disciplined personnel on the ground in formed bodies.  The overwatching guns are there as a measure of last resort to protect the bodies on the ground.

Caesar beat barbarians not with better weapons but with better discipline.  One of the things that 18th and 19th century enemies commented on concerning the British troops was their stillness and lack of emotion while waiting for the order to charge.  This was considered more unsettling than facing a crowd howling blood curdling threats against ancestors spirits or some such.  The Americans were particularly impressed by the Hessians and Hanoverians.

Here in Canada, as well as in the US, I have watched on newsreels while small bodies of police go swaggering into position, beating their shields.  The crowd reacts aggressively to the arrival, it seldom seems to calm the crowd, or cause it any consternation.  Often it just seems to ratchet up the intensity.  It is not the swaggering or beating that is the problem.  It is the lack of numbers associated with it.  That kind of approach with inadequate numbers invites derision not respect and it is respect that must be gained quickly.  In the absence of respect the crowd refuses, or is unable, to listen to instruction.  At some point thereafter the police act to disperse, not control, the crowd - firing tear gas and swinging batons.  At that point, in my opinion, the police have lost control of the situation.  What often happens then is an running fight lasting hours, with the crowd getting drunker, the police getting more frustrated and the damage bill mounting.  Vancouver and Montreal hockey fans are brilliant in bringing out the best in their police departments.  The inhabitants of Los Angeles seem pretty talented as well.

Those are the results with good, solid constables with years of experience, the best available kit and suitable training facing drunken hockey fans with little risk of being shot or bombed.  What are the odds of finding similar police forces in Kabul, Basra or Kigali?  If order is to be imposed the army will have to do it and particularly the infantry.

You don't need shooters to control a crowd. You need disciplined bodies on the ground capable of controlling access and egress and cutting the crowd into manageable clumps.

That need for numbers, in my opinion, is the best argument for infantry heavy forces on peace support missions.  Better 600 soldiers in body armour with clubs, standing rigidly and silently at attention, backed by half a dozen LAVs and a score of marksmen than a company of armed soldiers hiding in the woodwork knocking down individual hard cases.

IMHO

By the way, with respect to the sword bayonet, you are right about its "unhandiness" when mounted on a Lee Enfield.  My point was that the bayonet itself was a fairly useful tool without the rifle attached.  It would be at least as effective as the gladius the roman sword of roughly the same length that was used for stabbing between the shields of a formed body.  It wasn't for swinging.

More to the point, with the short weapons now in service, especially the British Bullpup design, I have seen the comments about lack of "stand-off" between the bayoneter and the bayonetee.  A longer blade would help to offset that problem.

Anyway, just random thoughts.

A I am catching up on some of the other threads I see that some of what I have said is covering well-travelled ground by folks like yourself, Kevin, 2B and Royal Highland Fusilier.  Sorry if this is redundant folks.

 

[a_majoor]

Perhaps CCO is the worst possible example of "how to use soldiers", since soldiers are by training and inclination the people to escalate the situation. Using the LI force in the rooftops to provide overwatch and SA to the force commander seems to be the "best" possible use in the scenario you gave me. Remember, I did stipulate the local police should be controlling things on the ground, perhaps backed up by Cavalry Dragoons and vehicles. Opening fire should be the last resort, but the use of trained LI marksmen supplemented by Dragoon or police sniper dets at least allows escalation to be very focused and controlled.

This should be the story of any Light Infantry force deployment, moving quickly and quietly through the AOR, identifying targets and dealing with them with a very focused use of force. Even in an Urban Operation like Fallujiah, Light Infantry forces would be engaging in "sniper duels" or isolating areas by gunning down enemy fighters, or in really extreme cases, anyone who may be acting as support (i.e. on the street who may be runners or delivering supplies). While very dangerous, it would still be far less intense than overrunning strong points with M-1 tanks of using AH-64 gunships to take out sniper positions.

If the situation isn't yet as extreme as Fallujiah (i.e. the Jihadis are still trying to establish control of the neighbourhood), then the combination of intelligence gathering and judicious shooting of identified Jihadi fighters and leaders would tend to dampen their enthusiasm for controlling the 'hood; not to mention the locals will be a lot less inclined to associate with the Jihadis if the chance of being hit by a "stray" round becomes fairly high.

Like the SAS in Borneo and Yemen, or Marines in Central America during the Banana Wars, most of the success will be due to patrolling and dominating the areas; preventing low level enemy forces from becoming established in an area, and assisting other organizations to establish government control over the AOR (the use of medics by the SAS; Marine "county fairs" in Viet Nam; both examples were means of converting the population from friendly or neutral towards the Indonesians and "Popular Forces" to supporting the lawful authorities). The key here is making the Infantry soldier "light" to be tactically, operationally and strategically mobile by cutting off the logistics tail.

 

[Kirkhill]

I take your point on the use of soldiers generally and "light infantry, LI-SOC, rangers, raiders, commandos...." in particular.  I agree with you on the matter of Dragoons.

The point I am trying to make is that in the current political climate it seems to me that governments are fighting a running battle against anarchy and lawlessness. The things that all governments fear is leaving ungoverned spaces on the map where individuals can organize and plot and amass resources beyond the reach of the forces of order.  The English and the Scots had to put up with the Borderers for centuries, eventually got them pacified, then had to deal with "barbary pirates" - tinpot little despots and thugs that claimed sovereign rights and operated out of Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia and Libya.  These folks, not all of the Arabs or Berbers, there were some Brits, Dutch, Spaniards and Frenchmen amongst them conducted slaving expeditions up the river Dart in Devon, the site of the Royal Navy's officer training school today, even as the words of Rule Britannia were being put to paper ("Britons never.....shall be slaves").

In that environment what governments want to do is establish and maintain order.  They despatch people to do that.  They people they despatch are soldiers, no others.  How they accomplish the task should largely be up to the soldiers.

If the local authorities and forces were up to the task there would be no need for foreign intervention or assistance.  Therefore, demonstrably, the locals are not up to the tasks at hand.

The locals need to be trained and the best training is in the form of leadership by example. As well, while the new forces are finding their feet then the foreigners can either wait until the locals are ready to take on the job themselves (a task made more difficult if it appears that the foreigners are not willing to share the risk with the locals) or the can stand up to the plate and set an example and do it themselves ALONGSIDE the locals.  It makes it harder for either side to flub it if national and personal pride are at stake.

What this means is that all the tools and tactics for establishing and maintaining order need to be familiar to the forces deployed.  Now the government could decide to send 100 LI, 20 Dragoons and 600 paramilitary Carabinieri type police expert in the tactics of crowd control.  But we don't have such a force available.  (And politically and historically it is unlikely that such a force would get much support as it is considered a dangerous concept to the Anglo-Saxon nations that remember Cromwell and also to many immigrants who understand the word Milice as the head-crackers employed by the Ministry of the Interior to suppress dissent.)  Such forces do not exist in the US, the UK, Australia or New Zealand.  The duty is handled by either the police domestically, or the army (apologies to the Marines everywhere) both domestically on occasion or overseas.

This explains why the USMC with their 3-Block model spend time on non-lethal weapons and tactics, including crowd control.  They have, like other colonial powers, been imposing order on disordered places for over a century.  Interestingly the marines made their name "on the shores of Tripoli" slapping those same Barbary Pirates that were taking Europeans and Americans hostages for slavery or ransom.  (And who said that hostage-taking was a new line of trade for the Iraqis and al-Zarqawi - the Americans and the West are probably despised for cutting into their profits, bad for business - digression ;D)

That really is the definition of an imperium: a government extending control over an area to impose order and permit peaceful commerce.  Those that impose that order are the soldiers of the imperium.  Currently the imperium has something of a voluntary confederation of nations about it, but just as Canada has been formed and benefited from various empires in the past (American, British, French, Iroquois, Huron, Haida and Inuit) so it is in Canada's interests to become an upstanding and contributing member of the emerging confederacy.  That makes Canada's soldiers not disciples of St. Barbara, dedicated to fire and lightning and the destruction of armies (though there needs to be something of that in them) but old-fashioned soldiers - servants of the state earning their salt by doing that which the state requires - whether it is handing out candies and assisting old ladies across the street, cracking heads or killing people.  All of those are jobs for soldiers, for infanteers in particular.  The government decides the who, the what, the where and the when.

The other arms, commandos and scouts, engineers, cavalry and gunners (including those that engage in aerial bombardment) are alll there to ensure that no body, no rabble and no army interferes with the infanteers conducting their government assigned tasks.

How's this for a definition of an infanteer: An infanteer gets to do mundane jobs in exciting, stressful and dangerous circumstances in exotic locales surrounded by people speaking strange tongues and occasionally is allowed to kill his tormenters.  ?

Cheers.

 

[Britney Spears]

No discussion of crowd control is complete without <a href=http://dolby.dyndns.org/upfoo/mov/1111677575718.wmv>this South Korean video</a>

 

[a_majoor]

In that environment what governments want to do is establish and maintain order.  They dispatch people to do that.  They people they dispatch are soldiers, no others.  How they accomplish the task should largely be up to the soldiers.

Hence the need to reduce the logistics tail. Dispatching LI will be orders of magnitude easier than sending the same numbers of soldiers as a Cavalry battlegroup, and Light troops can also be moved by any and all available means, ranging from aircraft (even parachuting the LI in), helicopters, trucks, trains, mules (with Infanteer leading the way  ), watercraft or on foot. If they are trained to "out G the G", then their presence will not be signalled by the presence of Atco Frontec; large camps, supply convoys or daily helicopter flights, making it harder for the enemy to respond to the presence of the LI.

I am not really a fan of "Full Spectrum Ops" aka "Three Block War", and feel the job of the soldiers is to dominate an AOR and allow the other agencies which specialize in civic reconstruction, humanitarian aid and so on to operate freely within the AOR. Clear and Hold tactics like this worked well in Malaysia and other low intensity conflicts where applied, and Light Infantry have operated successfully in high intensity conflicts as well. This is an idea which needs to be explored fully and deeply, since it would give us a great deal of capability if it was adopted, and could be done quickly, since training and equipping 5000 new soldiers to act as Light Infantry would not be as big a call on resources as other options.

 

[Kirkhill]

Hence the need to reduce the logistics tail. Dispatching LI will be orders of magnitude easier than sending the same numbers of soldiers as a Cavalry battlegroup, and Light troops can also be moved by any and all available means, ranging from aircraft (even parachuting the LI in), helicopters, trucks, trains, mules (with Infanteer leading the way   ), watercraft or on foot. If they are trained to "out G the G", then their presence will not be signalled by the presence of Atco Frontec; large camps, supply convoys or daily helicopter flights, making it harder for the enemy to respond to the presence of the LI.

Stipulated and agreed wholeheartedly.

I am not really a fan of "Full Spectrum Ops" aka "Three Block War", and feel the job of the soldiers is to dominate an AOR and allow the other agencies which specialize in civic reconstruction, humanitarian aid and so on to operate freely within the AOR.

Got that fairly clearly as well. 

Clear and Hold tactics like this worked well in Malaysia and other low intensity conflicts where applied,

How I do love Malaysia.  Dead right Arthur.  Contrary to the Right Inglorious Pettigrew the 3 D solution ain't new.  Malaysia wasn't solved until they got the Army, the Police and the District Commissioner (Colonial Officer responsible for civil administration) all working together.  Thing is the Police had to be created, as did the Malaysian army.  The Police were trained largely by British ex-members of the Palestine Police that were surplus to requirement after 1948. 

Curiously enough crowd control operations in Palestine were handled by - wait for it - Light Infantry, Paratroopers amongst them, along with plain old line infantry (that which used to be referred to in the parlance of the day as "flat-foot heavies".  Back to Dad's war stories but he spent as much time on operations with an entrenching tool handle, as he did with an unloaded Lee-Enfield Mk V with bayonet fixed as he did with a loaded Lee-Enfield.  Most of the time with a loaded weapon was spent on guard duty, only a few sporadic incidents necessitating breaking out the cleaning kit and fourbytwos.

Throughout the old Empire, soldiering meant policing, sometimes vigorously to the chagrin of some of the locals.

and Light Infantry have operated successfully in high intensity conflicts as well.

Agreed completely.

This is an idea which needs to be explored fully and deeply, since it would give us a great deal of capability if it was adopted, and could be done quickly, since training and equipping 5000 new soldiers to act as Light Infantry would not be as big a call on resources as other options.

Likewise.


Cheers, 

PS "out G the G"?? ???

 

[Jungle]

No discussion of crowd control is complete without <a href=http://dolby.dyndns.org/upfoo/mov/1111677575718.wmv>this South Korean video</a>

Interesting... I like how they only show the end of the incidents... we never see how it begins. Seems like media manipulation again...

 

[a_majoor]

A bit of bulking up: Light Infantry should be able to deal with a wide range of targets, lightweight "fire and forget" missiles like the Javelin or Gill/Spike offer a way to deal with hard targets. I am not too sure about the proposed LI Orbat with a "heavy weapons platoon" per company, companies and even platoons can operate in quite widely dispersed formations (LCol Bank's article in the CAJ talks about separations of five to thirty kilometers between squads in US platoons deployed in CJTF-76; http://www.army.forces.gc.ca/caj/documents/vol_08/iss_1/CAJ_vol8.1_05_e.pdf), obviously we need something the individual can carry; one or two per section.

In high intensity operations, the LI equipped with fire and forget missiles can be employed as "skirmishers"; see http://www.knox.army.mil/center/ocoa/ArmorMag/mj96/3skirm96.pdf  LI forces should not require HMGs, AGLs, 81 mm mortars or other paraphernalia, we will leave that amount of firepower for the Dragoons.

 

[Kirkhill]

LI units cannot interface directly with mechanized formations due to speed, mobility and logistical issues, so how do they interact? What is the best way to transition an AOR form Mech to Light forces or Light to Mech, and so on.  - from a-majoor.

Mech formations are not required in every event -  In fact it could be argued that mech forces are only suitable in "civilized" terrain (urban and rural with roads).

Most of our current problems are from places like the old NW Frontier in India, the Foreign Legion's Sahara and such like.  These places are not suitable for large mech formations.  Some mech capabilities will go a long way over there but most operations will require the PBI with what ever transport and support that can be found.  Accessibility issues.

If Infantry is to be used with a Mech Formation then supply them with Kangaroos and carry the full Infantry organization as the organization is founded.  Don't make them adjust TTPs to turn them into gunners and drivers and crew commanders.  Those are not Infantry jobs. 

Marry the kit to the Infantry, not the Infantry to the kit.

By way of illustration - http://www.thestar.com/NASApp/cs/ContentServer?pagename=thestar/Layout/Article_Type1&c=Article&cid=1123969809699&call_pageid=968332188492&col=968793972154&t=TS_Home&DPL=IvsNDS%2f7ChAX&tacodalogin=yes

The latest in high technology for the modern Infantry.

Cheers.

 

[tomahawk6]

I think it all goes back to the means of getting the infantry to the fight and sustaining it in the field. You can be as light or as heavy but if you arent able to perform the mission. I believe light infantry have to be airmobile period. Once on the ground they have to be able to perform their mission until reinforced by heavy forces or additional light forces. A light infantry force needs to be flexible and provided with the means to defend themselves from all threats. Do they need to haul heavy ATM's on arctic mission ? No those can be left at base, but smaller ATM's can also be used against vehicles/fortifications. A light infantry battalion task force can be deployed by helicopter deep behind enemy lines to seize and hold an objective until reinforced/ link up by a heavy force. Going back to a Canadian requirement I would suggest buying medium left helo's and blackhawk type assault helo's to be able to project a Canadian brigade group. If you dont have the means to transport light infantry then forget the concept and stick to a LAV equiped infantry force [as you currently have].

 

[Kirkhill]

Broadly agreed Tomahawk.  Light Infantry can fight in any battle, in any terrain.  How they get there is less critical than the fact that they get there with the kit they need to counter the threats likely to be met.  If we can't drive in, and drive around, then it is unlikely that the other guy can either.  The odds of running into an MBT are slim under those circumstances.

Light Infantry can be deployed by any means, including helicopter, anywhere.  LAVs, or tracks for that matter, are more limited, I am sure you will agree.

I mentioned that the problem for modern governments is lawless areas, areas that are not policed - areas like the Sahara and the Sahel or like Afghanistan, or like they Yemeni border area.  Canada potentially has an equivalent in our bush country and the high arctic.  If we don't operate there then someone else might.

An alignment of criminals, discontented natives declaring autonomy, foreign states interested in mischief, OBL and others, may result in a "no-go" area within Canada's borders.  Oka in '90 was a near run thing as it was.  If that had happened closer to salt water, away from highways it might have been a different scenario.  And before folks start saying it can't happen here consider Waco or Oklahoma City or they civilian militias in the States.  Those events happened in a country where much more of the land mass is regularly utilized.  There are a lot fewer places to hide down there than up here.

An ability to operate in our own back yard in light vehicles, boats, over-snow vehicles, supported by helicopters and fixed wing aircraft (transport, recce and strike), against small pockets of malcontents is what is required.  LAVs, or MBTs won't work in those areas.

If we create troops that can operate at home they can be used elsewhere.  Some "armoured" (light/medium/heavy, wheeled and/or tracked) forces capable of acting independently or in support in rural/urban areas seems reasonable.

In my view the requirement is to get troops on the ground anywhere the other guys feel safe and then equip them so that they can defeat any threat that they are likely to meet.  If they are likely to meet tanks the requirement is not necessarily another tank but a way to either eliminate the effect of the tank (difficult to build sufficient shields) or eliminate the tank (considerably easier).

Maybe it comes down to this.  Is a soldier strictly an agent of destruction, acting on the instructions of his/her government. or is a soldier first and foremost an agent of his/her government authorized to use destructive means?

My sense is that the British Army has been long used to the latter role - policemen that can kill whoever the government tells them to, while in America (where the populace rebelled against that very concept), the Army has a more limited brief - it is raised by the people to defend the nation, to destroy the nation's enemies. 

The British or European concept, I would suggest, the traditional concept, sees the army as a tool of control available to the government.  It controls the borders but also the citizenry of the state. After all a government can't enter into an agreement with a neighbouring state unless the neighbour is sure that the government can keep its own people in line.  If it can't then there is no point in doing the deal as you will still have to act in your own interest to defend your borders.

The American concept, expects more from its own citizens and neighbouring countries.  It assumes that people are naturally peaceful and that only governments make war.  Given a chance people will go about their business and not invade other peoples. (A dubious thought in my mind not much borne out by the evidence).  Within that construct the army exists solely to destroy the armies of other governments and has no business in the population control game.  A fact that is explicitly set out in your constitution I believe.

I see the Infanteer as an armed agent of the government, a policeman if you like, who is supported by a whole raft of tools and specialists (including cavalrymen and gunners etc) designed to eliminate threats to the PBI.

For domestic purposes we need a Light, Mobile force capable of operating not just off-road but completely divorced from roads, supported by a Cavalry force capable of sending sub-units rapidly to urban environments and to patrol routes between towns and rural areas. 

Internationally such forces could find employment. 

If we can afford more, I think we can, my government thinks otherwise, then we should move up the ladder and maintain some heavy forces.

A LAV army doesn't serve us well either at home or abroad because of deployment and operational limitations.

An infantry army, with LAV-CAV support and some heavy equipment available.

Helicopters not so much for assault purposes but certainly for support and logistics.

 

[tomahawk6]

Well thought out post. However, light infantry dont have the vehicles that other infantry units have. If troops are mounted n Strykers/LAV's then they are motorized infantry, not light infantry. If troops are mounted in Bradley's they arent light infantry but mech infantry. Once you mount infantry in vehicles they cease to be light infantry - just my .02.

 

[BITTER PPLCI CPL]

In the Canadian army we use only the term Mechanized not motorized (the chinese and North Koreans use them), and when we train we also train as light infantry because we won't always have our LAV's near by. This way we are trained in a bit of everything (sort of, not as much as 3PPCLI or 3RCR, I think that's it!). We're not like the U. S. Army where they specialize in one trade, weapon, vehicle, etc...

​

 

[Britney Spears]

the chinese and North Koreans use them

They do? Where?

 

[a_majoor]

If I remember correctly, "Motor Infantry" was a sort of hybrid solution to the mobility problem of mechanized forces. Very few armies in the world can afford a complete fleet of APCs/IFVs (and apparently never could, even at the hight of WWII most infantry marched), so in the British army, at least, "Motor Battalions" were formed to use the on road mobility of trucks to shuttle Infantry from place to place. Although the "official" practice of Motor Battalions and Motor Infantry was retired sometime after WWII, the use of trucks to ferry troops from the UK to Germany in Reforger exercises remained, and the "Saxon" Infantry carrier was developed in the 1980s in an effort to address the shortfall in protected transport for soldiers. Motor Infantry was roadbound and unprotected, certainly a huge fault in todays environment.

WRT our Light Infantry, hitching a ride on trucks might be considered a means of getting around an AOR, but certainly never the primary means, which should always be the silent use of feet. I have some issues with Tomahawks stipulation of "Airmobile period". Fleets of helicopters have fairly huge logistical needs (not to mention protection of the airfields, unless they are being based off a JSS at sea), and overflights by helicopters would certainly diminish if not eliminate the strong suit of Light Infantry; stealth.

I once wrote a piece entitled "The Return of the Canadian Mounted Rifles" http://www.army.forces.gc.ca/caj/documents/vol_05/iss_4/CAJ_vol5.4_11_e.pdf which argued for an airmobile force as you suggest, but re reading it reveals this to be a "heavy" force; really mechanized Dragoons riding helicopters rather than M-2s or LAVs. No enemy would ever be in doubt as to the presence of the Canadian Mounted Rifles Mk II in the AOR, and the Jihadis at least have demonstrated an amazing ability to "go to ground" in the presence of heavy forces, only to spring back up again when they leave. An airmobile unit would be a good match to a Light Infantry battlegroup, since they could act as the QRF (emphasis on Quick Reaction) should the LI flush out some high value targets or become embroiled in an engagement with a much bigger or tougher force than expected.

 

[McG]

If troops are mounted n Strykers/LAV's then they are motorized infantry, not light infantry. If troops are mounted in Bradley's they arent light infantry but mech infantry.

Just semantics but, putting infantry into those vehicles does not make the infantry mechanized if the vehicles are not integral to the infantry organization & if the infantry TO&E is optimized to work independent of the vehicles.

Personally I think ALL Infantry should be Light - augmented with vehicle from Cavalry Units for certain missions and roles - which woudl allow the LI to fight seperate and the Cav to fight the vehicle with no dependance upon each other IF the situation demanded.

I disagree.  There is a distinct need for mechanized infantry (or "dismounted cavalry" if you prefer) in mechanized operations.  Infantry & cavalry must be mutually supporting and there is a dependence between the two.  Infantry protect the cavalry in close terrain, and infantry secure the objective that cavalry has hammered with cannon and missile fires.  Therefore, as long as we have mechanized cavalry, we need mechanized infantry.

If Infantry is to be used with a Mech Formation then supply them with Kangaroos and carry the full Infantry organization as the organization is founded. 

Rather than establishing LAV based APC Regts, why not go with mech infantry.  We know that a certain proportion of our operations will be mech, so we can optimize the mech infantry force structure for that role (no MG Pl in the coys, a mixed cavalry & infantry ISTAR Coy, etc).

 

[Kirkhill]

Actually, doesn't this relate back to the comments about Marius's Mules and load carrying the other Infantry thread?

Lets just suppose for a moment that command decrees that all an infanteer needs to do the job is 50 rounds and 2 grenades. That can be carried by the infanteer.   If the infanteer needs to be moved from A to B there are any variety of transport options available.

However with the transport comes the possibility of carrying more gear.   The temptation now is to fill that space with stuff that might be needed. Indeed some of it may well be needed and used.

Next mission the unit decides that the kit that was used is now mission essential.   Transport must now be supplied to carry that kit.   But perhaps the mission doesn't require it.   Perhaps other kit is required instead.

The infanteer is still an infanteer regardless of the kit available.  

A Mech Infanteer/Dragoon requires specialized skills, kit and TTPs to interface with the vehicle and systems that carry him/her.   They are less infanteers than sub-systems of their vehicles.

While an infanteer (light) can be dispatched to the scene quickly and armed to meet the threat a Dragoon with all the specialized training and kit loses a lot of that value without their vehicles.

Dragoons seem inherently less flexible in employment.

It seems to come down to how dependent the force of employment is on its vehicles and its supply train.   If the force must have vehicles to be able to perform even at minimal level then the government is limited in its intervention options.   On the other hand if some capabilities are available to a "light" force, however that is defined, then the government will find them more useful in more situations.

From that starting point I believe that suggests that the basic building block of the army is the well trained infanteer, skilled in a variety of systems and weapons but lightly equipped.   Other systems, to meet other threats can be either supplied to the infanteers on situational or mission based needs, or when impractical added to the infantry organization.

What I am trying to say is that 600 infanteers are easy to transport.   600 infanteers with 300 vehicles worth of baggage are hard to transport.   Matters become even worse if the 300 vehicles require 300   specialist drivers and the payroll department says they have to be found from the 600 infanteers.   Now there are 300 infanteers, fewer to impose order, and harder to move.

On the other hand, 600 infanteers could be transported by 15 truck, bus or Chinook drivers or 60 APC drivers.

Perhaps planning could start from the basis of getting 600 infanteers on the ground, then add kit, then add other capabilities.

And McG:

I am agreeing with your point about the specialized nature of Dragoons, I am also agreeing with Kevin's point about Infantry and Cavalry.  

My point is that Cavalry forces should have their own dismounts or assault troops who are skilled in operations with IFVs and FSVs (including MBTs if the government supplies them).    Infantry however can be useful in Cavalry-centric operations if it can keep up with the Cavalry forces.   It does not need to be an assault force in those types of operations.   Leave that up to the Cavalry.

Light Infantry in trucks, (Motorized Infantry) followed armour formations not to assault the enemy from the trucks but to fill the space left by the advancing armoured forces, to secure the flanks, to secure bases and lines of communication, to hold ground and to be closer to ground that armoured formations found impassable - ground that only dismounted infantry could assault and/or occupy.   These infantry forces just needed transport to carry them and the kit necessary to do the job.   They weren't forced into new organizations just to meet the demands of the transport.

Final thought on this:

Given our 9 battalions of infantry and 3 armoured regiments make the organization 6 infantry battalions (light scale) 3 infantry battalions (Special Ops Capable) 3 Cavalry regiments with 4 independent squadrons each with their own recce troop  and fire support troop as well as 3 troops of Dragoons in LAVs.

Armour/Cav preserved.  Combined Arms skills preserved and available for High intensity combat.  More infanteers/dragoons available.

 

[Kirkhill]

What are the 3rd bn types specialized in other than jumping? In 2002 C-coy 2PPLCI (mech fags according to those EEElite 3VP boys), anyways we did everything that we were tasked by the 3VP CO. There is nothing special or different in the Ghan that can be done by a mech bn or a light bn. Ooh I'm riding around in a G-wagon, I'm so qualified! That G-wagon hits an anti-tank mine what do you think will happen, the liberal magic solution will save them, at least in LAV-III, there's a bit more of a chance. No disrespect to the 3rd, but there are other infantry bn's who can do the same job in the ghan! 

Re: Dragoons = Mechanized Infantry?
« Reply #9 on: Today at 10:16:52 »  Bitter PPCLI Cpl.

Quote from: AmmoTech90 on Yesterday at 13:29:11
I would argue that every Canadian infantryman is trained in a dismounted role first rather than a light role.
Quote from: Unknown Factor on Yesterday at 14:22:14
Having taught BIQ, this is in fact incorrect. The skills that are taught are infact 'Basic infantry skills' commonly reffered to as 'Light infantry skills' amoung the trade. In fact all infantry soldiers in Canada are light infantry first, the continued training that is offered once they arrive at their parent Bn will dictate whether they are mechanized or light. The splitting of hairs occures when a mechanized soldier dismounts and conducts dismounted operations and the answer is no he is not a light infantry soldier.  The conduct of the overall operations of that Bn are still mechanized operations, hense the terms apply to their speciffic roles not to the temporary employment of the soldier.

This arguement could go on forever but the reality of the situation is that you wouldn't call a light infantry soldier a mechanized soldier just because he mounts the back of a LAV for insertion.  Light infantry soldiers are trained quite differently than mounted soldiers in that they closely follow the training requirments of the CAR becoming proficent in all aspects of Airborne, Mountain, Anphibious and Aimobile operatations and it is this continueous training that sets them apart for their mechanized counterparts. ...



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Why am I starting to feel dizzy?

Are infanteers infanteers as Field Marshall Slim and Bitter PPCLI Cpl suggest?  With para qualified battalions being infanteers that can jump and that the only distinction?
In which case why not make infantry battalions separate from the LAVs and assign LAVs the way that boats and helicopters are assigned.

Or do mech and air and amphib and helo and mountain and tree-climbing operations all require dedicated, task specific troops?

As to the Armoured/Cavalry - What exactly are they supposed to be doing if the infantry is doing mounted assaults, mounted patrols, mounted recce, mounted fire support?

Just when I thought I was starting to understand where you folks were headed.

Oh well

 

[BITTER PPLCI CPL]

Ok kirkhill, I'm an infantryman, however you interpert that, is up to you. But it seems to me that you blurp off 6000 word post's to make yourself sound sophisticated (and your obviously in extreme favour of Light Bn's and mech are a waste of time) and the fact you can't name everything DRAGOOOONS!!!