Informing the Army’s Future Structure

[FJAG]

Sorry FJAG but that is completely false, I’m breaking into that world right now and yeah… simply not true.

Then things have changed recently. I'd be very interested in knowing in which way they have changed.

 

[markppcli]

FAC is not the same as JTAC is probably where your confusion is coming from, or maybe you got bad int. The pass rate / ref requirements necessitate that you can’t have every FOO certified and qualified. But I’m not in a position to describe the JTAC MOAs history in Canada and how it relates to the Artillery Officer career path frankly.

 

[Pewpews521]

There is a relatively simple solution to all of this.

First of all the schedule of 4x 40 min schedules every Wednesday night, complete with parade for orders is doable and sustainable. It even allowed for smoke breaks between classes.

Second is the establishment of a standard curriculum across the force. With standard lesson plans.

Third, is to start training the trainers early in their careers and ensuring that Methods of Instruction are taught at the beginning and that recruits start learning how to present lessons from the standard curriculum.

Yes, a standard curriculum. Assigning some PYs at Army HQ to work on pumping out model training materials for the PRes would be great. Unit rep selects an exercise package from the library, adapt it to local conditions and go. Pamphlets, posters, lesson plans, and yes PowerPoint slides, available to download. Let’s accept there is only so much time to accomplish training.

 

[FJAG]

FAC is not the same as JTAC is probably where your confusion is coming from, or maybe you got bad int. The pass rate / ref requirements necessitate that you can’t have every FOO certified and qualified. But I’m not in a position to describe the JTAC MOAs history in Canada and how it relates to the Artillery Officer career path frankly.

I'm not confused and know the difference quite well.

Short lesson for you.

Historically the term is Forward Air Controller (FAC). This was and continued to be the term in general usage well into the war. Within NATO there are certain standards set and the universal STANAG within NATO was for FACs until 2016.

Up until the spring of 2002 the RCAF was responsible for FAC training in Canada but became bored with it (in fact they adopted the USAF post Gulf War belief that FACs were no longer relevant because of the effect that precision guided munitions brought to the game.) and turned the training over to the Royal Canadian School of Artillery. (As an aside the Army wasn't too happy with the product the RCAF was turning out anyway.) Artillery officers attending the Advanced Gunnery course and subsequently the FOO course were all trained as FACs (Your truly became one back in the seventies and in did a month in Germany as a member of a divisional TACP FACing my little heart out between beers).

A team of two artillery officers became Air to Ground Weapon Range Safety Officers and certified as both Canadian and NATO FAC Instructors and started rebuilding the Canadian FAC training system.

Just as the RCAS was defining and rewriting the training standards for the new and refreshed FAC course, the US around the fall of 2003 adopted the JTAC terminology and standards culminating in an MOA being signed between the US services. With that in play and the reality that in all probability in the light of the developing War on Terror that most aircraft to be dealt with would be American, the Canadian RCAS also moved towards certifying JTACs and signed the US JTAC MOU to ensure that all subsequent Canadian FACs would be JTAC certified. There is in fact a fairly rigorous certification process demanded under the MOU which is closely observed in theatre.

Over the next several years as the RCAS took charge of the process, the training at the school, the certification of brigade and TACP FACs and the establishment of a certification program within special forces took hold with the new FACs all qualifying to and certified as JTACs.

A problem occurred as a result of the A10 incident on Op Medusa. The resulting BOI/Ball Report pointed out that the forward air control in that incident wasn't a cause of the incident but that there were certain deficiencies. One key one was that the NATO STANAG didn't require training with live ordnance, attack helicopters or multiple sorties. It also made mention of the fact that for Canadian FOO/FACs, FACing was a secondary task.

Note that even before the report was out, the FAC/JTAC training for the next roto - 1-07 - was considered inadequate and it just so happened that part of that deploying roto included one of the instructors-in-gunnery who had been working at the RCAS on the FAC project for the last few years. Just before Christmas of 2006 he spun up a very major exercise in the US involving US helicopters, Canadian jets and US FAC trainers, a mortar platoon and all of the FOO/FACs who would deploy to get them fully JTAC certified.

In the aftermath of the BOI, several changes were made including an endorsement in July of 2007 by the CLS authorizing the attachment to each artillery regiment of 4 combat arms officers for FAC/FOO parties (their words, not mine) for a total of 9-12 PYs in addition to the existing 36 artillery FOO/FAC parties (again, the system's words, not mine). The resultant FAC/FOO party would consist of a combat arms officer (capt/lt) and an artillery senior NCO, both FAC qualified and two other gunners as driver/sigs. In contrast the the FOO/FAC party consists of an artillery capt FOO, an artillery sergeant FAC, and four other artillerymen. There was also a provision for the brigade TACP.

It's around this time too that terminology starts changing. Official documents still referred to the common term of FAC even though the certification was already under the JTAC MOU and the designation of an individual in the field was commonly as JTAC. FAC remained the NATO term under STANAG 3797 "Minimum Qualifications for Forward Air Controllers & Laser Operators for Forward Air Controllers" until it's title and content was changed to "Joint Terminal Attack Controller Program" in 2016.

The high water mark was when TF 1-10 deployed 13 JTACs on their roto. However, with the end of the war things started to go sour again. It costs a lot to make and keep a JTAC qualification - especially F-18 hours which the RCAF is loath to spend on lowly ground pounders. There's also a fairly high failure rate so from 2010 on there's a constant reevaluation as to how many courses need to be run and how many current JTACs are needed at any given time. Just as a statistic by 2015, Canada had trained a total of 267 JTACs at a cost of some $600,000 apiece to Limited Combat Ready status and an additional $400,000 to Combat Ready status. The retention rate was some 17%. The problem is that after training and initial deployment the individuals generally moved on to other aspects of their career.

By 2016 there were several pushes to resolve the issue - and that's roughly where my currency on the matter ends.

The math simply doesn't work. For the Army there were at that time 62 authorized JTAC positions yet the Army's throughput was 9 per year which meant that to keep positions filled a given person would need to spend on average 7 years in the job. They don't. Artillery officers spend roughly 2 years in the job as FOO so that's no longer a good fit. It's not much better for arty NCO techs as generally anyone smart enough to be a good JTAC will probably also get promoted out of the job fairly quickly. CSOR has a much better situation than the Army because an operator can spend quite some time in the job. So at this point, I'm not sure what direction the Army has gone with training FOOs as JTACs. I'll probably be speaking to someone who knows later this week and bring myself up to date.

 

[markppcli]

I'm not confused and know the difference quite well.

Short lesson for you.

Historically the term is Forward Air Controller (FAC). This was and continued to be the term in general usage well into the war. Within NATO there are certain standards set and the universal STANAG within NATO was for FACs until 2016.

Up until the spring of 2002 the RCAF was responsible for FAC training in Canada but became bored with it (in fact they adopted the USAF post Gulf War belief that FACs were no longer relevant because of the effect that precision guided munitions brought to the game.) and turned the training over to the Royal Canadian School of Artillery. (As an aside the Army wasn't too happy with the product the RCAF was turning out anyway.) Artillery officers attending the Advanced Gunnery course and subsequently the FOO course were all trained as FACs (Your truly became one back in the seventies and in did a month in Germany as a member of a divisional TACP FACing my little heart out between beers).

A team of two artillery officers became Air to Ground Weapon Range Safety Officers and certified as both Canadian and NATO FAC Instructors and started rebuilding the Canadian FAC training system.

Just as the RCAS was defining and rewriting the training standards for the new and refreshed FAC course, the US around the fall of 2003 adopted the JTAC terminology and standards culminating in an MOA being signed between the US services. With that in play and the reality that in all probability in the light of the developing War on Terror that most aircraft to be dealt with would be American, the Canadian RCAS also moved towards certifying JTACs and signed the US JTAC MOU to ensure that all subsequent Canadian FACs would be JTAC certified. There is in fact a fairly rigorous certification process demanded under the MOU which is closely observed in theatre.

Over the next several years as the RCAS took charge of the process, the training at the school, the certification of brigade and TACP FACs and the establishment of a certification program within special forces took hold with the new FACs all qualifying to and certified as JTACs.

A problem occurred as a result of the A10 incident on Op Medusa. The resulting BOI/Ball Report pointed out that the forward air control in that incident wasn't a cause of the incident but that there were certain deficiencies. One key one was that the NATO STANAG didn't require training with live ordnance, attack helicopters or multiple sorties. It also made mention of the fact that for Canadian FOO/FACs, FACing was a secondary task.

Note that even before the report was out, the FAC/JTAC training for the next roto - 1-07 - was considered inadequate and it just so happened that part of that deploying roto included one of the instructors-in-gunnery who had been working at the RCAS on the FAC project for the last few years. Just before Christmas of 2006 he spun up a very major exercise in the US involving US helicopters, Canadian jets and US FAC trainers, a mortar platoon and all of the FOO/FACs who would deploy to get them fully JTAC certified.

In the aftermath of the BOI, several changes were made including an endorsement in July of 2007 by the CLS authorizing the attachment to each artillery regiment of 4 combat arms officers for FAC/FOO parties (their words, not mine) for a total of 9-12 PYs in addition to the existing 36 artillery FOO/FAC parties (again, the system's words, not mine). The resultant FAC/FOO party would consist of a combat arms officer (capt/lt) and an artillery senior NCO, both FAC qualified and two other gunners as driver/sigs. In contrast the the FOO/FAC party consists of an artillery capt FOO, an artillery sergeant FAC, and four other artillerymen. There was also a provision for the brigade TACP.

It's around this time too that terminology starts changing. Official documents still referred to the common term of FAC even though the certification was already under the JTAC MOU and the designation of an individual in the field was commonly as JTAC. FAC remained the NATO term under STANAG 3797 "Minimum Qualifications for Forward Air Controllers & Laser Operators for Forward Air Controllers" until it's title and content was changed to "Joint Terminal Attack Controller Program" in 2016.

The high water mark was when TF 1-10 deployed 13 JTACs on their roto. However, with the end of the war things started to go sour again. It costs a lot to make and keep a JTAC qualification - especially F-18 hours which the RCAF is loath to spend on lowly ground pounders. There's also a fairly high failure rate so from 2010 on there's a constant reevaluation as to how many courses need to be run and how many current JTACs are needed at any given time. Just as a statistic by 2015, Canada had trained a total of 267 JTACs at a cost of some $600,000 apiece to Limited Combat Ready status and an additional $400,000 to Combat Ready status. The retention rate was some 17%. The problem is that after training and initial deployment the individuals generally moved on to other aspects of their career.

By 2016 there were several pushes to resolve the issue - and that's roughly where my currency on the matter ends.

The math simply doesn't work. For the Army there were at that time 62 authorized JTAC positions yet the Army's throughput was 9 per year which meant that to keep positions filled a given person would need to spend on average 7 years in the job. They don't. Artillery officers spend roughly 2 years in the job as FOO so that's no longer a good fit. It's not much better for arty NCO techs as generally anyone smart enough to be a good JTAC will probably also get promoted out of the job fairly quickly. CSOR has a much better situation than the Army because an operator can spend quite some time in the job. So at this point, I'm not sure what direction the Army has gone with training FOOs as JTACs. I'll probably be speaking to someone who knows later this week and bring myself up to date.

From the briefings I’ve gotten, the new system is that JTAC is open to All Combat arms mosid MCpl - Capt, and comes with a minimum time posted of 3 years, extended if you qualify as an instructor.

 

[KevinB]

From the briefings I’ve gotten, the new system is that JTAC is open to All Combat arms mosid MCpl - Capt, and comes with a minimum time posted of 3 years, extended if you qualify as an instructor.

To me personally it makes a lot more sense for the regular Canadian Army to post folks into US formations for 3-4 years first - I don't see the RCAF dedicating enough time to keep folks current if they don't have a solid grasp.

CANSOFCOM has the advantage that in both CSOR and JTF-2 personnel are in positions much longer - as well as a training budget, and as importantly allies with fixed and rotary attack assets who don't view ground attack as an insignificant side job.

 

[markppcli]

To me personally it makes a lot more sense for the regular Canadian Army to post folks into US formations for 3-4 years first - I don't see the RCAF dedicating enough time to keep folks current if they don't have a solid grasp.

CANSOFCOM has the advantage that in both CSOR and JTF-2 personnel are in positions much longer - as well as a training budget, and as importantly allies with fixed and rotary attack assets who don't view ground attack as an insignificant side job.

Of all the JTACs I’ve talked to, most do the majority of their training outside of Canada. Or with contracted Alpha Jets, because yeah the F-18s don’t like cas, and don’t value it. Probably why they were about the only combat units not involved in Afghanistan… but I digress.

 

[Halifax Tar]

Of all the JTACs I’ve talked to, most do the majority of their training outside of Canada. Or with contracted Alpha Jets, because yeah the F-18s don’t like cas, and don’t value it. Probably why they were about the only combat units not involved in Afghanistan… but I digress.

Iraq ?

 

[SeaKingTacco]

Of all the JTACs I’ve talked to, most do the majority of their training outside of Canada. Or with contracted Alpha Jets, because yeah the F-18s don’t like cas, and don’t value it. Probably why they were about the only combat units not involved in Afghanistan… but I digress.

That is not entirely fair.

I was trained as a FAC (before the JTAC name change). There is no point giving students a high priced asset to learn on when they still have their training wheels on. I learned on T-33s before I got CF-18 sorties and I still found the Hornets frustrating because they moved faster than I could manage. Their On Station time was measured in 10s of minutes (giving you time for maybe 2-3 passes) where I could get about an hour out of each T-bird pair.

As for variety of airframes, on my course, I controlled T-33s, CF-18s, A-4s and A-10s. I watched AC-130 gunships, A-6 Intruders and a B52 strike, but did not get control time on any of them (luck of the draw).

 

[daftandbarmy]

That is not entirely fair.

I was trained as a FAC (before the JTAC name change). There is no point giving students a high priced asset to learn on when they still have their training wheels on. I learned on T-33s before I got CF-18 sorties and I still found the Hornets frustrating because they moved faster than I could manage. Their On Station time was measured in 10s of minutes (giving you time for maybe 2-3 passes) where I could get about an hour out of each T-bird pair.

As for variety of airframes, on my course, I controlled T-33s, CF-18s, A-4s and A-10s. I watched AC-130 gunships, A-6 Intruders and a B52 strike, but did not get control time on any of them (luck of the draw).

Spectre approves....

 

[SeaKingTacco]

The AC-130 is pretty bad-assed…

 

[Humphrey Bogart]

That experience is why I pay attention when you say things. Mine in the seventies was different in that we rarely did or had time for "work up training". We all understood the concept of rehearsals but something like the six months of predeployment training for an op was a non starter. For the Octoberfest we just got on the bus and went. For the 1976 Olympics we did do some specialized training but that was the Olympics immediately after Munich so we were on edge. Battalions going to Cyprus did some work up but those of us on flyover status for either AMF/CAST or 4 CMBG did nothing in particular other than our ordinary training.

I know we all think of SOP per the last war but my thought is that the 6 months of predeployment training with a 6 month rotation model is probably not what the next major event for Canada's Army will look like. IMHO, we should be looking more at something in the nature of REFORGER operations with predeployed equipment and short notice flyover manning as the extreme end of the capability with something in the nature of routine and sustained Op Unifer and Latvia commitments as part of the day-to-day missions to prepare for. The latter ops have predeployment training time the former not so much.

This is where my thought process departs from what Canada's Army does. We seem to be in a rut where we believe we will always have time. And maybe I'm wrong and we always will. Let's face it we've had a tremendously long period of peace where our security as a nation or alliance hasn't been threatened. During the sixties to eighties we felt that the likelihood of having to go quickly was more real so we trained like we would and could. With 20/20 hindsight I'm not so sure that we could have, but at the time it felt like we could.

At the turn of the century the Army's tasking from the government was still to have an IRU light battalion on 10 days notice to move, a mechanized battlegroup on 21 days notice to move and a full mechanized brigade group on 90 days notice to move. LGen Jeffery, the CLS then, said we could do the first, would be challenged to do the second would be a challenge but achievable in six months. He was wishy washy on the brigade issue saying it depended on what you called a "brigade". A small one was doable but a full up brigade - nope - and even a smaller one had sustainment issues.

IMHO, this inability to "mobilize" substantial elements of even our RegF rapidly is a severe capability deficiency. I actually sometimes wonder if that's a real inability or an imagined one brought on by risk aversion. I have a hard time imagining that given a week or two you couldn't assemble a full-up equipped and manned brigade from the resources we have available. I'm not sure whether we have the ability to do the staff work and logistics required to launch it, but assembling it ... I'd be surprised if we couldn't do that.

Anyway that a long roundabout way to get me to my point. Reserves should be there for the big surprise events. And those come with shorter lead times than the low key routine ones. We spend all this money on an army to provide us with an ability to respond rapidly to big events - whether a flood, forest fire or war. We should aim for and build a force that can be called up with an acceptable amount of risk and that means certain levels of individual and group capabilities. Which brings me to:


Fully agree. Over and over again we have had happy accidents like what ResF members did in the Medak pocket or in small groups during Afghanistan and the odd mortar platoon to Latvia but the overarching RegF leadership attitude is not to expect too much from the ResF beyond individual augmentees and to do nothing to build on those successes. There are dozens of things that could and ought to be done and I see some opportunity in F2025 in that but nowhere near enough.

Since I joined in 1965 I've watched the Army slowly die by a thousand cuts (and I don't mean financial; there's more money going into DND than ever before). Much of the gear is better and I think individually, the soldiers are every bit as good, but as a force, we are a shadow of our former selves and the slip to complete irrelevance is shorter than ever before. Something big needs doing. I don't see F2025 as it.

The RCN actually has a pretty good training program for getting Ships ready to go out the door. The training is well run and by the end, you feel worked up and ready to do what you need to do.

The workup training I did consisted of three separate programs:

Mar-Apr-May 2020 - Basic Ship Readiness Training (BSRT) - When I say basic, I mean basic......
basic battle damage scenarios, some damage control stuff, man overboards, alongsides, moorings, anchorages, some basic screenexs, basic gunnery and ranges, etc.

Oct-Nov 2020 - Intermediate Multiship Readiness Training (IMSRT) - Prep for fighting a war - screenexs, working with consort ships, Air Defence Ex, ASW Exs, AsuW Exs, complex damage control, force protection scenarios, boardings, Lots of Helo Ops, working with MPAs, HADR, SOLAS Missions, Lots of warfighting scenarios.

Jan-Feb 2021 - Mission Specific Readiness Training (MSRT) - Training for the specific missions, in our case lots of Boardings, Force Protection, Air Defence Stuff, Missile Shoots.

Feb-Sep 2021 - Deployment, we also do additional training enroute to the AO. The seven weeks it took to get to our AO for ARTEMIS were spent studying the theatre, reading intelligence reports, building guides for the Ops Team on all manners of equipment our potential adversaries possess as well as guides for the various organizations in the AO that conduct illicit smuggling activity, what types of ships they use, what they look like, etc.

I have also now seen the difference between a worked up and seasoned crew and a brand new crew with tonnes of trainees. The difference is stark.

The training is good, the only problem the Navy has is they don't have enough sailors and because they don't have enough sailors, it's the same people doing workups over and over again which results in burnout and people being unfit for further service, further exacerbating the lack of personnel.

The above tells me that what we are doing isn't sustainable and needs to be rationalized. I think a lot of our issues come from trying to do more with less. We have less Ships than we did even a decade ago and we are tacking on more to every program. It's the same with all the services really.

 

[FJAG]

That is not entirely fair.

I was trained as a FAC (before the JTAC name change). There is no point giving students a high priced asset to learn on when they still have their training wheels on. I learned on T-33s before I got CF-18 sorties and I still found the Hornets frustrating because they moved faster than I could manage. Their On Station time was measured in 10s of minutes (giving you time for maybe 2-3 passes) where I could get about an hour out of each T-bird pair.

As for variety of airframes, on my course, I controlled T-33s, CF-18s, A-4s and A-10s. I watched AC-130 gunships, A-6 Intruders and a B52 strike, but did not get control time on any of them (luck of the draw).

I'm a tad older and the FAC portion of my Advanced Artillery Officer Course was with the CF-5D which included one day of flying in the backseat to see it from the pilot's point of view.

 

[SeaKingTacco]

I'm a tad older and the FAC portion of my Advanced Artillery Officer Course was with the CF-5D which included one day of flying in the backseat to see it from the pilot's point of view.

I also did a backseat ride in a T-bird, on a hot September Day over Gagetown. I have never been so happy to get out of an aircraft, in my life.

 

[Humphrey Bogart]

Awesome discussion here. I note that COA 3.1 was selected and we are losing light battalions - well we are really losing half of the Reg F infantry (27 rifle coys to 12) in the Army. We will be left with 6 x 'mech' bns with 2 x coys each (along with a ARes coy). The Army seems to gain a PSYOPS Bn and a FP Bn. Oh, and CANSOF gets a LIB that they don't want. Am I right in feeling this is the stupidest possible COA?

This is exactly what I was talking about a few pages ago. The Canadian Army has never been able to shake the habit of using creative accounting to project to others, its capabilities or lack thereof.

This is actually the biggest reason why our Readiness, Training, Personnel Management Plans don't actually work.

2xRifle Companies with an Imaginary Company made up of Reservist Pixie Dust isn't a Battalion, and by definition, it can never be at high readiness because it doesn't have the necessary pieces to actually create a formed unit.

That's like a Frigate sailing without one of its combat departments, conducting a set of workups without said combat department, then parachuting in a bunch of randoms at the 11th hour.

When your entire training and readiness plan is based on generating formed units, it will never work as intended because the units will need to take from others not in the cycle to bring itself up to allocated strength.

Doctrinally, the Army only has 4 actual Infantry Battalions worth of Companies by allocated personnel.

 

[FJAG]

To me personally it makes a lot more sense for the regular Canadian Army to post folks into US formations for 3-4 years first - I don't see the RCAF dedicating enough time to keep folks current if they don't have a solid grasp.

CANSOFCOM has the advantage that in both CSOR and JTF-2 personnel are in positions much longer - as well as a training budget, and as importantly allies with fixed and rotary attack assets who don't view ground attack as an insignificant side job.

That just compounds the career flow problem, Kevin. Switched on guys move onward and upward so don't spend enough time in the job after training to make it worth the money for the bean counters to invest in. The problem is how many of these guys can you afford to have ready to go when they are not actually dropping ordnance for real, just training. It's the same problem across the board for the Army - why do we scrap air defence? No one is attacking us with planes and its expensive.

Its a perpetual problem for expensive capabilities. You set standards and mandate x number of individuals or units are required and then you starve it of resources so that there is an ever growing delta as between the plan and reality.

I also did a backseat ride in a T-bird, on a hot September Day over Gagetown. I have never been so happy to get out of an aircraft, in my life.

Took mine in Gagetown as well but that reminded me that on an earlier course they trained as an Air Contact Officer which was a kind of mini-me version of FAC. That took us to Bagotville to call jets down on the poor farmers in the valley. What impressed me most of all though was when we were in the hangar, they had an F-5 sitting next to an engine from a Voodoo and they were roughly the same size. That impressed me.

I liked my time in the F-5. Edited to add: On the FAC course, to get us from Gagetown to Summerside (I think that's where we flew out of) - they flew us a couple at a time in the last of the Trackers. That was fun too.

 

[Humphrey Bogart]

That just compounds the career flow problem, Kevin. Switched on guys move onward and upward so don't spend enough time in the job after training to make it worth the money for the bean counters to invest in. The problem is how many of these guys can you afford to have ready to go when they are not actually dropping ordnance for real, just training. It's the same problem across the board for the Army - why do we scrap air defence? No one is attacking us with planes and its expensive.

Its a perpetual problem for expensive capabilities. You set standards and mandate x number of individuals or units are required and then you starve it of resources so that there is an ever growing delta as between the plan and reality.

You're first problem is assuming the Canadian Armed Forces invests ANY TIME having bean counters look at the cost to train, equip and employ any person in uniform.

From what I've seen, the CAF could spend $millions of dollars training someone and wouldn't care if they got exactly $0.00 ROI on their principal.

 

[Good2Golf]

I'm a tad older and the FAC portion of my Advanced Artillery Officer Course was with the CF-5D which included one day of flying in the backseat to see it from the pilot's point of view.

Back when FMC/10TAG flew the ‘5s…

 

[FJAG]

This is exactly what I was talking about a few pages ago. The Canadian Army has never been able to shake the habit of using creative accounting to project to others, its capabilities or lack thereof.

This is actually the biggest reason why our Readiness, Training, Personnel Management Plans don't actually work.

2xRifle Companies with an Imaginary Company made up of Reservist Pixie Dust isn't a Battalion, and by definition, it can never be at high readiness because it doesn't have the necessary pieces to actually create a formed unit.

That's like a Frigate sailing without one of its combat departments, conducting a set of workups without said combat department, then parachuting in a bunch of randoms at the 11th hour.

When your entire training and readiness plan is based on generating formed units, it will never work as intended because the units will need to take from others not in the cycle to bring itself up to allocated strength.

Doctrinally, the Army only has 4 actual Infantry Battalions worth of Companies by allocated personnel.

This though is the false concept we were building at the turn of the century and confirmed in Afghanistan.

We created Frankensteinian battle groups which sewed together a battalion headquarters with company sized elements from all over the place. To cater to that, and on the assumption we would only ever deploy a battery, artillery regiments became solely force generators and the battery the force employer. In turn the battery was a cobbled together task oriented amalgamation of one or more troops from the observer battery, the gun batteries and an STA battery. Every time they put a roto out the door it would be formed under the command team from a given battery and personnel from all over the regiment ( and sometimes other RegF regiments) as well as ASCC folks from 4 AD/GS, and reservists from the LF area. It's no wonder it takes six months of training to put such a group out the door.

It was the same for the battalions. Most were augmented by individuals and companies from other battalions (sometimes from other brigades e.g. TF 1-07 with 2 RCR with its H and I Coys and C Coy 3 PPCLI) plus reservists.

If the plan is to reduce a battalion to two full companies, then its nothing more than what has been happening in practice. To reach a high readiness status for that battalion then all that needs doing is to designate the add-on company early in the cycle and have it participate in training as required. That is absolutely not optimal but essentially is business as usual.

My only concern is that every time that the Army has tightened up the establishments to reduce the hollow companies problem, it is only a matter of time that the hollowness returns to the now smaller establishment.

 

[FJAG]

Back when FMC/10TAG flew the ‘5s…

Yup and I love the emoji and will wear it with pride even though I'm not a herbivore - this one's more me