Divining the right role, capabilities, structure, and Regimental System for Canada's Army Reserves

[tango22a]

recceguy:

BRAVO ZULU!!!

tango22a

 

[George Wallace]

Michael

If you want, then why have all the current units lost numbers?  Would amalgamation not do so over time also?

 

[Michael OLeary]

Michael

If you want, then why have all the current units lost numbers?  Would amalgamation not do so over time also?

Are you blaming all loses of positions in the Reserves on past amalgamations?

Don't you think there may be other factors at play over the past few decades?

Can't total position numbers be protected and still allow amalgamations?

 

[dapaterson]

For the past 5+ years there's been a single CO commanding the Res Svc Bns in Winnipeg and Regina.  Units are doing as well as the other CBG units.  We moved to a single Res Engr unit in each CBG (less 38 CBG) - so now there's a CO commanding Trail, Chilliwack and North Vancouver.  It's working.  It's happening now with the Svc Bns in LFCA - one Svc Bn per CBG AOR, with multiple locations (less Toronto).  So are CSS types and Engineers inherently more capable than the other combat arms?  Much as I'd like to say yes, they're not.  If it works with REMFs and sappers, it can work elsewhere.


Yes - there has to be buy in.  There were millions pissed away or lost under LFRR that could have been very effective carrots and sticks to enable such transformations - "Hey!  More money!  Better tasks! And one or two less senior officers around."  We let that opportunity go by.  So now it may be more difficult.


One thing that has not been discussed:  the need to get more people employed extra-regimentally earlier in their careers.  When your first employment outside the unit lines is post RSM/post-command it's too late.  (And summer training does not count - it needs to be for a normal tour of 2-3 years).  Broadening minds, giving people exposure the the wider Army around them is a good thing, and helps break down some of the asinine internal barriers that exist (and maybe a few Guardsmen would learn proper drill  > ).  A broader base of experiecne and knowledge is a sine qua non to be an effective leader - but when all you've ever known is the Buckshot Fusiliers, how can you effectively command 94th CBG?

 

[dapaterson]

Michael

If you want, then why have all the current units lost numbers?  Would amalgamation not do so over time also?

I used to be the LFC HQ guy tracking the Reserve attendance.  The numbers parading increased from 1998-2008.  La nombre de personnel qui se presente pour la formation est superieure maintenant qu'en 1998.  (In both official languages - don't know how much clearer I can make it)

We have yet to fully define what we want - unit establishments are no indication of that.  The Army Reserve establishment is larger than the target strength (and over the CFP 219 limits, but that's another issue).  It's a cookie cutter, all units the same approach to keep the hounds at bay - "Everyone is equal".  Rather than reinforcing success, we drag all units down to a common denominator.

Keeping what we have because we always had it would mean we re-role the Ont R to a mounted unit, horses and all.  Goodbye C7, hello Ross Rifle.  We moved on from those.  We need to change our structures as well.  And dragging a long tail of LCols who've only ever commanded rump companies who trot out, consuming oxygen and rations and funding for little/nothing in return does nothing to build institutional credibility.

The Reserves are capable.  But most leadership above Capt / WO is suspect at best.  Improve the conditions for their development and selection and that will in time generate higher quality leaders.


Or, one simple question:  Is there a Sir Arthur Currie in the Reserve Army today?  I don't think so.



(Though maybe we'll know once the mess audits are done...)

 

[Fishbone Jones]

Also, can anyone confirm how many Reservists released directly as a result of the rerolling of the Lanark and Renfrew Scottish or The Elgin Regiment?

Go back to what I said Michael. It'll work if you have a better alternative and buy in from the floor. The Elgins would have never survived the switch if it had been forced, without thought for the men. They were given an option and the reasoning and explanation was solid, forthcoming and properly explained. They were also given ownership. It became their project. They also held on to a large part of their hierarchy and history. Which is everything I stated. I can't speak for the L&R.

 

[Fishbone Jones]

One thing that has not been discussed:  the need to get more people employed extra-regimentally earlier in their careers.  When your first employment outside the unit lines is post RSM/post-command it's too late.  (And summer training does not count - it needs to be for a normal tour of 2-3 years).  Broadening minds, giving people exposure the the wider Army around them is a good thing, and helps break down some of the asinine internal barriers that exist (and maybe a few Guardsmen would learn proper drill  > ).  A broader base of experiecne and knowledge is a sine qua non to be an effective leader - but when all you've ever known is the Buckshot Fusiliers, how can you effectively command 94th CBG?

Great, a whole new bunch of Cl B Bumbles that want the military for a career but won't go Reg. A klarge swath of Reservists are already doing just that. Moving around the country backfilling Reg positions. Pretty soo Cl A Reservists will only constitute 1/4 of the Reserves with your plan ;D

But most leadership above Capt / WO is suspect at best

Good thing for you I'm still a WO

 

[tango22a]

DA Paterson:

Suppose X number of Officers and WOs were posted to the reserve regiments (and I don't mean SCRAP that can't hack it or are deemed surplus at their home Regts or Batts) sort of a Super RSS?  It would re-inforce the RegF need to control the PRes and eventually the Pres would wither away and die...."oh goody we finally got rid of those Weekend Warrors!!!" But wait, because there are no more PRes then  the funding levels WILL drop!.

tango22a

 

[George Wallace]

Are you blaming all loses of positions in the Reserves on past amalgamations?

Don't you think there may be other factors at play over the past few decades?

Can't total position numbers be protected and still allow amalgamations?

I guess you aren't getting what I am trying to say.  In the past we have seen large numbers in our Militia Regiments.  As numbers fell in the 1970s, they did away with some of their outlying Rural Sqns and Coys.  Come to the present, their numbers are once again down, and there is talk of amalgamation to solve the numbers problem.  Where will we be in the future (not the near future) when the numbers drop again? 

A totally different question:  Is there the potential of reversing amalgamation further down the road if numbers rise drastically.........should there be funding to do so?

 

[Monsoon]

Just an unsolicited observation from a NAVRES guy: the Naval Reserve seems to have managed alright having different people of different trades working together. The units are fewer and further apart, but we've had no difficulty keeping things rolling. Our numbers are fewer, but I imagine the number of people to whom it would occur to join NAVRES is substantially smaller than the number of people that would consider the militia.

And our COs and Coxswains (that's RSMs to you fellas): LCdrs and PO1. Promotions are made based on a national merit list much like the reg force. It causes headaches of its own, but it's far better than waving a wand to turn a 35-year-old into a CWO so he can be an RSM of a unit of 100 people. Almost all of the meaningful training and employment happens outside of the units - again, this causes problems of it's own, but the organization exists for reasons other than the proper manning of the class A establishment. If the senior guy around is a Lt(N), then he's the CO - it's happened (for brief periods) and it ain't the end of the world. And the Cooks, Communicators, NCIOPs, Boatswains, Divers, etc don't "get in each other's way" - it works surprisingly well.

To my mind the militia could do worse than to reorganize itself into garrisons and drop the position-based ranks. God knows it's big enough that it could carry it off more easily than NAVRES.

I shall now back away slowly.

 

[tango22a]

Michael O'Leary:

IF an attempt is made to IMPOSE the "Snakes-And-Ladders" on the PRes than I am sure more people will leave just like when it was tried in the 60's.

It may surprise you that when I joined, I CHOSE my Regiment because I wanted to be an ARMOURED soldier.

tango22a

 

[George Wallace]

hamiltongs

I don't think you can legitimately compare the NAVRES with the PRes, as you can not compare the Navy to the Army, when you look at their organizations and functions.

 

[Monsoon]

I don't think you can legitimately compare the NAVRES with the PRes, as you can not compare the Navy to the Army, when you look at their organizations and functions.

Fair enough, but I have a feeling that there isn't so much fundamentally different about the militia and NAVRES that there's any real justification for why the CO of a militia unit absolutely needs to be a LCol.

 

[George Wallace]

Fair enough, but I have a feeling that there isn't so much fundamentally different about the militia and NAVRES that there's any real justification for why the CO of a militia unit absolutely needs to be a LCol.

Not all CO's are LCols.  It depends on the type of Unit.  There are units that have Majors as their CO's. 

At the same time there are some Units that have CO's who are Regular Force.

 

[the 48th regulator]

Fair enough, but I have a feeling that there isn't so much fundamentally different about the militia and NAVRES that there's any real justification for why the CO of a militia unit absolutely needs to be a LCol.

Numbers maybe....

dileas

tess

 

[Monsoon]

I actually did a spot check to make sure I wasn't talking out of my ass here - in 34 CBG, every unit that I could find info on had an LCol as a CO; that just leaves 51 Svc Bn and 34 CER as question marks. Many of those units parade in the sub-100 range, just like most NAVRES divisions. Either way, is the best way to determine ranks to say which unit gets positions at which rank, or to do it by the merit system and appoint people to positions accordingly? It's not a rhetorical question - I actually don't know. The NAVRES system is certainly fraught with some difficulty.

 

[davidk]

I actually did a spot check to make sure I wasn't talking out of my ass here - in 34 CBG, every unit that I could find info on had an LCol as a CO; that just leaves 51 Svc Bn and 34 CER as question marks. Many of those units parade in the sub-100 range, just like most NAVRES divisions. Either way, is the best way to determine ranks to say which unit gets positions at which rank, or to do it by the merit system and appoint people to positions accordingly? It's not a rhetorical question - I actually don't know. The NAVRES system is certainly fraught with some difficulty.

51st Svc Bn has an LCol - but he was a major in the fall, and still CO. If I remember correctly, 34 CER is made up of the old 3 Fld Eng Reg't and 9 Fld Eng Sqn in Rouyn-Noranda. I remember hearing something about them sharing a CO - may have already happened, may be in the works, not entirely sure.

 

[Brad Sallows]

If the point is to simply down-rank the senior members one level, not much money will be saved.  If the point is to eliminate their positions entirely, some money will be saved.

If realistic rank levels are desired, a 100+ person organization doesn't need more than a Capt OC, Lt 2I/C, and MWO in the command group.  Cutting two levels from the status quo will necessitate a very healthy up and out (to supernumery or other positions for the competent and deserving) flow and ensure the candidate pool for command group members is broad.

A complementary across-the-board cut at the Res CBG level would serve well, also.  LCol comd, CWO Bde RSM, Maj G3 (Bde Maj), everyone else Capt or under.

 

[George Wallace]

If realistic rank levels are desired, a 100+ person organization doesn't need more than a Capt OC, Lt 2I/C, and MWO in the command group.  Cutting two levels from the status quo will necessitate a very healthy up and out (to supernumery or other positions for the competent and deserving) flow and ensure the candidate pool for command group members is broad.

Realistically remembering my time, every Sqn I have been in, in the RCD, has numbered just over 100 pers, and was commanded by a Major, with a SSM holding the rank of MWO.  2 i/c and Battle Capt were both Captains.  Troop Leaders were Lt or Capt in the majority of cases.  I am sure that other Reg Force Cbt Arms had similar examples.

Right now my Acting CO is a Capt, but the position is a Major's. 

 

[the 48th regulator]

I actually did a spot check to make sure I wasn't talking out of my ass here - in 34 CBG, every unit that I could find info on had an LCol as a CO; that just leaves 51 Svc Bn and 34 CER as question marks. Many of those units parade in the sub-100 range, just like most NAVRES divisions. Either way, is the best way to determine ranks to say which unit gets positions at which rank, or to do it by the merit system and appoint people to positions accordingly? It's not a rhetorical question - I actually don't know. The NAVRES system is certainly fraught with some difficulty.

So to clarify,

You suggest the PRes, go with a national merit board, with regards to rank and position, simmilar to that of the the naval reserve.

You know when I meant numbers, I was talking overall, not individual units.

But, before I comment further, I just want to make sure I am reding you right.

dileas

tess