Informing the Army’s Future Structure

[TangoTwoBravo]

But is there another body of potential recruits that could be reached today by changing the emphasis? Could a double win happen by elevating the profile of the Service Battalion and the Engineers, and reforming the Field Ambulances and demonstrating their critical role in civil emergencies as well as in war? And, perhaps, by ensuring that every sub-unit has a well-formed transport section, perhaps under an experienced NCO that would also serve civil needs in crisis?



So does that argue for more or less engagement? Could one RSS team manage 3 units if the 3 units paraded on Tuesday, Wednesday and Thursday nights?

Isn't there another way to fix that?



Do we have to discard the willing help because not all of them can meet the schedule? In a world of work from home, zoom meetings, online courses, podcasts .... can't we devise a better syllabus that reduces the scheduled requirements? Perhaps limits the face to face efforts to TOETs and performance evaluations? How about building field events around 5 day weekends? Many people are on shift work and can adjust schedules.



And I am not wanting to take those 10% away from their battalions and regiments at all. I am suggesting that the bodies that are allocated to CADTC be better employed




Agreement.

What is your understanding of the people allocated to CADTC in terms of numbers and tasks?

 

[Kirkhill]

What is your understanding of the people allocated to CADTC in terms of numbers and tasks?

Canadian Army Doctrine and Training Centre (CADTC) - Canada.ca

Canadian Army Doctrine and Training Centre, headquartered at CFB Kingston, Ontario, is responsible for the supervision, integration and delivery of Army training and the long-range planning of the Army training and doctrine development, including simulations.

www.canada.ca

Is this incorrect?

 

[TangoTwoBravo]

Canadian Army Doctrine and Training Centre (CADTC) - Canada.ca

Canadian Army Doctrine and Training Centre, headquartered at CFB Kingston, Ontario, is responsible for the supervision, integration and delivery of Army training and the long-range planning of the Army training and doctrine development, including simulations.

www.canada.ca

Is this incorrect?

You've read a webpage. What is your understanding of the personnel numbers and tasks? Do you know how many of those people are students? Do you want to reallocate students and instructors from CADTC to ARes units? Because that is what the lion-share of the CADTC numbers are - students and instructors.

CADTC is the Army's seed-corn.

 

[daftandbarmy]

Responding to this one as It's been interesting for me see the number of international resources in Canada this year on Wildfire. Australian and New Zealand resources coming over have had a large number of VOLUNTEERS who receive minimal pay to deploy for weeks on end. The big difference is the CFA/RFS staff who are volunteers are trained to the same standard, fill the same roles, and most importantly have job protection from all levels of their respective state and federal governments to leave their role for wildfire/bush fire duty.

I realize the military is filling a different role (or should be) than emergency service response but when you look at the capacity for bushfire/flooding response in Australia the majority of available bodies are not full time employees but volunteers connected via a local brigade and like our volunteer fire departments tend to represent a wide range of skills and knowledge. Yes...they still need to get employer consent at times to deploy - job protection does not mean unlimited absences allowed - but they all acknowledged it was a key part to getting people to be able to turn out and especially for their families as they knew that even as volunteers they were still covered in the event of tragedy.

I know it's not directly military but definitely some similar feelings and issues. Note they, like everyone else, are also struggling with recruitment especially with younger candidates but they have a clear role which they also market quite well.

foresterab

There was a time, I believe, when the forest sector did a great job at bringing in students, and others looking for a career/ higher education in forest management, to do lower level work like fire cleanup, tree planting, pruning and spacing etc, especially during the summer.

I think this was all part of a type of para-military career path from 'Junior Woodchuck' up to the exalted ranks of Faller, or Registered Professional Forester. You know, like wayyy back when I was a Junior Forest Warden (Zenith 5555!)

As a result, I don't think they relied so heavily on the military coming in to make up numbers.

Unless I'm mistaken, since then, there has been an increasingly heavy reliance on the CAF to do jobs that would otherwise be done by students at the start of their journeys into good paying and rewarding natural resource sector jobs.

Call me crazy but, if you're a 'woke' kid looking for a way to make a difference in the environmental sphere, growing and managing healthy forests is a pretty good way to add value to the world.

 

[Rifleman62]

I always wondered about the US education system that turned out people skilled to use/train on modern military equipment incl aircraft while Canadians can not.

Posted prior, on RV's, US National Guard Abrams/Blackhawks were well accepted.

 

[FJAG]

My friend, you're playing in a fantasy land.

Take a deep breath, I massive respect for you, but I'm not gonna be nice.

Having now spent time inside the ARes I can tell you there is a ton of heart and no volume of pers. We have regiments and battalions that are really oversized platoons, and lucky to muster a section on a parade night. I SIV'd a unit that regularly paraded 12 people, and that includes RSS and Class B folks. In a year in a CBG HQ I never met the CBG Commander, I couldn't pick the guy out of line up. It looked to me like the CoS ran the show, and the commander was something akin to the GG, a figure head.

We managed much less than 300 people for a CBG wide exercise this passed year. Thats it, all units. I get it Gagetown in Feb sucks, but if you wanna be taken seriously, you have to seriously do serious things... like a CBG wide ex.

Its abysmal. In my completely unedumecated opinion The ARes has no/zero tactical, strategic or institutional value, at the moment, outside FGing individual augmentation to the regular force.

I saw highly motivated but poorly trained and employed troops, led by almost no Snr NCMs or WOs and above and an officer corps that is wildly inexperienced. I saw a force, and I use that term lightly, solely focused on combat arms with no consideration and value given to CS and CSS functions.

This can be changed, but its going to take the willingness of the ARes to champion that change and push for it.

Take my post as the uneducated observations of a Navy Chief marking time in the ARes and just trying leave the place a lil better than I found it. The people I worked with were great. I just want them to be better, and sometimes that takes a honest look.

I fully understand and agree with what you say with one minor exception and I'll get to that at the end.

I'll be the first to admit that since I retired in 2009 I have not kept up with what happens at the unit level, neither RegF and ResF. What I know about the situation today I have first hand from folks on this forum and others that I talk to which are mostly gunners.

That said, what you're describing is no different than what I saw around me as an RSSO from 1976-8 and thereafter as a legal advisor to ResF units until 2009.

And that in a nutshell is the problem. I've been RegF and ResF for neigh onto 44 years and during all that time and the 15 years since, NOTHING HAS CHANGED FOR THE BETTER. In any corporate structure where one of its divisions has been recognized at being below standard, top down corrective action would have been taken. It hasn't been. Instead the top leadership has become satisfied with a ResF system that provides a mostly inefficient office overload program by way of Class Bs. And let me just deviate for a second to say that during my time I knew many Class Bs (especially at the NCM level) who were the foundation of what was holding some rickety RegF offices together by way of their individual talent and the fact that they provided stability in offices populated by frequently posted or stress leaved full-time military or civilian staff.)

Here's the place where you and I disagree a bit. Its the bit about "the willingness of the ARes to champion that change and push for it." I sat at what I cynically called the kids' table (Chief Res Council) for eight years. You don't have to be very bright to see when you are being fed "squirrel" issues to take your eyes off the things that matter in order to deal with the trivial. Much of our time was wasted on the constant drip we were being fed about the reserve force pension in those days. @dapaterson will have a much better understanding of the timeline, but essentially it took DND and TB some seven or more years to implement a decision by parliament. In the meantime we blithely went on while we had reservists in combat and never addressed the elephant in the room that the only way we could deploy them was with extensive additional training and massive RegF supervision while the Americans were deploying National Guard brigades to both Iraq and Afghanistan. We couldn't deploy a platoon and no one cared. I watched equipment purchases going through where everyone nodded sagely and agreed that the reserves didn't need it and couldn't maintain it if given to them. I watched M109s being cut up for scrap rather than passed on to the reserves because they "couldn't handle them anyway." The RegF has a thousand excuses (usually its "the government doesn't give us enough money") for why the ResF is what it is but it has absolutely zero desire to take the absolutely critical and essential steps to move the goal posts forward.

Back to that kid's table. There's a Stockholm syndrome there. Every senior ResF leader knows that whatever the RegF leadership doesn't want to happen won't happen. So they get on board for the tiny little incremental changes that helps guy on the armoury floor because that's all that they can accomplish. It's a bit like that scene in Oliver Twist "Please Sir. Can I have some More?"

So. Am I living in a fantasy land. You bet I am. I know for a fact that the changes needed to make the ResF a viable one cannot and will not come within the ARes because they cannot raise an effective champion to lead the way. Reserves 2000 was well intentioned but misguided and the clout that those ex-reservists had (and it was over estimated anyway) has dropped away since then. Bureaucracies that promote from within always promote in their own image, and the long term image of reserve leadership is that of a subservient one. The model of a great industrial reserve leader who could mold political opinion has been fully subsumed by the career bureaucrat. And do not overestimate the clout that a CCA carries. Without consensus of the L2s institutional friction will pretty much defeat an unpopular initiative.

The only way that effective change for the ResF will come is if there is a political champion at the MND level who will push hard and long for such change. The RegF will fight that equally long and hard. This is a rice bowl issue. A move to a viable ARes is the slippery slope to returning to a small permanent force/large active militia system for the army. If the government had a clear demonstration that a part-time force supported and led by a smaller core of full-timers could provide for national security contingencies then they would go down that road. They'd be fiscally stupid not to.

So I'll just keep building my napkin forces, shamelessly borrowing concepts from folks smarter or more broadly minded than me but knowing full well that even if I convince one up and coming RegF officer in the wisdom of some of these ideas, his enthusiasm will be pounded down by his less enlightened peers.

 

[daftandbarmy]

So. Am I living in a fantasy land. You bet I am. I know for a fact that the changes needed to make the ResF a viable one cannot and will not come within the ARes because they cannot raise an effective champion to lead the way.

But... but... but.... we have ARes GOFOs now!

 

[Kirkhill]

You've read a webpage. What is your understanding of the personnel numbers and tasks? Do you know how many of those people are students? Do you want to reallocate students and instructors from CADTC to ARes units? Because that is what the lion-share of the CADTC numbers are - students and instructors.

CADTC is the Army's seed-corn.

Point taken but

That webpage indicates that his Deputy Commander is a Brigadier General and a Reservist and he is part of Reservist Command Team along with a Reservist Chief Warrant Officer.

Also, and here I acknowledge that relying on the interwebs is chancy, I note that circa 2019 there was a position called Director of Reserves also held by a Reservist Brigadier General. It is not clear to me what the relation of these positions is to each other.

Either way it seems to be suggestive that CADTC has a role to play in the training and employment of the Army Reserve. If the Reserve is not meeting CADTC standards so that Reservists can slot into Regular Formations might that not be a CADTC problem?

Does CADTC need more Reserve Force trainers? Can they manage to generate more Train the Trainer programmes? Can Reserve friendly training syllabuses be created?

And how can lessons learned by the Regular Force be transmitted to the Reserve Force?

I gather that CADTC has its hands full.

But it has obligations to the Reserves as well.

 

[foresterab]

There was a time, I believe, when the forest sector did a great job at bringing in students, and others looking for a career/ higher education in forest management, to do lower level work like fire cleanup, tree planting, pruning and spacing etc, especially during the summer.

I think this was all part of a type of para-military career path from 'Junior Woodchuck' up to the exalted ranks of Faller, or Registered Professional Forester. You know, like wayyy back when I was a Junior Forest Warden (Zenith 5555!)

As a result, I don't think they relied so heavily on the military coming in to make up numbers.

Unless I'm mistaken, since then, there has been an increasingly heavy reliance on the CAF to do jobs that would otherwise be done by students at the start of their journeys into good paying and rewarding natural resource sector jobs.

Call me crazy but, if you're a 'woke' kid looking for a way to make a difference in the environmental sphere, growing and managing healthy forests is a pretty good way to add value to the world.

Part of the issue in the Forestry Sector...and Mining....and Oil and Gas...is that the increased productivity of mills + technology changes + safety changes have eliminated huge portions of the employment that used to exist 20 years ago.

Timber cruising for example is almost obsolete in the west due to LIDAR based tree mapping on entire forests. GPS vs. compass and chain crews? Harvesters/Feller bunchers vs. hand fallers? optical eye scanning vs. lumber graders in sawmills? All of these have eliminated huge employment options and makes it tougher for locals to be hired...you know where you want to live.

BC paper on stats but

https://www2.gov.bc.ca/assets/gov/farming-natural-resources-and-industry/forestry/forest-industry-economics/economic-state/multiple_employment_estimates.pdf

Or to use a Statistics Canada Report:

Statistical data | Natural Resources Canada

97,149 odd jobs in 1991 is now 47,640 jobs in 2021 - 49% of the previous total

Don't get me wrong that I enjoy my job but it's not a large pool of hiring people that it used to be even when I started my career. I think of it more like the introduction of the machine gun - all of a sudden one tool made a lot of rifleman redundant for putting bullets down rage. Unfortunately events like WW1 showed that you needed troops with guns to hold the lines and the former single purpose gun now needs the support that took time to develop.

Will also agree that the CAF has been called out too much especially in recent year...but it's not like it hasn't happened in the past. Of the fatalities related to wildfires locally I can think of at least two members of the CAF killed while on wildfire work back in the 1950's...and that's when everyone locally was being drafted - aka "back the bus up to the bar and grab the men". I'm not sure what the solution is but the events of the last few years for the CAF being called out for civil emergencies is high compared to say - 1990's when much of the CAF was deployed on UN Missions or 2000's and Afghanistan - but I'm not sure how it compares to the post Korea Cold war era.

 

[Halifax Tar]

I fully understand and agree with what you say with one minor exception and I'll get to that at the end.

I'll be the first to admit that since I retired in 2009 I have not kept up with what happens at the unit level, neither RegF and ResF. What I know about the situation today I have first hand from folks on this forum and others that I talk to which are mostly gunners.

That said, what you're describing is no different than what I saw around me as an RSSO from 1976-8 and thereafter as a legal advisor to ResF units until 2009.

And that in a nutshell is the problem. I've been RegF and ResF for neigh onto 44 years and during all that time and the 15 years since, NOTHING HAS CHANGED FOR THE BETTER. In any corporate structure where one of its divisions has been recognized at being below standard, top down corrective action would have been taken. It hasn't been. Instead the top leadership has become satisfied with a ResF system that provides a mostly inefficient office overload program by way of Class Bs. And let me just deviate for a second to say that during my time I knew many Class Bs (especially at the NCM level) who were the foundation of what was holding some rickety RegF offices together by way of their individual talent and the fact that they provided stability in offices populated by frequently posted or stress leaved full-time military or civilian staff.)

Here's the place where you and I disagree a bit. Its the bit about "the willingness of the ARes to champion that change and push for it." I sat at what I cynically called the kids' table (Chief Res Council) for eight years. You don't have to be very bright to see when you are being fed "squirrel" issues to take your eyes off the things that matter in order to deal with the trivial. Much of our time was wasted on the constant drip we were being fed about the reserve force pension in those days. @dapaterson will have a much better understanding of the timeline, but essentially it took DND and TB some seven or more years to implement a decision by parliament. In the meantime we blithely went on while we had reservists in combat and never addressed the elephant in the room that the only way we could deploy them was with extensive additional training and massive RegF supervision while the Americans were deploying National Guard brigades to both Iraq and Afghanistan. We couldn't deploy a platoon and no one cared. I watched equipment purchases going through where everyone nodded sagely and agreed that the reserves didn't need it and couldn't maintain it if given to them. I watched M109s being cut up for scrap rather than passed on to the reserves because they "couldn't handle them anyway." The RegF has a thousand excuses (usually its "the government doesn't give us enough money") for why the ResF is what it is but it has absolutely zero desire to take the absolutely critical and essential steps to move the goal posts forward.

Back to that kid's table. There's a Stockholm syndrome there. Every senior ResF leader knows that whatever the RegF leadership doesn't want to happen won't happen. So they get on board for the tiny little incremental changes that helps guy on the armoury floor because that's all that they can accomplish. It's a bit like that scene in Oliver Twist "Please Sir. Can I have some More?"

So. Am I living in a fantasy land. You bet I am. I know for a fact that the changes needed to make the ResF a viable one cannot and will not come within the ARes because they cannot raise an effective champion to lead the way. Reserves 2000 was well intentioned but misguided and the clout that those ex-reservists had (and it was over estimated anyway) has dropped away since then. Bureaucracies that promote from within always promote in their own image, and the long term image of reserve leadership is that of a subservient one. The model of a great industrial reserve leader who could mold political opinion has been fully subsumed by the career bureaucrat. And do not overestimate the clout that a CCA carries. Without consensus of the L2s institutional friction will pretty much defeat an unpopular initiative.

The only way that effective change for the ResF will come is if there is a political champion at the MND level who will push hard and long for such change. The RegF will fight that equally long and hard. This is a rice bowl issue. A move to a viable ARes is the slippery slope to returning to a small permanent force/large active militia system for the army. If the government had a clear demonstration that a part-time force supported and led by a smaller core of full-timers could provide for national security contingencies then they would go down that road. They'd be fiscally stupid not to.

So I'll just keep building my napkin forces, shamelessly borrowing concepts from folks smarter or more broadly minded than me but knowing full well that even if I convince one up and coming RegF officer in the wisdom of some of these ideas, his enthusiasm will be pounded down by his less enlightened peers.

Good post @FJAG

I'm off to the woods for the weekend! I will get back in a more substantial way later.

 

[Kirkhill]

From an earlier post - A US Army National Guard Infantry Division -

1x Infantry Division HQ
1x Sustainment Brigade
2x Maneuver Support Brigades
1x Field Artillery Brigade
1x Combat Aviation Brigade
3x Infantry Brigade Combat Teams
1x Engineer Brigade
1x MP/VP Security Brigade

The Infantry Brigade Combat Team
These make up the majority of the National Guard Combat Arms strength - 20 IBCTs in 8 IDs with 3 Stryker Brigade Combat Teams that are similarly organized. The difference is the SBCTs are mounted in Stryker LAVs and the IBCTs are to be mounted in ISV open carriers.

Infantry Brigade Combat Team

Headquarters and Headquarters Company

Brigade Support Battalion

Brigade Engineer Battalion

Field Artillery Battalion

Cavalry Squadron (RSTA)

Infantry Battalion

Infantry Battalion

Infantry Battalion

Could a Canadian Division look like this?

					1x Infantry Division HQ
					1x Sustainment Brigade
					2x Maneuver Support Brigades
					1x MP/VP Security Brigade
					1x Engineer Brigade
					1x Field Artillery Brigade
Infantry Brigade Combat Team (West)					Infantry Brigade Combat Team (Central)					Infantry Brigade Combat Team (East)
Headquarters and Signals Squadron					Headquarters and Signals Squadron					Headquarters and Signals Squadron
Service Battalion					Service Battalion					Service Battalion
Engineer Regiment					Engineer Regiment					Engineer Regiment
Field Artillery Regiment					Field Artillery Regiment					Field Artillery Regiment
Cavalry Regiment (RSTA)					Cavalry Regiment (RSTA)					Cavalry Regiment (RSTA)
Infantry Battalion					Infantry Battalion					Infantry Battalion
Infantry Battalion					Infantry Battalion					Infantry Battalion
Infantry Battalion					Infantry Battalion					Infantry Battalion

 

[Kirkhill]

Then three regional Infantry Brigade Combat Teams

Infantry Brigade Combat Team (Central)

Headquarters and Signals Squadron

Service Battalion

Engineer Regiment

Artillery Regiment (7/11/30/42/49/56)

Cavalry Regiment (RSTA)(1H/WR/GGHG/QYR/OntR)

Infantry Battalion (31-RHLI/4RCR/RHFC/GSF/EKS/ASHoC)

Infantry Battalion (32-QORC/RRC/LS/48HoC/TSR/LWR)

Infantry Battalion (33-GGFG/PWOR/HPER/BR/SDGH/CHoO/AlgR/IrR)

Infantry Brigade Combat Team (East)

Headquarters and Signals Squadron

Service Battalion

Engineer Regiment

Artillery Regiment (1/2/3/6/62/84)

Cavalry Regiment (RSTA)(RCH/RdH/12RBCM/ShH/HfxR/PEIR/8CH)

Infantry Battalion (34-CGG/RHR/4R22R/6R22R/FMR/RdMais/RMtlR)

Infantry Battalion (35-VdQ/FdSL/RdlCh/RdSag/FdSh)

Infantry Battalion (36/37-PLF/WNSR/NSH/CBH/RNBR/NSR/1RNR/2RNR)

Infantry Brigade Combat Team (West)

Headquarters and Signals Squadron

Service Battalion

Engineer Regiment

Artillery Regiment (5/10/15/20/26/116/20)

Cavalry Regiment (RSTA) (SALH/KOCR/RMR/BCD/BCR)

Infantry Battalion (38-RWR/LSSR/NSkR/RRR/QOCHoC)

Infantry Battalion (39-CSR/RWmR/SHoC)

Infantry Battalion (41-CH/LER)

The units are intentionally over-filled with sub-units supplied by the various Reserve units.
My thinking is to make each Reserve unit responsible for supplying a full sub-unit and then, on mobilization, the highest readiness sub-units get tasked.

Taking things a bit further and basing the next step on the British experimental work then each Reserve Infantry Unit would be responsible for finding the following:

Light Infantry Company

Light Mobiilty Vehicles Milverado Variants

90 Pers

Phalanx Platoon

Phalanx Platoon

26 Pers

26 Pers

Section

Section

Section

Section

4

2

4

6

4

2

4

4

2

4

6

4

2

4

Vehicle

Vehicle

Vehicle

Vehicle

Vehicle

Vehicle

Vehicle

Vehicle

7.62 LMG

7.62 LMG

7.62 LMG

7.62 LMG

7.62 LMG

7.62 LMG

7.62 LMG

7.62 LMG

NLAW

NLAW

NLAW

NLAW

NLAW

NLAW

NLAW

NLAW

40mm LV

40mm LV

40mm LV

40mm LV

40mm LV

40mm LV

40mm LV

40mm LV

Fire Tm A

Fire Tm B

Fire Tm A

Fire Tm B

Fire Tm A

Fire Tm B

Fire Tm A

Fire Tm B

SUAS

SUAS

SUAS

SUAS

Sys Op

Sys Op

Sys Op

Sys Op

Sect Comd

Sect Comd

Sect Comd

Sect Comd

Vehicle(s)

Vehicle(s)

CG84

CG84

LAM

LAM

60mm

60mm

SDE Tm

SDE Tm

SUAS

SUAS

Sys Op

Sys Op

Pl Sgt

Pl Sgt

Pl Cmd

Pl Cmd

Manoeuvre Support Group

32

3

3

3

Javelin Tm

Javelin Tm

Javelin Tm

3

Wolfram

Brimstone

3

3

Vehicle

Vehicle

SUAS

SUAS

Dr/Sec

Dr/Sec

SysOp/MFC

SysOp/MFC

Ptl Cmd

Ptl Cmd

SDE Tm

SDE Tm

3

3

Vehicle

Vehicle

81 mm

81 mm

LAM

LAM

Mortar Tm

Mortar Tm

2

MSG 2ic

MSG Comd

6

CQMS

CSM

2iC

OC

My thinking here is first of all to keep the personnel budget small to reduce the difficulty in finding and retaining personnel. Secondly by making the third platoon a Manoeuver Support Group it supplies a full slate of training opportunities locally and gives the OC the opportunity to work in a limited combined arms environment.

Depending on the situation the MSG can leave some or all of their weapons behind. On the other hand ISR capabilities useful in all circumstances, together with transportation and communication are widely distributed.

And, on mobilization, given that there are more companies than required, some or all of the MSG components could be grouped within the battalion or platoons could be chopped to build bigger companies.

 

[Kirkhill]

And while I am at it, Aviation Support?

Full time SAR but expandable with reserves.

Aviation Wing

440 Tpt Sqn CC-138

413 T&R Sqn CC-130H

424 T&R Sqn CC-130H

435 T&R Sqn CC-130H

103 SAR Sqn CH-149

413 T&R Sqn CH-149

442 T&R Sqn CH-149

417 Cbt Spt Sqn CH-146

439 Cbt Spt Sqn CH-146

444 Cbt Spt Sqn CH-146

400 TAC Sqn CH-146

438 TAC Sqn CH-146

424 T&R Sqn CH-146

No change in organization or locations or affiliations. I just parsed the available units and aircraft to group them by aircraft type for this table.

 

[TangoTwoBravo]

Point taken but

That webpage indicates that his Deputy Commander is a Brigadier General and a Reservist and he is part of Reservist Command Team along with a Reservist Chief Warrant Officer.

Also, and here I acknowledge that relying on the interwebs is chancy, I note that circa 2019 there was a position called Director of Reserves also held by a Reservist Brigadier General. It is not clear to me what the relation of these positions is to each other.

Either way it seems to be suggestive that CADTC has a role to play in the training and employment of the Army Reserve. If the Reserve is not meeting CADTC standards so that Reservists can slot into Regular Formations might that not be a CADTC problem?

Does CADTC need more Reserve Force trainers? Can they manage to generate more Train the Trainer programmes? Can Reserve friendly training syllabuses be created?

And how can lessons learned by the Regular Force be transmitted to the Reserve Force?

I gather that CADTC has its hands full.

But it has obligations to the Reserves as well.

CADTC absolutely has responsibilities for the Reserves, and I am struggling to figure out what would make you point out that CADTC has obligations to the Reserves. What makes you think that they don't? You suggested reallocating people from CADTC to Reserve units - I am pointing out that you don't really understand the situation. What makes you think that Lessons Learned is only for the Regular Force? What are you basing all of your questions/comments on? When was your last time in uniform in an Armoury?

CADTC tackles both Reg and Res training issues for both Individual and Collective Training. Delivery of that training varies between CADTC-controlled schools and those controlled the Divs. This is true for both Reg and Res. I had a position there where I was responsible for Collective Training, which meant both Reg and Res. I had a ARes advisor as well.

It is worth pointing out that each Division has variations in their local situation, so a one-size-fits-all approach does not always work. The Divs have a lot of control, which makes sense.

 

[KevinB]

But is there another body of potential recruits that could be reached today by changing the emphasis? Could a double win happen by elevating the profile of the Service Battalion and the Engineers, and reforming the Field Ambulances and demonstrating their critical role in civil emergencies as well as in war? And, perhaps, by ensuring that every sub-unit has a well-formed transport section, perhaps under an experienced NCO that would also serve civil needs in crisis?

I suspect that the desires of teenagers hasn’t changed since many of us here initially joined the Reserves.
Generally wanting to do cool stuff.
Fires, Floods, Ice Storms etc are anything but cool.
(though in Kelowna it was briefly cool riding on the top of a Fire truck for 48hrs when we got trapped from the rest of the Coy - it wasn’t as cool as the Fire Department crews kept changing and we where still stuck on that truck)

So does that argue for more or less engagement? Could one RSS team manage 3 units if the 3 units paraded on Tuesday, Wednesday and Thursday nights?

You no longer looking at the typical RSS setup as for the most part an Infantry Sgt isn’t going to do much in a Svc Bn, as one can only do so many ToET’s
But that sort of cross training is not terrible either.
The biggest challenge most reserve units that are not near a major unit base is mechanics IMHO.

Do we have to discard the willing help because not all of them can meet the schedule? In a world of work from home, zoom meetings, online courses, podcasts .... can't we devise a better syllabus that reduces the scheduled requirements? Perhaps limits the face to face efforts to TOETs and performance evaluations? How about building field events around 5 day weekends? Many people are on shift work and can adjust schedules.

One still needs mandatory large collective training events annually, in the terms of a summer several week block.

I personally don’t think that the CA takes the Army PRes seriously, and won’t until the Government allocated a significant budget increase to fund equipment for them.
Which considering the state of the Reg Force Army, is something I can’t ever seen occurring as the Army is generationally deficient on multiple levels.

 

[Furniture]

I don't for one minute deny that this is the thinking that goes on and is the thinking that has gone on for the last fifty years and will continue to go on indefinitely until an MND is put in place with a mandate to reform DND from the top down. Bureaucracies are bureaucracies regardless of the colour of suit that they wear.

I don't believe that it comes from the GoC. I think its bureaucratic friction that influences political minds.

It's a chicken and egg argument. Exchanging full-time numbers for equipment and part-timers could be sold as a win-win situation. It won't happen, however, because the military leadership refuses to see it as that and there will always be some admiral flapping his gums. Full-time numbers are our "d*ck measuring" standard. No one cares how many hanger-queens there are as long as we can keep a battle group deployed. The managed readiness plan and whole fleet management plans were the army's acknowledgement that running a shell-game is fine as long as no PYs are cut.

This gets me back to pejorative language vs true programs to make the reserves more effective. A reserve force which trains for the needs of the country is politically acceptable. The problem is that the full-timers consider the use of reservists to suit their own convenience (think the thousands of Class B's filling cubicles) as the pinnacle of reserve service. Obviously compulsory call-out on less than national emergency levels would be unacceptable. You'd be surprised how much tolerance people have when they aren't lied to.

I keep telling people, our legislation and regulations are every bit as coercive as the US Army's. So the politicians have already made the decision as to where the red line is. The problem is that our military leaders are risk averse pussies when it comes to this area of the law/policy. QR&O 9.04(2) says that a CO can order a reservist to train up to 15 days Class B and 60 days Class A per year. That's an order in council from the government. Show me the general officer that has seen fit to enforce even a part of that. Our reservists are "fair weather" because the army (not the government) allows them to be makes them that way.

So, to distill this down to simple weatherman terms... You have a set of rules that have never been used, but have existed for decades, and you imagine that it's lack of fortitude from the CAF that is why the rules haven't been used... I genuinely respect your position, and have enjoyed speaking with you in online, but I think you're completely out to lunch on this.

If the CAF started forcing reservists to parade for training, we'd have 90% of reservists hand in their kit. It's not that they aren't dedicated, and loyal, it's more that you're asking more than the government can give.

Our reservists are "fair weather" because it makes sense for them.

 

[Halifax Tar]

I fully understand and agree with what you say with one minor exception and I'll get to that at the end.

I'll be the first to admit that since I retired in 2009 I have not kept up with what happens at the unit level, neither RegF and ResF. What I know about the situation today I have first hand from folks on this forum and others that I talk to which are mostly gunners.

That said, what you're describing is no different than what I saw around me as an RSSO from 1976-8 and thereafter as a legal advisor to ResF units until 2009.

And that in a nutshell is the problem. I've been RegF and ResF for neigh onto 44 years and during all that time and the 15 years since, NOTHING HAS CHANGED FOR THE BETTER. In any corporate structure where one of its divisions has been recognized at being below standard, top down corrective action would have been taken. It hasn't been. Instead the top leadership has become satisfied with a ResF system that provides a mostly inefficient office overload program by way of Class Bs. And let me just deviate for a second to say that during my time I knew many Class Bs (especially at the NCM level) who were the foundation of what was holding some rickety RegF offices together by way of their individual talent and the fact that they provided stability in offices populated by frequently posted or stress leaved full-time military or civilian staff.)

Here's the place where you and I disagree a bit. Its the bit about "the willingness of the ARes to champion that change and push for it." I sat at what I cynically called the kids' table (Chief Res Council) for eight years. You don't have to be very bright to see when you are being fed "squirrel" issues to take your eyes off the things that matter in order to deal with the trivial. Much of our time was wasted on the constant drip we were being fed about the reserve force pension in those days. @dapaterson will have a much better understanding of the timeline, but essentially it took DND and TB some seven or more years to implement a decision by parliament. In the meantime we blithely went on while we had reservists in combat and never addressed the elephant in the room that the only way we could deploy them was with extensive additional training and massive RegF supervision while the Americans were deploying National Guard brigades to both Iraq and Afghanistan. We couldn't deploy a platoon and no one cared. I watched equipment purchases going through where everyone nodded sagely and agreed that the reserves didn't need it and couldn't maintain it if given to them. I watched M109s being cut up for scrap rather than passed on to the reserves because they "couldn't handle them anyway." The RegF has a thousand excuses (usually its "the government doesn't give us enough money") for why the ResF is what it is but it has absolutely zero desire to take the absolutely critical and essential steps to move the goal posts forward.

Back to that kid's table. There's a Stockholm syndrome there. Every senior ResF leader knows that whatever the RegF leadership doesn't want to happen won't happen. So they get on board for the tiny little incremental changes that helps guy on the armoury floor because that's all that they can accomplish. It's a bit like that scene in Oliver Twist "Please Sir. Can I have some More?"

So. Am I living in a fantasy land. You bet I am. I know for a fact that the changes needed to make the ResF a viable one cannot and will not come within the ARes because they cannot raise an effective champion to lead the way. Reserves 2000 was well intentioned but misguided and the clout that those ex-reservists had (and it was over estimated anyway) has dropped away since then. Bureaucracies that promote from within always promote in their own image, and the long term image of reserve leadership is that of a subservient one. The model of a great industrial reserve leader who could mold political opinion has been fully subsumed by the career bureaucrat. And do not overestimate the clout that a CCA carries. Without consensus of the L2s institutional friction will pretty much defeat an unpopular initiative.

The only way that effective change for the ResF will come is if there is a political champion at the MND level who will push hard and long for such change. The RegF will fight that equally long and hard. This is a rice bowl issue. A move to a viable ARes is the slippery slope to returning to a small permanent force/large active militia system for the army. If the government had a clear demonstration that a part-time force supported and led by a smaller core of full-timers could provide for national security contingencies then they would go down that road. They'd be fiscally stupid not to.

So I'll just keep building my napkin forces, shamelessly borrowing concepts from folks smarter or more broadly minded than me but knowing full well that even if I convince one up and coming RegF officer in the wisdom of some of these ideas, his enthusiasm will be pounded down by his less enlightened peers.

Finally relaxing on my deck with a coffee.

I think the ARes has to come to big Army and say:

"We're broken and we have a plan... What do you think ?"

And I think that plan has to include:

Complete top to bottom restructuring of units and organizations, with caveats for expansion should that occur;

A distilling down of trades that can actually be trained and employed gainfully on reserve time, personally I like Inf and MSEOP. Both valuable trades that can be easily learned and employed;

A rank cap set to unit levels. Meaning if your Organization only musters 12 people you top out at Capt and WO. With a road map to use as/if expansion occurs;

An set in stone commitment from big Army that they will establish regional training depots. This will allow year round basic and trades training as courses fill and concurrently act as regional stores and maintenance depots at th same time.

 

[KevinB]

Finally relaxing on my deck with a coffee.

I think the ARes has to come to big Army and say:

"We're broken and we have a plan... What do you think ?"

And I think that plan has to include:

Complete top to bottom restructuring of units and organizations, with caveats for expansion should that occur;

A distilling down of trades that can actually be trained and employed gainfully on reserve time, personally I like Inf and MSEOP. Both valuable trades that can be easily learned and employed;

A rank cap set to unit levels. Meaning if your Organization only musters 12 people you top out at Capt and WO. With a road map to use as/if expansion occurs;

A set in stone commitment from big Army that they will establish regional training depots. This will allow year round basic and trades training as courses fill and concurrently act as regional stores and maintenance depots at th same time.

I cannot see the Army Reserve doing that because the people making those decisions would slice their own throat.

 

[Halifax Tar]

I cannot see the Army Reserve doing that because the people making those decisions would slice their own throat.

I agree.

As an institution we have to embrace that the institution is bigger and more important than any individual and their personal ambition and put the effectiveness of the institution first, above all else.

We're gonna have to break some eggs to make this omelet.

 

[daftandbarmy]

Our reservists are "fair weather" because it makes sense for them.

I'll go out on a limb here and suggest that, based on my observations over the years, Reservist attendance is not determined, over the long term, by 'fair weather' as much as it is by 'good leadership'.

No surprise, more often than not, great leadership builds great units and where that is compromised for one reason or another, attendance plummets, sometimes overnight, because as my old man observed about his experience in the 3rd Div in WW2, "No one wants to be part of a shit show."