Communications problems on the battlefield are not a new problem. The solution has always been the same - more autonomy.
The Experimental Corps of Riflemen operated dispersed in pairs. Commands were issued by bugle and whistle because drums were cumbersome and couldn't be heard over long distances in a noisy battle. Riflemen were expected to show initiative. This contrasted with the lines of Redcoats marching in close order within the sound of the drums. They were expected to do exactly what they were told.
150 years after the Experimental Corps Field Marshal Montgomery said of another experimental corps, the Parachute Regiment, that every man had a Field Marshal's baton in his pack. Every para, like the rifleman, was expected to show initiative. Even if the battalion was reduced to one solitary private then that private was expected to "Charlie Mike" and complete the battalion's mission, fulfilling the commander's intent, to the best of his ability.
In the interval between the Paras and the Rifles sits WW1 and two circulars printed and distributed by the British Army's Stationary Service in 1917, in the aftermath of the Somme, once all the new gadgets had been introduced: SS135 “
Instructions for the training of divisions for offensive action, 1917“ and SS143 “
Instructions for the training of platoons for offensive action, 1917“
I argue that SS143 was not evolutionary. It was revolutionary. Issued in February 1917 it marked a distinct dividing line between the army of Redcoat columns turned khaki and the modern army based upon Lieutenants, Mission Command and the paraphernalia of the industrial war machine. The Combined Arms platoon with bombs and bullets, capable of acting independently of Command for a period of hours, looking after its own defensive needs and, crucially operating independently of instruction. Autonomously to use a word in vogue.
...
SS135 says that a platoon, under the control of a small HQ can vary in size from 28 to 44 ORs. The ORs are split into 4 sections of 7 to 11 under the control of a single NCO reporting to the platoon's HQ. Internal communications were by voice and runner. External communications, from platoon to brigade were patchy enough as to be non-existent. Circumstances demanded that the Platoon Leader be left to get on with the job on his own terms, implementing the Commander's Intent to the best of his ability.
SS135 also says that if the platoon drops below 28 effectives then the platoon as a whole is ineffective. Why is that? What did those ORs contribute to the Ops Plan? Were they mules or spare Platoon Leaders? Were they valuable for what they could do, or what they carried?
...
Humans are electrified in the truest sense of the word. With every step, muscle contraction and reaction in our cells, our bodies produce
energy. At rest, the human body generates an average of 100 watts of output. During sports activities, it reaches 300 to 400 watts. That’s the equivalent of burning 2,000 calories a day (~8 MJ),
Or a quarter of a liter of JP-8 or half a pound of butter. Invest that much energy and you get a couch potato playing video games. Put a 60 lb pack on her back and you need to add another half pound of butter to supply her with 4000 calories. Send her north into the snow and put her in the traces of a pulk and give her a pair of snow shoes and she needs 10000 calories a day. She now needs 2 and a half pounds of butter. Or muktuk. And gets tired. Demanding rest every day and withdrawal for extended rest after about 3 days.
Those basic mechanics have plagued humanity for ever.
The more you carried the more you needed to carry as food and the less "useful" stuff you could carry. And the more you carried the more rest you needed. MTOW, Payload and Range.
Dogs were a godsend. You could put them in the traces and ride the pulk and revert to couch potato status again.
Rumour has it that one word used by some native north Americans for "horse" is "big dog". Dogs, horses, internal combustion engines or electric motors all of them are interchangeable. All of them are filling in Redcoats carrying muskets and bullets. All of them are filling in for ORs in the 1917 Platoon. They can carry bombs, bullets, rifle grenades, rations and water and extend the range of the autonomous platoon.
Curiously they can also decrease the autonomy of the platoon because the platoon can now afford to carry around a ruddy great radio that will communicate with the Platoon Leader's boss half a planet away and allow the Leader of the Free World to observe her operation on the big screen while sitting on a couch with a coffee in hand. Zero excess calories expended by the LOTFW.
....
In 1815 it took a battalion of Redcoats to have a noticeable effect.
In 1915 it took a platoon acting autonomously to have a noticeable effect.
In 1945 one well placed individual dropped into a useful area and acting autonomously could have a noticeable effect.
In 2025 we have machines that can act autonomously and have a noticeable effect.
The same machines can also replace the dogs in the traces of the pulks.
...
The real advantage of the machine to the soldier in the field is that it increases the useful load available to the soldier. It increases the range of the soldier. And it can be adapted to the demands of the environment.
....
Back to the autonomous platoon of 1917.
Is the assertion that you need a minimum of 28 people to achieve a given objective still valid? What if we assumed that the ORs under the command of the NCO were only there to permit the NCO to achieve his mission and that his mission was set by the Platoon Leader?
Suppose the Platoon were reduced to a Platoon Leader, his 2ic and 4 NCOs and some intelligent dogs, or autonomous machines, or even just some bright MRZRs (The Platoon is starting to sound like a Cavalry Troop). How many of those 1917 troops does each platoon really need?
...
Machines aren't soldiers. Machines can't eliminate soldiers. But they can reduce the need for soldiers.
...
I think the Euro experiments with the 6 person section (24 per platoon instead of 28) is worth consideration. Special Forces and Cavalry have been working with 4-man groups for quite a while now.
...
I think there is a lot of merit in the notion of retaining the 4 company battalion (6 if you include the Adm and Support companies) even if the manpower available requires reducing the section size to the brick of 4. The lack of carrying capacity can be managed by the machines. But the decision making central nervous system is maintained. And it is easy to expand the force by the simple expedient of adding 1 load carrier to assist each of the 4 members of the Brick.
In peace time those bricks of four can fit TAPVs, LAVs and Bradleys - Rhibs and Gryphons - Otters and C17s - or be supported by an Argo 8x8 and a Quadcopter.
...
And the small section, supported by batteries, needs a lot less butter.
cdainstitute.ca
