Informing the Army’s Future Structure

[Kirkhill]

As far as a rapid response, you really cannot beat an Airborne force.
Helicopters lack range and speed, and the Airborne are part of Joint Forcible Entry to allow you to control things like airports etc to land heavier equipment. For the Arctic - it is much easier to drop a few C-17's of Paratroops to make a presence - and the same goes for a lot of other places (jumping into Mountains sucks even with steerable chutes - but it does get folks there quickly.

Yes I am a firm believer in Helicopters, I just don't see much of a point with the Griffons, as their load sucks, and the CAF doesn't have many, and even less Hooks.

Kev, enough on the Griffons. Would you rather have the Griffons or no helicopters? Agreed there are other solutions out there with other capabilities and some of them stretch the envelope in different directions but there are no universal solutions. All helicopters have their limits which define and restrict their utility. Even if we had a hundred Blackhawks and a thirty Chinooks there are still things that couldn't be done or that would end up in dead crews and GIBs. Our envelope may be smaller than your envelope but we have an envelope. Some problems can be solved with the kit available. Other problems can't. The same thing would apply if we bought Vipers, Venoms or Valors.

We all know that Canada needs newer and better kit. But it is never going to have the range of capabilities that your government buys for you.

 

[KevinB]

I look at a structure like this though and I start to wonder, as a civilian who hasn't served, if maybe the first step is something even more drastic.
Break the regimental mafia roles.

Instead of having a single regiment that fills 3 battalions maybe we're better to have 3x separate units that can a) be "local" to their portion of the country and b) reduce thinking to only 3x Infantry and instead change it to 10-12x solutions? The other part of this is I often talk to friends and random veterans who tend to identify by unit - which is great - but then when you hear that they jumped between multiple battalions it's not providing the same depth of knowledge as they're still part of the greater parent unit. Instead I think of greater transfers between units - at least based upon promotion/career paths - which might include moving from the 22eR or RCR to the QOHR in Latvia if needed for a posting. Not 100% sure if this won't be a greater circus than rewards but I'm thinking not just from a deployment perspective but also an internal Canadian positing level where you move within the greater context of the division/Army vs. a single regiment.

I really dislike the Regimental Mafia, but I don't think making more "Regimental" Battalions is a fix - I would rather amalgamate all the Infantry under 1 Cap badge (RCIC) and Armoured under RCAC and make #'rd BN's but I think there would be a lot of hostility and resistance, so I went with adding two Regiments.

The PPCLI I kept out West as Mountains, and left the Arctic as a primary task (albeit I believe all CAF members should be equipped and trained for fight in the extreme cold) The Vandoo I set mainly for a Caribbean and French Africa role. The 3 RCR Amphibious role was more of a place holder and the 4 RCR and 4 VP Bn's as 10/90 to grow into that.

I am of the opinion that anyone going between a Light and Mech Role needs to conduct a solid (30 day) Indoc in the new role.

Most units of WW1 and many of WW2 were formed as training/recruitment units and then manpower was sent to a greater pool in Europe and individuals re-badged as needed by the Army. Instead we're trying to fit units, of different capacity and size, into a plug and play scenario which isn't working and is further compounded by the Reserves being treated as a "replacement" pool to fill in already - the classic Canadian hybrid of making a tough job more complicated.

The current PRes should be part of the Formed Army - -in terms of major crisis the Recruiting structure should be sending replacements to units as needed.

In regards to the roles of each unit - I'm not sure we need 30% of the Infantry to be jump units? But to be light forces definitely. I'd also argue that there should be artic based units on both sides of the country as operating near sea ice near Baffin Island is going to be very different than Yellowknife and also provides I think a much better fit/mission role for NATO/NORAD. If we can show we can support the US in AK, Denmark/Finland/Norway/Sweden we've got a much better alignment with current trade partners, and a more focused vision than trying to be everywhere. I think Artic just because of a) we have a large amount of the world's artic lands and b) Artic deployments are going be focused upon deployment of resources, long distances, at the end of a long supply chain, in challenging conditions and c) if you can handle the artic some of the other conditions are easier to train for (those who were in Afghanistan at +45 with full loads might disagree I know).

I agree with the difference in types of Arctic - see my caveats above - but I will say that I would prefer to have specialist forces for Arctic (versus generalist) and High Temperature Deserts.

If you practice deploying units 4,500 km within Canada (Toronto to upper northern Artic Islands) you've also included Alaska, Iceland, the Caribbean, and parts of South America. 6,500km puts you from Toronto to Hawaii, Latvia and Western Europe, Siberia, and Brazil/Peru. Map Radius Calculator The point here is if you can deploy a combat effective force to Coppermine, NWT you can also move that same force multiple directions even if they are not trained to local conditions.

I think training needs to be flexible - so everyone has both equipment and training for all climates -- but you do want specific specialist areas of responsibility.

The other missing part not discussed is on the larger scale formation exercises. Don't really care if it's Div/Corp/Brigade level but organize a serious training exercise and then start handing out invites - Australia, Singapore, New Zealand, Norway etc....for infantry companies or larger formations to take place. Provide an opportunity for learnings both ways - lateral and vertical - as most countries are not going to send poor units to something like that and to have a second force to compare yourself too often leads to big awareness of where differences and improvements might exist. I'm not sure if it's appropriate given the state of manpower and equipment right now but delaying things until they're perfect will mean it's an empty bucket of knowledge for when needed. Heck - just look at how many countries sent fire fighters to Canada this year - Australia, New Zealand, South Korea, USA, Portugal, France, Spain, Dominican Republic, Mexico, Costa Rica, Chile, Brazil, South Africa - and the lessons being learned by all from that exposure.

I would strike a number of those countries - but I agree wholeheartedly that CAF Bde's should interact regularly with allies in larger exercises and deployments.
I would argue that the Bde is the smallest non SOF entity that the CAF should field anywhere.

 

[KevinB]

Absofeckinlootly not. We are in this situation because nobody is focused on delivering useful reserves. The regs can't be bothered. They just want bodies to magically appear to fatten their ranks at their whim while they moan about the quality of the help they are offered.

The Primary Reserves need to be like the NGAR and part of the formed Army - or they won't have a role or equipment ever.

The Reserves need someone whose job it is to make them useful. End of.

Yes being part of a operational Division

Kindofish... have to chew on the Support and Service Support chunks. My inclination is towards a regular force Support structure with the Reserves contributing more truck and ambulance drivers than mechanics and electricians.

Yes, and honestly I wouldn't have a large part of Support being Reservist period if I could help it.

CJOC is a thing. And it is an non-Army thing. Making local commanders responsible for standing up a JTF seems right to me. The commander should not be the JTF commander. That job should go to one of his subordinates. Kind of in line with the role of my 1st Div commander - staying on top of the situation and prepared to steal troops to meet the needs of the situation.

You misunderstanding me, I view the Army "Corps" as Admin, Strategy, Long Range Plans, Training etc - not Operational Command.

The one area that I think could offer opportunity is the National Search and Rescue System with its Joint Rescue Co-Ordination Centres at Halifax, Trenton and Victoria. Why couldn't their roles be expanded to include all civil co-ordination? And make them more closely aligned with the Coast Guard's Regions?

View attachment 79341View attachment 79342

But we're talking about the Army here and not the CAF at large.

And I think it is more important to generate a functional command structure that can flexibly respond to multiple situations (my 80% of known knowns and known unknowns).

Agreed

Do I really need to worry if an artillery battery draws 16x 81s or 120s from stores or 6 105s or 155s or HIMARS?
What is the training time necessary to take 105 gunners and turn them into mortarmen or rocketmen?

Yes, because they are all fairly different, and I want gunner who don't require a few weeks of familiarization training before deployment.

From what I take from @FJAG the secret sauce is in the C4ISR and not in serving the guns.

A different matter for the GBAD tasking in the sense that the C4ISR is radically different but how different is it to serve the different remote effectors?

Can I swap a Squadron from Jeeps to LAVs to Tanks? What is the training delta?

Huge training and Mindset differences - the whole method of fighting is different.

Can I swap a Company from legs, to ropes, to helos, to trucks, to LAVs, to chutes, to boats? What is the training delta?

With cash anything is possible. And time.

Cash and Time are finite.
Even in Tier 1 units where those are not really considerations, folks make careers in certain fields.

What are the basic skill sets that should be common to a sub-unit that allows it to switch roles - given time and money?

Loaded Question - as to answer that it would need a few paragraphs.

NCOs are good. Where do they learn their trade? In the class or in the field.

Both

Cheers.

 

[FJAG]

Do I really need to worry if an artillery battery draws 16x 81s or 120s from stores or 6 105s or 155s or HIMARS?
What is the training time necessary to take 105 gunners and turn them into mortarmen or rocketmen?
From what I take from @FJAG the secret sauce is in the C4ISR and not in serving the guns.

A different matter for the GBAD tasking in the sense that the C4ISR is radically different but how different is it to serve the different remote effectors?

You're not wrong. The people that went on Op Apollo converted for LG1s to 81mm mortars in slightly under two weeks and much of the C4ISR was identical.

The same for the battery that went with TF Orion who converted from M109/C3 to M777 in roughly two weeks but had additional time in theatre to experience several of the complexities (like big honking trucks pulling big honking guns on narrow busted up trails in Afghanistan) that get missed in training.

More complex, however, is the logistics issues in switching from say an 81mm mortar to an M777. While the fire control computer may be identical and you just pull up the appropriate firing tables for the weapon required the complexity of the M777 and its inherent gun management system presents an entirely different maintenance challenge. Ammunition handling and management (which I keep harping on) is another. In large measure that can be mitigated by staffing and training for the most complex system.

There is a certain false economy in the "golf-bag" system of weapons management. What might work fine for special forces who rotate back to base and refit and reset for the next mission probably does not work as well for a gun battery that is deployed to an austere position for 100% of its deployment and providing continuous fire support 24/7. Yes we deployed troops with 2 x M777s and 4 x 81 routinely in Afghanistan, but you can only man some of those at any given time. The 81s were deployed most often for the guns own local defence because the infantry was generally out of range of for the mortars. If you wanted to move the mortars forward to being within range then you would have to take a gun or two out of action while that happens. It's the same for AD and anti-armour. Yes you can cross train on systems but the practicality of switching from one to the other in a given scenario is often not there.

Edited to add. - I agree fully with Kevin on the huge mindset difference re mortars and arty. I considered the decision to give mortars to the guns back in the early 00s a big mistake. In part it was based on the old Airborne Regiment where the airborne battery had 6 L5s and 12 81mms (or a combo of those) and could jump in with whatever was required. The airborne, like special forces, generally operated on a short mission cycle which included being relieved and resetting for the next mission where you could rearm for the next mission as required. For ordinary "leg" battalions the mortar platoon is an essential part of the battalion's guaranteed fire support. It should never, ever have been taken away as their training is 100% intimately tied to the battalion while the guns look further afield.

 

[foresterab]

The one area that I think could offer opportunity is the National Search and Rescue System with its Joint Rescue Co-Ordination Centres at Halifax, Trenton and Victoria. Why couldn't their roles be expanded to include all civil co-ordination? And make them more closely aligned with the Coast Guard's Regions?

View attachment 79341View attachment 79342

Just going to point out the CIFFC National office works out of Winnipeg and already deals with the inter-provincial and international aid requests for wildfires. Has also been used for post-hurricane clean up and could be used for flooding deployments (I assume this as the same crews and personal are involved at times).

Homepage | CIFFC

www.ciffc.ca

Note that I am unclear how the Armed Forces align here. Parks Canada is treated like a separate province for tracking but the Federal assistance offered by the CAF is more murky to me. Big thing is some of that structure already exists.

 

[Kirkhill]

Just going to point out the CIFFC National office works out of Winnipeg and already deals with the inter-provincial and international aid requests for wildfires. Has also been used for post-hurricane clean up and could be used for flooding deployments (I assume this as the same crews and personal are involved at times).

Homepage | CIFFC

www.ciffc.ca

Note that I am unclear how the Armed Forces align here. Parks Canada is treated like a separate province for tracking but the Federal assistance offered by the CAF is more murky to me. Big thing is some of that structure already exists.

Move JRCC Trenton to Winnipeg as well? Along with 440 Squadron the Yellowknife Twotters.

1CADHQ is located there as well.

 

[foresterab]

Not sure about who all the different HQ's are and functional roles in Canada. I had a happy moment thinking there was a fleet of C-130's, Twotter's, and the contract 737 used by CIFFC all on the same strip for inter-Canadian logistics but then remembered how that's too many shiny things away from Ottawa and the powers that be.

I tend to only know what I read here on the forum re: retention/recruitment rates so not sure how Winnipeg compares to other bases and if this would be a positive or negative factor. Cost of living would definitely be better than Ottawa/Victoria/Halifax.

 

[Kirkhill]

The Primary Reserves need to be like the NGAR and part of the formed Army - or they won't have a role or equipment ever.

Chief of the United States Army Reserve is Lieutenant General Jody J. Daniels.

United States Army Reserve - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

General Daniel R. Hokanson serves as the 29th Chief of the National Guard Bureau and as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In this capacity, he serves as a military adviser to the President, Secretary of Defense, National Security Council and is the Department of Defense’s official channel of communication to the Governors and State Adjutants General on all matters pertaining to the National Guard. He is responsible for ensuring the more than 453,000 Army and Air National Guard personnel are accessible, capable and ready to protect the homeland and provide combat ready resources to the Army and Air Force.

Chief, National Guard Bureau - Leadership - The National Guard

Then add in all 50 State Governors and their Adjutants-General

Neither the National Guard, nor the Army Reserves, exist solely to fill holes in active ranks. Both exist as independent entities which supply trained, and formed, personnel to the active force.

Yes being part of a operational Division

See above.

Yes, and honestly I wouldn't have a large part of Support being Reservist period if I could help it.

Similar thoughts

You misunderstanding me, I view the Army "Corps" as Admin, Strategy, Long Range Plans, Training etc - not Operational Command.

Not the first time that claim has been made.
I get your Administrative Corps / Canadian Army and I agree.
My point re CJOC is that despite the JARMY vocabulary CJOC exists outside the Army. I see a lot of reasons why it could be an Air Force heavy posting on the domestic side.

Agreed

Yay?

Yes, because they are all fairly different, and I want gunner who don't require a few weeks of familiarization training before deployment.

Which is why there are Ready forces in the first place. Ready. Regulars. Some of whom man mortars. Some of whom man guns and, with luck, some of whom would man missiles.

On the other hand we have the UnReady forces - Ethelred in command - the Reserves.
With the time the Regulars buy then the Reserves could be tailored to meet the demonstrated needs of the situation.

Two weeks for a Ready Force is a nonsense.
A month for a Reserve Force is a miracle.

Huge training and Mindset differences - the whole method of fighting is different.

Fine. See above.

Cash and Time are finite.
Even in Tier 1 units where those are not really considerations, folks make careers in certain fields.

And again. See above.

Loaded Question - as to answer that it would need a few paragraphs.

Both

When were our discussions not loaded?

 

[FJAG]

Neither the National Guard, nor the Army Reserves, exist solely to fill holes in active ranks. Both exist as independent entities which supply trained, and formed, personnel, detachments, sub-units, units and formations, to the active force Army.

Neither the USAR nor the ARNG are "independent". The USAR is a component of the US Army and both the active component and the reserve component are Title 10 USC. Similarly, the ARNG is a component of the US Army although it is subject to Title 38 USC which has a more complex relationship because of its states aspect. It might be possible to say that there is a degree of separation as between the active component of the US Army and its two reserve components but "independent" is misleading.

The fact that both reserve components are responsible for supplying, and do supply, not just individual personnel but everything up to and including formations is a critical factual distinction between Canadian and American reserve employment concepts. Legally Canada's reserves are similarly liable but practically speaking its neither expected nor planned.

On the aspect of whether or not our reserve force should stand separate, or "independent" as you suggest, I disagree. One can organize and fund a reserve model in numerous ways. My desire to see integration of RegF and ResF components comes from the fact that it is very difficult to have an efficient and capable reserve force which is able to be mobilized into up to formation level without a core of full-time officers and NCOs who have gone through RegF training and gained the necessary experience to complement the training. I've been in RSS and IMHO our current CBG and RSS structure is inadequate to create viable units and formations. The level of accountability for outputs is too low and the constant failure to meet low expectations is consistently ignored. The complexity of warfare makes it virtually impossible for a ResF officer to hold key command positions from coy comd level and up without extensive predeployment training.

A proper responsible and accountable command structure is essential and one can't expect RegF officers in ResF command positions to be accountable if not properly resourced. Resourcing requires funding, equipment and sufficient trained full-timers. I don't see that possible outside of something like a 30/70 structure. 10/90 was barely adequate and in many ways underutilized the 10% full-timers. In a 30/70 structure the 30% remain a viable full-time entity in their own right while also able to support the 70% part-timers. Two 10/90 companies within a 30/70 battalion can work. A 10/90 battalion not.

 

[Kirkhill]

This article from The Wavell Room suggests that our militaries may be missing key elements in our ORBATS in light of the scale of drone warfare in Ukraine:

Drones and the Close Battle

Recreational drones are changing the character of the close battle. How is this happening and how should the British Army respond?

wavellroom.com

Some interesting points:





Maybe we need to re-examine our proposed ORBATS and potential roles for our Reserves.

Was the above article written by @Kirkhill ?

Further to....

Army may procure multiple variants of LASSO kamikaze drones to boost production capacity, acquisition chief says

The Army is pursuing new kamikaze drones for its LASSO program, and the service may look to multiple vendors to meet its needs, acquisition chief Doug Bush suggested during a meeting with reporters on Monday.

defensescoop.com

we are initiating a new program — the acronym is LASSO — to provide infantry units primarily with a loitering attack munition.

The Army is pursuing new kamikaze drones for its LASSO program, and the service may look to multiple vendors to meet its needs, acquisition chief Doug Bush suggested during a meeting with reporters on Monday.

The so-called Low Altitude Stalking and Strike Ordnance initiative is being led by project manager soldier warrior and product manager soldier precision targeting devices under Program Executive Office Soldier.

“LASSO is a man-portable, tube-launched, lethal payload munition, unmanned aerial system. It includes electrical optical /infrared sensor, precision flight control, and the ability to fly, track and engage non-line-of-sight targets and armored vehicles with precision lethal fires,” according to an Army release issued last month.

“On counter-UAS, I think we’ve been buying systems quite extensively, both for fixed site and mobile sets. A lot of that equipment is — we’re confident in it because of how it’s done in the Middle East. Frankly, that’s where they’ve seen the most action. Some of that … is going to Ukraine. Also, though, we’ve seen some very innovative work from the defense industry on some very low cost, low-tech approaches to counter-UAS that have gone to Ukraine that are quite promising,” Bush said.

 

[Kirkhill]

Neither the USAR nor the ARNG are "independent". The USAR is a component of the US Army and both the active component and the reserve component are Title 10 USC. Similarly, the ARNG is a component of the US Army although it is subject to Title 38 USC which has a more complex relationship because of its states aspect. It might be possible to say that there is a degree of separation as between the active component of the US Army and its two reserve components but "independent" is misleading.

The fact that both reserve components are responsible for supplying, and do supply, not just individual personnel but everything up to and including formations is a critical factual distinction between Canadian and American reserve employment concepts. Legally Canada's reserves are similarly liable but practically speaking its neither expected nor planned.

On the aspect of whether or not our reserve force should stand separate, or "independent" as you suggest, I disagree. One can organize and fund a reserve model in numerous ways. My desire to see integration of RegF and ResF components comes from the fact that it is very difficult to have an efficient and capable reserve force which is able to be mobilized into up to formation level without a core of full-time officers and NCOs who have gone through RegF training and gained the necessary experience to complement the training. I've been in RSS and IMHO our current CBG and RSS structure is inadequate to create viable units and formations. The level of accountability for outputs is too low and the constant failure to meet low expectations is consistently ignored. The complexity of warfare makes it virtually impossible for a ResF officer to hold key command positions from coy comd level and up without extensive predeployment training.

A proper responsible and accountable command structure is essential and one can't expect RegF officers in ResF command positions to be accountable if not properly resourced. Resourcing requires funding, equipment and sufficient trained full-timers. I don't see that possible outside of something like a 30/70 structure. 10/90 was barely adequate and in many ways underutilized the 10% full-timers. In a 30/70 structure the 30% remain a viable full-time entity in their own right while also able to support the 70% part-timers. Two 10/90 companies within a 30/70 battalion can work. A 10/90 battalion not.

They Reserve may be Of the Army, and it may contribute to the Field Army but it exists separately of the Field Army. Neither the Chief of Reserves nor the Chief of the National Guard Bureau are responsible to the Field Army for their positions.

I don't have a problem with incorporating Reserves into the Ready force - if you are willing to wait long enough for the Ready force to take the field.

The Reserves need to be seen separately to the Regs. Their availability, their motivations are entirely different to those of the Regs and continuing to expect them to behave like Regs just waiting for the call is to misunderstand them completely.

They ARE there as your Break Glass In Case Of War force. But not all of them are going to be available at your beck and call for all operations. Your sense of need and theirs are likely to be quite different.

 

[KevinB]

The Reserves need to be seen separately to the Regs. Their availability, their motivations are entirely different to those of the Regs and continuing to expect them to behave like Regs just waiting for the call is to misunderstand them completely.

You understand that is exactly what we do down here.

They ARE there as your Break Glass In Case Of War force. But not all of them are going to be available at your beck and call for all operations. Your sense of need and theirs are likely to be quite different.

Actually Reservists and the ARNG are often called up.
Reservists need to stop thinking they are the fair weather Army. Yes I known that doesn’t apply to all, but let’s face it a vast amount of the PRes aren’t really ready to deploy, and they should be.

This is what aggravates me about your beliefs of what the PRes is. They should be equipped and trained like the Regular Army.
They should conduct mandatory 3 week exercises annually at the minimum.

If they aren’t, then shutter the Reserves as the money can be better spent elsewhere.

 

[Kirkhill]

You understand that is exactly what we do down here.


Actually Reservists and the ARNG are often called up.
Reservists need to stop thinking they are the fair weather Army. Yes I known that doesn’t apply to all, but let’s face it a vast amount of the PRes aren’t really ready to deploy, and they should be.

This is what aggravates me about your beliefs of what the PRes is. They should be equipped and trained like the Regular Army.
They should conduct mandatory 3 week exercises annually at the minimum.

If they aren’t, then shutter the Reserves as the money can be better spent elsewhere.

If you want that from the Reserves then hire Reserves and not Militiamen. There is a reason why Territorials, Homeguards, National Guards and Militia are different to Reserves.

You want Reserves. Reserves are superannuated Regs. They are working the back end of their contracts and are available for 5 to 7 years post discharge. They are ready to fall back in on their old slot.

The Territorials/Militia/Homeguard/National Guard will produce some willing volunteers for deployments but that is not who they are in most countries.

The proper home for YOUR PRES is the Supp List.

 

[FJAG]

They Reserve may be Of the Army, and it may contribute to the Field Army but it exists separately of the Field Army. Neither the Chief of Reserves nor the Chief of the National Guard Bureau are responsible to the Field Army for their positions.

We can parce language indefinitely but the word you used is "independent" and neither the USAR nor the ARNG is "independent" of the Department of the Army. For that matter neither is the Chief of Reserves - a simple Wikipedia search shows this:

The chief of the United States Army Reserve (CAR)[1] is the commanding officer of the United States Army Reserve, the reserve component of the United States Army. As the highest-ranking officer in the United States Army Reserve, the CAR[2] is the principal advisor to the chief of staff of the Army on all matters relating to the Army Reserve, and is responsible for the personnel, operations and construction budgets of the Army Reserve, subject to the supervision and control of the secretary of the Army.[3] Dual-hatted as Commanding General, United States Army Reserve Command, the CAR is also responsible to the Commanding General, United States Army Forces Command for the oversight of operationally-deployed Army Reserve forces.[4]

By statute, the CAR is a member of the Army Staff,[5] as well as one of five Army Reserve members of the Reserve Forces Policy Board.[6] The CAR is also designated by statute as the executive agent for the Full Time Support Program, a personnel program under the Department of Defense. The Chief's headquarters is the Office of the Chief of Army Reserve, housed at Fort Liberty, North Carolina.

Its a powerful position, yes - but not "independent". Its similar with the ARNG - there are great interrelated dependencies between the active and reserve components under the overall arch of the Department of the Army. It's not like the USAF is independent of the US Army.

I don't have a problem with incorporating Reserves into the Ready force - if you are willing to wait long enough for the Ready force to take the field.

I don't mind admitting that I have no idea what DND actually considers the Ready Force. I know its a big line item and has a web page here. But by the time you get past the GBA+ and UN 2030 Agenda for Sustainability and the usual skillfully crafted meaningless performance measures you really have little idea of what it is rather than the sum of various disjointed components. If you consider the "Raedy force" as something that comes out of the tail end of Maple Resolve, then I agree - the ResF is not ready - and never will be as long as its is left to play by itself within its own sandbox.

The Reserves need to be seen separately to the Regs. Their availability, their motivations are entirely different to those of the Regs and continuing to expect them to behave like Regs just waiting for the call is to misunderstand them completely.

So what your saying is that as long as they have their own messes and get to be impotent colonels of impotent brigades everything is all right, Jack. Nowhere have I ever said that I "expect them to behave like Regs just waiting for the call". What I do expect is that they be more competent than they are and be able to answer the call as subunits and units if the call comes. Otherwise you might as well scrap the whole damn social club.

They ARE there as your Break Glass In Case Of War force. But not all of them are going to be available at your beck and call for all operations. Your sense of need and theirs are likely to be quite different.

You keep misusing the word "you" again. Because I've said many times over that they are a "break glass in case of war" force and not one for routine, peace-time operations (except those who volunteer to go on those). However, they are not now capable of being a "break glass" force and will never be one as long as left to their own devices. What they are now is a large pool which generates individuals to augment daily operations - and for the most part they do that well. The so called independent structure you call for is exactly what prevents them from being a "break glass" force.

 

[Kirkhill]

Would you accept some Consultant Speak and accept "Champion"?

And I am not talking about leaving them to their own devices. That is the last thing that I am talking about. I am suggesting that they be integrated on terms they can live with. Total Force expectations of those volunteers has not yielded that force that has been sought for decades.

Something else needs to be tried.

 

[FJAG]

If you want that from the Reserves then hire Reserves and not Militiamen. There is a reason why Territorials, Homeguards, National Guards and Militia are different to Reserves.

You want Reserves. Reserves are superannuated Regs. They are working the back end of their contracts and are available for 5 to 7 years post discharge. They are ready to fall back in on their old slot.

The Territorials/Militia/Homeguard/National Guard will produce some willing volunteers for deployments but that is not who they are in most countries.

The proper home for YOUR PRES is the Supp List.

You're making up your own definitions here. Reserve categories are how a country defines them. The common factor is that they are only in the military part-time and carry on their civilian lives in the majority of the time.

Much of the terminology comes from the historical way varying countries created reserves.

Canada's reserves are defined in the legislation and regulations and vary from your terminology. So are the Americans.

 

[KevinB]

Would you accept some Consultant Speak and accept "Champion"?

And I am not talking about leaving them to their own devices. That is the last thing that I am talking about. I am suggesting that they be integrated on terms they can live with. Total Force expectations of those volunteers has not yielded that force that has been sought for decades.

Something else needs to be tried.

I’d argue that Total Force hasn’t been tried.
The 10/90 system was only a success in the Arty, as the Infantry was simply a placeholder with the 3rd BN’s by robbing their PY’s for the 1st and 2nd Bn’s
I can’t speak to the Armour or Engineer side, other than from talking to friends in those units back then they never got equipped.


If you want an ineffective PRes system that is solely for supporting individual augmentees to the Regs, then the system Canada has now can be retained, but cutting down to units to lone Platoons. No need to have ANY PRes over the rank of Capt and WO.

My suggestion is to reform the PRes into an entity like the ARNG with real units with real training and equipment. Generally real roles and equipment and training draw the type of people that you want and need.

Canada doesn’t need a system of fair weather soldiers. It’s green welfare and not a good use of CAF money.

 

[daftandbarmy]

Canada doesn’t need a system of fair weather soldiers. It’s green welfare and not a good use of CAF money

But who would keep the CAF in touch with Canadians if not the socially ostracized, marginally employable/ dependent on CAF cash, members of the Reserves' Officers' Messes?

 

[FJAG]

Would you accept some Consultant Speak and accept "Champion"?

And I am not talking about leaving them to their own devices. That is the last thing that I am talking about. I am suggesting that they be integrated on terms they can live with. Total Force expectations of those volunteers has not yielded that force that has been sought for decades.

Something else needs to be tried.

We don't have a Total Force. Its a term of art that has been used to pretend that progress has been made since the 1970s. There has been no progress and there is no real total force.

I'm not advocating a total force because the term is meaningless. I'm advocating a hybrid or blended force where each component brings to the table what they are best at - from the RegF full-time leadership and administration and equipment and from the ResF part-time service capable of adding mass and specialist skills in extreme circumstances.

 

[markppcli]

No progress will ever be made as long as “the regs want us to do this” and “the reserves wants to do that” is an argument. There is simply the army. The army is ran by full time professionals, this is a fact that is not going to change. You can call the reserves the non permanent force, the reserves, the national guard, the militia, he’ll call it the Fyrd for all I care, just structure it in a way that makes logical sense to meet the needs of Canada as determined by the Army.