Divining the right role, capabilities, structure, and Regimental System for Canada's Army Reserves

[PuckChaser]

If it was OPSEC information it wouldn't be on the UNCLASS DWAN....

You mean like the RCAF having a spreadsheet with the flight info for every cargo and pax flight heading into and out of operational theatres, to include stopover/layovers?

Yeah that'd never be on UNCLASS DWAN...

 

[MilEME09]

Any discussion of the TAPV (or any armoured vehicle) for the reserves has to start with maintenance. While the TAPV isn’t a tank, it is a significantly more complex vehicle than the AVGP, which as I recall, the reserves struggled to maintain. And the army reserve hasn’t had the greatest track record at training large numbers of RCEME.

And civi side probably isn’t an option. If you’re contracting out your first and second line maintenance, you’re not building a fighting force. And besides, the reserves are dispersed, and what neighbourhood auto shop can maintain a remote weapons system?

The army can't quickly train reserve techs because it doesn't manage the trades reserve side well. 4 to 5 years to train a vehicle tech is crazy and we could half that if we utilized civilian automotive programs to teach the basics, and then taught the military specific stuff in summers.

PRes also needs proper tooling, parts supply, etc.... we the reserves have hemorrhaged techs in recent years because once trained we are not able to do our jobs. My unit alone I have seen loose 5 qualified vehicle techs to CT or release because we don't do any turning if wrenches.

 

[Brad Sallows]

If we want more full time battalions, we should create more Reg F.

Absolutely. If we're going to employ and pay people full-time, do it properly. Of course, think of the money we could save if all full-time positions were Cl B...

 

[FJAG]

Interesting revival of this thread. Let me just address a couple of points.

How sustainable would it be to assign units fully manned with Class B reservists to the CMBGs as a light motorized infantry unit. ...

Sustainability of such a battalion depends entirely on funding. In effect there is very little difference between a Reg F and a Class B-based unit with respect to costs albeit terms of service differ significantly. However, creating a Class B unit is just a way to cheat the PY limitations imposed by the government on the number of regular force personnel. As others have stated, reservist, regardless of class are CF members who are "enrolled for other than continuing, full-time military service when not on active service". That's a legal status and the creation of a unit composed of "continuing, full-time" members by way of Class Bs isn't really allowed although we have for quite some time now run rough-shod on the concept. I'm of the view that for every Class B member you can hire 3 Class A members and properly train AND equip them indefinitely.

... I have far to much time on my hands and produced this; both the rationalize the reserves structure and give purpose to the RCAC units as TAPV "carrier" and DFS formations. ...

I love reorganizing the ORBAT of the CAF as much as anyone, but there are certain considerations to keep in mind:

1. We tend to lose sight of the purpose behind the reserve force structure. For almost a century Militia units were the foundation of mobilization. Militia units in peacetime had much of the needed command structure (both officer, NCO and a core of ORs) so that it could be bulked up by civilian recruits, trained and deployed as a "mobilized" unit. Because of this there were hundreds of Militia units which could conceivably be mobilized into several corps of hundreds of thousands of troops.

Over the years the size of the "to be mobilized force" was reduced and accordingly many Militia units were zero-manned and relegated to the supplementary order of battle. Around the 1960s, with the expansion of the full-time army, the "mobilization" concept faded away and was mostly replaced with a concept of individual and small group "augmentation" to full-time regular force units. At the time equipping Militia units with "mobilizable" equipment disappeared in favour of a handful of training equipment only while all the operational equipment is held by the Reg F.

The reserves, however, still have a structure that looks "mobilizable" with all its COs, RSMs, Coy Commanders etc. If one was to take our current structure (which according to one government website says has 19,000 Army reservists in 185 unit - and I question the accuracy of those numbers) and manned each of those 185 units to a "mobilized" level of let's say 600 personnel each then the Army Reserve could expand to some 111,000 people. We have no plans to do that. If, on the other hand, you want to set up the minimal structure necessary to train and hold those 19,000 reservists based on those same 600 man units then you could reduce the number of units to just 34. We have no plan to do that either.

So why are we structured the way we are? Its basically a policy of sucking and blowing at the same time. We don't want to pay more reservists but at the same time we don't want to offend a whole lot of folks by putting even more units onto the supplementary order of battle regardless of how weak they are.

2. It's a bit hard to aggregate Res F units because they too have a legal structure albeit that this can be changed by the MND as needed. There's no reason what you propose can't be done, but it's more complex than necessary. Effectively what you are doing is part and parcel of the same "suck and blow" shell game that we're doing now through such structures as the always popular "tactical group". Effectively we're trying desperately to keep some old units and traditions alive. The right thing to do is to either keep the structure we have but develop a proper mobilization and expansion plan (which is really something we will never do) or, on the other hand, reduce the number of units to those that can be properly recruited and equipped indefinitely as either force generation units, force employment units or (and preferably) both.

3. The fact of the matter is that our Res F system is an anachronism that is on the one hand fed by a Res F leadership that is hanging onto the past and a Reg F leadership that doesn't want to or doesn't know how to make the reserve force a viable, credible mobilizable force by creating proper system of reserve service that elevates the training standard of the reservists, properly equipping the reserves and providing for its maintenance and properly including the reserve units (and formations) into defence plans. For the Reg F it's always a budget issue, but as I've said many times, I think it goes much deeper than that because a properly trained and organized reserve force would be be less expensive to maintain on an annual basis than a similar full-time. The trick is to determine what forces you absolutely need during peace time and which are only necessary in a major emergency (which for DND by definition includes war)

What's missing from our entire Army reserve system is an overarching coherent plan - in essence a doctrine for the army that full incorporates the reserves in the full spectrum from peacetime to high intensity conflict. We've had numerous studies on the subject which have for the most part either gone into the trash bin or resulted in minor incremental changes. I'm afraid that there is no way that the situation for the reserves will ever improve until there is both a Minister of National Defence and a CDS and a CLS who are prepared to undertake serious reform from the bottom up.

 

[quadrapiper]

To me it doesn't really matter, if I'm totally honest. Regimental names are, in this case, a note to tradition and that is it. The TAPV Sqn is there to provide mobility and fire support. Similarly I see that "sqn" dispersed across the area in multiple troops. When I worked out numbers for the TAPV across the army I think 24... ish provides enough mobility for a company? So if that works out being like 4 troops of 5 and an HQ split across those armouries, or two troops of ten so be it. In short Operational tasks > Regimental Tradition.

I'll say this as an aside. We had, up until the end of WW2, absolutely no problems re rolling units from Artillery, to Cavalry, to Infantry and back again. The British Columbia Rifle started life as Coastal Artillery, the Halifax Rifles were original (shocker) a Volunteer Rifle regiment. The idea that regiments cannot be renamed, re roled, and re purposed is a very very modern one and I think is a massive obstacle in reform and modernization.

PS Absent from my order of battle there are 1st Hussars and SALH - who I would task as Crew Replacement Regiments and locate close to Regular Force Armoured units to use their simulators and tanks to train.

Equally, don't we have enough miscellaneous names floating around in varying degrees of non-existence that, should you want to, you could just find a pre-existing name to match a new or shifted mission set, possibly even one with local place names in it? Or just stand up a new identity entirely, if there's nothing in the inactive list that's a good match.

Given the unit-specific recruiting aspect of the PRes, unless they shift to something closer to the NAVRES or Service Battalion multiple trades/roles in one unit approaches, having either some resonance or absolutely none between whatever you're trying to recruit for and the name over the door might be a good thing, especially in areas with multiple units in one town.

 

[markppcli]

Which is exactly why I suggested the GM ISV.

If Jane & Joe Public can take care of their Colorado ZR2s, so can the PRes. You could probably even get a "C&R" variant for the Armd Recce & have them fill a light cav/DFS role.

And we're back to having to retrain "armoured" reservists whenever we deploy them / employ them with the regular force. The reserves are already employing the TAPV at units spread out across the country, does anyone have first hand knowledge of how they handle the maintenance?

Also the IMV has yet to be fielded and is under trials at the moment, it won't be pushed to units until 2025 and I can't see us realistically procuring it by 2025 given it's going to take us 13 years to buy new ATGMs. TAPV is what we have, so for better or worse we need to use it.

Equally, don't we have enough miscellaneous names floating around in varying degrees of non-existence that, should you want to, you could just find a pre-existing name to match a new or shifted mission set, possibly even one with local place names in it? Or just stand up a new identity entirely, if there's nothing in the inactive list that's a good match.

Given the unit-specific recruiting aspect of the PRes, unless they shift to something closer to the NAVRES or Service Battalion multiple trades/roles in one unit approaches, having either some resonance or absolutely none between whatever you're trying to recruit for and the name over the door might be a good thing, especially in areas with multiple units in one town.

I mean apparently we don't have enough names, because we've used the Cameron Highlanders twice. In most of my moves to the TAPV Squadrons I tried to avoid "Regional" names, Hull and Windsor being exceptions, to encourage dispersion across their respective areas. That was part and parcel of why the PEI Regiment would be stood down to a rifle company. The intent was to maintain as much perpetuation, and thus ruffle less feathers and keep identity, while radically shifting the way we look at the reserves. The way the Navy handles it's reserves is exactly how I see this working. Ie: if I'm in PEI instead of only being able to be an Armoured Recce reservists, I join as what ever trade, and am assigned to the relevant sub unit or sub sub unit as the case may be.

Interesting revival of this thread. Let me just address a couple of points.

Sustainability of such a battalion depends entirely on funding. In effect there is very little difference between a Reg F and a Class B-based unit with respect to costs albeit terms of service differ significantly. However, creating a Class B unit is just a way to cheat the PY limitations imposed by the government on the number of regular force personnel. As others have stated, reservist, regardless of class are CF members who are "enrolled for other than continuing, full-time military service when not on active service". That's a legal status and the creation of a unit composed of "continuing, full-time" members by way of Class Bs isn't really allowed although we have for quite some time now run rough-shod on the concept. I'm of the view that for every Class B member you can hire 3 Class A members and properly train AND equip them indefinitely.


I love reorganizing the ORBAT of the CAF as much as anyone, but there are certain considerations to keep in mind:

1. We tend to lose sight of the purpose behind the reserve force structure. For almost a century Militia units were the foundation of mobilization. Militia units in peacetime had much of the needed command structure (both officer, NCO and a core of ORs) so that it could be bulked up by civilian recruits, trained and deployed as a "mobilized" unit. Because of this there were hundreds of Militia units which could conceivably be mobilized into several corps of hundreds of thousands of troops.

Over the years the size of the "to be mobilized force" was reduced and accordingly many Militia units were zero-manned and relegated to the supplementary order of battle. Around the 1960s, with the expansion of the full-time army, the "mobilization" concept faded away and was mostly replaced with a concept of individual and small group "augmentation" to full-time regular force units. At the time equipping Militia units with "mobilizable" equipment disappeared in favour of a handful of training equipment only while all the operational equipment is held by the Reg F.

The reserves, however, still have a structure that looks "mobilizable" with all its COs, RSMs, Coy Commanders etc. If one was to take our current structure (which according to one government website says has 19,000 Army reservists in 185 unit - and I question the accuracy of those numbers) and manned each of those 185 units to a "mobilized" level of let's say 600 personnel each then the Army Reserve could expand to some 111,000 people. We have no plans to do that. If, on the other hand, you want to set up the minimal structure necessary to train and hold those 19,000 reservists based on those same 600 man units then you could reduce the number of units to just 34. We have no plan to do that either.

So why are we structured the way we are? Its basically a policy of sucking and blowing at the same time. We don't want to pay more reservists but at the same time we don't want to offend a whole lot of folks by putting even more units onto the supplementary order of battle regardless of how weak they are.

2. It's a bit hard to aggregate Res F units because they too have a legal structure albeit that this can be changed by the MND as needed. There's no reason what you propose can't be done, but it's more complex than necessary. Effectively what you are doing is part and parcel of the same "suck and blow" shell game that we're doing now through such structures as the always popular "tactical group". Effectively we're trying desperately to keep some old units and traditions alive. The right thing to do is to either keep the structure we have but develop a proper mobilization and expansion plan (which is really something we will never do) or, on the other hand, reduce the number of units to those that can be properly recruited and equipped indefinitely as either force generation units, force employment units or (and preferably) both.

3. The fact of the matter is that our Res F system is an anachronism that is on the one hand fed by a Res F leadership that is hanging onto the past and a Reg F leadership that doesn't want to or doesn't know how to make the reserve force a viable, credible mobilizable force by creating proper system of reserve service that elevates the training standard of the reservists, properly equipping the reserves and providing for its maintenance and properly including the reserve units (and formations) into defence plans. For the Reg F it's always a budget issue, but as I've said many times, I think it goes much deeper than that because a properly trained and organized reserve force would be be less expensive to maintain on an annual basis than a similar full-time. The trick is to determine what forces you absolutely need during peace time and which are only necessary in a major emergency (which for DND by definition includes war)

What's missing from our entire Army reserve system is an overarching coherent plan - in essence a doctrine for the army that full incorporates the reserves in the full spectrum from peacetime to high intensity conflict. We've had numerous studies on the subject which have for the most part either gone into the trash bin or resulted in minor incremental changes. I'm afraid that there is no way that the situation for the reserves will ever improve until there is both a Minister of National Defence and a CDS and a CLS who are prepared to undertake serious reform from the bottom up.

I'll stress what I said above, and I think I've said it before in here. This would see the idea of the Rocky Mountain Rangers, near and dear to my heart though they are, no longer being the only show in Kamloops and BC, their name is kept by a company for tradition purposes but for the organization it's just a name. If you show up the Armoury in Kamloops you could be an Infantry Soldier, a TAPV Crewman, a Sig Op, ect they would mass regionally during training, where I see those parade nights being changed to a single weekend a month.

 

[Eye In The Sky]

To me it doesn't really matter, if I'm totally honest. Regimental names are, in this case, a note to tradition and that is it.

You're absolutely wrong in your 40 CRB org; it does matter. PEIR knows as much about dismounted inf ops and PLF knows about mounted recce ops. PEIR knows as much about Pioneer tasks as PLF knows about mounted screen ops or flank surv.

Sure, PRes units have been changed to other functions...I remember how well that went for the Elgins initially. I had a few friends in RETS at CFSME in Gagetown, and because they (Elgins) didn't have the background knowledge and experience, they were viewed as 'dangerous'. That was a few moons ago, but that is still the initial result. There was more $ allotted to unit trg days back then, and far less 'mandatory' trg eating away at a precious Cl A trg budgets. Nowadays, who many years would it take a re-role a Inf unit to Recce, and train them to any level of actual proficiency?

But you're not talking about re-roling units, you talking about "swapping"; example - Hfx Rifles go to 'dismounted', PLF go to 'mounted'. Why? What benefit is this? I see none.

The Princess Louise Fusiliers​

Who We Are
The Princess Louise Fusiliers (PLF) is a Primary Reserve infantry unit of the Canadian Armed Forces. Based out of Halifax, Nova Scotia, this infantry regiment traces its local roots as a Halifax unit of Militia back to June 18, 1749.

The Princess Louise Fusiliers’s main responsibility is as a Light Infantry regiment, including a new mission task of Pioneers.

The mission task for our unit is: Assault Pioneers – A platoon of 31 members, which is trained in the employment of obstacle-building and obstacle-breaching tools to provide mobility and counter-mobility support to a manoeuvring battle group.

The Halifax Rifles (RCAC)​

Who We Are
The Halifax Rifles (RCAC) is a Primary Reserve armoured reconnaissance regiment of the Canadian Armed Forces.

The mission task for our unit is: Influence Activities – A Squadron of up to 52 members, which is trained in the employment of population group influence techniques, including Psychological Operations and Civil-Military Cooperation, to provide behavioural and psychological effects on those populations in support of a Commander’s intent or mission.

So you'd basically take those 2 units, and "flip" them. I'm going to suggest, being that both units are in Halifax, that the folks who joined PLF wanted to do "infantry stuff" and the ones who joined Hfx Rifles wanted to do "armd recce stuff". The ones that join Inf and then go "hey that mounted stuff looks fun"...they transfer within the Bde.

But overall...re-naming units to "this or that"...what benefit? If the same amount of troops are available for Dom Ops, summer trg support, FTX and all that....what's the benefit? This just looks like window dressing to me; name changes etc that will cost money...for no added 'troops on the ground'.

 

[Halifax Tar]

Why not just get rid of names and regimental mafias and simply go to numbers ?

It seems the army is very held back from structural change by names.

 

[markppcli]

You're absolutely wrong in your 40 CRB org; it does matter. PEIR knows as much about dismounted inf ops and PLF knows about mounted recce ops. PEIR knows as much about Pioneer tasks as PLF knows about mounted screen ops or flank surv.

Sure, PRes units have been changed to other functions...I remember how well that went for the Elgins initially. I had a few friends in RETS at CFSME in Gagetown, and because they (Elgins) didn't have the background knowledge and experience, they were viewed as 'dangerous'. That was a few moons ago, but that is still the initial result. There was more $ allotted to unit trg days back then, and far less 'mandatory' trg eating away at a precious Cl A trg budgets. Nowadays, who many years would it take a re-role a Inf unit to Recce, and train them to any level of actual proficiency?

But you're not talking about re-roling units, you talking about "swapping"; example - Hfx Rifles go to 'dismounted', PLF go to 'mounted'. Why? What benefit is this? I see none.

The Princess Louise Fusiliers​

Who We Are
The Princess Louise Fusiliers (PLF) is a Primary Reserve infantry unit of the Canadian Armed Forces. Based out of Halifax, Nova Scotia, this infantry regiment traces its local roots as a Halifax unit of Militia back to June 18, 1749.

The Princess Louise Fusiliers’s main responsibility is as a Light Infantry regiment, including a new mission task of Pioneers.

The mission task for our unit is: Assault Pioneers – A platoon of 31 members, which is trained in the employment of obstacle-building and obstacle-breaching tools to provide mobility and counter-mobility support to a manoeuvring battle group.

The Halifax Rifles (RCAC)​

Who We Are
The Halifax Rifles (RCAC) is a Primary Reserve armoured reconnaissance regiment of the Canadian Armed Forces.

The mission task for our unit is: Influence Activities – A Squadron of up to 52 members, which is trained in the employment of population group influence techniques, including Psychological Operations and Civil-Military Cooperation, to provide behavioural and psychological effects on those populations in support of a Commander’s intent or mission.

So you'd basically take those 2 units, and "flip" them. I'm going to suggest, being that both units are in Halifax, that the folks who joined PLF wanted to do "infantry stuff" and the ones who joined Hfx Rifles wanted to do "armd recce stuff". The ones that join Inf and then go "hey that mounted stuff looks fun"...they transfer within the Bde.

But overall...re-naming units to "this or that"...what benefit? If the same amount of troops are available for Dom Ops, summer trg support, FTX and all that....what's the benefit? This just looks like window dressing to me; name changes etc that will cost money...for no added 'troops on the ground'.

They wouldn't be mounted Recce, they would be there to provide mobility and limited DFS to the Bn. I have explained multiple times that the nature of these units would be very much different. You are ignoring my other points and are seeing these units as they are not as I would have them. If you join the reserves in in Nova Scotia, you will pick your trade, and be assigned to a sub unit from there. If that means you're an infantry soldier in A Coy so be it, if you choose to be armoured you'll be in the TAPV Sqn whether you parade in Sydney or Halifax. Quite frankly you seem obsessive over the minutia as opposed to the structure, does your opposition change if those two sub units change who they perpetuate?

As to why change to a mounted rifle bn vs a CBG? Because we dedicated an absurd amount of time, money, and effort to maintaining the "regiments" of the reserves. What is the possible benefit of the 52 members of the Halifax Rifles having a Lt Col, a DCO, an Agj, an RSM, and what ever else to administer half a Sqn? In my methodology that Sqn would recruit across Nova Scotia, and would be a Sqn as part of a Bn. Again, it's not about re rolling individual regiments, it's about forming new structures and the regimental titles are there purely as perpetuation. Frankly I wouldn't even keep their cap badges.

@Halifax Tar absolutely yes. Every one will see this a reeducation of their regiment as opposed to streamlining the reserves into a Division Structure that could actually be deployed.

 

[Eye In The Sky]

The (few TAPVs) roled as limited DFS? Sorry...I don't see ANY benefit to this. What would be the recce elements in this structure, then? I'm looking at your proposed establishment changes with a 'benefit for cost' view. I see great cost, little benefit.

Easier solution; collapse 36 and 37 CBG into a single PRes Bde. Using the Armd Recce units as an example

1. let them keep their cap badges (only to keep people happy...and morale should be taken into consideration, or you might see an exodus when you make 'change').

2. PEIR, 8 CH and Hfx Rifles all become A/B/C Sqn of the "new atlantic CBG" (whatever the name would be). Or...make them D Sqn if they can't sustain a Sqn, and then they can provide 41 -> 43, and maybe a reasonable A1 Ech on Bde FTXs, ARCON, etc.

3. 1 RHQ, remainder get SHQ and applic manning.

4. Do the same for all CBGs across Canada, if it works for 36/37.

TL;DR: there is way to increase economy of force without reinventing the wheel, and stripping units of their Guidons/Colors and identities while trimming away the fat (LCols in charge of what amounts to understrength Sqns).

 

[markppcli]

Recce element would be the Bns integral Recce platoon.
TAPV is mobility and DFS, ie they provide enough lift to be able to move a company at a time.
Your suggestion would be to amalgamate units and have a single brigade for the Atlantic, ie the structure I suggested, where do you see savings in regards to what I suggested. In fact collapsing those units into a Sqn or Two is what I essentially did, I just grouped them in a Bn, and actual manned Bn, to support and gave them something Reserve Armoured Recce doesn’t have, a mission.

Frankly I see more hinderance in keeping, for example, single trade units as the only option in given places. So I’m in PEI and armoured Recce doesn’t appeal to me, guess I don’t join the reserves because we care more about Guidons and Cap Badges than mission and capability.

ps 8 CH isn’t in there because it becomes a tank crew replacement Sqn, working closely with the tanks in Gagetown. If that makes more sense to be another unit then fine, the principals matter more than the minutia.

 

[Eye In The Sky]

PEI? not interested in Armd Recce...I can still be a veh tech, or HRA at PEIR. They used to have wpns techs, medics. I can join Signals...as one of the RCCS trades they have, or support trades they have...or I can join the NavRes....there's PLENTY of options if someone isn't interested in Armoured Soldier/Officer.

So the infantry Bn's are doing recce....for who? Are they mounted, dismounted? They are going to provide the "bde level" recce and cover off all those tasks? They can't do both at the same time...

Savings? less LCols and CWOs that can be turned into pay for Cpls and Lts. it's a start...

Sorry...I don't see much 'mission capability' in your changes. Those org's still have the same kit, the same trg budgets...

Guidons aren't important? People died earning those battle honours. We don't have to throw away cap badges...just bloated command structures.

 

[Eye In The Sky]

Why not just get rid of names and regimental mafias and simply go to numbers ?

It seems the army is very held back from structural change by names.

People are genuinely proud of their units history; PEIR as an example has battle honours from the South African War (1900) to WWII. Mbr have served in UN mission like Cyprus, Yugo (including Medak Pocket), Afghanistan...so while not serving as a formed unit or sub-unit even, like many reserve units, they have still augmented the Reg Force on operations.

Regimental mafia's are an issue...official lineage and cap badges aren't. My old unit, for example, has a pretty storied history. Light Horse, Highland, Regt members have visited the The 9th/12th Royal Lancers (Prince of Wales's). There's much to be proud of in the cap badge itself, and the strong ties serving members feel to PEI.

Take a few minutes and read thru the history. I'm not saying it is the most important thing...but it is important, at the same time. I think we can 'make change' without making proud troops and Officers re-badge to the 36 Atlantic Inf Bn, or some other "generic" title...end of the day, everyone still have to have a cap badge.

The official lineage of The Prince Edward Island Regiment (RCAC) armour regiment

Is the PEIR a capable Regiment? No. Are they even a functional Sqn at this point in time? No.

Why is that? Because of the decisions of the Govt of Canada and the CAF.

- when I joined way back when...PEIR could field a 3-Tp recce sqn with A1 Ech and SHQ with 4/4B (step up CP)...the stuff you'd expect. Depending on VORs, those recce tps could be 7 car, but 5 car was normal.

- each veh had double-banked comms. Jnr C/S's had a 77-set as their double-bank but...that's all the needed.

- the budget allowed for 2 trg nights a week (Mon and Thurs). Sep - Nov and April - June, we would do 2 FTXs a month sometimes. Jan/Feb was winter indoc stuff, and we'd knock off our mandatory stuff like AFV, etc.

- we used to do mini-ex's on trg nights because we had the time and kit. Mon night might be 'issue Wng O, begin Battle Procedure for a mounted Op screen". Thurs night...bomb up the veh's, kit checks, comms check...and off to estab a mounted Op on the harbour or something. didn't matter, it was exercising the BP, getting crews into the crew lockers, testing radios and all that kind of stuff. once the last OP report was sent...End Ex....quick Stables, then a Troop hot-wash in the mess with pizza and beverages. Morale was high...we had a normal 90%+ turn out for FTXs.

- then...Iltis was replaced, but not one for one, with G Wags.

- TCCS replaced 46/49/77 sets...but not one for one.

- Cl A trg was cut in half, and then some more. FTXs were 'a couple a year'....

- on FTXs...it wasn't unheard of for OPs to send "contact reports" over people's pers cell phones...because there wasn't enough radios to have one in each C/S.

- morale dropped...interest dropped. people released, or stopped showing up. everyone knows how Cl A funding works...


Changing 36 and 37 CBG isn't to 40 CRB isn't going to change the REAL issues. Kit shortages, morale shortages, training budget shortages. All these 'rename/reorg this to that' conversations that don't address equipment, training money and morale issues do nothing to increase capability and morale.

Fix the kit and training $ shortage. If you want to rename "36 CBG" to "40 Cdn Bn of Rifles" or whatever...fine, but do it so people aren't throwing away cap badges and history....go after the bloated Command/HQ aspects. Cpl and Capt Bloggins are proud of their cap badge...why kick the shit out of what morale is left out there?

 

[markppcli]

PEI? not interested in Armd Recce...I can still be a veh tech, or HRA at PEIR. They used to have wpns techs, medics. I can join Signals...as one of the RCCS trades they have, or support trades they have...or I can join the NavRes....there's PLENTY of options if someone isn't interested in Armoured Soldier/Officer.

So the infantry Bn's are doing recce....for who? Are they mounted, dismounted? They are going to provide the "bde level" recce and cover off all those tasks? They can't do both at the same time...

Savings? less LCols and CWOs that can be turned into pay for Cpls and Lts. it's a start...

Sorry...I don't see much 'mission capability' in your changes. Those org's still have the same kit, the same trg budgets...

Guidons aren't important? People died earning those battle honours. We don't have to throw away cap badges...just bloated command structures.

And under this structure you would be able to join as a gunner, or an engineer, an infanteer.

You’re of course aware of a Recce platoon as per the standard Bn orbat right? Well they would provide Recce for the Bn, defining Objectives in the exact same way that every infantry Recce platoon does.

As stated multiple times the the Bn has the TAPV Sqn that can motorized one coy at a time, or provide mobility to Recce platoon, or what ever. Capability comes from the fact that now you have actual credible units organized for tasks as opposed to being organized for history and tradition. These are designed to actually be capable of filling their orbats

Less CWO, less Lt Cols, less Cols, less captains in Bde HQs, many full time, are all budget savings that can go to training.

History and tradition are important until they become hinderances to progress. This is the road block we have to at some point overcome if the reserves is ever going to crawl toward relevance.

 

[Eye In The Sky]

I am sensing you don't know what a Bde Recce Sqn does/is supposed to do?

Under your structure...anyone in PEI could join as a Gnr, Spr or Tpr? LOL ok. where do, and who do they train with on parade nights, wknd trg? I am sure PEI isn't going to have a Arty, Engr and Armd sub-units. ??????? Is PEI going to have 1 x Engr Sect, and 1 x Armd Recce Ptl, and 1 Arty Gun Det? Where is the kit they are training on?

Units ARE organized for tasks now. All you're doing in moving the shells around on the table. It's the same amount of shells, and the ball is still under the same one, when your done.

The problem isn't tasks; kit shortages, Cl A training budgets...those are your culprits.

Capability comes from the fact that now you have actual credible units organized for tasks as opposed to being organized for history and tradition

Sorry, I don't see credible units. I see name changes, and 're-roling' that is more detrimental than anything.

Your plan doesn't address equipment shortages or Cl A training budget issues.

 

[Eye In The Sky]

Less CWO, less Lt Cols, less Cols, less captains in Bde HQs, many full time, are all budget savings that can go to training.

This, I agree on. And...change has to start somewhere. 36/37 is a logical place to start (it was supposed to happen years ago, but never did...).

36 CBG HQ is in Halifax, 37 in Moncton. Do we need 2 Pres CBGs and their HQs for the actual amount of troops in both? Nope.

PEIR, 8 CH, Hfx Rifles. Are they all really Regt's that need a CO and RSM? Nope. PLF, 1 NSH, CBH, N Nfld R...are they all really Regt's that need a CO and RSM? Nope. Are all the Herbie units Regt's...you see the pattern I'm sure.

- Collapse 36 and 37 CBGs into 1 Bde. Cut the excess HQs (Bde and Regt). Make 1 Armd Regiment, with 1 CO. Make 1 Inf Regt, with 1 CO....etc etc etc.

- let the Bns, Sqns, Battery's all keep the cap badges and names. 84th in Yarmouth can still call themselves 84th...but their HQ is the "Atlantic Arty Regt"...

Fat gets trimmed, monies are saved, cap badges (pride) and Battle Honours carry on...

Now, do this in all the Div's...

Changing names and all that stuff right now to me is like "painting over rust".

 

[Kirkhill]

...

Sustainability of such a battalion depends entirely on funding. In effect there is very little difference between a Reg F and a Class B-based unit with respect to costs albeit terms of service differ significantly. However, creating a Class B unit is just a way to cheat the PY limitations imposed by the government on the number of regular force personnel. As others have stated, reservist, regardless of class are CF members who are "enrolled for other than continuing, full-time military service when not on active service". That's a legal status and the creation of a unit composed of "continuing, full-time" members by way of Class Bs isn't really allowed although we have for quite some time now run rough-shod on the concept. I'm of the view that for every Class B member you can hire 3 Class A members and properly train AND equip them indefinitely.


...

Just to focus on the Class system for a moment. And kind of in line with something I saw Dimsum post about the Aussies and varying terms of service.

What would be wrong with

Enroll all entrants as Class A
Entrants proceed to Class B for training
Trained personnel remain in Class B to support Mark's 3rd Battalion and local support personnel for the Reserves
Career personnel move to Reg Force
Deployable Reserves temporarily operating in support of the Regs go to Class C
Reserves liable for service but not actively serving remain on strength as Class A so long as they parade on the traditional Militia schedule.

 

[McG]

Just to focus on the Class system for a moment. And kind of in line with something I saw Dimsum post about the Aussies and varying terms of service.

What would be wrong with

Enroll all entrants as Class A
Entrants proceed to Class B for training
Trained personnel remain in Class B to support Mark's 3rd Battalion and local support personnel for the Reserves
Career personnel move to Reg Force
Deployable Reserves temporarily operating in support of the Regs go to Class C
Reserves liable for service but not actively serving remain on strength as Class A so long as they parade on the traditional Militia schedule.

Once you create pseudo-RegF Class B battalions, there will be no money for Class A pay. Aside from being contrary to the NDA, it will effectively kill the actual PRes.

 

[Brad Sallows]

The reserves, however, still have a structure that looks "mobilizable" with all its COs, RSMs, Coy Commanders etc.

The "mobilizable" (fit for war on the scale and intensity which requires mobilization) part of the Res F is soldiers under 30, with a few under 40 (if suited for formation-level appointments). Of the rest, some would be employable in administrative positions (districts) and the remainder would be jettisoned. (And with respect to the latter, why not immediately?)

 

[markppcli]

This, I agree on. And...change has to start somewhere. 36/37 is a logical place to start (it was supposed to happen years ago, but never did...).

36 CBG HQ is in Halifax, 37 in Moncton. Do we need 2 Pres CBGs and their HQs for the actual amount of troops in both? Nope.

PEIR, 8 CH, Hfx Rifles. Are they all really Regt's that need a CO and RSM? Nope. PLF, 1 NSH, CBH, N Nfld R...are they all really Regt's that need a CO and RSM? Nope. Are all the Herbie units Regt's...you see the pattern I'm sure.

- Collapse 36 and 37 CBGs into 1 Bde. Cut the excess HQs (Bde and Regt). Make 1 Armd Regiment, with 1 CO. Make 1 Inf Regt, with 1 CO....etc etc etc.

- let the Bns, Sqns, Battery's all keep the cap badges and names. 84th in Yarmouth can still call themselves 84th...but their HQ is the "Atlantic Arty Regt"...

Fat gets trimmed, monies are saved, cap badges (pride) and Battle Honours carry on...

Now, do this in all the Div's...

Changing names and all that stuff right now to me is like "painting over rust".

I agree and is where my thought process was going.

(1)I am sensing you don't know what a Bde Recce Sqn does/is supposed to do?

(2)Under your structure...anyone in PEI could join as a Gnr, Spr or Tpr? LOL ok. where do, and who do they train with on parade nights, wknd trg? I am sure PEI isn't going to have a Arty, Engr and Armd sub-units. ??????? Is PEI going to have 1 x Engr Sect, and 1 x Armd Recce Ptl, and 1 Arty Gun Det? Where is the kit they are training on?

(3)Units ARE organized for tasks now. All you're doing in moving the shells around on the table. It's the same amount of shells, and the ball is still under the same one, when your done.

(4)The problem isn't tasks; kit shortages, Cl A training budgets...those are your culprits.



Sorry, I don't see credible units. I see name changes, and 're-roling' that is more detrimental than anything.

Your plan doesn't address equipment shortages or Cl A training budget issues.

I'll go point by point here if you don't mind.
1. I am acutely aware of the roles of Bde recce, however if you read that full order of battle for the reserves you will note how dispersed those Bn's are and how difficult it would be to mass a Bde Recce force across the entirety of Western Canada for example.
2. Those Arty, Eng, Armd, Infantry Sub units would belong to the Bde, again look, and the training may not look like what it is now. We get 12 hours of training out of 4 parade nights when we can get a full weekend for the same price. Let's do that, and allow some travel for sub units to mass for training. There's no reason, for example, that Artillery Reservists from Lethbridge can't drive to Calgary to train for a weekend. They'll probably get more out of that then 3 hours on a Thursday night.
3. RCAC Reserve units are not task organized. The actual doctrine for "mud" recce is lacking, and their role in operations is doubtful at best. So we have to consider what are we actually looking for them to do on operations and what equipment do they have? Well we need them to be able to crew vehicles, and integrate in Operation. What they have is the TAPV. What can it do? Well it's being ditched for Recce as fast as possible so I think we can write that role off. It can move our infantry around as an APC, and at least we'll get some guys experienced in motorized operation if not mechanized. Similarly it can provide some limited DFS. Could that Sqn be tasked as a recce element? Sure why not.
4. Kit Shortages and Class A days, I agree, but if you want the kit and the budge you need to be able to say we provide x,y, z. Right now the reserves, frankly, provides 120 Lt Cols and an unreliable labour pool. Organize into a unit where you can say " the reserves provides 10 Infantry Bn's with TAPV Sqns attached to provide mobility, fire power, and a recce capability, we are enabled by light Artillery and Engineer assets spread across the country which are capable of providing Regiments to each Brigade." - that is assigning a role.
5. You seem focused on who does what, and which names I placed where and I'm sympathetic to regimental pride. However that's not the most important bit here. What matters is these units are being reformed into combined arms groups, under a single HQ, grouped into Bde. What matter is getting rid of the idea that it makes sense to say "Sorry you live in London, you can't be a combat engineer." I concede that tactical groups are an easier pill to swallow, but from what I've seen they seem to be splitting apart, and are often victims of regimental rivalries with who gets to be CO next. I am aware this is painful, but surely if the British can survive creating the Royal Regiment of Scotland by smashing all their Scots together, or the Rifles by smashing all the light infantry together, we can do the same.