Infantry Vehicles

[GR66]

Trying a different tack.

The Squadron appears to be the basic operational unit. A usefully sized F Echelon with a well developed support echelon.

Suppose the Squadron Quartermaster were to be allocated four more armoured logistics vehicles to supplement the Squadron's existing vehicles. Logistics vehicles like the USMC LAV-Logistics. Sorry about the resemblance to the ACSV and the Bison.

View attachment 88705

These vehicles would be unassigned in the sense that they would not have a pre-determined load. They would be utility vehicles. They could move between the front line and the Regimental or Brigade Maintenance Areas. They could be used to bring up more ammo to the gun tanks, POL, spares, water, rations. They could be used to supplement the ambulances and drag the dead and wounded to the rear. They could also be used to bring fresh troops up to the front line - either to fill vehicles or to fill trenches.

If you have staged a successful assault with a limited number of your precious vehicle fleet, and suffered losses in gaining the yardage, do you want to give up that yardage by withdrawing your advanced vehicles from the front and replenishing them? Or would you rather push the replenishment forwards to the gained front?

My view is that, unfortunately, managing the infantry contribution to the battle is a matter of logistics. It is a matter of continually replacing expended soldiers exactly as it is necessary to continually replace expended ammunition. And probably in direct relationship. The more bullets and bombs expended then it is likely that more soldiers will be expended.

...

Your unit, whether recce, tank or mounted infantry, is going to expend soldiers. If not due to enemy bullets then simply to fatigue and wear and tear. You will need a means of constantly refreshing your unit and its attached elements.

You keep your vehicles. You decide if you want big ones or small ones, big guns or little one, for fighting or recce. You decide if you want space in the back for more bullets and water or to carry a few infanteers along with you.

But

My proposition is that there be a greater ability, based on more general utility vehicles, to move troops to the front, and around the field generally. Basically I am calling for an armoured equivalent of the Deuce and a Half / MLVW / MSVS. The USMC found that in the LAV-L from which the Bison was created.

I am suggesting that every SQM adds a troop of 4 Bison/ACSV/AMPV for general duties, that every RQM adds a squadron of 16 to 20, that every Brigade adds a battalion of 40 to 60 or so, maybe it is only a company in the service battalion. 4 Bison would allow a Squadron to lift a light infantry platoon. 16 to 20 would lift a company. 40 to 60 would lift a battalion.

And because, like they are not attached to the light infantry, they can drop off the infantry at the front, retire to the rear with the sick and the tired and bring up fresh troops.

...

This does not mean that there is no need for mounted infantry specializing in LAV/IFV operations. It just means that the delta between LAV and Lt is reduced and that Lt troops can keep up with the LAV and armoured forces and be brought forwards on demand.

...

Lots more of these

View attachment 88708View attachment 88709,
and/or perhaps these View attachment 88710 to supplement these
View attachment 88713 and these View attachment 88712

...

And I am sure this is already being done, is not revolutionary and that I am as usual a day late and a dollar short.

But it sure doesn't sound as if there are many exercises with light infantry being lifted into the field to support heavy or otherwise engaged forces.

....

I can see the need for something like these vehicles for troops deployed by helo and air -

View attachment 88714

You don't want to, or have the ability, to lift a battalion's worth of trucks into the field so the battalion is going to have to drive itself. But are they particularly useful to a general duties light infantry battalion that could draw on service battalion trucks?

...

Although, re air deployment, the old Deuce and a Half could be loaded on the Herc (2 per aircraft) and each truck could lift a platoon ( 20 to 30 troops). Be interesting to see which would be the more efficient lift.

Aren't you just describing a Service Battalion/Sustainment Brigade/National Support Element (depending on how far back you're going from the front and what size deployment you're supporting)?

 

[markppcli]

But then you end up with the big LAV and you looking for a smaller vehicle in which to conduct reconnaissance - and a bunch of other tasks that require vehicles and guns but not troops.

As to Cruisers, like the rest of the landships the term arose out of navy usage. Although the development track veered between light and heavy tanks, lt tanks for recce and heavies for infantry support, Cruisers were supposed to be the happy medium for the cavalry force.

Our MBTs, Main Battle Tanks used to be known as Medium Battle Tanks, direct descendents of the Cruisers.

The big lav is a vehicle designed to do a job. A recce vehicle is also a vehicle designed to do a job. While often an IFV chassis can work sometimes they don’t. That isn’t a reason to make smaller sections, especially ones so small they can’t fulfill core functions.


Youre surely aware that we spend the better part of a decade and a half running Bde exercises where the light Bns maneuvered and fought as part of our mechanized Bdes? And that they were moved by various means to take up their positions.

 

[Kirkhill]

II am not just talking about the VDV. The Russian mechanized BTGs that invaded Ukraine in 2022 were understrength, and as a result they fielded BMP2s that had understrength sections. This meant that when situations called for infantry to get out and do things there weren't enough infantry to do the tasks. It is one thing to have a 90s US Army Cavalry organization where you have M3 Bradleys with two dismounts in the back. Those were Cavalry Scouts for dismounted scouting - not infantry for clearing trenches and buildings.

You are also creating your own terms or porting old ones in when there is no need to do so. The Main Battle Tank emerged from WW2 as the way forward. Even during WW2, by 1944 Montgomery was doing away with the distinction between Cruisers and other tanks and going with medium tanks. Of course, they still had light tanks and infantry tanks, but the concept of the unitary Main Battle Tank was there.

The LAV brings a section to the fight that has a useful size. The vehicle's firepower and optics can contribute to the fight without making the 25mm cannon the section's raison d'etre. We also need vehicles to do some other roles so the ACSV is there along with the LAV LRSS etc etc.

If production resources were tight and we could only make ACSVs for the size of the mechanized force that would be required then that might be a decision to make. There would have to be off-sets made elsewhere - nothing is free.

Re - terminology

Send me the manuals and I will use your vocabulary. Absent the manuals, and access to them, I find it difficult to do anything but try to explain my thoughts in my own terms.

Re - the rapid evolution of the terminology in the years between 1940 and 1943 I think you rather make my point. Evolution doesn't occur at a steady pace. It jumps from mutation to mutation. Ukraine is driving a whole bunch of mutations. Darwin will pick the winners.

...

I agree that the LAV transports a useful body of troops, all 6, 7 or 8 of them. But the Bison also lifted 8 and the M113 lifted 11.

The Merkava, like the Cougar had, has access to the rear that can carry troops or additional rounds. In nautical terms it might be described as a Mission Bay or Flex space.

One of the complaints I hear about the LAV, and especially the ACSV, is that they are too big and too heavy for either a light tank suitable for cavalry and recce operations, that they force the infantry section to be reduced from 10, and that they are too difficult to deploy internationally, demanding a fleet of C17s which we haven't got, or a ship that we also haven't got. Even the old Cougar, a modified Grizzly was considered too big as compared to the Brit Scorpion that used the same turret. Curiously the infantry was complaining about the Grizzly being too small because it couldn't carry the same number of dismounts as the M113.

In my opinion we are going back over the Bradley discussions - should the turret have been added or not?

History shows that that actually was a good decision. That the compromises that resulted in a cramped, inconvenient space for the infantry were worth making. The relationship between those guys crammed in the back and the vehicle and the TTPs have all been sorted out and successfully applied.

That relationship, and those TTPs, I agree, can also be successfully mirrored in similar IFVs and I will stipulate that the LAV is a similar IFV.

...

But an IFV Brigade (LAV or Bradley) does not an Army make. Those brigades can do one job and do it well. But apparently there are a number of other jobs that turn up from time to time that they can't do.

The US manages the problem by hiring other brigades to manage those other jobs. They have the wealth and size to do that.

....

We are still stuck with very few soldiers and many jobs and trying to figure out how to turn them into an army that is capable of tackling most of them. I think we are forced by circumstances to look for our own solutions while making ourselves inter-operable with our friends and neighbours.

And figuring out how to usefully, and rapidly, transition civilians through the reserve force so that they can be useful to the regular force in the front lines.

...

I will continue to argue for the KISS solution and the biggest part of that is Keeping It Simple by not asking too much of those people you are training. To me, teaching civilians how to fire personal and crew-served weapons and fight in teams of 4 to 10 is asking a lot of them in the first place. Throwing in vehicle skills is just going to increase the complexity and duration of the training. The necessary time is available in peacetime to people that are employed full time. But the time will not be available if we get to Ukraine's situation and it is not available to people that are volunteering some of their family time to learn the skills on their own terms.

And one thing Ukraine is reiterating is the historical demand for people. It remains to be seen if the vehicles of WW2 and the Gulf Wars are as useful today as they used to be.

 

[Kirkhill]

Aren't you just describing a Service Battalion/Sustainment Brigade/National Support Element (depending on how far back you're going from the front and what size deployment you're supporting)?

Yes.

The question that remains for me is does an infantry battalion have to be self-deployable? Does it need its own set of wheels?

Or should an infantry battalion concentrate on the 4 mph battle as some American tankers used to derisively describe it? They were tootling around at 40 mph.

While I can agree that a group of men and women living with a vehicle for an extended period time are going to perform better than if they are just jammed into the back of a new vehicle with a new crew I still think there is going to be a need to replenish those GIBs with new GIBs. And those new GIBs are going to have to come from somewhere on a regular basis.

Unless of course the vehicles are disappearing at the same rate as the GIBs. Which they will do if the GIBs are mounted all the time.

 

[Kirkhill]

The big lav is a vehicle designed to do a job. A recce vehicle is also a vehicle designed to do a job. While often an IFV chassis can work sometimes they don’t. That isn’t a reason to make smaller sections, especially ones so small they can’t fulfill core functions.

I keep coming back to my preference for the Saladin/Saracen/Stalwart solution. One common drive train in three separate bodies with each body tailored more precisely to fit the needs of the task. I don't think we are disagreeing here. I think we both see that LAV as a compromise that can be, and has been, made to work within limitations.

Youre surely aware that we spend the better part of a decade and a half running Bde exercises where the light Bns maneuvered and fought as part of our mechanized Bdes? And that they were moved by various means to take up their positions.

And yet your light battalion proposals included TAPVs that couldn't carry a full section and a company echelon that was identical to that of the LAV battalions.

Why not just leave the vehicles right out of the LAV battalion structure and focus the allocated PYs on the Rifle and Combat Support Coys?

Adding transport companies to the service battalion from the reserves shouldn't be as difficult as trying to train reserve batteries or squadrons of reserve engineers. And those reserve transport companies would be pretty useful the next disaster.

 

[TangoTwoBravo]

Trying a different tack.

The Squadron appears to be the basic operational unit. A usefully sized F Echelon with a well developed support echelon.

Suppose the Squadron Quartermaster were to be allocated four more armoured logistics vehicles to supplement the Squadron's existing vehicles. Logistics vehicles like the USMC LAV-Logistics. Sorry about the resemblance to the ACSV and the Bison.

View attachment 88705

These vehicles would be unassigned in the sense that they would not have a pre-determined load. They would be utility vehicles. They could move between the front line and the Regimental or Brigade Maintenance Areas. They could be used to bring up more ammo to the gun tanks, POL, spares, water, rations. They could be used to supplement the ambulances and drag the dead and wounded to the rear. They could also be used to bring fresh troops up to the front line - either to fill vehicles or to fill trenches.

If you have staged a successful assault with a limited number of your precious vehicle fleet, and suffered losses in gaining the yardage, do you want to give up that yardage by withdrawing your advanced vehicles from the front and replenishing them? Or would you rather push the replenishment forwards to the gained front?

My view is that, unfortunately, managing the infantry contribution to the battle is a matter of logistics. It is a matter of continually replacing expended soldiers exactly as it is necessary to continually replace expended ammunition. And probably in direct relationship. The more bullets and bombs expended then it is likely that more soldiers will be expended.

...

Your unit, whether recce, tank or mounted infantry, is going to expend soldiers. If not due to enemy bullets then simply to fatigue and wear and tear. You will need a means of constantly refreshing your unit and its attached elements.

You keep your vehicles. You decide if you want big ones or small ones, big guns or little one, for fighting or recce. You decide if you want space in the back for more bullets and water or to carry a few infanteers along with you.

But

My proposition is that there be a greater ability, based on more general utility vehicles, to move troops to the front, and around the field generally. Basically I am calling for an armoured equivalent of the Deuce and a Half / MLVW / MSVS. The USMC found that in the LAV-L from which the Bison was created.

I am suggesting that every SQM adds a troop of 4 Bison/ACSV/AMPV for general duties, that every RQM adds a squadron of 16 to 20, that every Brigade adds a battalion of 40 to 60 or so, maybe it is only a company in the service battalion. 4 Bison would allow a Squadron to lift a light infantry platoon. 16 to 20 would lift a company. 40 to 60 would lift a battalion.

And because, like they are not attached to the light infantry, they can drop off the infantry at the front, retire to the rear with the sick and the tired and bring up fresh troops.

...

This does not mean that there is no need for mounted infantry specializing in LAV/IFV operations. It just means that the delta between LAV and Lt is reduced and that Lt troops can keep up with the LAV and armoured forces and be brought forwards on demand.

...

Lots more of these

View attachment 88708View attachment 88709,
and/or perhaps these View attachment 88710 to supplement these
View attachment 88713 and these View attachment 88712

...

And I am sure this is already being done, is not revolutionary and that I am as usual a day late and a dollar short.

But it sure doesn't sound as if there are many exercises with light infantry being lifted into the field to support heavy or otherwise engaged forces.

....

I can see the need for something like these vehicles for troops deployed by helo and air -

View attachment 88714

You don't want to, or have the ability, to lift a battalion's worth of trucks into the field so the battalion is going to have to drive itself. But are they particularly useful to a general duties light infantry battalion that could draw on service battalion trucks?

...

Although, re air deployment, the old Deuce and a Half could be loaded on the Herc (2 per aircraft) and each truck could lift a platoon ( 20 to 30 troops). Be interesting to see which would be the more efficient lift.

I have to assume that you do not understand sustainment in mechanized/armoured units? We try to sustain as close as possible to where the F Ech (the fighting troops) are.

LAV Company and Tank Squadron A echelons are different in composition, but broadly follow the same principles. The vehicles in the A echelon are mostly armoured (there are exceptions - the FAR being a glaring one). The ACSV has a Cargo variant. The A Echelon will have a Maintenance Load of all combat supplies and will resupply the F Echelon forward. Not in contact, but not in the rear either. Tank Squadrons have an A2 echelon that carries another Maintenance Load. The sub-unit A echelon is resupplied by the Battalion or Regimental Transport Platoon (HLVW equivalents) which are in turn replenished by the Service Battalion Transportation Company.

The SQMS/CQMS have a job already in the B Ech. Giving them four empty ACSV means that we have to crew, maintain and resupply those ACSV. Pretty much the only vehicles that start the battle empty are the Ambulances. Sqn Sergeant-Majors and Coy 2ICs have LAVs which means that they can carry harbour guides etc along with individual replacements and stuff like the mail, ADREPs etc. And also the chicken-dogs for the field canteen. Those things are pure profit to pay for the Sqn Christmas Party.

Replacing soldiers is handled differently. They are not like ammunition or fuel that can be simply delivered to a unit on the front and function perfectly. My own thoughts on the importance of proper integration can be found in my signature line! If a Leopard loses a crew member but is still serviceable then the Sqn Sergeant Major and Sqn 2IC/SQMS will likely move a qualified soldier from the echelon up to the F Ech as part of the replenishment cycle. That soldier is from the Sqn and would be a known quality. Replacements from outside the unit will arrive in the B Echelon and greeted by the Adjt/SQMS teams. They will then be moved forward at an opportune time.

All this to say we already have echelon vehicles, and the ACSV family is/will be a big part of that capability.

ps - I see that I took lots of words to say what GR66 said in one line! What he said!

 

[Kirkhill]

I have to assume that you do not understand sustainment in mechanized/armoured units? We try to sustain as close as possible to where the F Ech (the fighting troops) are.

LAV Company and Tank Squadron A echelons are different in composition, but broadly follow the same principles. The vehicles in the A echelon are mostly armoured (there are exceptions - the FAR being a glaring one). The ACSV has a Cargo variant. The A Echelon will have a Maintenance Load of all combat supplies and will resupply the F Echelon forward. Not in contact, but not in the rear either. Tank Squadrons have an A2 echelon that carries another Maintenance Load. The sub-unit A echelon is resupplied by the Battalion or Regimental Transport Platoon (HLVW equivalents) which are in turn replenished by the Service Battalion Transportation Company.

The SQMS/CQMS have a job already in the B Ech. Giving them four empty ACSV means that we have to crew, maintain and resupply those ACSV. Pretty much the only vehicles that start the battle empty are the Ambulances. Sqn Sergeant-Majors and Coy 2ICs have LAVs which means that they can carry harbour guides etc along with individual replacements and stuff like the mail, ADREPs etc. And also the chicken-dogs for the field canteen. Those things are pure profit to pay for the Sqn Christmas Party.

Replacing soldiers is handled differently. They are not like ammunition or fuel that can be simply delivered to a unit on the front and function perfectly. My own thoughts on the importance of proper integration can be found in my signature line! If a Leopard loses a crew member but is still serviceable then the Sqn Sergeant Major and Sqn 2IC/SQMS will likely move a qualified soldier from the echelon up to the F Ech as part of the replenishment cycle. That soldier is from the Sqn and would be a known quality. Replacements from outside the unit will arrive in the B Echelon and greeted by the Adjt/SQMS teams. They will then be moved forward at an opportune time.

All this to say we already have echelon vehicles, and the ACSV family is/will be a big part of that capability.

ps - I see that I took lots of words to say what GR66 said in one line! What he said!

Roger. Out.

 

[PrairieFella]

But then you end up with the big LAV and you looking for a smaller vehicle in which to conduct reconnaissance - and a bunch of other tasks that require vehicles and guns but not troops.

As to Cruisers, like the rest of the landships the term arose out of navy usage. Although the development track veered between light and heavy tanks, lt tanks for recce and heavies for infantry support, Cruisers were supposed to be the happy medium for the cavalry force.

Our MBTs, Main Battle Tanks used to be known as Medium Battle Tanks, direct descendents of the Cruisers.

No, main battle tanks were never known as medium battle tanks. The whole idea of a medium tank is it wasn't the fastest, the thickest or the punchiest tank in the inventory, it was a balance of the iron triangle. An MBT is a maximization, not a balancing of characteristics. The biggest distinction being the MBT class always had the biggest gun possible. A medium tank would be packing something like a 57mm or 75mm.

 

[PrairieFella]

Trying a different tack.

The Squadron appears to be the basic operational unit. A usefully sized F Echelon with a well developed support echelon.

Suppose the Squadron Quartermaster were to be allocated four more armoured logistics vehicles to supplement the Squadron's existing vehicles. Logistics vehicles like the USMC LAV-Logistics. Sorry about the resemblance to the ACSV and the Bison.

View attachment 88705

These vehicles would be unassigned in the sense that they would not have a pre-determined load. They would be utility vehicles. They could move between the front line and the Regimental or Brigade Maintenance Areas. They could be used to bring up more ammo to the gun tanks, POL, spares, water, rations. They could be used to supplement the ambulances and drag the dead and wounded to the rear. They could also be used to bring fresh troops up to the front line - either to fill vehicles or to fill trenches.

If you have staged a successful assault with a limited number of your precious vehicle fleet, and suffered losses in gaining the yardage, do you want to give up that yardage by withdrawing your advanced vehicles from the front and replenishing them? Or would you rather push the replenishment forwards to the gained front?

My view is that, unfortunately, managing the infantry contribution to the battle is a matter of logistics. It is a matter of continually replacing expended soldiers exactly as it is necessary to continually replace expended ammunition. And probably in direct relationship. The more bullets and bombs expended then it is likely that more soldiers will be expended.

...

Your unit, whether recce, tank or mounted infantry, is going to expend soldiers. If not due to enemy bullets then simply to fatigue and wear and tear. You will need a means of constantly refreshing your unit and its attached elements.

You keep your vehicles. You decide if you want big ones or small ones, big guns or little one, for fighting or recce. You decide if you want space in the back for more bullets and water or to carry a few infanteers along with you.

But

My proposition is that there be a greater ability, based on more general utility vehicles, to move troops to the front, and around the field generally. Basically I am calling for an armoured equivalent of the Deuce and a Half / MLVW / MSVS. The USMC found that in the LAV-L from which the Bison was created.

I am suggesting that every SQM adds a troop of 4 Bison/ACSV/AMPV for general duties, that every RQM adds a squadron of 16 to 20, that every Brigade adds a battalion of 40 to 60 or so, maybe it is only a company in the service battalion. 4 Bison would allow a Squadron to lift a light infantry platoon. 16 to 20 would lift a company. 40 to 60 would lift a battalion.

And because, like they are not attached to the light infantry, they can drop off the infantry at the front, retire to the rear with the sick and the tired and bring up fresh troops.

...

This does not mean that there is no need for mounted infantry specializing in LAV/IFV operations. It just means that the delta between LAV and Lt is reduced and that Lt troops can keep up with the LAV and armoured forces and be brought forwards on demand.

...

Lots more of these

View attachment 88708View attachment 88709,
and/or perhaps these View attachment 88710 to supplement these
View attachment 88713 and these View attachment 88712

...

And I am sure this is already being done, is not revolutionary and that I am as usual a day late and a dollar short.

But it sure doesn't sound as if there are many exercises with light infantry being lifted into the field to support heavy or otherwise engaged forces.

....

I can see the need for something like these vehicles for troops deployed by helo and air -

View attachment 88714

You don't want to, or have the ability, to lift a battalion's worth of trucks into the field so the battalion is going to have to drive itself. But are they particularly useful to a general duties light infantry battalion that could draw on service battalion trucks?

...

Although, re air deployment, the old Deuce and a Half could be loaded on the Herc (2 per aircraft) and each truck could lift a platoon ( 20 to 30 troops). Be interesting to see which would be the more efficient lift.

You're essentially describing the SSM's fastpack in a sense based on what you're getting at. The fastpack is the lifeblood of the Armoured Squadron and is run by the SSM, the chief combat logistician (in a sense) of the squadron.

 

[ueo]

In terms of doctrine, VDV formations were designed to be dropped in the operational/strategic depths to seize critical objectives, ideally with the element of surprise. Having an air-droppable IFV was intended to give them the capacity to overwhelm whatever rear echelon troops they might encounter. The BMD is very vulnerable, but has quite a bit of firepower for its size, and enough mobility to make it very difficult to contain an airborne landing if it is not immediately contained. The VDV were certainly not expected to have to fight through prepared defenses or to hold ground for long before being relieved by advancing Tank/Motorized Rifle formations.

Being a little light on dismounts at the section and platoon level was seen as a reasonable tradeoff under the circumstances.

Of course, this means that when you put a VDV unit into a situation where it doesn't have surprise or its IFVs, and is forced to engage conventional infantry/armoured forces, the VDV will likely find themselves in over their heads.

In the opening waves of the Ukrainian invasion, it seems that in some circumstances the Russians chose sensible objectives for the VDV but they lacked the element of surprise or the VDV landings couldn't be relieved quickly enough. The heliborne assault on Hostomel airport is the most notable of these scenarios. In other areas, the Russians badly misused the VDV and allowed it to be chewed up in conventional ground fighting for which it is ill-suited.

mmmm, Market Garden et al?

 

[IKnowNothing]

What LAV battalions need to be able to fight in LSCO are plentiful integral anti-tank guided missiles and mortars. With those squared away a LAV battalion can hold terrain.

I had assumed between the UOR's for Latvia, ATGMR, reading on here about mortars being brought back to the battalions, that the CA has acknowledged the need for those (integral ATGM's and Mortars) and "re integrating them" was a current work in progress- therefore any hypothetical discussion of a near future LAV Bn in LCSO was assuming they would be so equipped.

So just to be clear-

1. when you stated that a LAV Bn without attached tanks was only suitable for security tasks in LSCO that was in reference to a "current state" LAV Bn without integral mortars and ATGM's of the appropriate quality and quantity?
2. a doctrinally equipped LAV Bn with proper platoon level anti-armour weapon, mortar platoon, AT platoon would be able to be employed in an LCSO defense without having tanks attached?

If we are acquiring new vehicles for this thought experiment (which is a good one).... Adding a LAV-equipped "Armd Cav" Sqn to a LAV battalion gives it more reconnaissance, but it doesn't radically change its combat power.

Doesn't that depend entirely on the armament of the LAV equipped "Armd Cav" Sqn relative to the state of the LAV Bn it's being attached to?
Like sure, adding a squadron in LRSS/TAPV to a "current state LAV Bn" doesn't really change the equation - less so to a doctrinally equipped one. But a Sqn in @PrairieFella 's Jaguar, or a LAV Desert Viper with a 50mm and twin ATGM added to a "current state" Bn? Or one that has found the PY's for a mortar platoon, but had neither the PY's nor the ATGMR project scope* to stand up a proper mounted AT platoon?

* My cynical guess is that ATGRM is limited to putting a dismounted launcher/CLU into every platoon/troop weapons det.


As always, I'm likely way off base, but the way I see it

• the RCAC has 1/3 committed/equipped to tanks, 1/3 committed equipped to Recce (undergunned CAV), 1/3 looking for a home
• the role the RCAC wants to carve for itself is providing mounted firepower to the army
• the LAV Bn's in their current state lack the punch to mount a defense in LSCO, and the RCIC lacks the PY's to man the doctrinal punch needed

Answer to thought experiment: How to set up a (near) current state symmetrical LAV based CMBG for LSCO in Latvia?

1. Fast track ATGMR to get proper ATGM's at platoon
2. Prioritize PY's/ Reserve integration to get Mortar platoons back
3. Fast track LAV CFV procurement for 65-75 such vehicles
4. Buy everything else needed to scale from sustaining a BG to a Bde

At that point a symmetrical 1/3 of the (mounted) Combat Arms would be
1x LAV LRSS Sqn
1x LAV CFV Sqn
1x Leo Sqn
2x LAV Bn (w/Bn Mortar Platoon, ATGM held at at platoon)

Baseline organization

1 Squadron cavalry screen/ guard

2 Lav BG's "Up" in Cover/ Defense- firepower augmented by Half CFV squadron each, Both Bn's less one Inf Platoon

1 Leo Combat team as reserve/ counterpunch, augmented by 2x Lav Platoons.


No one would confuse it for an American ABCT, and of course it would be better if the CFV squadron was in tanks- but could it hold it's own as a Bde in in a defensive role?

 

[daftandbarmy]

mmmm, Market Garden et al?

Without the right strategic approach in deployment, and supporting assets, airborne troops might just be very fit road pizzas

 

[KevinB]

No, main battle tanks were never known as medium battle tanks. The whole idea of a medium tank is it wasn't the fastest, the thickest or the punchiest tank in the inventory, it was a balance of the iron triangle. An MBT is a maximization, not a balancing of characteristics. The biggest distinction being the MBT class always had the biggest gun possible. A medium tank would be packing something like a 57mm or 75mm.

I think you are missing some history, as to what Heavy Tanks and Light Tanks where.
The MBT did absolutely come out of the Medium tank role.
You can see all tanks guns started growing and the T-55 through T-62 and the Pershing to Patton series down here.
*acknowledging the Pershing was designed initially as a heavy tank in WW2.

Western MBT’s however did start taking on some heavier tank characteristics after the 90’s from 105mm to 120mm guns, and more armor - but retained the sole role of the MBT, and when one looks at the lineage of the medium tank, the gun growth 75mm to 76mm to 90mm to 105mm the 120mm change wasn’t really dramatic considering the time line and it was solely based on the penetration needs to fight other MBT’s.

 

[Halifax Tar]

I think you are missing some history, as to what Heavy Tanks and Light Tanks where.
The MBT did absolutely come out of the Medium tank role.
You can see all tanks guns started growing and the T-55 through T-62 and the Pershing to Patton series down here.
*acknowledging the Pershing was designed initially as a heavy tank in WW2.

Western MBT’s however did start taking on some heavier tank characteristics after the 90’s from 105mm to 120mm guns, and more armor - but retained the sole role of the MBT, and when one looks at the lineage of the medium tank, the gun growth 75mm to 76mm to 90mm to 105mm the 120mm change wasn’t really dramatic considering the time line and it was solely based on the penetration needs to fight other MBT’s.

The US maintained the M103 in their fleets until the mid 70s.

M103 heavy tank - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

 

[FJAG]

The US maintained the M103 in their fleets until the mid 70s.

M103 heavy tank - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

During the 70s and 80s it was the M60 which was the main battle tank for the US army in Europe and at home. My FOO party in Germany in the winter of 1980 (or 81) adopted an M60 Reforger tank crew from Texas that had slid down a hill, thrown both tracks and been abandoned by their company. They'd come poorly prepared for a winter exercise, even by Germany's relatively mild standards and needed a lot of heater time.

 

[KevinB]

The US maintained the M103 in their fleets until the mid 70s.

M103 heavy tank - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

I think only the USMC still had heavy tanks in the DoD at that point, the Army dumping them in the early 1950's.
Similarly the Russians had the Joseph Stalin line heavy tanks into the 50's and only stopped designing them in 1960.

I had assumed between the UOR's for Latvia, ATGMR, reading on here about mortars being brought back to the battalions, that the CA has acknowledged the need for those (integral ATGM's and Mortars) and "re integrating them" was a current work in progress- therefore any hypothetical discussion of a near future LAV Bn in LCSO was assuming they would be so equipped.

So just to be clear-

1. when you stated that a LAV Bn without attached tanks was only suitable for security tasks in LSCO that was in reference to a "current state" LAV Bn without integral mortars and ATGM's of the appropriate quality and quantity?
2. a doctrinally equipped LAV Bn with proper platoon level anti-armour weapon, mortar platoon, AT platoon would be able to be employed in an LCSO defense without having tanks attached?

While not @TangoTwoBravo I would want several other enablers at the LAV Bn level.
1) some sort of Pioneer Platoon equipped with at least two different LAV based Engineering platforms
- something like the M1257 ESSV (Stryker Double V Hull), and something with a bucket or trench cutter to make improvised fortifications, and improvements to them. Plus the ability for making nasty obstacles, and clearance of same.

2) Some sort of C-UAS/C-RAM LAV to provide protection from those sorts of attacks.

3) M1252 120mm Mortar (again LAV 6.0/Stryker 2.0 Double V hull), I am relatively agnostic on the turreted mortars (mainly as the Stryker/LAV wouldn't be my choice for a LSCO - but also because if I needed to use a LAV in a LSCO, I would want a lot of C-UAS and C-RAM LAV variants around.

Doesn't that depend entirely on the armament of the LAV equipped "Armd Cav" Sqn relative to the state of the LAV Bn it's being attached to?
Like sure, adding a squadron in LRSS/TAPV to a "current state LAV Bn" doesn't really change the equation - less so to a doctrinally equipped one. But a Sqn in @PrairieFella 's Jaguar, or a LAV Desert Viper with a 50mm and twin ATGM added to a "current state" Bn? Or one that has found the PY's for a mortar platoon, but had neither the PY's nor the ATGMR project scope* to stand up a proper mounted AT platoon?

* My cynical guess is that ATGRM is limited to putting a dismounted launcher/CLU into every platoon/troop weapons det.

4) Depending upon the type of Dismount ATGM acquired, I would be willing to ignore a separate Armour Defence Platoon, as if you have a link NLOS capability with the Section/Platoon ATGM's it would offer more flexibility than a sole Platoon.
Furthermore If I was the CA, before I went and got a new cannon or turret to current LAV 6.0 ISV's - I would be looking at adding 25mm APFSDS-DU to the inventory - as it has been proven in Ukraine to give Bradley's with the same M242 Bushmaster cannon the ability to front penetrate any of the Russian MBT's -- and seeing what has been done for some of the prototype AMPV turrets - it seems that one can make a fairly simple bracket mount for the Javelin on the side of turrets - and launch via a linked CLU.
It would require a upgraded comms suite - but everything that the CA already has in inventory other than the Javelin and LWCLU's

 

[PrairieFella]

I think you are missing some history, as to what Heavy Tanks and Light Tanks where.
The MBT did absolutely come out of the Medium tank role.
You can see all tanks guns started growing and the T-55 through T-62 and the Pershing to Patton series down here.
*acknowledging the Pershing was designed initially as a heavy tank in WW2.

Western MBT’s however did start taking on some heavier tank characteristics after the 90’s from 105mm to 120mm guns, and more armor - but retained the sole role of the MBT, and when one looks at the lineage of the medium tank, the gun growth 75mm to 76mm to 90mm to 105mm the 120mm change wasn’t really dramatic considering the time line and it was solely based on the penetration needs to fight other MBT’s.

The MBT was an acknowledgement that the rolls established were obsolete. The first true MBT, the Centurion was initially designed as a heavy cruiser tank and exceeded the weight of earlier mediums by almost double. Medium tank designed influenced the MBT in terms of the versatility aspect but the Western MBT was not direct line from the medium tank.

As an aside on your calibre growth to defeat armour, American doctrine was never to fight tanks with the Sherman 75mm. That was the role of the tank destroyer corps. In practice it did happen but it's not accurate to say that the lineage was designed for armour penetration, 75mm just so happens to be the most useful happy medium between anti-material punch and explosive filler technology for the time.

 

[FJAG]

I would be willing to ignore a separate Armour Defence Platoon, as if you have a link NLOS capability with the Section/Platoon ATGM's it would offer more flexibility than a sole Platoon.

I lean heavily to an ATGM platoon, not in substitution for what's already in the coy but to augment it. A platoon gave the CO flexibility. Sure he could hand them out in pairs to the coys but also send four-team groups to stiffen the front two coys or have them work flank guards on the advance etc, etc.

Don't count out arty launched loitering munitions as tank busters to augment the bn's anti-armour kit. A low launch signature from a few kilometres in the back. And yes, we are looking at LMs.

 

[KevinB]

The MBT was an acknowledgement that the rolls established were obsolete. The first true MBT, the Centurion was initially designed as a heavy cruiser tank and exceeded the weight of earlier mediums by almost double. Medium tank designed influenced the MBT in terms of the versatility aspect but the Western MBT was not direct line from the medium tank.

The Centurion design morphed before it even got off the drawing board. It wasn’t an A type cruiser tank but an FV at that point, designed to be a universal tank. But even then it went through several revisions before a viable model.

As an aside on your calibre growth to defeat armour, American doctrine was never to fight tanks with the Sherman 75mm. That was the role of the tank destroyer corps. In practice it did happen but it's not accurate to say that the lineage was designed for armour penetration, 75mm just so happens to be the most useful happy medium between anti-material punch and explosive filler technology for the time.

The Sherman got the 76mm due to the 75mm penetration issues. The same issues sparked the change from the 76mm to 90mm etc.

I’d agree that the 75mm on the Lee and Sherman’s wasn’t solely planned as an anti/tank gun, but the early German tanks weren’t significantly armed or armored either.

It did become obvious that tanks needed to be able to fight other tanks - and the TD Gun system wasn’t flexible enough.

I lean heavily to an ATGM platoon, not in substitution for what's already in the coy but to augment it. A platoon gave the CO flexibility. Sure he could hand them out in pairs to the coys but also send four-team groups to stiffen the front two coys or have them work flank guards on the advance etc, etc.

Well if you have an ATGM on every ISC/IFV the need for a BN level ADP is fairly low.

Don't count out arty launched loitering munitions as tank busters to augment the bn's anti-armour kit. A low launch signature from a few kilometres in the back. And yes, we are looking at LMs.

I’m not, I’d put those under the Mortar FSCC, and given the loiter time/space some have the whole TACP issue comes into question, that I start to wonder if Bde isn’t the better place for those.

 

[FJAG]

The Sherman got the 76mm due to the 75mm penetration issues. The same issues sparked the change from the 76mm to 90mm etc.

Don't forget the 17 pdr Firefly.

I’m not, I’d put those [LMs] under the Mortar FSCC, and given the loiter time/space some have the whole TACP issue comes into question, that I start to wonder if Bde isn’t the better place for those.

Bde. I see each CS regiment being either three gun batteries and one LM battery or even two of each.