Informing the Army’s Future Structure

[KevinB]

@Kirkhill as far as structures go one of the biggest take aways via OS is the fact the Ukrainian Army has issues operating above the Coy level. At least in a combined arms setting.
They are primarily a Bde Army at this point. Which really means Bn level attacks as far a solid coordination.

The Russians are no better, they started with the BTG - a Battalion Tactical Group, which failed miserably that they eventually started to rebuild a Bde and later Div Army (albeit most units are so FUBAR the Bde’s are closer to the Bn in strength)

As much as I support the Ukrainians, and their sovereignty in the fight against Russia, I don’t think they are a good role model.
Sure they are doing the best they can with the tools they are given, but also very limited training in higher combined operations, it’s a far from optimal position they are in.

We have embraced Maneuver warfare in the West to reduce our casualties, so we aren’t forced into an attritional battle like UKR is forced. Yes we conduct degradation strikes to attrite the enemy, but we do so primarily outside enemy fires.

Yes, most of our enemies then resort to OOTW as they aren’t willing to face the combined arms power directly.
OOTW are significantly less casualty producing than great power wars.
Let’s face it in a few weeks in Bakhmut both sides lost more troops than the entire GWOT did in 2 decades.

A Conventional Modern Army can conduct OOTW, simply be restructuring its ORBAT and potentially replacing some equipment with Theatre Specific items.
A OOTW postured force CANNOT do the same thing and reorient towards Peer/Near Peer combat.

This is how down here we restructured to the XBCT’s as we didn’t need all the Div structures and enablers to conduct COIN. Yea some units even were re-roled for deployments down here.

However after GWOT we returned to a Divisional Army system.

The Russian invasion of Ukraine has brought UAS into a great light, from small Recce units, to larger payload systems and one’s even capable of retrieving casualties for Medivac. As well other uncrewed systems in the seas (above and under) and on the ground. But I don’t think that has changed the premise of warfare other than an area that needs to be developed further as well as counters to them.

The Ukrainians want more NATO Tanks, IFV’s, F-16’s and longer range missiles.
Which is basically to allow them to fight as a NATO military.

We already know we need to be prepared to fight in an A2D2 (Anti-Access Area Denial) World. That was in the cards pre Russian invasion. I recommend you take a look at the OS released copies of the MDO Strategy (my copy isn’t OS or I would put it here)

 

[FJAG]

The Ukrainians want more NATO Tanks, IFV’s, F-16’s and longer range missiles.
Which is basically to allow them to fight as a NATO military.

I think that you've really hit the nail on the head with your last two posts.

The two lines above both reinforce and contradict the issue. It's not so much the equipment that makes the difference here. Both Russia and the Ukrainians could fight a "western war" with what they have. They would just need to accept some some heavy casualties and the way it has gone they've already taken on quite a lot - so casualties alone that isn't the problem.

The problem is that neither army is capable of fighting a proper manoeuvre war for many reasons starting with logistics, moving through an absence of capable mid level leaders and stopping at the higher level of leadership which cannot coordinate all the moving pieces needed to properly conduct a manoeuvre based fight.

Canada ran through the 1990s without proper training at the brigade level. We went back to that with CMTC just in time to turn to the necessity of the battle group centric fight which we committed to in Afghanistan. We did well in having chosen leaders that we sent off to do tours with larger US formations but that barely kept our hand in the game and from an overarching doctrinal view we barely kept our head in the game. I gather from @Infanteer and @TangoTwoBravo that we do CAXs at the divisional level but from even their anecdotes (like the 1,000 page op order) that we are far from masters at the task. I think 6 CCSB is a critical element for a proper divisional structure but am of the feeling its done more for administrative convenience than as a doctrinal structure. If we truly had a doctrinal focus we would have a sustainment brigade. An arty brigade and an engineer brigade too but they are nowhere near as essential as a sustainment brigade. Even at the height of the XBCT fetish (great term incidentally - XBCT) the US kept divisional headquarters and used and trained them.

The biggest point --which you make--is that anyone can take a doctrinal division equipped and trained for general war and spin off smaller detachments capable for OOTW. You can't do it the other way around. General Guy Simmonds knew that when he was Chief of the General Staff in the 1950s (he was also for integrating NDHQ but dead set against unification of the services). We understood that under Charlie Belzile and then lost the plot when 4 CMBG came home.

The big issue about building a proper divisional structure and its necessary enablers, is not merely to hive them off into discrete silos that do not interact, but to form a permanent, stable structure and to develop a doctrine and TTPs for its use, AND also to develop the flexibility to easily reassign those enablers to where they are most needed at any given time and which includes being able to split off task forces of any size that are structured to maximize the use of those enablers. You can do that top down. You cannot do that bottom up.

 

[KevinB]

@FJAG small points of correction.
We did RV 92 as a Division, and sometime during 95 or 96 we did a Bde winter Ex in 1CMBG (troops nearly freezing in a Grizzly gives heavy reminders, nothing like two stoves and a lantern going in the back of a Griz, CO (Walter S) opened to door, before anyone realized who it was he was told Fuck off and Mark Allred slammed the door slammed shut.
He then knocked laughing and we begrudgingly let him in, he agreed it was a total clusterfuck as we hadn’t done much but freeze for three days.
But generally yes I totally agree that Bde and Higher Operations were not part of the system at all.
Beyond that one ‘Bde Ex’ which the guns were not at, and only the LdSH and 2VP did a few Cbt Team runs live, we generally did Cbt Team Dry a few times (Sarcee Trg area) with the Strats, the rest was all Bn level training.


I told DInf the Sumer of ‘97 we probably could afford to kill ever officer over Captain and NCO over WO and have zero change in performance as frankly all we where doing is practicing Section to Coy attacks live, and nothing higher. The RSM (Ford) wasn’t thrilled, but my OC and CO agreed that I had a point.

 

[FJAG]

@FJAG small points of correction.
We did RV 92 as a Division, and sometime during 95 or 96 we did a Bde winter Ex in 1CMBG (troops nearly freezing in a Grizzly gives heavy reminders, nothing like two stoves and a lantern going in the back of a Griz, CO (Walter S) opened to door, before anyone realized who it was he was told Fuck off and Mark Allred slammed the door slammed shut.
He then knocked laughing and we begrudgingly let him in, he agreed it was a total clusterfuck as we hadn’t done much but freeze for three days.
But generally yes I totally agree that Bde and Higher Operations were not part of the system at all.
Beyond that one ‘Bde Ex’ which the guns were not at, and only the LdSH and 2VP did a few Cbt Team runs live, we generally did Cbt Team Dry a few times (Sarcee Trg area) with the Strats, the rest was all Bn level training.


I told DInf the Sumer of ‘97 we probably could afford to kill ever officer over Captain and NCO over WO and have zero change in performance as frankly all we where doing is practicing Section to Coy attacks live, and nothing higher. The RSM (Ford) wasn’t thrilled, but my OC and CO agreed that I had a point.

I've got to admit that all the brigade and higher exercises I was ever on, from the spring concentrations to Reforgers and the like in Germany were at best mixed. As gunners we had a week or two of good regimental firing and then we started trucking around all over the countryside doing dry stuff that was exceedingly boring for everyone below battalion or regimental command level.

The best experiences I had was the dozen plus Black Bears in Shilo with German armoured battlegroups live fire assaults under live Canadian artillery fire which were highly scripted. Unfortunately I never got to participate in a BATUS.

I've never experienced a CMTC Maple Resolve either but immediately have concerns because a given brigade only sees it once every three years. With one or two brigade exercises per year we were just barely able to properly cycle through the different phases of war during a given officer's regimental postings/courses cycles. It's just not enough.

 

[Kirkhill]

I'm not disagreeing with either of you on what is necessary to create a functional division. I just don't see us creating a division, exercising a division or supplying the necessary manpower flow to support a deployed division. Any shot we have at fielding a division right now would end up as a Division (-) and still eat up all of the Regs leaving precious little to convert the Reserves into troops capable of functioning even at the level of the Ukrainians currently. I agree that the Ukrainians can't manage offenses beyond the Company/Battalion level. Neither the Russians nor the Ukrainians have been particularly effective, from Open Source info, beyond the Section/Platoon level.

The Ukrainians are managing the defence well, but so are the Russians. Neither side seems to do particularly well with counter-attacks. The Russians go Hasty and perform badly. The Ukrainians do better but only by going Deliberate meaning that the opportunity to do real damage seems to escape them. The Ukrainians seem to do really well on Dispersed Ops but, as noted, it requires concentrating mass to break lines. Which results in fighting like water - a slow, wearing campaign advancing where opportunity presents.

In the Canadian context I was asking if our bigger problem isn't the lack of Brigade level training, mixing and matching sub-units and units and repeatedly changing the training scenarios - running Heavy, Medium and Light variants through all three of Krulak's blocks in Prairie Summers, Arctic Winters and BC Rains, by day and night.

That kind of constant training at that level, to my mind, is what is necessary to produce a capable force useful in 80% of the situations.

If you formed a single Division of our 4 Brigades then it seems to me likely that the Division Commander would, most likely, end up chopping chunks in order to tailor her force to the needs of the field and enemy she faces.

I argue for a Peacetime Division to be able to create those flexible Brigades and competent HQs. To create a Field Division, a wartime Division, I would anticipate that we need to plan on creating a Corps, even if the Corps is only 30% Regular, and then need to figure out how to exercise the Division, in the field, with troops, on a regular basis.

That costs lots of money.

We aren't even willing to spend the money necessary to regularly train the Brigades we have. We penny pinch on Combined Arms Regiments, which we could field with the kit we have because we can't be arsed to ship parts and mechanics to three towns in Canada. The Canadian economy is built on companies shipping parts and mechanics to remote locations like Barrie and Peterborough.

So, instead, we bundle all of our tanks into one location and search for a mechanic who wants to live with them.

....


Canada can afford a Division. No doubt. But it chooses to do the other thing - to my chagrin.

The only real question that remains as far as I am concerned is "how much mayhem can we create with the dollars and bodies available?" My gut says a lot more than we seem to be settling for.

 

[KevinB]

Canada theoretically has more than a Division in the Army.
By numerical strength the CA (Reg and Res) should be able to field a Corps.

 

[Kirkhill]

Canada theoretically has more than a Division in the Army.
By numerical strength the CA (Reg and Res) should be able to field a Corps.

And there we are probably come closer to agreement. I agree that we could organize a Corps. But would you like the Corps that we could organize? Would it have enough of the right type of kit and the right type of training for you? And would it be used on the right types of operations?

 

[FJAG]

Canada theoretically has more than a Division in the Army.
By numerical strength the CA (Reg and Res) should be able to field a Corps.

Numerically we can form a weak corps but we should be able to field and sustain a division.

If you formed a single Division of our 4 Brigades then it seems to me likely that the Division Commander would, most likely, end up chopping chunks in order to tailor her force to the needs of the field and enemy she faces.

I argue for a Peacetime Division to be able to create those flexible Brigades and competent HQs. To create a Field Division, a wartime Division, I would anticipate that we need to plan on creating a Corps, even if the Corps is only 30% Regular, and then need to figure out how to exercise the Division, in the field, with troops, on a regular basis.

My argument has always been to form two divisions: a day-to-day peacetime division and a break glass in case of war division.

The latter is reserve heavy and primarily trained and equipped to be a deployed expeditionary force. That is not to say that elements of it could not be used for peacetime missions as well to sustain the day-to-day division.

The day-to-day division is primarily RegF and designed to primarily fulfill our peacetime day-to-day commitments and form a faster readiness force for immediate emergencies. Again, that is not to say that in case of war it could not be used to sustain the break glass in case of war division.

The day-to-day division will probably never deploy as a division per se but merely launch smaller forces. It does not need to know how to function within a corps.

The break glass division absolutely needs to be able to function in a corps and should be organized, equipped and trained as such. That doesn't need to be a Canadian corps but it should be assigned to a dedicated foreign corps - preferably an American one.

 

[KevinB]

@FJAG I agree for the most part.

I would however have a Regular Bde in the ‘2nd CDN Div’ (forward deployed to Europe) and a PRes Bde in “1 Cdn Div”.

 

[Rifleman62]

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[GR66]

I don't see that yet. I see Japan's increased budget (which is still only 1% of their GDP and $ going to ADM systems but beyond that I don't see much. There's one rapid deployment amphibious brigade but other than that they have 9 divisions (which are more like large brigades rather than divisions) and 8 independent brigades. There's nothing in their navy or air force that talks expeditionary - rather it goes to the name of the force itself - self defence. I'm not really too sure what to say about the Australians. They are cutting back on the concept of a balanced force to one devoted to firepower but its hard to see how that works. I've never liked their structure. It looks like ours only worse.

Honestly, I always understood the Pacific strategy during WW2 but for the life of me have no idea what either China's or the US's strategy is for these days.

Here's an article that discusses Japan's defence spending increases and gives an overview of their general strategy vis-a-vis China.

https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2023/08/08/japans_military_is_getting_ready_to_take_on_a_rising_china_971421.html

 

[KevinB]

@FJAG I agree for the most part.

I would however have a Regular Bde in the ‘2nd CDN Div’ (forward deployed to Europe) and a PRes Bde in “1 Cdn Div”.

My biggest issues with the 2 Div "Corps" in the CA, is the lack of equipment.

I would vastly prefer their to be equipment for these entities.

Reworking a Napkin Army to fit this.

1 CDN Corps (Non Deployable Administrative)

1 Cdn Div Light.
1 Bde: 1-3 PPCLI (Airborne, Mountain/Arctic)
2 Bde: 1-3 22eR (Airborne, Desert)
3 Bde: 3 RCR - and 4 RCR & PPCLI both 10/90 PRes (Airborne, Amphibious)
Arty Bde: M777, 120mm Mortar, AD/CUAS

2 Div Armoured
4 Bde 1-2 RCR and LdSH(RC) (Tank) - Pre Deployed to Europe
5 Bde 1-2 Canadian Guard (10/90), Equipment PreDeployed to Europe, 12 RBC (Tank) Pre-Deployed to Europe.
6 Bde 1-2 The Black Watch (10/90), RCD (LAV) - Equipment based in Shilo (fairly central for 5 and 6 Bde Training)
Arty Bde M109A7 & HIMARS, AD/CUAS

 

[Kirkhill]

Numerically we can form a weak corps but we should be able to field and sustain a division.


My argument has always been to form two divisions: a day-to-day peacetime division and a break glass in case of war division.

The latter is reserve heavy and primarily trained and equipped to be a deployed expeditionary force. That is not to say that elements of it could not be used for peacetime missions as well to sustain the day-to-day division.

The day-to-day division is primarily RegF and designed to primarily fulfill our peacetime day-to-day commitments and form a faster readiness force for immediate emergencies. Again, that is not to say that in case of war it could not be used to sustain the break glass in case of war division.

The day-to-day division will probably never deploy as a division per se but merely launch smaller forces. It does not need to know how to function within a corps.

The break glass division absolutely needs to be able to function in a corps and should be organized, equipped and trained as such. That doesn't need to be a Canadian corps but it should be assigned to a dedicated foreign corps - preferably an American one.

@FJAG I agree for the most part.

I would however have a Regular Bde in the ‘2nd CDN Div’ (forward deployed to Europe) and a PRes Bde in “1 Cdn Div”.

Are we all agreeing then, that Canada needs:

a Lt Gen in charge of the Canadian Army
at least 2 MGens subordinate to manage Peace and War demands?

Do we have to get wrapped around the axle over how many Brigades or Brigade Groups report to each MGen, understanding that chopping will happen and will depend on the demands of the situation?

Perhaps we need 3 MGens with the 3rd MGen tasked with ensuring the Reserves are useful (properly organized, equipped and trained)?

That would, based on where we are now, result in:

A, 1 MGen Looking outwards towards the next overseas deployment and planning which of the units he is going to rob from the other two MGens.

B, 1 MGen Responsible for keeping 1,2,5 and 6 Brigades at high readiness for any eventuality anywhere.

C, 1 MGen Responsible for 2,3,4 and 5 "Divs" and ensuring that the Reserves are functional. That would demote the "Divs" to their more appropriate "Brigade" status and be in line with supplying 10 "Territorial Groups" (I dislike the "battle" reference, in this context, for a whole bunch of reasons best left alone just now.)

We have a Lt Gen in charge of the Army - Lt Gen Paul
We have an MGen as Deputy CCA - MGen Scott
We have and MGen as CCADTC - MGen Pelletier
We have a MGen looking outwards (1 Cdn Div) - MGen Misener

Then we have a raft of BGens
CoS Ops
CoS Strat
DG Army Reserves
Cmdr 2 Div (JTFE)
Cmdr 3 Div (JTFW)
Cmdr 4 Div (JTFC)
Cmdr 5 Div (JTFA)

And our Brigades are commanded by Colonels.
1 CMBG
2 CMBG
5 CMBG
6 CSBG
31 CBG
32 CBG
33 CBG
34 CBG
35 CBG
36 CBG
37 CBG
38 CBG
39 CBG
41 CBG

And somebody somewhere is somehow in charge of the Rangers

The Canadian Rangers became part of the Canadian Army in October 2007, having previously been under the vice chief of the Defence Staff for the Canadian Armed Forces. The Commander of the Canadian Army is the Canadian Ranger National Authority (CRNA), but this role is delegated down to the Army Chief of Staff Reserve (ACOS Res), a brigadier-general. The commander of the Canadian Army has a small cadre of CRNA staff in Ottawa, headed by a Class-A (part-time) lieutenant-colonel and consisting of a full-time major and a small number of captains and master warrant officers. The conduit between the CRNA staff and the ACOS REs is the Director Army Reserve (DARes), a full colonel. These CRNA staff act as a conduit for information, assist with general development and improvement, assist in generating, modifying, and maintaining policy that addresses the unique nature of the Canadian Rangers (including administrative policy, unit establishment and structure, training policy, and logistical policy), and with the financing (overall funding model) of the Canadian Rangers. These staff are not directly within the chain of command and have no authority over the CRPGs, but are instead seen as the technical and advisory link between the Canadian Ranger units and the Commander of the Canadian Army.

If the wiki info is correct then it seems to be symptomatic of the confusion that I associate with the High Command and also the Reserves generally.

What would happen if....

CCA - Lt Gen
DCCA - MGen
CoS Adm - BGen
CoS Ops - BGen
CoS Strat - BGen

So far so bad.

But then
1 Div (Deployed) - MGen with a primary focus on Latvia.
2 Div (Ready - Regular) - MGen
3 Div (Reserve) - MGen
Support - MGen
Rangers - BGen

1 Div is responsible for those elements of 2 and 3 Divs deployed.
2 Div is responsible for 1,2,5 and 6 Brigades
3 Div is responsible for the 10 Territorial Units organized into 4 Territorial Brigades and tasked with generating functioning sub-units.
Support is responsible for the domestic infrastructure, deployed support is a function of the 1 Div organization, beefed up as needed.
Rangers - carry on.

CADTC and CMP - can those be merged after the fashion of the ancient Adjutant-General?

I am intentionally steering clear of nuts and bolts and roles and tasks and kit. Those are situationally dependent.

The key element, in my view, to making this, or any other structure, work is constantly exercising the various elements as elements. Perhaps more emphasis on group training with OJT personal development and less on dedicated individual training in classes?


Edit to add thoughts on transitions:

When 2 Div loses a Brigade plus atts to 1 Div for deployment then 2 Div should be made whole by standing up a new Brigade drawn from 3 Div.
Does that Brigade need to be defined now or could that Brigade be created from whole cloth from the sub units of 3 Div and tailored to suit the needs of the situation? How long would that take? Could 2 Div cover the deployments on its own until the new Brigade was ready for deployment?

 

[foresterab]

My biggest issues with the 2 Div "Corps" in the CA, is the lack of equipment.

I would vastly prefer their to be equipment for these entities.

Reworking a Napkin Army to fit this.

1 CDN Corps (Non Deployable Administrative)

1 Cdn Div Light.
1 Bde: 1-3 PPCLI (Airborne, Mountain/Arctic)
2 Bde: 1-3 22eR (Airborne, Desert)
3 Bde: 3 RCR - and 4 RCR & PPCLI both 10/90 PRes (Airborne, Amphibious)
Arty Bde: M777, 120mm Mortar, AD/CUAS

2 Div Armoured
4 Bde 1-2 RCR and LdSH(RC) (Tank) - Pre Deployed to Europe
5 Bde 1-2 Canadian Guard (10/90), Equipment PreDeployed to Europe, 12 RBC (Tank) Pre-Deployed to Europe.
6 Bde 1-2 The Black Watch (10/90), RCD (LAV) - Equipment based in Shilo (fairly central for 5 and 6 Bde Training)
Arty Bde M109A7 & HIMARS, AD/CUAS

I look at a structure like this though and I start to wonder, as a civilian who hasn't served, if maybe the first step is something even more drastic.
Break the regimental mafia roles.

Instead of having a single regiment that fills 3 battalions maybe we're better to have 3x separate units that can a) be "local" to their portion of the country and b) reduce thinking to only 3x Infantry and instead change it to 10-12x solutions? The other part of this is I often talk to friends and random veterans who tend to identify by unit - which is great - but then when you hear that they jumped between multiple battalions it's not providing the same depth of knowledge as they're still part of the greater parent unit. Instead I think of greater transfers between units - at least based upon promotion/career paths - which might include moving from the 22eR or RCR to the QOHR in Latvia if needed for a posting. Not 100% sure if this won't be a greater circus than rewards but I'm thinking not just from a deployment perspective but also an internal Canadian positing level where you move within the greater context of the division/Army vs. a single regiment.

Most units of WW1 and many of WW2 were formed as training/recruitment units and then manpower was sent to a greater pool in Europe and individuals re-badged as needed by the Army. Instead we're trying to fit units, of different capacity and size, into a plug and play scenario which isn't working and is further compounded by the Reserves being treated as a "replacement" pool to fill in already - the classic Canadian hybrid of making a tough job more complicated.

In regards to the roles of each unit - I'm not sure we need 30% of the Infantry to be jump units? But to be light forces definitely. I'd also argue that there should be artic based units on both sides of the country as operating near sea ice near Baffin Island is going to be very different than Yellowknife and also provides I think a much better fit/mission role for NATO/NORAD. If we can show we can support the US in AK, Denmark/Finland/Norway/Sweden we've got a much better alignment with current trade partners, and a more focused vision than trying to be everywhere. I think Artic just because of a) we have a large amount of the world's artic lands and b) Artic deployments are going be focused upon deployment of resources, long distances, at the end of a long supply chain, in challenging conditions and c) if you can handle the artic some of the other conditions are easier to train for (those who were in Afghanistan at +45 with full loads might disagree I know).

If you practice deploying units 4,500 km within Canada (Toronto to upper northern Artic Islands) you've also included Alaska, Iceland, the Caribbean, and parts of South America. 6,500km puts you from Toronto to Hawaii, Latvia and Western Europe, Siberia, and Brazil/Peru. Map Radius Calculator The point here is if you can deploy a combat effective force to Coppermine, NWT you can also move that same force multiple directions even if they are not trained to local conditions.

The other missing part not discussed is on the larger scale formation exercises. Don't really care if it's Div/Corp/Brigade level but organize a serious training exercise and then start handing out invites - Australia, Singapore, New Zealand, Norway etc....for infantry companies or larger formations to take place. Provide an opportunity for learnings both ways - lateral and vertical - as most countries are not going to send poor units to something like that and to have a second force to compare yourself too often leads to big awareness of where differences and improvements might exist. I'm not sure if it's appropriate given the state of manpower and equipment right now but delaying things until they're perfect will mean it's an empty bucket of knowledge for when needed. Heck - just look at how many countries sent fire fighters to Canada this year - Australia, New Zealand, South Korea, USA, Portugal, France, Spain, Dominican Republic, Mexico, Costa Rica, Chile, Brazil, South Africa - and the lessons being learned by all from that exposure.

 

[KevinB]

Are we all agreeing then, that Canada needs:

a Lt Gen in charge of the Canadian Army
at least 2 MGens subordinate to manage Peace and War demands?

Do we have to get wrapped around the axle over how many Brigades or Brigade Groups report to each MGen, understanding that chopping will happen and will depend on the demands of the situation?

Perhaps we need 3 MGens with the 3rd MGen tasked with ensuring the Reserves are useful (properly organized, equipped and trained)?

I wouldn't -- as I would have the PRes under the 2 Divisions, thus the G1 in each of those Divisions would look at all Personnel.

That would, based on where we are now, result in:

A, 1 MGen Looking outwards towards the next overseas deployment and planning which of the units he is going to rob from the other two MGens.

B, 1 MGen Responsible for keeping 1,2,5 and 6 Brigades at high readiness for any eventuality anywhere.

C, 1 MGen Responsible for 2,3,4 and 5 "Divs" and ensuring that the Reserves are functional. That would demote the "Divs" to their more appropriate "Brigade" status and be in line with supplying 10 "Territorial Groups" (I dislike the "battle" reference, in this context, for a whole bunch of reasons best left alone just now.)

We have a Lt Gen in charge of the Army - Lt Gen Paul
We have an MGen as Deputy CCA - MGen Scott
We have and MGen as CCADTC - MGen Pelletier
We have a MGen looking outwards (1 Cdn Div) - MGen Misener

I think you can trim a lot more than that.
1 LtGen CCA (who is also the 1 Cdn Corps Commander)
1 MG as XO
1 * Positions for the G Staff (9). Which would house programs and directorate staff.

1 ** for the each of the Div's
1* XO for each plus a bunch of COL and LtCol staff spots.

Moving from 14 "CBG's" to 6, with 2 Arty Bde, 2 CSSB, and 2 FSB, or 12.

Then we have a raft of BGens
CoS Ops
CoS Strat
DG Army Reserves
Cmdr 2 Div (JTFE)
Cmdr 3 Div (JTFW)
Cmdr 4 Div (JTFC)
Cmdr 5 Div (JTFA)

And our Brigades are commanded by Colonels.
1 CMBG
2 CMBG
5 CMBG
6 CSBG
31 CBG
32 CBG
33 CBG
34 CBG
35 CBG
36 CBG
37 CBG
38 CBG
39 CBG
41 CBG

And somebody somewhere is somehow in charge of the Rangers

I would have the Domestic Support role under the Corps G-3

If the wiki info is correct then it seems to be symptomatic of the confusion that I associate with the High Command and also the Reserves generally.

What would happen if....

CCA - Lt Gen
DCCA - MGen
CoS Adm - BGen
CoS Ops - BGen
CoS Strat - BGen

So far so bad.

But then
1 Div (Deployed) - MGen with a primary focus on Latvia.
2 Div (Ready - Regular) - MGen
3 Div (Reserve) - MGen
Support - MGen
Rangers - BGen

1 Div is responsible for those elements of 2 and 3 Divs deployed.
2 Div is responsible for 1,2,5 and 6 Brigades
3 Div is responsible for the 10 Territorial Units organized into 4 Territorial Brigades and tasked with generating functioning sub-units.
Support is responsible for the domestic infrastructure, deployed support is a function of the 1 Div organization, beefed up as needed.
Rangers - carry on.

CADTC and CMP - can those be merged after the fashion of the ancient Adjutant-General?

I am intentionally steering clear of nuts and bolts and roles and tasks and kit. Those are situationally dependent.

The key element, in my view, to making this, or any other structure, work is constantly exercising the various elements as elements. Perhaps more emphasis on group training with OJT personal development and less on dedicated individual training in classes?

New sergeant major of the Army calls NCO development a top priority

There's a new sergeant major of the Army. Here's what he told reporters his priorities will be.

www.armytimes.com

I don't just agree with him because he was an assaulter at the unit.

 

[KevinB]

@foresterab - Airborne is simply a means of delivery.
Frankly if I was king, everyone would go through jump school as part of basic. It has a lot of benefits, and when everyone is a jumper, there isn't anything significantly elitism about it.

 

[foresterab]

@foresterab - Airborne is simply a means of delivery.
Frankly if I was king, everyone would go through jump school as part of basic. It has a lot of benefits, and when everyone is a jumper, there isn't anything significantly elitism about it.

Hi KevinB,

Agree on the method of delivery option and to reduce the elitism that sometimes comes of things. My background comes from wildfire and I see the few outfits that use Smoke Jumpers, or frankly even Rappel crews and I'm constantly questioning if that small increase in capacity is worth the significantly larger support needs and transport complications...and much more limited recruitment pool to draw from. That being said I'm a huge fan of a helicopter taking me somewhere vs. walking but it's a common discussion at coffee - was the capacity of helicopters in 1985 the same as today? Answer no - lower powered machines. And in the absence of that power did some of those programs make way more sense - heck yes.

In WW2 Airborne was a key way to leap frog fixed defenses and open corridors (Crete and Arnhem aside) but by Vietnam 20 years later the early model Huey's changed much of that dynamic. Now it's squads per machine being deployed as formed subunits or larger and the aircraft have only improved. Chinooks and Blackhawks have that much more capacity...but also seem to be about the maximum size to be functional. Light airframes like the Bell 206 (Kiowa in US Army) have almost been fully replaced by A-Star's that have more lift, more control and greater cargo.

Drones are the darling of the day but I find they are either excellent at their task...or not worth the paper the proposal was written on. The technology is changing so fast I don't see them replacing manned medivac or other key taskings yet but from an intelligence perspective I'm a fan.
The point I'm trying to make, and I think you're also making, is that no one solution will be perfect for all conditions and scenarios, and that the solutions change with technology too. Flexibility in training and a range of capacity will allow for a much superior overall product that can be utilized anywhere vs. a static formation that is only good for a single role.

 

[KevinB]

Hi KevinB,

Agree on the method of delivery option and to reduce the elitism that sometimes comes of things. My background comes from wildfire and I see the few outfits that use Smoke Jumpers, or frankly even Rappel crews and I'm constantly questioning if that small increase in capacity is worth the significantly larger support needs and transport complications...and much more limited recruitment pool to draw from. That being said I'm a huge fan of a helicopter taking me somewhere vs. walking but it's a common discussion at coffee - was the capacity of helicopters in 1985 the same as today? Answer no - lower powered machines. And in the absence of that power did some of those programs make way more sense - heck yes.

In WW2 Airborne was a key way to leap frog fixed defenses and open corridors (Crete and Arnhem aside) but by Vietnam 20 years later the early model Huey's changed much of that dynamic. Now it's squads per machine being deployed as formed subunits or larger and the aircraft have only improved. Chinooks and Blackhawks have that much more capacity...but also seem to be about the maximum size to be functional. Light airframes like the Bell 206 (Kiowa in US Army) have almost been fully replaced by A-Star's that have more lift, more control and greater cargo.

Drones are the darling of the day but I find they are either excellent at their task...or not worth the paper the proposal was written on. The technology is changing so fast I don't see them replacing manned medivac or other key taskings yet but from an intelligence perspective I'm a fan.
The point I'm trying to make, and I think you're also making, is that no one solution will be perfect for all conditions and scenarios, and that the solutions change with technology too. Flexibility in training and a range of capacity will allow for a much superior overall product that can be utilized anywhere vs. a static formation that is only good for a single role.

As far as a rapid response, you really cannot beat an Airborne force.
Helicopters lack range and speed, and the Airborne are part of Joint Forcible Entry to allow you to control things like airports etc to land heavier equipment. For the Arctic - it is much easier to drop a few C-17's of Paratroops to make a presence - and the same goes for a lot of other places (jumping into Mountains sucks even with steerable chutes - but it does get folks there quickly.

Yes I am a firm believer in Helicopters, I just don't see much of a point with the Griffons, as their load sucks, and the CAF doesn't have many, and even less Hooks.

 

[FJAG]

My biggest issues with the 2 Div "Corps" in the CA, is the lack of equipment.

I don't overly concentrate on equipment. Clearly equipment is needed in the long run, but I focus on the following 1) a defence structure that meet logical defence needs (both immediate as well as reasonably foreseeable) 2. a plan that takes us from a current personnel and equipment state to a sustainable end-state. 3) a fully equipped and manned steady state. Most of my napkin forces are at stage 2 which provides a foundation for an equipping plan. All that to say that while I don't mention what is needed in the long run, I haven't forgotten that it needs to be there eventually.

I would vastly prefer their to be equipment for these entities.

Reworking a Napkin Army to fit this.

1 CDN Corps (Non Deployable Administrative)

I adamantly refuse to form any non deployable administrative headquarters. They should all be deployable entities with a specific defence plan missions or is a headquarters needed to do overall management of sustainment functions. This is why I think that our current five divisions and several of 10 of our brigade headquarters are simply foolish.

We already have Army headquarters for the overall administrative management of the army and we already have CJOC for overall "management" of joint deployed operations. 1 Div as constituted is unnecessary and the essential parts of it should move into CJOC. "Deployable headquarters should all come from the field organizations of which I see two: a heavy div focused on Europe ( a repurposed 1 Div) and a light/medium div focused everywhere else (2 Div). (The numbering has no great significance other than the current 2 Div is already where I want it and if you have a 2 Div then logically the other one should be 1 Div.)

1 Cdn Div Light.
1 Bde: 1-3 PPCLI (Airborne, Mountain/Arctic)
2 Bde: 1-3 22eR (Airborne, Desert)
3 Bde: 3 RCR - and 4 RCR & PPCLI both 10/90 PRes (Airborne, Amphibious)
Arty Bde: M777, 120mm Mortar, AD/CUAS

2 Div Armoured
4 Bde 1-2 RCR and LdSH(RC) (Tank) - Pre Deployed to Europe
5 Bde 1-2 Canadian Guard (10/90), Equipment PreDeployed to Europe, 12 RBC (Tank) Pre-Deployed to Europe.
6 Bde 1-2 The Black Watch (10/90), RCD (LAV) - Equipment based in Shilo (fairly central for 5 and 6 Bde Training)
Arty Bde M109A7 & HIMARS, AD/CUAS

I see 2 Div in Montreal because it is mid way between 2 Bde and 5 Bde which in my mind are the two core brigades for 2 Div with 2 Bde being light and 5 Bde being medium (both are RegF heavy - averaging a 70/30 force). 2 Div's span crosses the whole country with a 30/70 "regiment" on each coast responsible for coastal defence; an additional 30/70 medium/light bde; all the Canadian Rangers; a CSS bde and a sustainment bde. 2 Div's primary function is defence of Canada and smaller expeditionary missions to places other than Europe. It draws most of its manpower from Eastern Canada as well as BC.

I have two possible locations for 1 Div, Winnipeg or Trenton in order to be close to the RCAF headquarters there (as I think air movement planning will be a big deal for it) and to make it more centrally located. It will have four manoeuvre brigades - 3 Bde in Europe with a brigade of prepositioned kit and sufficient manning to provide a full-time headquarters and logistics staff to maintain equipment and war stocks. three 30/70 bdes with one on the Prairies (1 Bde - Edmonton) and two in Ontario (Toronto and London). In addition there will be an artillery bde and a sustainment brigade and additional divisional troops such as a divisional recce regiment and engineer regiment. CMTC relocates to Europe. 1 Div's primary function is to maintain our eFP and a prepositioned brigade in Europe. It draws most of its manpower from Ontario and the prairie provinces. It conducts up to battle group training in Canada but deploys on flyovers to 3 Bde for combined arms exercises formulated and managed by CMTC.

Don't mistake "primary function" in the above with "exclusive function". I see the CSS Bde for example having regular tasks to support 1 Div. I see elements of 1 Div to be tasked to operate on peacetime expeditionary tasks that fall under 2 Divs responsibility.

Also, I see both Divs having a greater role than merely force generating elements for CJOC. I see more of a force employer role for the two. For example, 1 Div HQ might have a small forward element located in Europe while 2 Div might play a larger role in force employing troops deployed on operations in Canada. I'm still trying to find a better relationship for the two divs with CJOC. It's not possible with our current structure but it might be once responsibilities for theatres are assigned.

One point. I'm not in favour of a "light division" although I clearly think that a true and properly trained and equipped light brigade is essential (and further the two coastal "regiments" will be light as well - its basically 5 Bde and the additional Quebec brigade which I see as mech in 2 Div). I can see where the current equipment holdings draw you to a "light division". My view is that even if we lack equipment now, the organization and training should focus on where we want to end up even if it means equipment sharing or the use of prepositioned equipment in the short term. (As an example, of our 18 mech companies, I see 6 prepositioned in Europe, 6 with the 3 heavy brigades in Ont/Prairies, and 6 with 2 Div's two mech bdes - that demands sharing equipment in up to battalion level training and use of the two prepositioned battalions in Europe for more complex battle group exercises [hence the need for a better connection with our airlift people and more maintainers])

Just one more point. I'm not bringing back the Canadian Guards. In fact there will only be one each battalion of the PPCLI, RCR and R22eR and those will be in the three 100/0 battalions of the light brigade. Everyone else will be a member of about 14+ or so existing ResF battalions that will be retained as 70/30 or 30/70 battalions (the remainder will be absorbed as full-strength companies within full-strength battalions).

 

[Kirkhill]

I wouldn't -- as I would have the PRes under the 2 Divisions, thus the G1 in each of those Divisions would look at all Personnel.

Absofeckinlootly not. We are in this situation because nobody is focused on delivering useful reserves. The regs can't be bothered. They just want bodies to magically appear to fatten their ranks at their whim while they moan about the quality of the help they are offered.

The Reserves need someone whose job it is to make them useful. End of.

I think you can trim a lot more than that.
1 LtGen CCA (who is also the 1 Cdn Corps Commander)
1 MG as XO
1 * Positions for the G Staff (9). Which would house programs and directorate staff.

Agreed.

1 ** for the each of the Div's
1* XO for each plus a bunch of COL and LtCol staff spots.

Agreed

Moving from 14 "CBG's" to 6, with 2 Arty Bde, 2 CSSB, and 2 FSB, or 12.

Kindofish... have to chew on the Support and Service Support chunks. My inclination is towards a regular force Support structure with the Reserves contributing more truck and ambulance drivers than mechanics and electricians.

I would have the Domestic Support role under the Corps G-3

CJOC is a thing. And it is an non-Army thing. Making local commanders responsible for standing up a JTF seems right to me. The commander should not be the JTF commander. That job should go to one of his subordinates. Kind of in line with the role of my 1st Div commander - staying on top of the situation and prepared to steal troops to meet the needs of the situation.

The one area that I think could offer opportunity is the National Search and Rescue System with its Joint Rescue Co-Ordination Centres at Halifax, Trenton and Victoria. Why couldn't their roles be expanded to include all civil co-ordination? And make them more closely aligned with the Coast Guard's Regions?



But we're talking about the Army here and not the CAF at large.

And I think it is more important to generate a functional command structure that can flexibly respond to multiple situations (my 80% of known knowns and known unknowns).

Do I really need to worry if an artillery battery draws 16x 81s or 120s from stores or 6 105s or 155s or HIMARS?
What is the training time necessary to take 105 gunners and turn them into mortarmen or rocketmen?
From what I take from @FJAG the secret sauce is in the C4ISR and not in serving the guns.

A different matter for the GBAD tasking in the sense that the C4ISR is radically different but how different is it to serve the different remote effectors?

Can I swap a Squadron from Jeeps to LAVs to Tanks? What is the training delta?

Can I swap a Company from legs, to ropes, to helos, to trucks, to LAVs, to chutes, to boats? What is the training delta?

With cash anything is possible. And time.

What are the basic skill sets that should be common to a sub-unit that allows it to switch roles - given time and money?

New sergeant major of the Army calls NCO development a top priority

There's a new sergeant major of the Army. Here's what he told reporters his priorities will be.

www.armytimes.com

I don't just agree with him because he was an assaulter at the unit.

NCOs are good. Where do they learn their trade? In the class or in the field.

Cheers.