Informing the Army’s Future Structure

[Kirkhill]

And watch the volunteers flood through the recruiting office doors.

 

[FJAG]

... just structure it in a way that makes logical sense to meet the needs of Canada as determined by the Army.

And therein lies the rub.

The RegF, while professional, is consumed by day-to-day challenges and allocates resources accordingly. The ResF, by whatever name, is tomorrow's "break glass" force. Long term planning can be deferred on the basis of accepting the risk that tomorrow never comes.

When there is a daily struggle for resources those professional decision makers will inevitably default to determining that the needs of Canada do not require a well trained, well equipped, nor well organized tomorrow army at the expense of today's army.

I personally think that the army, and its reserve component, should be structured to meet the needs of Canada as determined by the government. The government consistently fail to do that in a meaningful way (in large measure because they do not get the advice from senior leadership that it is essential). I agree that the army should step in and lead with a vision. Unfortunately 50 years of history has shown the army incapable of moving the goal posts in any meaningful way.

This isn't just meaningless quibbling between professionals and amateurs. This is a deep-seated disagreement over a critical, fundamental issue that's been facing the army for a long time. There's a level of professional arrogance coming from the leadership which, unfortunately, has been bolstered by the fact that for 50 years our security has never been seriously challenged. That makes it very easy to keep ones head buried in the sand. Canada's army has calcified into a status quo that will continue the ongoing death spiral as personnel costs rise and capabilities lag. Our defence outputs seriously fall short of the defence inputs provided which in themselves are inadequate. Our allies see that. You can be sure our potential adversaries do as well.

 

[markppcli]

And watch the volunteers flood through the recruiting office doors.

I don’t know what you’re trying to say here. Reserve units can recruit as it stands now. I don’t think you’ll see a swarm of recruits with your many proposals for vital point guards and what ever else. Or a home guard that’s purely voluntary. We have historically only seen recruiting boons when we’re engaged in combat operations. Young men march to the sound of guns and all that. Also I’m not sure how well versed you are in our recruiting issues, I’m assuming not well because anyone who’s worked in recruiting will tell you the same thing; people are walking in the door, we just can’t process them. So again I don’t know what you’re trying to say, but if it’s what I think it has no basis in fact.

And therein lies the rub.

The RegF, while professional, is consumed by day-to-day challenges and allocates resources accordingly. The ResF, by whatever name, is tomorrow's "break glass" force. Long term planning can be deferred on the basis of accepting the risk that tomorrow never comes.

When there is a daily struggle for resources those professional decision makers will inevitably default to determining that the needs of Canada do not require a well trained, well equipped, nor well organized tomorrow army at the expense of today's army.

I personally think that the army, and its reserve component, should be structured to meet the needs of Canada as determined by the government. The government consistently fail to do that in a meaningful way (in large measure because they do not get the advice from senior leadership that it is essential). I agree that the army should step in and lead with a vision. Unfortunately 50 years of history has shown the army incapable of moving the goal posts in any meaningful way.

This isn't just meaningless quibbling between professionals and amateurs. This is a deep-seated disagreement over a critical, fundamental issue that's been facing the army for a long time. There's a level of professional arrogance coming from the leadership which, unfortunately, has been bolstered by the fact that for 50 years our security has never been seriously challenged. That makes it very easy to keep ones head buried in the sand. Canada's army has calcified into a status quo that will continue the ongoing death spiral as personnel costs rise and capabilities lag. Our defence outputs seriously fall short of the defence inputs provided which in themselves are inadequate. Our allies see that. You can be sure our potential adversaries do as well.

What I’m trying to say is the Government tells the CDS you will provide X. It’s then passed down and it’s up to the Army not the Regs and Reserves separately, the Army, to determine how that is met. The first step isn’t saying “well how does this benefit the reserves and maintain the proud traditions of the Flinflon Fusiliers and their stellar work during Op Snowgoose in 1983, the first decision should be how does this contribute to what the government wants and needs. I see a lot of the discussion on here being led with “well the reserves could do this” vice the Canadian Army should be able to provide X, and the way it should do that is Y.

 

[Colin Parkinson]

What the government wants fluctuates wildly and trying to follow that ball will cause you problems. What Canada wants and needs is a different thing from the government of the day. Trying to get to that place is hard though.

 

[Rifleman62]

Local military reserve units hiring "full steam ahead"

If you're looking for a new adventure, the Army Reserve in Windsor and Chatham is recruiting.

windsornewstoday.ca

 

[Kirkhill]

I got curious as to how many ways you can end up serving Uncle Sam.

Active Duty
Reserve Component

Reserve Component (RC) Soldiers mainly perform part-time duties as opposed to the full-time (active duty) Soldiers, but rotate through mobilizations to full-time duty. When not on active duty, RC Soldiers typically perform training and service one weekend per month, currently referred to as Battle Assembly, and for two continuous weeks at a time during the year referred to as Annual Training (AT). Many RC Soldiers are organized into Army Reserve troop program units (TPU), while others serve in active Army units as Individual Mobilization Augmentees (IMA), or are in non-drilling control groups of the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR). Soldiers may also serve on active duty in an Active Guard/Reserve (AGR) status in support of the United States Army Reserve (USAR) mission or through Active Duty Operational Support (ADOS) and Contingency Operations-Active Duty Operational Support (CO-ADOS) missions.

All United States Army soldiers sign an initial eight-year service contract upon entry into the military. Occasionally, the contract specifies that some of the service will be in the Regular Army (also called Active Component/AC) for two, three, or four-year periods; with the remaining obligation served in the RC. Though typically, soldiers sign contracts specifying that all eight years be served in the RC, with the first six years in drilling status and the last two years in a non-drilling IRR status.

Soldiers entering directly into the U.S. Army Reserve nevertheless encompasses a period of initial entry training (IET). The amount of time begins with approximately nine weeks of Basic Combat Training (BCT), but total IET time varies according to the enlistee's elected Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) which dictates Advanced Individual Training (AIT). All U.S. Army Reserve Soldiers are subject to mobilization throughout the term of their enlistment. Soldiers who, after completing the AC portion of their enlistment contract choose not to re-enlist on active duty, are automatically transferred to the RC to complete the remainder of their Statutory Obligation (eight-year service total) and may be served in a drilling Troop Program Unit (TPU), Individual Mobilization Augmentee (IMA), or Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) status.

Non-commissioned officers of the rank of Staff Sergeant (E-6) and above will reenlist for an indefinite status after they have served for 12 years of service or more.

Ready Reserve - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

Selected Reserve - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

Individual Ready Reserve - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

Standby Reserve - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

Retired Reserve - Force Composition

Then, of course there are the multiple ways you can become an officer.

Or you can join the National Guard

Army National Guard Federal and State Missions

Unlike other branches of the U.S. military, the National Guard takes on different responsibilities at the state and federal level.

www.military.com

Excuse a bit of cutting and pasting here.

The Army National Guard is a partner with the Active Army and the Army Reserves in fulfilling the country's military needs.

​

State​

The Army National Guard exists in all 50 states, three territories and the District of Columbia. The state, territory or district leadership are the Commanders in Chief for each Guard. Their Adjutants General are answerable to them for the training and readiness of the units.

At the state level, the governors reserve the ability, under the Constitution of the United States, to call up members of the National Guard in time of domestic emergencies or need.

The Army National Guard's state mission is perhaps the most visible and well known. Nearly everyone has seen or heard of Guard units responding to battle fires or helping communities deal with floods, tornadoes, hurricanes, snowstorms or other emergency situations. In times of civil unrest, the citizens of a state can rest assured that the Guard will be ready to respond, if needed.

​

Federal​

During peacetime each state National Guard answers to leadership in the 50 states, three territories and the District of Columbia. During national emergencies, however, the President reserves the right to mobilize the National Guard, putting them in federal duty status.

While federalized, the units answer to the Combatant Commander of the theatre in which they are operating and, ultimately, to the President.

Even when not federalized, the Army National Guard has a federal obligation (or mission.) That mission is to maintain properly trained and equipped units, available for prompt mobilization for war, national emergency, or as otherwise needed.

Active Guard Reserve - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

Inactive National Guard - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

Then, of course, the USMC has its own separate sets of options.

And you could always serve as a civilian.


It seems kind of like that add about the airline passengers. Not everybody signs the same contract. The person beside you may have agreed to different terms entirely.


It is almost as if the Americans were trying to be flexible to attract recruits.

 

[Kirkhill]

The National Guard - Official Website of the National Guard

The National Guard continues its historic dual mission, providing trained units to the states, territories and the District of Columbia and keeping itself equipped to protect life and property. The Guard also provides trained units to the nation equipped and ready to defend the United States and its interests all over the globe.

The Guard's "Champion" - Chief of the National Guard Bureau and Joint Chief of Staff

General Daniel R. Hokanson serves as the 29th Chief of the National Guard Bureau and as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In this capacity, he serves as a military adviser to the President, Secretary of Defense, National Security Council and is the Department of Defense’s official channel of communication to the Governors and State Adjutants General on all matters pertaining to the National Guard. He is responsible for ensuring the more than 453,000 Army and Air National Guard personnel are accessible, capable and ready to protect the homeland and provide combat ready resources to the Army and Air Force.

A Four Star - Equivalent to Commandant USMC and Chiefs of Staff of Army, Navy, Air Force and Space and a step above the Commandant Coast Guard.

National Guard (United States) - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

 

[Kirkhill]

The US Government supplies the State National Guards with the necessary kit to perform their Federal Roles.

Army National Guard - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

The Army National Guard (ARNG), in conjunction with the Air National Guard, is an organized militia force and a federal military reserve force of the United States Army. They are simultaneously part of two different organizations: the ARNG of each state, most territories, and the District of Columbia (also referred to as the Militia of the United States), as well as the federal ARNG (as part of the U.S. National Guard). The ARNG is divided into subordinate units stationed in each U.S. region, operating under their respective governors and governor-equivalents.[4]

The Army National Guard (ARNG) as currently authorized and organized operates under Title 10 of the United States Code when under federal control, and Title 32 of the United States Code and applicable state laws when under state control. The ARNG may be called up for active duty by the state or territorial governors to help respond to domestic emergencies and disasters, such as those caused by hurricanes, floods, and earthquakes, as well as civil disorder.[4] The District of Columbia Army National Guard is a federal militia, controlled by the President of the United States with authority delegated to the Secretary of Defense, and through him to the Secretary of the Army.[7]

Members or units of the ARNG may be ordered, temporarily or indefinitely, into the service of the U.S.[8][9] If mobilized for federal service, the member or unit becomes part of the U.S. ARNG, which is a reserve component of the U.S. Army.[10][11][12] Individuals volunteering for active federal service may do so subject to the consent of their governors.[13] Largely on the basis of a 1990 U.S. Supreme Court decision, governors generally cannot veto involuntary activations of individuals or units for federal service, either for training or national emergency.[14]

The President may also call up members and units of the ARNG, in its status as the militia of the several states, to repel invasion, suppress rebellion, or enforce federal laws.[15] The U.S. ARNG is one of two organizations administered by the National Guard Bureau, the other being the U.S. Air National Guard. The Director of the ARNG is the head of the organization, and reports to the Chief of the National Guard Bureau. Because the ARNG is both the militia of the several states and a federal reserve component of the Army, neither the Chief of the National Guard Bureau nor the Director of the ARNG "commands" it. This operational command authority is performed in each state or territory by the State Adjutant General, and in the District of Columbia by the Commanding General of the D.C. National Guard when a unit is in its militia status. While under federal activation, the operational command authority is transferred to the commanders of the unified combatant commands, who command all U.S. forces within their area of responsibility. The Chief of the National Guard Bureau and the Director of the ARNG serve as the channel of communications between the Department of the Army and the ARNG in each state and territory, and administer federal programs, policies, and resources for the National Guard.[16]

That is a hybrid organization composed of multiple types of "volunteers".

Some of them are career Army.

 

[FJAG]

What I’m trying to say is the Government tells the CDS you will provide X.

I think its a lot more two-way than that. I expect that there is a lot of push back coming from the L1s through the CDS as to what we can do with what we got and here are our options if we stay status quo with funding and what will change if funding goes up or down. It covers the broad picture and leaves the details to the L1s once the left and right of arcs are understood by both.

It’s then passed down and it’s up to the Army not the Regs and Reserves separately, the Army, to determine how that is met.

True enough and that gets us to the points I raised about the day-to-day army and how its needs are seen as the priority for the governments needs rather than the tomorrow "break glass" army.

The first step isn’t saying “well how does this benefit the reserves and maintain the proud traditions of the Flinflon Fusiliers and their stellar work during Op Snowgoose in 1983, the first decision should be how does this contribute to what the government wants and needs.

And that's where things go off the rail with the RegF. It's a common misconception amongst the RegF that the ResF thinks in those terms. Which, by the way is a bit condescending. You get exactly the same thought process at the L2 tables when one discusses the issue of where do the tanks go or should the Patricias have a mortar platoon or whose PYs do we cut to create yet another divisional headquarters. Do you really think the government decided it wanted and needed 5 divisional headquarters?

We almost agree on one point at the end there. I do believe that the primary consideration should be "what does the country need?" Governments are too fickle and military leadership is too parochial to make truly dispassionate decisions vis a vis the country's needs.

IMHO, we'd be much better off if existing governments and militaries understood clearly that there will be another war at some point in the future that will involve Canada. We are already a target and the shaping operations have begun. It is time to stop thinking about how to keep the current PYs churning and how to build a viable force for the future. There is a key factor that the RegF dismisses entirely when it makes its little jokes about the Flin Flon Fusiliers - that's the fact that for every RegF PY you can hire and keep 5-6 reservists. It's that equipment kept in reserve lasts substantially longer than equipment which is continuously used. It's an economy of effort/force thing. Those reservists have little or no value for the country if not properly trained or equipped. Whether Canada's ResF is of value to the country is entirely up to Canada's RegF leadership. Their track record is not good. ResF leadership in this country has no power regardless of how much power Reserves 2000 thinks it has or the RegF thinks it might have.

I see a lot of the discussion on here being led with “well the reserves could do this” vice the Canadian Army should be able to provide X, and the way it should do that is Y.

That's parsing the language too literally. Most folks in this discussion are tossing out ideas knowing full well that there are no decision makers to influence in this forum. The point of the matter is that the RegF should be looking beyond using the reserves as Class B office overloads. NDHQ looks at ResF as having value if it is doing something for the CF today - right now. That's missing the point entirely. A ResF is there for tomorrow by definition. It's primary job is to prepare for tomorrow. Again, IMHO, that's what most of the "well the reserves could do this" is about. What are the jobs the reserves should be preparing for that the RegF leadership has its head stuck in the sand about.

Sometimes when I'm feeling a little weak I seem to almost go over to @Kirkhill's dark side and say to myself - right - two defence budgets: a RegF today budget and a ResF tomorrow budget instead of the phoney baloney budgets that we have where the Class A (tomorrow) budgets get eroded by the Class Bs (today folks) that seem to infest every corner of NDHQ and other headquarters.

Rant off.

 

[Kirkhill]

For the record - and for those few of you that didn't know - I was born in Scotland.
The only time that I ever wore a kilt or a Balmoral was when I paraded with the Calgary Highlanders.
To be absolutely blunt the headdress that I envied the most, from the time I could walk, was the Aussie slouch hat. I would be ecstatic if the entire Canadian Army, Regs and Reserves, could come together under one similar, iconic, symbol so that they all looked the same.

For me this would be distinction enough.



I know that my harping on about the Militia grates but I really, honestly and strongly believe that something important was lost when the Militia became The Primary Reserve.

Why do I belt on about the National Guard? Because I think it is a good workable compromise.
The National Guard is one, singular, unique part of the US Army Reserve system.
There are multiple Reserves that feed directly into the Army.
The National Guard is one of them.

But the National Guard also incorporates a whole bunch of other people that want to be able to assist their community. Some do it for pay. Some do it for other more personal reasons. Some are available all year round "after hours". Some are only available on weekends or for disasters. Some can make themselves available for foreign commitments alongside their Regular and Reserve brothers and sisters. And all of them are willing to put themselves at the disposal of their local Governor and their President and trust that they will only be called to the colours if the need is real and great.

And somehow, the US Army manages to make a home for these part time soldiers on terms that appeal to them.

Not everybody that is interested in serving their country needs to serve it in the back of an APC.

All I'm asking is that the problem be considered, not just from the Army's perception of its needs, but also from the Government's perception of its needs and the citizenry's perceptions of how they can assist.


Take the issue of Vital Point Security and Airfield Guards. Apparently no real soldier wants to do that job. I mean.... how demeaning. Hanging around a hangar door with a pistol and a clipboard.

But, apparently, without that person, it may be difficult to convince the USAF to let us keep their super-secret mega-stealthy F35s on Canadian airfields.

I often feel that there is a lot of tunnel vision involved in these discussions.

 

[markppcli]

For the record - and for those few of you that didn't know - I was born in Scotland.
The only time that I ever wore a kilt or a Balmoral was when I paraded with the Calgary Highlanders.
To be absolutely blunt the headdress that I envied the most, from the time I could walk, was the Aussie slouch hat. I would be ecstatic if the entire Canadian Army, Regs and Reserves, could come together under one similar, iconic, symbol so that they all looked the same.

For me this would be distinction enough.

View attachment 79374

I know that my harping on about the Militia grates but I really, honestly and strongly believe that something important was lost when the Militia became The Primary Reserve.

Why do I belt on about the National Guard? Because I think it is a good workable compromise.
The National Guard is one, singular, unique part of the US Army Reserve system.
There are multiple Reserves that feed directly into the Army.
The National Guard is one of them.

But the National Guard also incorporates a whole bunch of other people that want to be able to assist their community. Some do it for pay. Some do it for other more personal reasons. Some are available all year round "after hours". Some are only available on weekends or for disasters. Some can make themselves available for foreign commitments alongside their Regular and Reserve brothers and sisters. And all of them are willing to put themselves at the disposal of their local Governor and their President and trust that they will only be called to the colours if the need is real and great.

And somehow, the US Army manages to make a home for these part time soldiers on terms that appeal to them.

Not everybody that is interested in serving their country needs to serve it in the back of an APC.

All I'm asking is that the problem be considered, not just from the Army's perception of its needs, but also from the Government's perception of its needs and the citizenry's perceptions of how they can assist.


Take the issue of Vital Point Security and Airfield Guards. Apparently no real soldier wants to do that job. I mean.... how demeaning. Hanging around a hangar door with a pistol and a clipboard.

But, apparently, without that person, it may be difficult to convince the USAF to let us keep their super-secret mega-stealthy F35s on Canadian airfields.

I often feel that there is a lot of tunnel vision involved in these discussions.

I honestly have never understood why we don’t just rotate platoons and troops on base guard dude as a matter of course.

Of course we could also adjust MP recruitment to accept two streams 1. No post secondary give us two years in an MP security platoon then go to MP school 2. Have post secondary straight to MP 3s.

 

[daftandbarmy]

I honestly have never understood why we don’t just rotate platoons and troops on base guard dude as a matter of course.

The British do that alot, even in training as an important part of your training (since before Roman times) is learning how to guard your base.

Week 4-6 recruits were tasked with guard duties, as were cadets at Sandhurst. Nothing like coming off of guard at night and going straight into a 10 miler/ log race. All good character building stuff that you'd better get used to!

Every location I was based at had a guard mounted after hours as well, with the usual Duty Officer/NCO etc.

 

[Kirkhill]

What does the US National Guard contribute?

19 Regional Support Brigades
Supporting the training of

20x Infantry Brigade Combat Teams
3x Stryker Brigade Combat Teams
6x Military Police Brigades
9x Engineer Brigades
12x Aviation Brigades
4x Air Defence Brigades

All of these Brigades have domestic utility, in my opinion, and serve the States needs as well as the US Army's needs.

The Army's needs are served by the following combat formations

8x Infantry Division HQs
8x Field Artillery Brigades
2x Cavalry Brigade Combat Teams
3x Armored Brigade Combat Teams

But more crucially, perhaps

16x Maneuver Enhancement Brigades
10x Sustainment Brigades
5x Theater Aviation Sustainment Maintenance Groups

And an assortment of Specialist formations

228th Theater Tactical Signal Brigade (SC ARNG)

261st Theater Tactical Signal Brigade (DE ARNG)

91st Cyber Brigade (VA ARNG)[68] (TDA organization)

58th Military Intelligence Brigade (Expeditionary) (MD ARNG)

71st Military Intelligence Brigade (Expeditionary) (TX ARNG)

300th Military Intelligence Brigade (Linguist) (UT ARNG) (TDA organization)

56th Theater Information Operations Group (WA ARNG)

71st Theater Information Operations Group (TX ARNG)

19th Special Forces Group (UT ARNG)

20th Special Forces Group (AL ARNG)

31st Chemical Brigade (AL ARNG)

111th Explosive Ordnance Disposal Group (AL ARNG)

204th Theater Aviation Operations Group (LA ARNG)

Broadly speaking, to my way of looking at things, the National Guard, when Federalized, can take time away from disaster relief jobs and field in two Theaters

1x Corps per Theater
Corps comprising

3x Infantry Divisions
3x Sustainment Brigades
6x Maneuver Support Brigades
3x Field Artillery Brigades
3x Combat Aviation Brigades
9x Infantry Brigade Combat Teams
3x Engineer Brigades
3x MP Brigades

And

1x Combined Arms Division
1x Sustainment Brigade
2x Maneuver Support Brigades
1x Field Artillery Brigade
1x Cavalry Brigade Combat Team
1x Armored Brigade Combat Team
1x Stryker Brigade Combat Team
1x Engineer Brigade

Theater Troops then are

1x Infantry Brigade Combat Team
2x Aviation Brigades
2x AMD Brigades
1x Sustainment Brigade
2x Theater Aviation Sustainment Maintenance Groups
1x Theater Tactical Signals Brigade
1x Military Intelligence Brigade
1x Theater Information Operations Group
1x Special Forces Group

Reserve

1x Armored Brigade Combat Team
1x Stryker Brigade Combat Team
1x Engineer Brigade
1x Theater Aviation Sustainment Maintenance Group
1x Theater Aviation Operations Group
1x Cyber Brigade
1x Military Intelligence (Linguist) Brigade
1x EOD Brigade
1x Chemical Brigade

Frankly if we could deliver 1/10th of that from our Militia (and yes I will continue to use that word) or effectively a single infantry division with

1x Infantry Division HQ
1x Sustainment Brigade
2x Maneuver Support Brigades
1x Field Artillery Brigade
1x Combat Aviation Brigade
3x Infantry Brigade Combat Teams
1x Engineer Brigade
1x MP/VP Security Brigade

Then I would think that we were starting to pull our weight.

Add in an AMD/GBAD Brigade and some of the other Specialists then we might be there.

A precondition for all of the above would be 3 Regional Support Brigades fully manned by full time personnel


This would be in addition to the 1 Cdn Div of 1,2,5 and 6 Brigades and 1 Wing.

The Reserve Combat Aviation Brigade could perhaps be double-hatted from the Yellow Fleet.

An Infantry Brigade Combat Team comprises

Infantry Brigade Combat Team

Headquarters and Headquarters Company

Brigade Support Battalion

Brigade Engineer Battalion

Field Artillery Battalion

Cavalry Squadron (RSTA)

Infantry Battalion

Infantry Battalion

Infantry Battalion

The Infantry Battalions will be getting the Infantry Squad Vehicle as a carrier.

 

[Furniture]

I think its a lot more two-way than that. I expect that there is a lot of push back coming from the L1s through the CDS as to what we can do with what we got and here are our options if we stay status quo with funding and what will change if funding goes up or down. It covers the broad picture and leaves the details to the L1s once the left and right of arcs are understood by both.


True enough and that gets us to the points I raised about the day-to-day army and how its needs are seen as the priority for the governments needs rather than the tomorrow "break glass" army.


And that's where things go off the rail with the RegF. It's a common misconception amongst the RegF that the ResF thinks in those terms. Which, by the way is a bit condescending. You get exactly the same thought process at the L2 tables when one discusses the issue of where do the tanks go or should the Patricias have a mortar platoon or whose PYs do we cut to create yet another divisional headquarters. Do you really think the government decided it wanted and needed 5 divisional headquarters?

We almost agree on one point at the end there. I do believe that the primary consideration should be "what does the country need?" Governments are too fickle and military leadership is too parochial to make truly dispassionate decisions vis a vis the country's needs.

IMHO, we'd be much better off if existing governments and militaries understood clearly that there will be another war at some point in the future that will involve Canada. We are already a target and the shaping operations have begun. It is time to stop thinking about how to keep the current PYs churning and how to build a viable force for the future. There is a key factor that the RegF dismisses entirely when it makes its little jokes about the Flin Flon Fusiliers - that's the fact that for every RegF PY you can hire and keep 5-6 reservists. It's that equipment kept in reserve lasts substantially longer than equipment which is continuously used. It's an economy of effort/force thing. Those reservists have little or no value for the country if not properly trained or equipped. Whether Canada's ResF is of value to the country is entirely up to Canada's RegF leadership. Their track record is not good. ResF leadership in this country has no power regardless of how much power Reserves 2000 thinks it has or the RegF thinks it might have.


That's parsing the language too literally. Most folks in this discussion are tossing out ideas knowing full well that there are no decision makers to influence in this forum. The point of the matter is that the RegF should be looking beyond using the reserves as Class B office overloads. NDHQ looks at ResF as having value if it is doing something for the CF today - right now. That's missing the point entirely. A ResF is there for tomorrow by definition. It's primary job is to prepare for tomorrow. Again, IMHO, that's what most of the "well the reserves could do this" is about. What are the jobs the reserves should be preparing for that the RegF leadership has its head stuck in the sand about.

Sometimes when I'm feeling a little weak I seem to almost go over to @Kirkhill's dark side and say to myself - right - two defence budgets: a RegF today budget and a ResF tomorrow budget instead of the phoney baloney budgets that we have where the Class A (tomorrow) budgets get eroded by the Class Bs (today folks) that seem to infest every corner of NDHQ and other headquarters.

Rant off.

The problem with this line of thinking is that history hasn't supported it in timelines that make sense to invest in heavily. We had the War of 1812, then WWI followed by WWII. Since 1945 there has not been a threat to Canada that required a large(mobilization) force of ready-to-go troops standing by.

By the time we actually need those numbers, we will have had months/years to prepare thanks to fortress North America.

 

[dapaterson]

By the time we actually need those numbers, we will have had months/years to prepare thanks to fortress North America.

And we will have pissed away all the time to prepare.

 

[Kirkhill]

The problem with this line of thinking is that history hasn't supported it in timelines that make sense to invest in heavily. We had the War of 1812, then WWI followed by WWII. Since 1945 there has not been a threat to Canada that required a large(mobilization) force of ready-to-go troops standing by.

By the time we actually need those numbers, we will have had months/years to prepare thanks to fortress North America.

Conversely we apparently are getting 200 calls for organized assistance domestically every year. Those are the types of jobs that National Guard gunners are volunteering to do when they are not serving their guns. They are able and willing to do both jobs when the situation warrants.

That is a different mindset, in my opinion, to the full-time Regular who is focused on their training and their next overseas deployment.

 

[Furniture]

And we will have pissed away all the time to prepare.

I have no doubt, bogged down in briefing notes, slide packages, and DLN training...

I'm not arguing against a sensible reserve force, but we need to temper "break glass in case of emergency" with "How does this help us now?" .

 

[Kirkhill]

I have no doubt, bogged down in briefing notes, slide packages, and DLN training...

I'm not arguing against a sensible reserve force, but we need to temper "break glass in case of emergency" with "How does this help us now?" .

See above.

 

[FJAG]

Why do I belt on about the National Guard? Because I think it is a good workable compromise.

I'm actually a great fan of the National Guard but regrettably have come to the conclusion that it won't work here the way it does in the US.

The first is that leadership and technical knowledge and experience at the major and warrant officer rank and above levels has become too complex to learn on a part-time basis. That is coupled with the CAF's risk aversion to send out anything at a less than 99% solution. In short our reservists can't become good enough to be perfect and the CAF doesn't accept less than that. Americans take risks we don't.

The problem with this line of thinking is that history hasn't supported it in timelines that make sense to invest in heavily. We had the War of 1812, then WWI followed by WWII. Since 1945 there has not been a threat to Canada that required a large(mobilization) force of ready-to-go troops standing by.

By the time we actually need those numbers, we will have had months/years to prepare thanks to fortress North America.

Actually its quite the opposite. The reason that the RegF grew exponentially in the late 50s early 60s was because the military formed the view that there would be no time to mobilize and the only forces that would ever get into the fight would be the RegF forces-in-being. They've milked that concept ever since modifying the ResF to be individual augmentees and occasional small teams. Canada has no level 4 mobilization plan.

My argument is that the last 50 years have shown that we do not need a large and expensive RegF while Ukraine is showing the need for a large stand-by force that can be rapidly mobilized and fielded.

And we will have pissed away all the time to prepare.

Exactly.

I have no doubt, bogged down in briefing notes, slide packages, and DLN training...

I'm not arguing against a sensible reserve force, but we need to temper "break glass in case of emergency" with "How does this help us now?" .

Boy! You couldn't have helped more to make my argument that the RegF only thinks about today and what are you doing for me today.

I agree very much that the size of each force needs to be very, very carefully tempered. I've always argued that we need enough full-timers to provide core leadership; to provide quick reaction elements; to provide those personnel whose levels of expertise and skill cannot be developed and maintained by part-timers; and enough full-time personnel to provide the career development streams and trainers needed to sustain the first three.

 

[Furniture]

Actually its quite the opposite. The reason that the RegF grew exponentially in the late 50s early 60s was because the military formed the view that there would be no time to mobilize and the only forces that would ever get into the fight would be the RegF forces-in-being. They've milked that concept ever since modifying the ResF to be individual augmentees and occasional small teams. Canada has no level 4 mobilization plan.

My argument is that the last 50 years have shown that we do not need a large and expensive RegF while Ukraine is showing the need for a large stand-by force that can be rapidly mobilized and fielded.


Exactly.


Boy! You couldn't have helped more to make my argument that the RegF only thinks about today and what are you doing for me today.

I agree very much that the size of each force needs to be very, very carefully tempered. I've always argued that we need enough full-timers to provide core leadership; to provide quick reaction elements; to provide those personnel whose levels of expertise and skill cannot be developed and maintained by part-timers; and enough full-time personnel to provide the career development streams and trainers needed to sustain the first three.

I don't disagree with you in the broad strokes, but in the very real "here and now", the current size of the standing full-time forces are not enough to meet the requirements of the GoC. Cutting those numbers to make more "break glass in case of emergency" troops is not the solution.

It's not the RegF that thinks in terms of "what have you done for me lately?", it's the GoC. If you can find a way to make the GoC think longer than 3-4 years please do so, but until then, we need to work with what we have. Making larger numbers of as @KevinB says "fair weather"* soldiers isn't the solution.

The RegF of the 50s-60s doesn't exist anymore. It was killed-off by budget cuts, and the "peace dividend". The only reason the RegF seems to expensive is because the GoC invests too little in the CAF overall. If we had a realistic budget for maintenance and life cycling of kit and infrastructure the pers % of the budget would be more realistic. The reason it's skewed so high on pers costs is because the GoC can't stop paying the troops without bad headlines, but cutting maintenance kicks the bad headlines down the road for decades...

*making the ResF less "fair weather" would require spending more political capital than just spending more of defence, so it's an unrealistic solution at this time.