Divining the right role, capabilities, structure, and Regimental System for Canada's Army Reserves

[WLSC]

From a Montreal persperctive, were most of the unit are concentrated on the island, you could keep the brig HQ and do 3 bn with the 7 units I count the 2 outside Mtl).  Would not put more troups on the ground but would makea more logic ballance.

If you wish to re-role, well then, you have 7 units to play with. 

 

[Michael OLeary]

My point is this.

As a reservist you can't be compeled/ordered to show up for anything you can simply just not show up, you have work or school or studying to do etc etc. I am not slagging the system here it's just how it is.

You can have paper strength of 600 but only 50 show up for parade what is the point?

For someone who is claiming not to be "slagging", you're not providing any input other than reiterating what everyone here knows are limitations of Reserve service and employment.  How about offering something useful.

 

[dapaterson]

So one full strenghth reserve unit.

Hmm, may work out, now I see what you mean.  So instead of brigades, we change the name to regiment, and problem solved...

ATTENTION THIS IS NOT A FACETIOUS STATEMENT

In fact, we should look at the complete military as a whole.  Do we really need three undermanned regular force battallions for each regiment?  I can see more budget being freed as well there.

dileas

tess

Not arguing the point.  If we can have multiple cap-badges in a Bde, why not in a Bn?

On the Reg F side:  The rule of 9 is suspect logic, driven by the desire for a multiple of three regts, all being equal.  My solution is to remove 2 R22eR, take the positions and spread them among the other 8 Bns.  Then rebadge 2 RCR and 2 PPCLI to 1 and 3 RHC (The Black Watch).  Then, while all that hub-bub is going on, create a few regional regiments in the Reserves, where the cap-badges stay, but at the Coy level.


And re: Cutting senior positions in the Reserves.  If we could get a ratio of 1 LCol to every 100 trained soldiers in the Reserves I'd be ecstatic.  (I'm talking parade strengths, not paper strengths).  Right now, we're closer to half that ratio.  So don't feed me bumph that we need all those senior spots for aspirational reasons - let's crank down a bit and push the cream to rise to the top, vice having the last man standing step into the chair.  The number of units that routinely parade more than 200 soldiers (trained or untrained) can be counted on one hand.

 

[the 48th regulator]

Not arguing the point.  If we can have multiple cap-badges in a Bde, why not in a Bn?

On the Reg F side:  The rule of 9 is suspect logic, driven by the desire for a multiple of three regts, all being equal.  My solution is to remove 2 R22eR, take the positions and spread them among the other 8 Bns.  Then rebadge 2 RCR and 2 PPCLI to 1 and 3 RHC (The Black Watch).  Then, while all that hub-bub is going on, create a few regional regiments in the Reserves, where the cap-badges stay, but at the Coy level.


And re: Cutting senior positions in the Reserves.  If we could get a ratio of 1 LCol to every 100 trained soldiers in the Reserves I'd be ecstatic.  (I'm talking parade strengths, not paper strengths).  Right now, we're closer to half that ratio.  So don't feed me bumph that we need all those senior spots for aspirational reasons - let's crank down a bit and push the cream to rise to the top, vice having the last man standing step into the chair.  The number of units that routinely parade more than 200 soldiers (trained or untrained) can be counted on one hand.

My point is,

The bumph you are promoting, is counter productive to retention.

You want to a) eliminate people from the military and b) allow for those that are in no goals to acheive.  Why not offer a solution that promotes the recruitment of soldiers, as opposed to getting rid of people and drive to acheive?

I know this idea is an old one, but a 10/90 battallion /Regiments might be the key? Or more so 50/50 unit, that has the capabillity to be thrown into the tour rotation, and be able to give the break to other regular force units.

Really, changing names and staffing, is a good idea, but not angle we are needing to promote recruitment and retention within the reserves.

dileas

tess

 

[TangoTwoBravo]

What career asprirations are closed for reservists by amalgamation? There will still be COs and RSMs. There would be less of them, but they would have much larger commands. It would also slow down progression to a point where Captains/Majors can spend some time at lower levels instead of being sucked into the vacuum.

I started out in a Reserve Regiment that had an RHQ, two Sabre Squadrons and a HQ Squadron. My Troop, however, consisted of six people that parade and six who were NES from before I had them. A couple of years later we combined the squadrons into one element and the training experience was much better. My Troop was twelve guys who showed up for everything, and the Sqn had an echelon.

You could have taken that process further to the other Armoured Regiments in the Area and come up with a Recce Regiment. That CO and RSM would have some 600 personnel under them. That would be a real command.

 

[the 48th regulator]

My point is a biased one, I will admit.

We are all arguing for the same goal.

However, it is too quick to say, amalgamante the reserves.  As I pointed it out, lead by example and start with the military as a whole.  Cut, slash, and merge everything.  I will use the infantry as an example, as this is what I know;

Create 3 completely fully manned, Regular Force Battallions.
Create 3 50/50 Battalions
Amalgamate, or merge reserve units.  To maintain local military foot prints.

How would this work for everyone?

dileas

tess

 

[TangoTwoBravo]

The nine Regular Force infantry battalions are smaller than they were circa 1989, but they are still much much larger than a reserve battalion. If Reserve Regiments were all parading 500 effective soldiers I would say keep them as they are in term of COs/RSMs. Otherwise, streamline the overhead to get better quality across the board.

 

[dapaterson]

My point is,

The bumph you are promoting, is counter productive to retention.

You want to a) eliminate people from the military and b) allow for those that are in no goals to acheive.  Why not offer a solution that promotes the recruitment of soldiers, as opposed to getting rid of people and drive to acheive?

No goals?  Please.  With my 1:100 LCol ratio there would still be 140 LCol positions to aspire to.  Which would be meaningful command roles with more than one understrength sub-unit.  If we use 3:1, that's 420 Majors, and 1200+ Capt/Lts.  Then we could build a proper NCM corps with the extra positions and funds.

Right now recruiting is not a problem.  I say again, recruiting is not a problem - the Army Reserve is at or slightly above its target strength.

I know this idea is an old one, but a 10/90 battallion /Regiments might be the key? Or more so 50/50 unit, that has the capabillity to be thrown into the tour rotation, and be able to give the break to other regular force units.

Until there is a political will to mobilize and oblige Reservists to serve (and there isn't) that is a non-starter, unless we build 50:150 units - half Reg F, and 3x the number of Reservists, hoping we can find 1 of 3 people willingand able to volunteer.  But it could be an option writ larger (though drawing down all units in one location degrades yor response capability in the event of a national disaster).  But still a concept worth exploring further.

Really, changing names and staffing, is a good idea, but not angle we are needing to promote recruitment and retention within the reserves.

Breaking old mindsets and freeing up considerable training dollars needed to make Col Blimps to instead build clicked-on Sgts and WOs strikes me as a very worthwhile effort.  Without capable Jr leaders on the floor we've got nothing.

 

[the 48th regulator]

Tango2Bravo and dapaterson ,

Got to start from the top I say, let us look what we save when we eliminate the full time salary of 6 Co's and 6 RSM, never mind all of the other staffing positions.

I am sure you would come up with a bigger bag of gold coins than nit picking at the reserves.  Maybe I am losing the focus of the goals in our thread.

AS for the 50/50 concept, it exists right now.  It may not be that percentage, however how long is a reservist away from home?  I am talking about the time he lands on the ground to start the pretraining, until he comes home in clean clothes and is restocking the shelves of Sobey's?  is that not over a year?  Does that not in essence make him a full time reservist, as in the concept I broached?

Is the priority to find more money, or Gather all the sheep under one to make the crowd look like a bigger reserve military?
If we do anything, it must be a complete restructure of the Military, not bits and pieces.

dileas

tess

 

[WLSC]

Got to start from the top I say, let us look what we save when we eliminate the full time salary of 6 Co's and 6 RSM, never mind all of the other staffing positions.

Do you meen that you CO's and RSM's were full time...???  If yes, I thing we should compare things.  I see graet diddiculties to have a cummon idea when the basis of the discution might be off.

 

[TangoTwoBravo]

I am not talking about saving salary money, nor about cutting people. I am talking about amalgamation of units to have realistic spans of control for a CO/RSM and their staff. This would let people spend more time in platoons and companies instead of racing upwards to fill succession plans. A Reserve unit with twelve officers parading would still have twelve officers, except that there wouldn't be a CO/DCO among them. They could still aspire to be a CO/DCO, and coming a little later in their reserve career (and having less) we wouldn't then have to wonder what to do with them after unit command. There could also be training efficiencies when you pool those resources under one CO.

 

[dapaterson]

Of course any change must be Army (and preferably CF) wide.  But the savings would be more than just 6 LCols & CWOs - the numbers are well out of whack nation wide.  And it's also a top down sign that change is coming.

And T2B:  Exactly!

 

[Old Sweat]

I fear we are going nowhwere fast, and are having a blast going over old ground. Now, the dilemma as I see it is that we have a militia structure that first developed at the time of the Crimean War. It eventually morphed post Boer War into a structure designed to support the mobilization of an expeditionary force for a general war in Europe as part of a larger British army. Looking at militia lists of a century ago and you will see militia brigades under a regional command structure, but these were not designed to be mobilized, unlike the US national guard and the British territorial army. All the major reorgnizations of the militia did not meddle with this basic premise.

We fought the two major wars of the last century and built up the army for Korea and NATO using this structure, and while the situation has changed, the militia organization and layout has not. We are now faced with the requirement to support forces fighting on civilization's frontiers on a more or less continual basis, if the experience of the last two decades is any indication. But I suggest much of our thinking and structure is based on supporting an expeditionary force mobilized for a specific threat and a relatively short period of time.

So what, as the DS say at staff college? How do the reserves contribute most effectively to this, while still maintaining their cohesion and ties to their local communities? 

Whatever else we do, to even consider eliminating regular force battalions or regiments is not the way to go. It is a lot easier to increase the size of an existing unit with its own corporate identity and culture than it is to start from scratch.

 

[the 48th regulator]

The example of Co and RSM goes back to my argument of revitalizing the regular force regiments.

They do collect a salary, as a regular force personnel.  Now if the argument is to save money, just by using those six people, how much do we save?  And by doing so, how much more effective would a fully manned regular force regiment be, as opposed to a regiment staffed by 3 undermanned battalions?

I have been swayed by the argument of merging reserve units, however some of the arguments are weak.  Meaning that, unless you want to do this across the board, I just see it as this modern sway where people see no use for a historical regimented unit.

It is easy to point to the guy wearing the red pom pom on a funny hat, but the military as a whole is guilty of creating position, to maintain retention of numbers.

dileas

tess

 

[dapaterson]

So what, as the DS say at staff college? How do the reserves contribute most effectively to this, while still maintaining their cohesion and ties to their local communities? 

Whatever else we do, to even consider eliminating regular force battalions or regiments is not the way to go. It is a lot easier to increase the size of an existing unit with its own corporate identity and culture than it is to start from scratch.

If I may (slightly) disagree:  we need to take a holistic CF view of what we requrie, then determine what parts of that vest best in the Reg F, and what parts vest best in the Res F. That must be cap-badge agnostic; if we decide we need two STA regiments, one rocket regiment, and three field artillery regiments, but only seven infantry battalions, so be it.  We can't afford to keep everything "because we may need it sometime."  By that logic we should have kept the veterinary corps following WWII - since we now use some donkeys in Afghanistan.

An honest assessment must figure out what end-state we want, then put everything on the table, warts and all, and figure out a roadmap from here to there.  The various Reserve Restructures never did that, and "CF Transformation" never transformed anything - it just grew new things.

Massive organizational change is very hard - but mission failure becuase of a failure to change is even worse.


Tess:  I've never called to eliminate the funny red pom-poms.  Do what they did with the London Regiment in the UK - all the component companies perpetuate the lineage of the former independant units and retain their accoutrements.

The problem isn't one unit - one or two folks here or there in the Reserves are inexpensive.  But a large group of inexpensive adds up.  Everyone knows it's a  model that isn't working.  But no one has the moral courage to stand up and say "This needs to be fixed - and I'll go first.".

So instead, we muddle along... how many pages on this thread already?

 

[the 48th regulator]

dapaterson,

Very true Very True.

But, to sum up my point, we do an overhaul of everything, and go forward.  Starting witht he Regular force, then moving down to the local reserve units.

dileas

tess

 

[Fishbone Jones]

I'll tell you all something right from the coal face. It's where I live. Let's use SW Ontario as an example. Amalgamate units and you're going to lose a lot of people. Including Officers and Snr NCOs. Go ahead and use the axiom that those people weren't worth keeping anyway, which is bullshit, but go ahead. The loss would be bad enough if you took the guidon & badge from one and made them go under another. Then the CO & RSM would have control over say, 3 Sqns, but have to travel all over SW Ontario, three different locations, to show themselves to everyone. You're not talking young piss and vinegar types with families. You're talking old dog eared types that are retired and can afford the time and travel.

So the other option is to keep the units at home but form all the garrison into a single unit. Infantry, Armoured, Svc Btn all one unit. You'll lose even more pers and be no better off than when you stated except instead of having three 100 man units doing different roles, that you can draw on, you'll have one 150 man unit with everyone pissing on each other. Higher up will be jockying for position and the others will see it and follow suit. Unit loyalties will win out.

It'll take years to make a cohesive outfit from this type of mishmash. It ain't pretty and it doesn't fit your pretty little cookie cutter designs, but it's a big elephant in the room that you can't ignore. It also has the largest capability of sewering any plans for roling in units and making your newest Mo experiment work.

Reservists are a fickle bunch and you have to understand how to sell them on the plan, because they are not a bunch of morons without any other means of employment or fall back. Most do it because they like it, not because they need a job. Fuck with what they like and don't offer a better alternative, they'll vote with their feet.


Whatever is planned, there better be a lot of buy in, consideration, and consultation. Show up and tell them they are all part of the 51st Dog Sled Mushers, here's your new badge, and you've lost before you even start.

Make all the grandiose plans you wish, but if you don't include or get inclusion from, that young troop on the floor, you've simply lost the best asset you ever had.

But hey, what do I know. Just tossing out random thoughts.

 

[the 48th regulator]

eff me.

That was what I wanted to say, but I just blathered on.

Thank you RC.

Plus one on that post.

dileas

tess

 

[George Wallace]

Amalgamation is a very short term and short sighted fix.  In a few years, the amalgamated units will have dropped in numbers, just as current units have seen.  Many of the reasons for this have already been stated by recceguy and others.

Recruiting in the Reserves and the CF is cyclic.  The thing that isn't cyclic, is funding.  When Unit strengths decrease, so does funding.  When they again increase in strength, funding does not.  This becomes a morale issue and Units loose people.

 

[Michael OLeary]

Can anyone come up with specific instances of past amalgamations being marked by mass releases of Reserve soldiers?

Also, can anyone confirm how many Reservists released directly as a result of the rerolling of the Lanark and Renfrew Scottish or The Elgin Regiment?

I believe that many Reservists join because they want to serve (more so than that they want to serve only as "insert trade here"), and the choice of units and trades is often based on local unit availability.  I'm an not certain that mass releases is much more than a perpetuated myth to warn politicians of the hazards of not protesting against the amalgamation of units in their constituencies.

I will be quite happy to reconsider that opinion on provision of hard data.