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Infantry Vehicles

That's a lot of words to ask if you can reduce the size of platoons. The answer is probably no because you don't have enough massing. I'd much rather a section of 8 over 4 in a defensive, regardless of whatever the flavour of the day wunderwaffe is.
I tend to agree. The smaller sections / squads of the Swedes or Dutch work because the vehicle is organic to them. The Swedes also expect to fight from the hatches which is weird but hey. You get to a point though where you can support your weapon systems anymore. In a squad or section I’d posit you need to have some kind of automatic weapon (ie an MG) and some AT / HE projection. You probably also need some one in charge. So right there we have at a minimum 3 people assuming both those weapons are single operator. Next you’re going to need to protect and support those weapon systems. It rapidly adds up to a minimum of six people.


Early days in Ukraine saw the Russian VDV suffer heavily with their very small squads lacking mass to support mechanized pushes and clear out dead ground. A VDV squad was five dismounts, and their companies would have less than 50 on the ground. You can’t simply keep calling in new companies to make up a full one without understanding the logistics get more and more demanding.
 
Early days in Ukraine saw the Russian VDV suffer heavily with their very small squads lacking mass to support mechanized pushes and clear out dead ground. A VDV squad was five dismounts, and their companies would have less than 50 on the ground. You can’t simply keep calling in new companies to make up a full one without understanding the logistics get more and more demanding.
This. 100%+++
 
Would it work to have assault companies having a different squad size/makeup and the follow up companies larger sections for holding/defensive work. The Assault company is used for assaults and as a mobile reserve? Basically tailoring their structure, weapons and possibly training to different tasks?
 
Would it work to have assault companies having a different squad size/makeup and the follow up companies larger sections for holding/defensive work. The Assault company is used for assaults and as a mobile reserve? Basically tailoring their structure, weapons and possibly training to different tasks?
What’s an assault company? How does that fit into our doctrine?
 
I am not sure, I was just thinking that the issues are:

Carrying capacity of AFV's
Tasks with possibly significantly different needs
Weapons loadouts and availability
Specialized equipment needed for assaulting or defensive works

Do you need/want a multi-tasked unit, or is it better to train and equip different components for different tasks?

Is our doctrine keeping up with the modern battlefield(s) or is it tied to the equipment and budgets we have?

Your knowledge on the subject vastly exceeds mine.
 
I think we see assault companies in Ukraine less because that’s a doctrinal ideal and more because of manning and equipment shortfalls. It’s not an aim point to shoot for is what I mean to say.

In the defensive I need a section to do largely what it does in any other task - service and protect its weapons while also having mass to hold space.
 
I tend to agree. The smaller sections / squads of the Swedes or Dutch work because the vehicle is organic to them. The Swedes also expect to fight from the hatches which is weird but hey. You get to a point though where you can support your weapon systems anymore. In a squad or section I’d posit you need to have some kind of automatic weapon (ie an MG) and some AT / HE projection. You probably also need some one in charge. So right there we have at a minimum 3 people assuming both those weapons are single operator. Next you’re going to need to protect and support those weapon systems. It rapidly adds up to a minimum of six people.


Early days in Ukraine saw the Russian VDV suffer heavily with their very small squads lacking mass to support mechanized pushes and clear out dead ground. A VDV squad was five dismounts, and their companies would have less than 50 on the ground. You can’t simply keep calling in new companies to make up a full one without understanding the logistics get more and more demanding.

Would it work to have assault companies having a different squad size/makeup and the follow up companies larger sections for holding/defensive work. The Assault company is used for assaults and as a mobile reserve? Basically tailoring their structure, weapons and possibly training to different tasks?

What’s an assault company? How does that fit into our doctrine?

...

Point taken on the employment in an active environment. But given our circumstances, our your numbers in particular, large sections or small sections are probably not going to make much of a difference. The transition from Garrison to Peace Support Ops is already cumbersome as you try to prevent it being bloody. The transition to War from either stance is likely to be bloody regardless of doctrine and support.

Currently, in my opinion, the Canadian Army is a Garrison Army that has experience in Peace Support Operations. Doctrinally they are prepared to fight a war. But is the war they are likely to encounter commensurate with their established doctrine?

Is the structure sufficiently strong, and sufficiently flexible, to build the Central Nervous System of Command and Control (through training) in Garrison, to be able to deploy rapidly on Peace Support Operations, AND to rapidly bulk up to fight a war?

If you go into a war with large sections of long-service personnel you recreate the problems of the BEF and the Old Contemptibles - some of the world's best soldiers of the day performed admirably for about 2 months until they were worn down and forced back on their heels. The survivors shaped the following armies but in the field their positions were taken by new armies - first the Territorials of Loos, then the Volunteers of the Somme and finally the Conscripts of the 100 days.

...

I'm inclined to think the critical bits are the Central Nervous System and the long service soldiers. I think the Garrison structure should focus on the Central Nervous System and ensuring that all the C2 nodes, all the way down to the section level, are covered off. That means, to me, a battalion fitted for, not with.

It means a small number of highly skilled operators distributed across that CNS. The battalion would not be fit for operations. It would have to be bulked up by adding a bunch of load carriers to support the skilled operators. The load carriers would supply the depth on operations while enhancing their existing knowledge base (whatever that might be) with OJT.

Some portion of the Army would be bulked up sufficiently to conduct PSOs and a QRF of sorts....

But going to war? Do you really want to put all of your peacetime army at risk on the first day of operations? Calgary Highlanders birthday is St Juliens Day. At Valcartier the battalion had an authorized strength of 1511 all ranks that by the time they were fielded in France had been whittled down to a 4 company establishment of 1124 all ranks. On 22 April the unit strength in the sector was 1022 when 816 of them were formed up for a Russian style meat wave attack on entrenched German positions in Kitchener's Wood. The next morning, after the battalion's first attack anywhere ever, there were 193 left standing in the trenches. The battalion lost 623 of its Trained Effective Strength its first day on the job.

The battalion survivors were not relieved. The Germans wouldn't permit it. The remaining 5 officers and 193 ORs had to hold on to their trenches for another 12 nights before being relieved on the 5th of May. All told, during that fortnight, the 10th Battalion lost 718 all ranks of their fielded 1022.

This wasn't unusual. It happened up and down the lines in all armies on both sides of the lines from 1914 to 1918, and again from 1939 to 1945.
Even in NW Europe in 1945 people were being chewed up. And apparently nothing much has changed in 2024.

...

Do you want to field all your Garrison troops, your Central Nervous System, and your PSO experienced troops to the first day of battle?

...

Is your doctrine, your structure, sufficiently flexible to:
build a Central Nervous System in Garrison;
supply a Peace Support force designed around vehicle mounted patrols, company sized QRFs and the occasional short, sharp action and;
sustain a mass casualty event indefinitely?

...

My thinking is focused on generating the CNS and providing for those Peace Support forces.

Managing the transition to war is never going to be easy because, among other things, in my opinion, the enemy will be voting on Canadian doctrine and adjustments on the fly will be necessary. And it will have to be done with an bunch of load carriers getting On the Job Training.

....

So, to generate the CNS, and to supply that CNS with some experience through PSOs I am suggesting small sections with lots of vehicles and letting the vehicles carry the weapons and radios and supplies - even if that means robo vehicles carrying the packs behind the foot patrol.

Beyond that I am proposing that those few foot fighting experts that are available should be allowed to perfect their skills in the field by not encumbering them with learning vehicle skills as well. Leave the fighting vehicles to the Cavalry and the transport vehicles to the Service Battalions and let them become expert with them. Work on developing inter-arms co-operation through regular exercises.

When required put 1 or 2 sections of 4 in the back of a Cavalry vehicle and learn to integrate and co-operate.

...

In the event of war every regular soldier gets and immediate promotion.

The reserves, also organized in sections of 4, plug in to the regular structure with every regular section of four getting a reserve section of 4 to generate a full section of 8. And no matter the quality of the reserves, how good or rough and ready their training, then the 1-1 mentoring with the active reserves will have to suffice to smooth out the relationship.

....

And those robo-vehicles, and smart tanks and UAVs are going to be a feature of operations regardless of the numbers of soldiers lost in the field.

...

Does the play book need to be expanded?
 
Do you want to field all your Garrison troops, your Central Nervous System, and your PSO experienced troops to the first day of battle?

Yeah I suspect we will, war is a come as your are game. We don’t get to sit back a tailor our force to a bespoke solution.

Is your doctrine, your structure, sufficiently flexible to:
build a Central Nervous System in Garrison;
supply a Peace Support force designed around vehicle mounted patrols, company sized QRFs and the occasional short, sharp action and;
sustain a mass casualty event indefinitely?

No but I don’t think any force can sustain a mass casualty event indefinitely.

My thinking is focused on generating the CNS and providing for those Peace Support forces.

Managing the transition to war is never going to be easy because, among other things, in my opinion, the enemy will be voting on Canadian doctrine and adjustments on the fly will be necessary. And it will have to be done with an bunch of load carriers getting On the Job Training.

Yes, the enemy gets a vote. Yes casualties happen, yes doctrine changes. Yes on the job training happens. I don’t think anything your saying is revolutionary or something that isn’t already part of how we do business.

....

So, to generate the CNS, and to supply that CNS with some experience through PSOs I am suggesting small sections with lots of vehicles and letting the vehicles carry the weapons and radios and supplies - even if that means robo vehicles carrying the packs behind the foot patrol.

small sections in garrison just means we have under strength Bns that can’t respond quickly. We infact already have sections that are deliberately smaller than war time establishments, and have done so since 2017. Again you’re not saying anything new.

Beyond that I am proposing that those few foot fighting experts that are available should be allowed to perfect their skills in the field by not encumbering them with learning vehicle skills as well. Leave the fighting vehicles to the Cavalry and the transport vehicles to the Service Battalions and let them become expert with them. Work on developing inter-arms co-operation through regular exercises.

For the 1000th time that’s a silly idea, please see the last four years of people with actual experience in working with mechanized forces telling you the same thing over and over. I actually got to work with an Army that does have separate infantry and carrier units, I can say it was worse in every measurable way. We do inter arms exercises, all the time.

When required put 1 or 2 sections of 4 in the back of a Cavalry vehicle and learn to integrate and co-operate.

maybe two sections could work. What if we called them groups, and in one there’d be a C9 and a MCpl, and in the other it’d be a C9 and Sgt. Then they could merge together and form some never before seen organization.

...

In the event of war every regular soldier gets and immediate promotion.

No they don’t

The reserves, also organized in sections of 4, plug in to the regular structure with every regular section of four getting a reserve section of 4 to generate a full section of 8. And no matter the quality of the reserves, how good or rough and ready their training, then the 1-1 mentoring with the active reserves will have to suffice to smooth out the relationship.

Then why have a section of four to begin with. I don’t expect the reserves to show up en mass or on time frankly. They just aren’t designed to do that.

....

And those robo-vehicles, and smart tanks and UAVs are going to be a feature of operations regardless of the numbers of soldiers lost in the field

Yes.

.

...

Does the play book need to be expanded?

No the play book needs to be understood and built up
 
Thanks again- my ignorance shows. Wasn't so much thinking of a surge alteration to the status quo as I was musing conceptually about what role a current/near future "intact" CMBG could play, and whether it's worth the Army shaping itself to play said role.

There was a version of that post where Cav Sqn had an asterisk linking to clause describing a hypothetical near future where the RCAC picks it's horse for a non MBT "Medium Cavalry" vehicle that is capable of providing novel capability (firepower) to a LAV Bn. Jaguar, LAV 700 Desert Viper, Booker, status quo LRSS- whatever, discussion for a different thread. A BG built around a LAV Bn plus a non MBT RCAC squadron.
If we are acquiring new vehicles for this thought experiment (which is a good one), then just get new Leopard 2s or M1s if we are fighting in Europe (so probably M1s). Adding a LAV-equipped "Armd Cav" Sqn to a LAV battalion gives it more reconnaissance, but it doesn't radically change its combat power. An Armd Cav squadron with something like an M10 added to a LAV battalion would be something else, but I'd just add those extra tons and get real tanks for general combat in Europe. The M10 option would, however, be intriguing for other more isolated theatres.

What LAV battalions need to be able to fight in LSCO are plentiful integral anti-tank guided missiles and mortars. With those squared away a LAV battalion can hold terrain. Tanks are generally needed for a any mech infantry to conduct attacks in a LSCO setting. So, I would take care of the ATGMs and mortars first.
 
...

Point taken on the employment in an active environment. But given our circumstances, our your numbers in particular, large sections or small sections are probably not going to make much of a difference. The transition from Garrison to Peace Support Ops is already cumbersome as you try to prevent it being bloody. The transition to War from either stance is likely to be bloody regardless of doctrine and support.

Currently, in my opinion, the Canadian Army is a Garrison Army that has experience in Peace Support Operations. Doctrinally they are prepared to fight a war. But is the war they are likely to encounter commensurate with their established doctrine?

Is the structure sufficiently strong, and sufficiently flexible, to build the Central Nervous System of Command and Control (through training) in Garrison, to be able to deploy rapidly on Peace Support Operations, AND to rapidly bulk up to fight a war?

If you go into a war with large sections of long-service personnel you recreate the problems of the BEF and the Old Contemptibles - some of the world's best soldiers of the day performed admirably for about 2 months until they were worn down and forced back on their heels. The survivors shaped the following armies but in the field their positions were taken by new armies - first the Territorials of Loos, then the Volunteers of the Somme and finally the Conscripts of the 100 days.

...

I'm inclined to think the critical bits are the Central Nervous System and the long service soldiers. I think the Garrison structure should focus on the Central Nervous System and ensuring that all the C2 nodes, all the way down to the section level, are covered off. That means, to me, a battalion fitted for, not with.

It means a small number of highly skilled operators distributed across that CNS. The battalion would not be fit for operations. It would have to be bulked up by adding a bunch of load carriers to support the skilled operators. The load carriers would supply the depth on operations while enhancing their existing knowledge base (whatever that might be) with OJT.

Some portion of the Army would be bulked up sufficiently to conduct PSOs and a QRF of sorts....

But going to war? Do you really want to put all of your peacetime army at risk on the first day of operations? Calgary Highlanders birthday is St Juliens Day. At Valcartier the battalion had an authorized strength of 1511 all ranks that by the time they were fielded in France had been whittled down to a 4 company establishment of 1124 all ranks. On 22 April the unit strength in the sector was 1022 when 816 of them were formed up for a Russian style meat wave attack on entrenched German positions in Kitchener's Wood. The next morning, after the battalion's first attack anywhere ever, there were 193 left standing in the trenches. The battalion lost 623 of its Trained Effective Strength its first day on the job.

The battalion survivors were not relieved. The Germans wouldn't permit it. The remaining 5 officers and 193 ORs had to hold on to their trenches for another 12 nights before being relieved on the 5th of May. All told, during that fortnight, the 10th Battalion lost 718 all ranks of their fielded 1022.

This wasn't unusual. It happened up and down the lines in all armies on both sides of the lines from 1914 to 1918, and again from 1939 to 1945.
Even in NW Europe in 1945 people were being chewed up. And apparently nothing much has changed in 2024.

...

Do you want to field all your Garrison troops, your Central Nervous System, and your PSO experienced troops to the first day of battle?

...

Is your doctrine, your structure, sufficiently flexible to:
build a Central Nervous System in Garrison;
supply a Peace Support force designed around vehicle mounted patrols, company sized QRFs and the occasional short, sharp action and;
sustain a mass casualty event indefinitely?

...

My thinking is focused on generating the CNS and providing for those Peace Support forces.

Managing the transition to war is never going to be easy because, among other things, in my opinion, the enemy will be voting on Canadian doctrine and adjustments on the fly will be necessary. And it will have to be done with an bunch of load carriers getting On the Job Training.

....

So, to generate the CNS, and to supply that CNS with some experience through PSOs I am suggesting small sections with lots of vehicles and letting the vehicles carry the weapons and radios and supplies - even if that means robo vehicles carrying the packs behind the foot patrol.

Beyond that I am proposing that those few foot fighting experts that are available should be allowed to perfect their skills in the field by not encumbering them with learning vehicle skills as well. Leave the fighting vehicles to the Cavalry and the transport vehicles to the Service Battalions and let them become expert with them. Work on developing inter-arms co-operation through regular exercises.

When required put 1 or 2 sections of 4 in the back of a Cavalry vehicle and learn to integrate and co-operate.

...

In the event of war every regular soldier gets and immediate promotion.

The reserves, also organized in sections of 4, plug in to the regular structure with every regular section of four getting a reserve section of 4 to generate a full section of 8. And no matter the quality of the reserves, how good or rough and ready their training, then the 1-1 mentoring with the active reserves will have to suffice to smooth out the relationship.

....

And those robo-vehicles, and smart tanks and UAVs are going to be a feature of operations regardless of the numbers of soldiers lost in the field.

...

Does the play book need to be expanded?
I am trying to follow your train of thought, which isn't helped when you invent terms or use terms that have other meanings than the ones that I presume you are using.

We have an army that was designed in the 60s based on WW2 experience anticipating WW3. Our individual training for our soldiers and junior officers is designed, at heart, around providing people that can join a unit on operations. We've made some recent amendments to that, but our DNA is very much from 1944.

The army since 1992 has been on operations. Some of it has been stability, some of it has been combat in a counter-insurgency and some of it has been as a deterrence in a general war context. We are long-service professionals and yes, we have been conducting rotational operations. We are also not the BEF of 1914 where the whole force crosses the channel and gets consumed in the opening moves.

Right now we have a Bde HQ, a BG(-) and various combat support and combat service support elements conducting a deterrence mission in Europe. Lets say we surge it to a full brigade. We still have two CMBGs plus our Schools back in Canada. If war starts then those two CMBG and the Schools will be the basis of mobilization along with the Reserves. There are some equipment acquisitions required before all that is able to cross the Atlantic.

All that to say, we shouldn't mess up our doctrine as part of some Left Out of Battle plan. Section size is quite low-level doctrine, but it is certainly worth talking about. We need to be careful taking lessons from the Ukraine War, but the Russian experience of 2022 shows the problem when "mech infantry" units don't really have any infantry in the back.
 
If we are acquiring new vehicles for this thought experiment (which is a good one), then just get new Leopard 2s or M1s if we are fighting in Europe (so probably M1s). Adding a LAV-equipped "Armd Cav" Sqn to a LAV battalion gives it more reconnaissance, but it doesn't radically change its combat power. An Armd Cav squadron with something like an M10 added to a LAV battalion would be something else, but I'd just add those extra tons and get real tanks for general combat in Europe. The M10 option would, however, be intriguing for other more isolated theatres.

What LAV battalions need to be able to fight in LSCO are plentiful integral anti-tank guided missiles and mortars. With those squared away a LAV battalion can hold terrain. Tanks are generally needed for an any mech infantry to conduct attacks in a LSCO setting. So, I would take care of the ATGMs and mortars first.
I’m all for an armoured recce vehicle, “medium cavalry” sorry, that’s built up around something with more punch than the 25mm. I’d love to see the RCAC gain a divisional regiment of such vehicles in a world where we go back to three tank regiments.



Anyways I tend to think the infantry vehicle should be able to move and support sections built around the need to operate automatic weapons and some kind of AT / HE projector. Ideally with an autocannon capable of destroying enemy IFVs and suppressing built up positions.
 
I’m all for an armoured recce vehicle, “medium cavalry” sorry, that’s built up around something with more punch than the 25mm. I’d love to see the RCAC gain a divisional regiment of such vehicles in a world where we go back to three tank regiments.



Anyways I tend to think the infantry vehicle should be able to move and support sections built around the need to operate automatic weapons and some kind of AT / HE projector. Ideally with an autocannon capable of destroying enemy IFVs and suppressing built up positions.
EBRC Jaguar or bust.
 
I am trying to follow your train of thought, which isn't helped when you invent terms or use terms that have other meanings than the ones that I presume you are using.

We have an army that was designed in the 60s based on WW2 experience anticipating WW3. Our individual training for our soldiers and junior officers is designed, at heart, around providing people that can join a unit on operations. We've made some recent amendments to that, but our DNA is very much from 1944.

The army since 1992 has been on operations. Some of it has been stability, some of it has been combat in a counter-insurgency and some of it has been as a deterrence in a general war context. We are long-service professionals and yes, we have been conducting rotational operations. We are also not the BEF of 1914 where the whole force crosses the channel and gets consumed in the opening moves.

Right now we have a Bde HQ, a BG(-) and various combat support and combat service support elements conducting a deterrence mission in Europe. Lets say we surge it to a full brigade. We still have two CMBGs plus our Schools back in Canada. If war starts then those two CMBG and the Schools will be the basis of mobilization along with the Reserves. There are some equipment acquisitions required before all that is able to cross the Atlantic.

All that to say, we shouldn't mess up our doctrine as part of some Left Out of Battle plan. Section size is quite low-level doctrine, but it is certainly worth talking about. We need to be careful taking lessons from the Ukraine War, but the Russian experience of 2022 shows the problem when "mech infantry" units don't really have any infantry in the back.

IIRC that what we have right now for the organization and deployment of the troops is pretty good, and equivalent to peer organizations.

What needs work is modernizing the weapons and equipment...
 
All that to say, we shouldn't mess up our doctrine as part of some Left Out of Battle plan. Section size is quite low-level doctrine, but it is certainly worth talking about. We need to be careful taking lessons from the Ukraine War, but the Russian experience of 2022 shows the problem when "mech infantry" units don't really have any infantry in the back.

The small Russian sections had as much to do with the small Russian vehicles. In my opinion there is no reason why the infantry that those columns needed couldn't have been riding in a separate vehicle. The space dedicated to the turret and the ammunition, and along with their weight, could have been spent on bigger sections and more armour plate.

That would suggest that the armoured force would be better served by three vehicles - Big Gun Tanks, Auto-Cannon Tanks and Armoured Troop Transports. Or Transports, Cruisers and Escorts. (Edit: TCVs, MBTs and Lt Tanks).
 
The small Russian sections had as much to do with the small Russian vehicles. In my opinion there is no reason why the infantry that those columns needed couldn't have been riding in a separate vehicle. The space dedicated to the turret and the ammunition, and along with their weight, could have been spent on bigger sections and more armour plate.

That would suggest that the armoured force would be better served by three vehicles - Big Gun Tanks, Auto-Cannon Tanks and Armoured Troop Transports. Or Transports, Cruisers and Escorts. (Edit: TCVs, MBTs and Lt Tanks).
Cruisers were abandoned a long time ago for a reason. Russia's small sections are doctrinal for the VDV, exposing a large weakness of the airborne doctrine in Russia. 8-10 is the ideal section size, heck it goes back to the contubernium. No need to reinvent the wheel on this one. As Mark says, a battle taxi corps is often worse than having some infanteers receive AFV courses.
 
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Cruisers were abandoned a long time ago for a reason. Russia's small sections are doctrinal for the VDV, exposing a large weakness of the airborne doctrine in Russia. 8-10 is the ideal section size, heck it goes back to the contubernium. No need to reinvent the wheel on this one. As Mark says, a battle taxi corps is often worse than having some infanteers receive AFV courses.

But then you end up with the big LAV and you looking for a smaller vehicle in which to conduct reconnaissance - and a bunch of other tasks that require vehicles and guns but not troops.

As to Cruisers, like the rest of the landships the term arose out of navy usage. Although the development track veered between light and heavy tanks, lt tanks for recce and heavies for infantry support, Cruisers were supposed to be the happy medium for the cavalry force.

Our MBTs, Main Battle Tanks used to be known as Medium Battle Tanks, direct descendents of the Cruisers.
 
But then you end up with the big LAV and you looking for a smaller vehicle in which to conduct reconnaissance - and a bunch of other tasks that require vehicles and guns but not troops.

As to Cruisers, like the rest of the landships the term arose out of navy usage. Although the development track veered between light and heavy tanks, lt tanks for recce and heavies for infantry support, Cruisers were supposed to be the happy medium for the cavalry force.

Our MBTs, Main Battle Tanks used to be known as Medium Battle Tanks, direct descendents of the Cruisers.
Do we really have a big issue with how we're organized on the Infantry side if we just get the right vehicles to transport and support them?

We have an MBT but just not enough of them. We have and IFV in the LAV but as many have pointed out it's not the ideal vehicle for that role...ideally it would be tracked, lower profile, have an ATGM and perhaps a bigger gun. We have what we're calling a Recce Vehicle in the TAPV but it's pretty universally recognized that it's totally unsuited to the role. We know there is a need for a transport vehicle for the Light Battalions but there is a program underway for that. There may be a role for a Medium vehicle that falls in between the Light vehicle and the IFV but one could debate if the CA is large enough to support a three-tier vs a two-tier Army. There are also a variety of CS roles that the CA needs to fulfill (AD, AT, Mortars, Engineering variants, Ambulances, Logistics, etc. but there is no reason that these cannot be adapted out of the Light/Medium/Heavy primary chassis we have/get.

So while we may have some issues with the vehicle fleets we have I'm not sure exactly where this translates into a need to revamp the way our Infantry is organized. And as far as the potential for loss of the experienced, full-time Army in a war I think that's solved simply by being realistic about what portion of your Reg Force you are able to deploy and sustain in the first place in addition to transforming the Reserves into a suitably trained and equipped mobilization force.
 
Russia's small sections are doctrinal for the VDV, exposing a large weakness of the airborne doctrine in Russia. 8-10 is the ideal section size, heck it goes back to the contubernium. No need to reinvent the wheel on this one. As Mark says, a battle taxi corps is often worse than having some infanteers receive AFV courses.

In terms of doctrine, VDV formations were designed to be dropped in the operational/strategic depths to seize critical objectives, ideally with the element of surprise. Having an air-droppable IFV was intended to give them the capacity to overwhelm whatever rear echelon troops they might encounter. The BMD is very vulnerable, but has quite a bit of firepower for its size, and enough mobility to make it very difficult to contain an airborne landing if it is not immediately contained. The VDV were certainly not expected to have to fight through prepared defenses or to hold ground for long before being relieved by advancing Tank/Motorized Rifle formations.

Being a little light on dismounts at the section and platoon level was seen as a reasonable tradeoff under the circumstances.

Of course, this means that when you put a VDV unit into a situation where it doesn't have surprise or its IFVs, and is forced to engage conventional infantry/armoured forces, the VDV will likely find themselves in over their heads.

In the opening waves of the Ukrainian invasion, it seems that in some circumstances the Russians chose sensible objectives for the VDV but they lacked the element of surprise or the VDV landings couldn't be relieved quickly enough. The heliborne assault on Hostomel airport is the most notable of these scenarios. In other areas, the Russians badly misused the VDV and allowed it to be chewed up in conventional ground fighting for which it is ill-suited.
 
The small Russian sections had as much to do with the small Russian vehicles. In my opinion there is no reason why the infantry that those columns needed couldn't have been riding in a separate vehicle. The space dedicated to the turret and the ammunition, and along with their weight, could have been spent on bigger sections and more armour plate.

That would suggest that the armoured force would be better served by three vehicles - Big Gun Tanks, Auto-Cannon Tanks and Armoured Troop Transports. Or Transports, Cruisers and Escorts. (Edit: TCVs, MBTs and Lt Tanks).
II am not just talking about the VDV. The Russian mechanized BTGs that invaded Ukraine in 2022 were understrength, and as a result they fielded BMP2s that had understrength sections. This meant that when situations called for infantry to get out and do things there weren't enough infantry to do the tasks. It is one thing to have a 90s US Army Cavalry organization where you have M3 Bradleys with two dismounts in the back. Those were Cavalry Scouts for dismounted scouting - not infantry for clearing trenches and buildings.

You are also creating your own terms or porting old ones in when there is no need to do so. The Main Battle Tank emerged from WW2 as the way forward. Even during WW2, by 1944 Montgomery was doing away with the distinction between Cruisers and other tanks and going with medium tanks. Of course, they still had light tanks and infantry tanks, but the concept of the unitary Main Battle Tank was there.

The LAV brings a section to the fight that has a useful size. The vehicle's firepower and optics can contribute to the fight without making the 25mm cannon the section's raison d'etre. We also need vehicles to do some other roles so the ACSV is there along with the LAV LRSS etc etc.

If production resources were tight and we could only make ACSVs for the size of the mechanized force that would be required then that might be a decision to make. There would have to be off-sets made elsewhere - nothing is free.
 
Trying a different tack.

The Squadron appears to be the basic operational unit. A usefully sized F Echelon with a well developed support echelon.

Suppose the Squadron Quartermaster were to be allocated four more armoured logistics vehicles to supplement the Squadron's existing vehicles. Logistics vehicles like the USMC LAV-Logistics. Sorry about the resemblance to the ACSV and the Bison.

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These vehicles would be unassigned in the sense that they would not have a pre-determined load. They would be utility vehicles. They could move between the front line and the Regimental or Brigade Maintenance Areas. They could be used to bring up more ammo to the gun tanks, POL, spares, water, rations. They could be used to supplement the ambulances and drag the dead and wounded to the rear. They could also be used to bring fresh troops up to the front line - either to fill vehicles or to fill trenches.

If you have staged a successful assault with a limited number of your precious vehicle fleet, and suffered losses in gaining the yardage, do you want to give up that yardage by withdrawing your advanced vehicles from the front and replenishing them? Or would you rather push the replenishment forwards to the gained front?

My view is that, unfortunately, managing the infantry contribution to the battle is a matter of logistics. It is a matter of continually replacing expended soldiers exactly as it is necessary to continually replace expended ammunition. And probably in direct relationship. The more bullets and bombs expended then it is likely that more soldiers will be expended.

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Your unit, whether recce, tank or mounted infantry, is going to expend soldiers. If not due to enemy bullets then simply to fatigue and wear and tear. You will need a means of constantly refreshing your unit and its attached elements.

You keep your vehicles. You decide if you want big ones or small ones, big guns or little one, for fighting or recce. You decide if you want space in the back for more bullets and water or to carry a few infanteers along with you.

But

My proposition is that there be a greater ability, based on more general utility vehicles, to move troops to the front, and around the field generally. Basically I am calling for an armoured equivalent of the Deuce and a Half / MLVW / MSVS. The USMC found that in the LAV-L from which the Bison was created.

I am suggesting that every SQM adds a troop of 4 Bison/ACSV/AMPV for general duties, that every RQM adds a squadron of 16 to 20, that every Brigade adds a battalion of 40 to 60 or so, maybe it is only a company in the service battalion. 4 Bison would allow a Squadron to lift a light infantry platoon. 16 to 20 would lift a company. 40 to 60 would lift a battalion.

And because, like they are not attached to the light infantry, they can drop off the infantry at the front, retire to the rear with the sick and the tired and bring up fresh troops.

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This does not mean that there is no need for mounted infantry specializing in LAV/IFV operations. It just means that the delta between LAV and Lt is reduced and that Lt troops can keep up with the LAV and armoured forces and be brought forwards on demand.

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Lots more of these

1730057767794.png1730058065504.png,
and/or perhaps these 1730058178855.png to supplement these
1730058725404.png and these 1730058725202.png

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And I am sure this is already being done, is not revolutionary and that I am as usual a day late and a dollar short.

But it sure doesn't sound as if there are many exercises with light infantry being lifted into the field to support heavy or otherwise engaged forces.

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I can see the need for something like these vehicles for troops deployed by helo and air -

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You don't want to, or have the ability, to lift a battalion's worth of trucks into the field so the battalion is going to have to drive itself. But are they particularly useful to a general duties light infantry battalion that could draw on service battalion trucks?

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Although, re air deployment, the old Deuce and a Half could be loaded on the Herc (2 per aircraft) and each truck could lift a platoon ( 20 to 30 troops). Be interesting to see which would be the more efficient lift.
 

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