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Kirkhill said:
Actually, re-reading it.. it does sound like an insult..
This was not my intent, so on that note.. I apologise.
The point I was trying to make, was inherently.. as an institution, all militaries are fairly entrenched in their ways, and that changing doctrine/systems/concepts is usually an uphill battle.
I don't think the above statement is either incorrect, nor insulting
Mortar guy
Sr. Member
- Reaction score
- 25
- Points
- 330
Guest - and I'm going to say this as respectfully as I can in case you are Gen Hillier :warstory: - do you have a smoke grenade? If so now would be the time to use it. You have admitted yourself that you know nothing about tactics and your posts lead me to believe that you have only the foggiest of technical knowledge about armoured fighting vehicles. Your constant comparison of the MMEV to fighter aircraft is the big clue, in my opinion, that you are treading dangerously close to Poserland. Just so you know, there are people on this forum who have dedicated their lives to the study of land warfare and the technical aspects of armoured vehicles so many dilittantes are smoked out very early in the game. I understand your enthusiasm for the MMEV because it does look real neat-o on PowerPoint but maybe you should spend a couple of days and read, really read, the Force Employment Concept, Robert Leonhard's The Art of Manoeuvre, Martin van Creveld's The Transformation of War, DLSC's Future Force, and the Future Security Environment. Do that and then come back and tell me if you still really believe that the MMEV is the solution to the problems our Army will face in the coming years. I will state once again why I think the MMEV is a boondoggle:
1) It is incredibly expensive and anyone with the slightest amount of technical knowledge will quickly agree that integrating all those sensors, comms systems and weapons in one platform that has to drive off road through mud and dust and water will be extremely difficult. Have you ever wondered why it takes a decade or more to design a fighter aircraft or attack helicopter? One reason is that it takes that long to work out the integration of the electronics and to un-frig the bugs that result.
2) It does not bring any new capability to the battlefield. The TUA with TOW 2 Aero can engage and destroy pretty much anything out there at ranges that we are likely to encounter (have you ever seen an 8km shot other than in Suffield? I have been to the deserts of the Arabian peninsula and am now in Afghanistan and can tell you 8km shots are extremely rare). So in the DF engagement, the MMEV seems a little redundant. As for NLOS, we already have the M777/Excalibur combo and if we really wanted a good NLOS missile we could just muckle on to the PAM. This is a MOTS solution that will cost far less than the MMEV and offer a far greater capability. So, in the NLOS fight, the MMEV seems a little redundant. The only place I could see the MMEV being useful is in the realm of AD but the threat is so low as to make this kind of investment seem very wasteful. Once again, we could replace ADATS with CLAWS/SLAMRAAM and achieve a better capability for less money. So, in the AD world, the MMEV offers no great capability at an exorbitant price. To summarize, we will spend a disgusting amount of money buying a vehicle that, at best, only brings mediocre capabilities to the battlefield.
3) The MMEV is incredibly vulnerable on the battlefield and would be too expensive to risk in most situations. I would argue that because of the sensitivity of all those sensors and missile hanging off the turret, and because of the small numbers that will be available to any commander, and because of the highly trained (and difficult to replace) crew - the MMEV will only be used as a NLOS platform. If that is the case then it utility rapidly drops to a number I like to call zero. If it can be outranged by Excalibur by a factor of 5 and its sensors are of no use it really becomes the world's most expensive self-licking ice cream cone.
4) In terms of tactics, have you ever heard the expression "fire without manoeuvre is useless". Without rewriting Leonhard's or Lind's books here I will just say that long-range precision fire without supporting manoeuvre does not place the enemy on the "horns of a dilemma". By that I mean that when presented with only one threat, the enemy will rapidly adapt to avoid that threat. For example, if an opponent is out in the open and is getting pummeled by NLOS missiles he will adapt to avoid that threat. He will improve his camouflage or move into built-up areas or dress like civilians. However, if presented with complimentary threats (i.e. fire and manoeuvre), he will face a dilemma. In our exmple, if he moves to avoid the NLOS missiles, he will make himself vulnerable to a manoeuvre force that is attacking in concert with the fires. If he stays put, he will be destroyed by the missiles: i.e. a dilemma. This is my single greatest problem with the MMEV and the DFSofS - it seems to presume that long range fire in the absence of manouevre will solve all of our problems. It is a symptom of the intellectual disease that has infected our army since the advent of precision guided weapons - namely that destruction equals defeat. Destruction by long range fires (even if they are precision fires) is very costly, will meet with diminishing returns, and doesn't present the enemy with a dilemma. The DFSofS, and specifically the MMEV are supplimentary weapons systems, not complimentary ones.
Regards,
MG
1) It is incredibly expensive and anyone with the slightest amount of technical knowledge will quickly agree that integrating all those sensors, comms systems and weapons in one platform that has to drive off road through mud and dust and water will be extremely difficult. Have you ever wondered why it takes a decade or more to design a fighter aircraft or attack helicopter? One reason is that it takes that long to work out the integration of the electronics and to un-frig the bugs that result.
2) It does not bring any new capability to the battlefield. The TUA with TOW 2 Aero can engage and destroy pretty much anything out there at ranges that we are likely to encounter (have you ever seen an 8km shot other than in Suffield? I have been to the deserts of the Arabian peninsula and am now in Afghanistan and can tell you 8km shots are extremely rare). So in the DF engagement, the MMEV seems a little redundant. As for NLOS, we already have the M777/Excalibur combo and if we really wanted a good NLOS missile we could just muckle on to the PAM. This is a MOTS solution that will cost far less than the MMEV and offer a far greater capability. So, in the NLOS fight, the MMEV seems a little redundant. The only place I could see the MMEV being useful is in the realm of AD but the threat is so low as to make this kind of investment seem very wasteful. Once again, we could replace ADATS with CLAWS/SLAMRAAM and achieve a better capability for less money. So, in the AD world, the MMEV offers no great capability at an exorbitant price. To summarize, we will spend a disgusting amount of money buying a vehicle that, at best, only brings mediocre capabilities to the battlefield.
3) The MMEV is incredibly vulnerable on the battlefield and would be too expensive to risk in most situations. I would argue that because of the sensitivity of all those sensors and missile hanging off the turret, and because of the small numbers that will be available to any commander, and because of the highly trained (and difficult to replace) crew - the MMEV will only be used as a NLOS platform. If that is the case then it utility rapidly drops to a number I like to call zero. If it can be outranged by Excalibur by a factor of 5 and its sensors are of no use it really becomes the world's most expensive self-licking ice cream cone.
4) In terms of tactics, have you ever heard the expression "fire without manoeuvre is useless". Without rewriting Leonhard's or Lind's books here I will just say that long-range precision fire without supporting manoeuvre does not place the enemy on the "horns of a dilemma". By that I mean that when presented with only one threat, the enemy will rapidly adapt to avoid that threat. For example, if an opponent is out in the open and is getting pummeled by NLOS missiles he will adapt to avoid that threat. He will improve his camouflage or move into built-up areas or dress like civilians. However, if presented with complimentary threats (i.e. fire and manoeuvre), he will face a dilemma. In our exmple, if he moves to avoid the NLOS missiles, he will make himself vulnerable to a manoeuvre force that is attacking in concert with the fires. If he stays put, he will be destroyed by the missiles: i.e. a dilemma. This is my single greatest problem with the MMEV and the DFSofS - it seems to presume that long range fire in the absence of manouevre will solve all of our problems. It is a symptom of the intellectual disease that has infected our army since the advent of precision guided weapons - namely that destruction equals defeat. Destruction by long range fires (even if they are precision fires) is very costly, will meet with diminishing returns, and doesn't present the enemy with a dilemma. The DFSofS, and specifically the MMEV are supplimentary weapons systems, not complimentary ones.
Regards,
MG
- Reaction score
- 1
- Points
- 410
Mortar guy for deputy CDS
- Reaction score
- 35
- Points
- 560
Interesting developments in this thread.
MGS and MMEV are really short and long range self propelled artillery platforms, but are using all kinds of clever tricks to try to get the job done. Let's just do what the REAL gunners do, lay on the gun and select the appropriate ammunition for the job. Any generation three, and most generation two tanks still in service have very sophisticated FCS which support fairly complex fire control solutions. Most modern tanks also have the ability to fire indirect with their gun laying instruments, allowing engagement of targets which are non line of sight. Conventional ammunition natures like APDSFS, HEAT-MP, HE and Smoke BE allow the tanker to engage a wide variety of hard and soft targets, and there are now through tube missiles on the market to extend the range out to 13km (LAHAT), as well as projected future "smart" rounds like TERM (Tank Extended Range Munitions) and STAFF (Sensor Target Activated Fire and Forget) to increase hit probabilities over an even wider range of conditions. With this in mind, we are really looking for a protected and mobile launch system, a M-109 "Paladin" or an FH-77 would do just fine if we were not too concerned about people shooting back.
Wheeled vehicles have demonstrated the ability to carry high velocity cannon and fire these types of rounds, in terms of firepower our objections to the MGS are based on the fact there is little ready ammunition and a lack of faith in the autoloader system. Armoured corps personnel I have spoken to, and first hand observation of an MGS prototype at the AUSA exhibition show deficiencies in the actual turret layout, the limited field of view hatches up or down being the worst problem. Certainly an MGS with a different turret layout that carries more ammunition in the ready rack would go a long way to silencing these objections.
Indeed a Fire Support Vehicle with a large capacity magazine or ready rack, sophisticated FCS and the ability to fire all the types of ammunition noted above would be able to serve both as the MGS AND the MMEV. As a bonus, such a vehicle tasked to perform the long range overwatch role will have more ammunition and be capable of a higher rate of fire than the MMEV as currently envisioned. A slight aside, the HMMVW/LOSAT demonstrator had the ability to do parallel target engagements i.e. lay on and fire at four different targets at the same time. I would suggest that unique capability would be worth persuing in a missile armed vehicle, but we already have the LAV-TOW to do this with.
Wheeled vehicles also have ultimate limits in terms of overall weight (and thus protection), as well as ground pressure, which translates to limitations in tactical mobility. I myself am not overly bothered by this, a wheeled "cavalry team" with its own TTPs would be able to take advantage of the speed and mobility LAVs do offer, and Strykers have demonstrated they are robust vehicles so long as we respect their limits. Mobility and protection should be revisited with a LAV 3.5 service life extension program, replacing parts with reduced weight substitutes, modifying the suspension to reduce ground pressure and retrofitting crew stations to maximize situational awareness (a series of contradictory prescriptions, I know, but nevertheless).
Tanks still make the best MGS and MMEVs because they have all the above virtues in spades, but also have large protected ammunition racks (compare a LAV mounting a CV_CT turret with 32 rounds of 105mm to a Leopard C2 with 51 rounds of 105mm, and you get the idea), protection against a wide range of threats over a wide aspect, tactical mobility due to the tracked suspension and high power to weight ratio and the ability to manoeuvre in the face of enemy fire.
MGS and MMEV are really short and long range self propelled artillery platforms, but are using all kinds of clever tricks to try to get the job done. Let's just do what the REAL gunners do, lay on the gun and select the appropriate ammunition for the job. Any generation three, and most generation two tanks still in service have very sophisticated FCS which support fairly complex fire control solutions. Most modern tanks also have the ability to fire indirect with their gun laying instruments, allowing engagement of targets which are non line of sight. Conventional ammunition natures like APDSFS, HEAT-MP, HE and Smoke BE allow the tanker to engage a wide variety of hard and soft targets, and there are now through tube missiles on the market to extend the range out to 13km (LAHAT), as well as projected future "smart" rounds like TERM (Tank Extended Range Munitions) and STAFF (Sensor Target Activated Fire and Forget) to increase hit probabilities over an even wider range of conditions. With this in mind, we are really looking for a protected and mobile launch system, a M-109 "Paladin" or an FH-77 would do just fine if we were not too concerned about people shooting back.
Wheeled vehicles have demonstrated the ability to carry high velocity cannon and fire these types of rounds, in terms of firepower our objections to the MGS are based on the fact there is little ready ammunition and a lack of faith in the autoloader system. Armoured corps personnel I have spoken to, and first hand observation of an MGS prototype at the AUSA exhibition show deficiencies in the actual turret layout, the limited field of view hatches up or down being the worst problem. Certainly an MGS with a different turret layout that carries more ammunition in the ready rack would go a long way to silencing these objections.
Indeed a Fire Support Vehicle with a large capacity magazine or ready rack, sophisticated FCS and the ability to fire all the types of ammunition noted above would be able to serve both as the MGS AND the MMEV. As a bonus, such a vehicle tasked to perform the long range overwatch role will have more ammunition and be capable of a higher rate of fire than the MMEV as currently envisioned. A slight aside, the HMMVW/LOSAT demonstrator had the ability to do parallel target engagements i.e. lay on and fire at four different targets at the same time. I would suggest that unique capability would be worth persuing in a missile armed vehicle, but we already have the LAV-TOW to do this with.
Wheeled vehicles also have ultimate limits in terms of overall weight (and thus protection), as well as ground pressure, which translates to limitations in tactical mobility. I myself am not overly bothered by this, a wheeled "cavalry team" with its own TTPs would be able to take advantage of the speed and mobility LAVs do offer, and Strykers have demonstrated they are robust vehicles so long as we respect their limits. Mobility and protection should be revisited with a LAV 3.5 service life extension program, replacing parts with reduced weight substitutes, modifying the suspension to reduce ground pressure and retrofitting crew stations to maximize situational awareness (a series of contradictory prescriptions, I know, but nevertheless).
Tanks still make the best MGS and MMEVs because they have all the above virtues in spades, but also have large protected ammunition racks (compare a LAV mounting a CV_CT turret with 32 rounds of 105mm to a Leopard C2 with 51 rounds of 105mm, and you get the idea), protection against a wide range of threats over a wide aspect, tactical mobility due to the tracked suspension and high power to weight ratio and the ability to manoeuvre in the face of enemy fire.
Mortar guy
Sr. Member
- Reaction score
- 25
- Points
- 330
OK, guest, I hereby recommend you be banished to Poserland! I have just re-read some of your posts and have detected even more silliness that I just can't help but comment on.
Before we go any further, we should all know what kind of experience you have. You have written some things here that are so out in left field as to have me believe you wouldn't know an ADATS missile from a broomhandle. Also, are you suggesting that the defence industry is motivated only by providing the best possible product to the Army and not by profit? I would argue that defence industry has a long track record of providing substandard kit, late and over budget while still turning a very good profit. I don't deny that there are some smart people working on this but are they motivated by providing the most useful, relevant vehicle the Army needs or by keeping their jobs and maximizing corporate profits for the benefit of the shareholders? You put far too much faith in the altruistic nature of the defence industry. And besides, as I said earlier, a good chunk of the people I have met involved in this project are far too dazzled by the whiz-bangery of the MMEV to realize the Emperor has no clothes. Ask those same people about the tactical employment of the MMEV and they mumble something about range overmatch or information dominance (i.e spurious buzz words) and then quickly change the subject.
You predict that do you? This statement more than any other is what has convinced me that you need a one way ticket to Poserland. As of right now, the plan for the MMEV is a 3D air search/MTI radar and an enhanced EO ball. There are no plans for LADAR and the other two systems you described are RTF out of 'er. What exactly is a GPS/SAL in your mind and how would it be used for missile guidance? Do you know that GPS and SAL are in no way related (same thing for IIR and SAL). That's like saying "I think it should have a laser spot tracker/cheese sandwich guidance system". Here is a rundown of the guidance systems of the proposed weapons for the MMEV:
ADATS missile: laser beam rider using a digitally encoded Carbon dioxide laser.
Spike NT-D: Fire and forget (direct fire) or fibre optic (NLOS) using CCD/IIR guidance system.
SLAMRAAM: Active radar guidance with data-link mid course upgrade.
Hellfire: Semi-active laser seeker using A-Code lasers (Hellfire II) or millimeter-wave guidance (Longbow Hellfire)
APKWS: Semi-active laser seeker using A-Code lasers.
OK, so you mentioned a millimeter wave radar so I assume you would prefer the Longbow Hellfire. That means that you would require the following guidance systems:
Carbon-dioxide laser for ADATS along with IR missile localizer.
Fibre optic interface and EO CLU for Spike
Air search radar and datalink for SLAMRAAM
Millimeter wave radar for Longbow Hellfire
Code-A laser designator for APKWS (very different from the ADATS Carbon dioxide laser)
Oh, and I forgot to mention that there is a plan to mount a CASW on an OWS for local protection so there's another, stand-alone, system.
Here's where your brilliant fighter aircraft analogy falls apart. There is not a single fighter aircraft in the world that uses 5 different guidance systems for its weapons (including 2 different kinds of radar). Are you starting to understand? Even if we pretend that it wouldn't be difficult to train crewmen on 5 vastly different weapons systems; even if we believe that those complicated systems will be easy to maintain; and even if we argue that those capabilities are really needed in the Army; you still have the very real technical hurdle of mating all those incompatible weapons and guidance systems onto one platform. And I haven't even begun on the data radios or the Link 16 system yet! Still not convinced? Do you realize that none of these weapons have ever been integrated together on the same platform? Are you aware that almost all use different mounting systems? Why is the Army going to all the trouble of creating this system when it will not add any revolutionary capability to the battlefield and will be outclassed by other, cheaper systems now coming on line? I don't understand why everyone is not foaming at the mouth about this project!
MG
Before we go any further, we should all know what kind of experience you have. You have written some things here that are so out in left field as to have me believe you wouldn't know an ADATS missile from a broomhandle. Also, are you suggesting that the defence industry is motivated only by providing the best possible product to the Army and not by profit? I would argue that defence industry has a long track record of providing substandard kit, late and over budget while still turning a very good profit. I don't deny that there are some smart people working on this but are they motivated by providing the most useful, relevant vehicle the Army needs or by keeping their jobs and maximizing corporate profits for the benefit of the shareholders? You put far too much faith in the altruistic nature of the defence industry. And besides, as I said earlier, a good chunk of the people I have met involved in this project are far too dazzled by the whiz-bangery of the MMEV to realize the Emperor has no clothes. Ask those same people about the tactical employment of the MMEV and they mumble something about range overmatch or information dominance (i.e spurious buzz words) and then quickly change the subject.
You predict that do you? This statement more than any other is what has convinced me that you need a one way ticket to Poserland. As of right now, the plan for the MMEV is a 3D air search/MTI radar and an enhanced EO ball. There are no plans for LADAR and the other two systems you described are RTF out of 'er. What exactly is a GPS/SAL in your mind and how would it be used for missile guidance? Do you know that GPS and SAL are in no way related (same thing for IIR and SAL). That's like saying "I think it should have a laser spot tracker/cheese sandwich guidance system". Here is a rundown of the guidance systems of the proposed weapons for the MMEV:
ADATS missile: laser beam rider using a digitally encoded Carbon dioxide laser.
Spike NT-D: Fire and forget (direct fire) or fibre optic (NLOS) using CCD/IIR guidance system.
SLAMRAAM: Active radar guidance with data-link mid course upgrade.
Hellfire: Semi-active laser seeker using A-Code lasers (Hellfire II) or millimeter-wave guidance (Longbow Hellfire)
APKWS: Semi-active laser seeker using A-Code lasers.
OK, so you mentioned a millimeter wave radar so I assume you would prefer the Longbow Hellfire. That means that you would require the following guidance systems:
Carbon-dioxide laser for ADATS along with IR missile localizer.
Fibre optic interface and EO CLU for Spike
Air search radar and datalink for SLAMRAAM
Millimeter wave radar for Longbow Hellfire
Code-A laser designator for APKWS (very different from the ADATS Carbon dioxide laser)
Oh, and I forgot to mention that there is a plan to mount a CASW on an OWS for local protection so there's another, stand-alone, system.
Here's where your brilliant fighter aircraft analogy falls apart. There is not a single fighter aircraft in the world that uses 5 different guidance systems for its weapons (including 2 different kinds of radar). Are you starting to understand? Even if we pretend that it wouldn't be difficult to train crewmen on 5 vastly different weapons systems; even if we believe that those complicated systems will be easy to maintain; and even if we argue that those capabilities are really needed in the Army; you still have the very real technical hurdle of mating all those incompatible weapons and guidance systems onto one platform. And I haven't even begun on the data radios or the Link 16 system yet! Still not convinced? Do you realize that none of these weapons have ever been integrated together on the same platform? Are you aware that almost all use different mounting systems? Why is the Army going to all the trouble of creating this system when it will not add any revolutionary capability to the battlefield and will be outclassed by other, cheaper systems now coming on line? I don't understand why everyone is not foaming at the mouth about this project!
MG
Okay guys. I give up. You win. I don't know a thing....
As to who I am. I am not an employee of any Defence Firm.
I am a freelance contractor in the field
MG,
as to my GPS/SAL ref.
Handoff goes like this for NON-LOS:
UAV/ISTAR handoff
GPS-> Target Area/SAL for Target Acquisition (And don't tell me this isn't so-- thats how you make precision GPS.. precision)
It's not a big deal to switch modes
I don't remember claiming to be involved with the specific project.
I made some educated guesses based on what I've heard from some people who ARE involved.
(Not execs,or project liaison officers sitting in on briefings)
But the real geeks..the ones who make it happen.
My personal area of knowledge is more mechanical in nature.
I don't know how all of this is going to tie together. (for sure)
I'm told it will, I believe my colleagues.. obviously you don't.
MG, you seem well read up on various technologies, but you seem to discount completely any chance that maybe there MIGHT be ways around these intregration roadblocks you seem feel are insurmountable.
Again, I've been told different.
You guys don't believe me, call me a "poser"
(Why the hell would I pretend to be a Def. Civi-- If I was going to pose, at least give me credit.. I'd pretend to be a OMG-DELTA1111)
Thats fine.. I can't offer any "proof" at this time.. so I'll accept that moniker for now.
When CANSEC comes around, I'll PM a few of you and perhaps we can have a discussion over coffee.
I could get into alot of trouble by posting here, in fact.. I see that I shouldn't have.
I've been lurking at this board for years, I've learned my lesson and will go back to lurking..
Thanks for you time Gentlemen.
As to who I am. I am not an employee of any Defence Firm.
I am a freelance contractor in the field
MG,
as to my GPS/SAL ref.
Handoff goes like this for NON-LOS:
UAV/ISTAR handoff
GPS-> Target Area/SAL for Target Acquisition (And don't tell me this isn't so-- thats how you make precision GPS.. precision)
It's not a big deal to switch modes
I don't remember claiming to be involved with the specific project.
I made some educated guesses based on what I've heard from some people who ARE involved.
(Not execs,or project liaison officers sitting in on briefings)
But the real geeks..the ones who make it happen.
My personal area of knowledge is more mechanical in nature.
I don't know how all of this is going to tie together. (for sure)
I'm told it will, I believe my colleagues.. obviously you don't.
MG, you seem well read up on various technologies, but you seem to discount completely any chance that maybe there MIGHT be ways around these intregration roadblocks you seem feel are insurmountable.
Again, I've been told different.
You guys don't believe me, call me a "poser"
(Why the hell would I pretend to be a Def. Civi-- If I was going to pose, at least give me credit.. I'd pretend to be a OMG-DELTA1111)
Thats fine.. I can't offer any "proof" at this time.. so I'll accept that moniker for now.
When CANSEC comes around, I'll PM a few of you and perhaps we can have a discussion over coffee.
I could get into alot of trouble by posting here, in fact.. I see that I shouldn't have.
I've been lurking at this board for years, I've learned my lesson and will go back to lurking..
Thanks for you time Gentlemen.
- Reaction score
- 21,931
- Points
- 1,260
Guest -- firstly the way the LAV ejects spent casings was the cause of the turret stoppage -- depending upon the direction of the turret to the hull expended casings can and do get caught up on the turret - same with spent links - where the commander has to lean way out and clear the link discharge door and the 7.62mm brass and link.
WRT the MGS - I dont trust anything that cant reload on the move and continue engaging.
WRT the MGS - I dont trust anything that cant reload on the move and continue engaging.
Mortar guy
Sr. Member
- Reaction score
- 25
- Points
- 330
Dude, (i.e. 'Guest') for the last time and for all that is good and holy, stay within your friggin lane!!
There is no such ground launched weapon in existence! I say again, there is no ground launched missile in production right now, to the best of my knowledge, that uses GPS to get to a target area and then semi-active laser homing for terminal guidance. None! And, if there is, it is not one of the missile proposed for the MMEV. And you wonder why you get called a poser?
Again, read my posts. I conceded that it might be technically feasible but at what cost? And to what benefit? You could make the MMEV hover is you threw enough cash at the program but what is the friggin point?
Ah, at last the truth begins to emerge. You may have heard something from some guy who sweeps floors at the Oerlikon plant and you are only guessing at the technical stuff. See, all this embarrassment on your part could have been avoided if you had just stated what you know, stated what was your opinion, and kept your 'educated guesses' to yourself. You see, a lot of people come here looking for good discussion of the topics of the day based on knowledge, experience or opinion backed with good helpings of knowledge and experience. Second or third hand information and educated guesses do not make for intelligent debate.
Shot over!
MG
There is no such ground launched weapon in existence! I say again, there is no ground launched missile in production right now, to the best of my knowledge, that uses GPS to get to a target area and then semi-active laser homing for terminal guidance. None! And, if there is, it is not one of the missile proposed for the MMEV. And you wonder why you get called a poser?
Again, read my posts. I conceded that it might be technically feasible but at what cost? And to what benefit? You could make the MMEV hover is you threw enough cash at the program but what is the friggin point?
Ah, at last the truth begins to emerge. You may have heard something from some guy who sweeps floors at the Oerlikon plant and you are only guessing at the technical stuff. See, all this embarrassment on your part could have been avoided if you had just stated what you know, stated what was your opinion, and kept your 'educated guesses' to yourself. You see, a lot of people come here looking for good discussion of the topics of the day based on knowledge, experience or opinion backed with good helpings of knowledge and experience. Second or third hand information and educated guesses do not make for intelligent debate.
Shot over!
MG
Lance Wiebe
Sr. Member
- Reaction score
- 6
- Points
- 230
Shot out!
I, like others, can actually see a role for the MGS, despite its oh so many shortcomings.
I just can't figure out how we are going to use the MMEV in the "three block war".
Here's my prediction: If in fact we go ahead with this boondoggle, the MMEV will be the most expensive army vehicle ever produced, and will have a VOR rate of 50%. (minimum)
I, like others, can actually see a role for the MGS, despite its oh so many shortcomings.
I just can't figure out how we are going to use the MMEV in the "three block war".
Here's my prediction: If in fact we go ahead with this boondoggle, the MMEV will be the most expensive army vehicle ever produced, and will have a VOR rate of 50%. (minimum)
Mortar guy
Sr. Member
- Reaction score
- 25
- Points
- 330
Lance,
I totally agree with you - the MGS does have its uses. It is a decent (not great but decent) Assault Gun and would be suitable for bunker busting, blowing holes in walls, convoy escort etc. This is what the US Army Operational Requirements Document says the MGS will be used for. On the other hand, our SOR says that the MGS will have to be able to take on T-72Ms, BMPs and the like. In other words, we see the MGS as a Tank Destroyer and in my opinion it makes a very poor Tank Destroyer (even with the TUA and MMEV backing it up). If we bring our MGS usage in line with what the vehicle is capable of, it will be OK. Now the MMEV...
MG
I totally agree with you - the MGS does have its uses. It is a decent (not great but decent) Assault Gun and would be suitable for bunker busting, blowing holes in walls, convoy escort etc. This is what the US Army Operational Requirements Document says the MGS will be used for. On the other hand, our SOR says that the MGS will have to be able to take on T-72Ms, BMPs and the like. In other words, we see the MGS as a Tank Destroyer and in my opinion it makes a very poor Tank Destroyer (even with the TUA and MMEV backing it up). If we bring our MGS usage in line with what the vehicle is capable of, it will be OK. Now the MMEV...
MG
- Reaction score
- 8,295
- Points
- 1,160
So Mortar Guy:
Leaving aside the heavy armour discussion for a moment do I take it that in your opinion, the money being spent on the MMEV portion of the DFS Regiment would be better spent, perhaps, on some combination of more readily available artillery systems such as LAV-AMOS, M777, and the Netfires LAM-PAM missiles?
Actually one area that I have had problems with is understanding what the missile vehicles in the DFS system have been intended for. The TUA in particular seems to be redundant since similarly capable missiles, or in fact more capable missiles, could be mounted right on LAVIIIs which then could be grouped in a troop with a pair of MGS for heavier DFS.
At the same time, as you point out, the MMEV appears to be a Direct Fire System that overlaps with the TUA at one corner of its operational envelope and at another corner, perhaps its most survivable usage, it is actually an Indirect Fire System.
Is there much that an MGS/LAVIII-Spike troop backed up by available artillery could not accomplish that the MGS/TUA/MMEV could?
Leaving aside the heavy armour discussion for a moment do I take it that in your opinion, the money being spent on the MMEV portion of the DFS Regiment would be better spent, perhaps, on some combination of more readily available artillery systems such as LAV-AMOS, M777, and the Netfires LAM-PAM missiles?
Actually one area that I have had problems with is understanding what the missile vehicles in the DFS system have been intended for. The TUA in particular seems to be redundant since similarly capable missiles, or in fact more capable missiles, could be mounted right on LAVIIIs which then could be grouped in a troop with a pair of MGS for heavier DFS.
At the same time, as you point out, the MMEV appears to be a Direct Fire System that overlaps with the TUA at one corner of its operational envelope and at another corner, perhaps its most survivable usage, it is actually an Indirect Fire System.
Is there much that an MGS/LAVIII-Spike troop backed up by available artillery could not accomplish that the MGS/TUA/MMEV could?
TangoTwoBravo
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Zoiks. We've been wrapped around this particular axle for some time now.
The MMEV strikes me as a Cold War system. I'm sure it appeals to some as a WW III version of the 88mm gun. Put twenty or so in a CMBG in Germany or Treblikastan and just dare those MRRs, Hinds and Frogfoots to come across the plains. ADATs was a wonderful JANUS weapon, as it was given a big bubble of omnisicience. Parked on a high feature it would happily fire off its load at red armour.
I'm not sure that the reality would be the same. Regardless, given that in our current operating environment we will either be securing a country or undertaking offensive operations the MMEV has somewhat limited utility. We've talked about ISTAR thresholds and other terms to get to the point that the enemy has a vote. He is not a JANUS icon dutifully waiting to be engaged. The enemy will conceal himself in complex terrain or among the population. Many times he will get the first shot (all else being equal).
Experience in Iraq (both wars) seem to indicate that the close battle is still a close battle. The enemy situation is rarely known with great fidelity at the tactical level. Firepower and mobility are important, but so is the ability to take hits as well.
The idea of long range missile systems, anti-tank or anti-aircraft, is certainly not a bad one. I just don't see them as a solution on their own. I favour the idea of putting ATGM launchers on Coyotes and LAVs, but we've been down this road as well. Iraq and Afghanistan also seem to tell us that the full gamut of fire support systems are also needed, ranging from 60mm mortars at company level to B52s dropping JDAMs. If we are trying to match our resources to the threat, we need to compare the most likely with the most dangerous. Perhaps the most dangerous threat is a near-peer nation with massive AFV forces coming across an international border that we happen to be on the other side of. The most likely, however, is that we are stabilizing a failed state. The MMEV seems to be designed for the former.
Looking at MGS, I still go back and forth on this one. It is difficult to make judgements not having had the chance to get my hands on one or read accounts of those who have. I have spoken with South African fellows who employed small armoured cars with 90mm guns against everything from trucks to T34s and T55s. As a "recce" platform delivering anti-tank fires, the MGS may well have a niche to fill, although of course the whole 25mm vs 105mm vs TOW argument needs to be made here as well. In a stability operation with "neutral" warlords about that own T55s etc, the MGS may present somewhat of a deterrent if included in a task force. The MGS may have an advantage over missile systems in urban terrain.
The MMEV strikes me as a Cold War system. I'm sure it appeals to some as a WW III version of the 88mm gun. Put twenty or so in a CMBG in Germany or Treblikastan and just dare those MRRs, Hinds and Frogfoots to come across the plains. ADATs was a wonderful JANUS weapon, as it was given a big bubble of omnisicience. Parked on a high feature it would happily fire off its load at red armour.
I'm not sure that the reality would be the same. Regardless, given that in our current operating environment we will either be securing a country or undertaking offensive operations the MMEV has somewhat limited utility. We've talked about ISTAR thresholds and other terms to get to the point that the enemy has a vote. He is not a JANUS icon dutifully waiting to be engaged. The enemy will conceal himself in complex terrain or among the population. Many times he will get the first shot (all else being equal).
Experience in Iraq (both wars) seem to indicate that the close battle is still a close battle. The enemy situation is rarely known with great fidelity at the tactical level. Firepower and mobility are important, but so is the ability to take hits as well.
The idea of long range missile systems, anti-tank or anti-aircraft, is certainly not a bad one. I just don't see them as a solution on their own. I favour the idea of putting ATGM launchers on Coyotes and LAVs, but we've been down this road as well. Iraq and Afghanistan also seem to tell us that the full gamut of fire support systems are also needed, ranging from 60mm mortars at company level to B52s dropping JDAMs. If we are trying to match our resources to the threat, we need to compare the most likely with the most dangerous. Perhaps the most dangerous threat is a near-peer nation with massive AFV forces coming across an international border that we happen to be on the other side of. The most likely, however, is that we are stabilizing a failed state. The MMEV seems to be designed for the former.
Looking at MGS, I still go back and forth on this one. It is difficult to make judgements not having had the chance to get my hands on one or read accounts of those who have. I have spoken with South African fellows who employed small armoured cars with 90mm guns against everything from trucks to T34s and T55s. As a "recce" platform delivering anti-tank fires, the MGS may well have a niche to fill, although of course the whole 25mm vs 105mm vs TOW argument needs to be made here as well. In a stability operation with "neutral" warlords about that own T55s etc, the MGS may present somewhat of a deterrent if included in a task force. The MGS may have an advantage over missile systems in urban terrain.
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2B: Wrapped indeed.
Just one point that I would make about your threat assesment. You seem to be suggesting that you might either be involved in securing a border or be involved in securing a failed state. Isn't it as likely that you will be involved in both simultaneously, ie. securing the borders of a failed/failing/recovering state against incursions at the same time as assisting in the process of securing the state itself? It seems to me that Iraq, Afghanistan and Eritrea (for that matter most of the African issues) all fall into this category. Iraq and Eritrea being examples of instances where there are conventionally armed forces on the borders waiting for a sufficient weakening of the defending state that they can then intervene successfully.
Further, given that there are a lot more poor people living in sub-par states than rich people living in approved states it seems likely that forces like Canada's involved in stability ops are always going to find themselves at a numeric disadvantage. Trading infanteer for infanteer, tank for tank or even fighter for fighter seems unlikely to be a winning formula in that case. We need to supply you with that infamous "over-match" capability. IMHO TTPs and Quality will only get you so far down that path, allowing for exchange ratios of 2-5:1. Technology seems to offer the only chance of achieving ratios of 10-20:1 and those ratios are only transitory. They are only possible until the enemy figures out a counter. Apaches were once considered to have an exchange rate of 10-20:1. I wonder if the expectations are still the same after the abortive Apache raid during the advance to Baghdad?
I am still confused about the role and viability of the MMEV, and I have no way of knowing if it could achieve a 10-20:1 exchange rate, but your statement
may in fact be its best justification. Assuming it works.
Cheers.
TangoTwoBravo
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Indeed. Places like Iraq are surrounded by neighbours who could indeed pose a "conventional" threat. Whether a MMEV is the best counter is a good question (assuming that the technology can be sorted out).
"Overmatch" is an interesting term and exchange ratios were certainly in vogue during the cold war. Overmatch that relies on the enemy not getting a shot in is somewhat optimistic in my opinion. M1s and Challengers took hits during both Gulf Wars but were able to survive and in turn destroy their opponents.
Whether the extra range of a MMEV (lets say 8 km for giggles) over a 4 of 5 km range for other missiles makes is worthwhile is an interesting question as well. Questions of target identification at that range must also be considered.
If you were securing a "failed state" against insurgents with the added fun of potentially hostile neighbours would you rather have:
(1) a force of M1s and LAV IIIs with TOW/Spike etc bolted on backed up by mortars, artillery and air support; or
(2) a force of LAV IIIs, MGS and MMEV backed up by mortars, artillery and air support?
If you absolutely had to get there quickly I suppose you would opt for version 2, but even then you might be tempted to go for the LAV IIIs with TOW/Spike etc to give you a little more simplicity and flexibility. If we are really worried about conventional neighbours attacking with AFVs then our coalition air power will be a huge deterent. If we are facing a true "peer" state then I suppose we are in trouble, but again we should look at the "most dangerous" vs "most likely" scenario.
Looking at the Apaches, while I was attending staff training down south the AH64 battalion was a big part of the Div Commander's "deep battle", along with his battery of MLRS (structures have since changed). That being said, one of my instructors had been in the first Gulf War on M1s and commented that his Division had used the Apaches to accompany the ground forces. A pair of Apaches would fly just behind the lead tanks to give a little extra view out front and engage at long range with Hellfires. A somewhat different and "lunchbox" approach than doctrine suggested but effective nonetheless. He commented as well that one Apache got out front a little and ended up getting shot down. The ground forces and Apaches offered each other mutual support when they worked together. Off topic. Sorry.
Cheers,
2B
"Overmatch" is an interesting term and exchange ratios were certainly in vogue during the cold war. Overmatch that relies on the enemy not getting a shot in is somewhat optimistic in my opinion. M1s and Challengers took hits during both Gulf Wars but were able to survive and in turn destroy their opponents.
Whether the extra range of a MMEV (lets say 8 km for giggles) over a 4 of 5 km range for other missiles makes is worthwhile is an interesting question as well. Questions of target identification at that range must also be considered.
If you were securing a "failed state" against insurgents with the added fun of potentially hostile neighbours would you rather have:
(1) a force of M1s and LAV IIIs with TOW/Spike etc bolted on backed up by mortars, artillery and air support; or
(2) a force of LAV IIIs, MGS and MMEV backed up by mortars, artillery and air support?
If you absolutely had to get there quickly I suppose you would opt for version 2, but even then you might be tempted to go for the LAV IIIs with TOW/Spike etc to give you a little more simplicity and flexibility. If we are really worried about conventional neighbours attacking with AFVs then our coalition air power will be a huge deterent. If we are facing a true "peer" state then I suppose we are in trouble, but again we should look at the "most dangerous" vs "most likely" scenario.
Looking at the Apaches, while I was attending staff training down south the AH64 battalion was a big part of the Div Commander's "deep battle", along with his battery of MLRS (structures have since changed). That being said, one of my instructors had been in the first Gulf War on M1s and commented that his Division had used the Apaches to accompany the ground forces. A pair of Apaches would fly just behind the lead tanks to give a little extra view out front and engage at long range with Hellfires. A somewhat different and "lunchbox" approach than doctrine suggested but effective nonetheless. He commented as well that one Apache got out front a little and ended up getting shot down. The ground forces and Apaches offered each other mutual support when they worked together. Off topic. Sorry.
Cheers,
2B
Even worse, the limit on Canadian staying power (or Western staying power for that matter) isn't the absolute number of troops on the ground, but rather the number of casulties the government/public is willing to sustain before pulling out - and that number is a good deal smaller than the total number of boots on the ground.
Unless they are physically surrounded and prevented from leaving, no modern Western nation will let its forces fight to the last man.
That suggests to me that it becomes imperative to not only be able to defeat the enemy as quickly as possible (to reduce the opportunity for him to inflict casulties) but it is imperative to have exceptional defensive capabilities. You need to be able to take hits and not incur casulties.
But at the same time... I've also become completely convinced that NO enemy is EVER truly defeated until he has become your staunch ally (see Marshall Plan) That means willing the hearts and minds of the local population, because the natural recourse for a heavily overmatched fighting force is to move to insergent/guerillia warfare, and the insergent/guerillia needs the tacit support of the local population in order to operate freely. So that tells me that not only do you have to defeat the enemy fighting forces as quickly and decisively as possible, you also have to to it with the minimum possible footprint on noncombatives.
On the surface, that might seem like a plea for more smart weapons, but I don't think that's the case. Instead, I think it is a requirement for better, faster, and more precise target acquisition, tied to a weapon system that exerts just enough force to eliminate the target with little to no collateral damage.
That sounds to me like a weapon system that can roll into an area with near-absolute impunity, decisively identify targets at its leisure, and then kill them with a pinpoint weapon.
What might that be I wonder?
I'll take the M1s, thanks.
DG
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looking at a bigger picture approach (and not postulating any magic weapons systems) then a Cavalry formation using the MGS as an assault gun backed by an improved LAV-TOW for long range overwatch is probably the best of all possible worlds. With an all LAV force we get a "sort of" balanced combat team formation. the ability to use speed to keep enemies off balance and provide Kinetic effects through most of the full spectrum of operations, either individually, or as part of a larger formation. (A LAV Cavalry team could provide a cordon around an urban area while the M-1 equipped battlegroup moves in, for example).
Since I am pretty sure this is the actual "End State" that is being envisioned for the transformation, we need to find the most cost effective way of achieving this, and of course the best "technical" solution to the tactical, operational and strategic problems being faced. I am on record as liking a LAV III equipped with a 105 MM CV_CT turret to fill the role of the MGS, and I can make a strong case for using different ammunition natures to fulfill most of the projected roles of the MMEV.
Since I am pretty sure this is the actual "End State" that is being envisioned for the transformation, we need to find the most cost effective way of achieving this, and of course the best "technical" solution to the tactical, operational and strategic problems being faced. I am on record as liking a LAV III equipped with a 105 MM CV_CT turret to fill the role of the MGS, and I can make a strong case for using different ammunition natures to fulfill most of the projected roles of the MMEV.
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