Divining the right role, capabilities, structure, and Regimental System for Canada's Army Reserves

[Infanteer]

I was reading various F2025 PowerPoints on DWAN. Most of it goes into opsec state of the CAF that can't be shared here.

If it was OPSEC information it wouldn't be on the UNCLASS DWAN....

 

[Haggis]

If it was OPSEC information it wouldn't be on the UNCLASS DWAN....

There you go again... using facts during an Internet discussion.

 

[MilEME09]

If it was OPSEC information it wouldn't be on the UNCLASS DWAN....

True but still not information that should be released publicly even if it's unclassified

 

[blacktriangle]

True but still not information that should be released publicly even if it's unclassified

Either way, threat actors now know that "something" exists where they may not have before, what system it resides on, and even the file format to look for!

 

[FJAG]

Sound familiar?

Is the overarching principle of Future Reserve 2020 realistically achievable by the British Army?​

As we reach the end of 2020, regardless of restrictions and delays by the COVID-19 virus and the fallout from it, the Future Reserve 2020 (FR2020) policy should lead to a fundamentally different Army Reserve. The FR2020 policy was developed in order to learn lessons from operational deployments and to create a Reserve that is fit for purpose.

Having been a reservist for nearly fifteen years, and having deployed operationally, I have been able to see the transformation of the Territorial Army (TA) into the Army Reserve (AR). The development taking place to transform the TA into a respected force that regularly supplies individual augmentees to the Field Army is being stymied by its mismanagement across the board. Many of the issues identified by FR2020 are still extant, with the cumbersome and inappropriate reporting process just one example. Indeed, FR2020 has been frustrated by rivalry and a lack of action between departments that are supposed to work together for a common goal. This was explored by Patrick Bury and Sergio Catignani in their scholarly analysis of FR2020, which criticised the intra departmental rivalries and lack of communication as being characteristic of poor management of the Reserves.

Furthermore, the quality of the soldier being promoted in the AR has diminished. This is a direct result of a lack of understanding of the role and capabilities of the Army Reserve has and resulted in unachievable demands placed on those in full-time employment trying to balance their civilian jobs with their commitment to defence. The shift towards a “One Army” method of training and attendance on Regular courses means that those able to and most likely to attend and progress are the unemployed or the unemployable. This creates other issues further down the line relating to morale, quality of training, and the perception of the Reserves. Furthermore, the misapplication of the “One Army” concept and a haphazard approach to the allocation of permanent staff has failed to develop the Reserve into an effective tool for supporting the “Whole Force”.

The desire for a fully integrated Reserve into the field army does not appear to have advanced at all since the publication of FR2020, and this is unlikely to ever be achieved unless there is fundamental change. In order to effect this change, senior elements of the Regular Army need to adjust their expectations and decide clearly on what type of a Reserve they actually want with a clearly delineated role. In conjunction, the AR needs to evolve professionally to become suitable for its role of supporting the Regular Army, with a more robust approach to Military Annual Training Tests (MATTs) a suitable starting point, especially considering physical fitness can be worked on in reservists’ spare time. Whilst FR2020 was a good start to this process, at this point it serves as a policy document not been acted upon by any stakeholder. ...

A Reserve Force that is an integral element of the Whole Force »

 

[markppcli]

How sustainable would it be to assign units fully manned with Class B reservists to the CMBGs as a light motorized infantry unit. I realize this is of course extremely hypothetical, but in the quest for PYs to man our support functions and given the impracticalities of having light infantry integral to a mechanized brigade could we see the idea of a "depth" battalion manned by reserves as practical? If we were to assume that each present CBG (I'm convinced they should be Bns but that's an enormous fight I'm sure) could force generate a rifle company, and a TAPV carrier troop, to stand up on 6 month contracts, with some form of ability to activate them for overseas service if needed we would have about the right numbers. Those companies could stay in location, and be be massed for Bde exercises, providing the nucleus for a regional depot company.

Would that similarly work for high formation requirements, something like DIV ARTY or even GBAD? What about taking a page out of the British Army's book and giving some reserve units "crew replacement" tasks (I'm thinking SALH is particularly well situated).

 

[McG]

That Class B battalion would sort of go against the NDA’s stipulation that PRes are for other than full time employment. If we want more full time battalions, we should create more Reg F. We should also make it easier to move between components for people who want to move between full & part time service.

 

[markppcli]

That Class B battalion would sort of go against the NDA’s stipulation that PRes are for other than full time employment. If we want more full time battalions, we should create more Reg F. We should also make it easier to move between components for people who want to move between full & part time service.

I mean fair point, but as of right now full time employment is available for all reserve force members who want it. Why not integrate that into the field force? Especially given the Force 2025 assertion that we are not getting any bigger anytime soon.

I have far to much time on my hands and produced this; both the rationalize the reserves structure and give purpose to the RCAC units as TAPV "carrier" and DFS formations. I haven't gone into detail on artillery or engineers simply because I have no knowledge of their internal works really and what would be appropriate. Fundamental to this would be a shit in thinking regarding armouries as reserve training centres were multiple sub units can conduct training.

I am open to the idea of regional names for the Reserve Bns, especially in Quebec where Mounted Rifles does not translate the Voltigeurs seems like the best option. Each coy would carry the name(s) of existing Regiments. Where I have listed combat support, those platoons may be dispersed as makes best sense. The “household” regiments have been reduced to ceremonial tasks. Part of this would see each Mounted Rifle Bn, or what ever name makes everyone happy frankly, raising a class be "depot" company that would be responsible for the training of that Bn.

• 10 Canadian Rifle Brigade
  • 11 Canadian Mounted Rifles
    • A Coy (Seaforth Highlanders of Canada
    • B Coy (Canadian Scottish)
    • C Coy (Royal Westminster Regiment)
    • Combat Support (Rocky Mountain Rangers)
    • TAPV Sqn (British Columbia Dragoons / British Columbia Regiment)
  • 12 Canadian Mounted Rifles
    • A Coy (Loyal Edmonton Regiment)
    • B Coy (Calgary Highlanders)
    • C Coy (Royal Regina Rifles)
    • Combat Support (North Sask Regiment)
    • TAPV Sqn (Sask Dragoons / Kings Own Calgary Regiment)
  • 13 Canadian Mounted Rifles
    • A Coy (Royal Winnipeg Rifles)
    • B Coy ( Winnipeg Grenadiers)
    • C Coy (Cameron Highlanders of Canada)
    • Combat Support (Lake Superior Scottish Regiment)
    • TAPV Sqn (Fort Gary Horse)
  • 10 Provisional Field Artillery Group
    • 3 x Field Battery
  • 10 Engineer Group
    • 3 x Field Sqn
  • 10 Support Bn
    • 3 x dispersed Support Groups
• 20 Canadian Rifle Brigade
  • 21 Canadian Mounted Rifles
    • A Coy (Royal Hamilton Light Infantry)
    • B Coy (Essex and Kent Scottish / Argyl and Sutherland Highlanders)
    • C Coy (Grey and Simcoe Foresters)
    • Combat Support (Royal Highland Fusiliers)
    • TAPV Sqn (Windsor Regiment)
  • 22 Canadian Mounted Rifles
    • A Coy (Toronto Scottish / 48th Highlanders / Lorne Scots)
    • B Coy (Queens own Rifles of Canada)
    • C Coy (Royal Regiment of Canada)
    • Combat Support (Lincoln and Welland Regiment / Hastings and Prince Edward Regiment)
    • TAPV Sqn (Queens York Rangers)
  • 23 Canadian Mounted Rifles
    • A Coy (Ontario Highlanders (Cameron, Stormont, Dundas and Glengary Highlanders))
      • Governor Generals Foot Guards (ceremonial)
    • B Coy (Irish Regiment of Canada)
    • C Coy (Princes of Wales own Regiment of Canada)
    • Combat Support (the Algonquin Regiment / Brockville Rifles)
    • TAPV Sqn (Ontario Regiment )
      • Governor Generals Horse Guards (ceremonial)
  • 20 Provisional Field Artillery Group
    • 3 x Field Battery
  • 20 Engineer Group
    • 3 x Field Sqn
  • 20 Support Bn
    • 3 x dispersed Support Groups
• 30 Brigade du Voltigeur Canadian
  • 31 Voltigeur Canadian
    • A Coy (Black Watch of Canada)
      • Canadian Grenadier Guards (ceremonial)
    • B Coy (Regiment de Maisonnueve)
    • C Coy (Fusiliers Mont-Royal)
    • Combat Support (Royal Montreal Regiment)
    • TAPV Sqn (Royal Canadian Hussars / Regiment du Hull)
  • 32 Voltigeur Canadian
    • A Coy (Voltigeur du Quebec)
      • Citadel Guard (no longer wasting 2 R22R’s time)
    • B Coy (la Regiment de Chaudiere)
    • C Coy (la Regiment de Saguenay)
    • Combat Support (Fusilier de Sherbrooke et St Lauren)
    • TAPV Sqn (Sherbrooke Hussars)
  • 30 Provisional Field Artillery Group
    • 3 x Field Battery
  • 30 Engineer Group
    • 3 x Field Sqn
  • 30 Support Bn
    • 3 x dispersed Support Groups
• 40 Canadian Rifle Brigade
  • 41 Canadian Mounted Rifles
    • A Coy (Halifax Rifles)
    • B Coy (West Nova Scotia Regiment)
    • C Coy (Nova Scotia Regiment)
    • Combat Support (Cape Breton Highlanders)
    • TAPV Sqn (Princess Louise’s Fusiliers)
  • 42 Canadian Mounted Rifles
    • A Coy (Royal Newfoundland Regiment)
    • B Coy (Royal New Brunswick Regiment)
    • C Coy (PEI Regiment)
    • Combat Support (The North Shore Regiment)
    • TAPV Sqn (8th Canadian Hussars)
  • 40 Provisional Field Artillery Group
    • 3 x Field Battery
  • 40 Engineer Group
    • 3 x Field Sqn
  • 40 Support Bn
    • 3 x dispersed Support Groups

 

[Eye In The Sky]

You gave TAPVs to units that have no links back to Armd (Mud) Recce...and made those Mud Recce Sqn's Inf Coys in your 40 CRB?

 

[markppcli]

You gave TAPVs to units that have no links back to Armd (Mud) Recce...and made those Mud Recce Sqn's Inf Coys in your 40 CRB?

To me it doesn't really matter, if I'm totally honest. Regimental names are, in this case, a note to tradition and that is it. The TAPV Sqn is there to provide mobility and fire support. Similarly I see that "sqn" dispersed across the area in multiple troops. When I worked out numbers for the TAPV across the army I think 24... ish provides enough mobility for a company? So if that works out being like 4 troops of 5 and an HQ split across those armouries, or two troops of ten so be it. In short Operational tasks > Regimental Tradition.

I'll say this as an aside. We had, up until the end of WW2, absolutely no problems re rolling units from Artillery, to Cavalry, to Infantry and back again. The British Columbia Rifle started life as Coastal Artillery, the Halifax Rifles were original (shocker) a Volunteer Rifle regiment. The idea that regiments cannot be renamed, re roled, and re purposed is a very very modern one and I think is a massive obstacle in reform and modernization.

PS Absent from my order of battle there are 1st Hussars and SALH - who I would task as Crew Replacement Regiments and locate close to Regular Force Armoured units to use their simulators and tanks to train.

 

[blacktriangle]

Why not give the PRes Inf something like the US Army ISV made by GM? If they had ATGM and a vehicle to move them quickly around the battlespace (but not to fight from) it might work, no?

You can still have the TAPVs do...whatever.

 

[markppcli]

Because I'm operating off of what we have in our system. Additionally the TAPV is in use by the regular forces so training soldiers on it allows them to support CAF Operations with minimal retraining.

 

[blacktriangle]

Fair enough.

 

[markppcli]

Fair enough.

sort of grew out of my reading on Force 2025, and @Kirkhill and a few others statments on "how do we make this system work for the army."

 

[Colin Parkinson]

Why not give the PRes Inf something like the US Army ISV made by GM? If they had ATGM and a vehicle to move them quickly around the battlespace (but not to fight from) it might work, no?

You can still have the TAPVs do...whatever.

Give it to the MP's for convoy escorts

 

[dapaterson]

Give it to the MP's for convoy escorts

You really don't like the MPs, do you?

 

[blacktriangle]

You really don't like the MPs, do you?

Even the MPs don't like the MPs, so it's a perfect fit.

 

[Ostrozac]

Any discussion of the TAPV (or any armoured vehicle) for the reserves has to start with maintenance. While the TAPV isn’t a tank, it is a significantly more complex vehicle than the AVGP, which as I recall, the reserves struggled to maintain. And the army reserve hasn’t had the greatest track record at training large numbers of RCEME.

And civi side probably isn’t an option. If you’re contracting out your first and second line maintenance, you’re not building a fighting force. And besides, the reserves are dispersed, and what neighbourhood auto shop can maintain a remote weapons system?

 

[markppcli]

Any discussion of the TAPV (or any armoured vehicle) for the reserves has to start with maintenance. While the TAPV isn’t a tank, it is a significantly more complex vehicle than the AVGP, which as I recall, the reserves struggled to maintain. And the army reserve hasn’t had the greatest track record at trsining large numbers of RCEME.

And civi side probably isn’t an option. If you’re contracting out your first and second line maintenance, you’re not building a fighting force. And besides, the reserves are dispersed, and what neighbourhood auto shop can maintain a remote weapons system?

a hundred percent. Which is why I also think we need to reimagine what a reserve unit looks like. In my force structure I included dispersed "support Bns" and I would see those being pushed out as much as possible to cast as wide a net as possible for getting folks into the reserves as RCEME, other trades too but RCEME I feel is most critical, dispersion of TAPV would have to be based on that. As I said before, if in one Bn that looks like two troops split between two major centres, in another it's across three provinces, and in a third they're all in one city, that's all fine. What's important is capability's that are equipped, in roles that are defined and make sense as part of a total force.

Out of curiosity how are Reserve Units like say the British Columbia Dragoons in Kelowna handling the maintenance of their TAPVs?

 

[blacktriangle]

Any discussion of the TAPV (or any armoured vehicle) for the reserves has to start with maintenance. While the TAPV isn’t a tank, it is a significantly more complex vehicle than the AVGP, which as I recall, the reserves struggled to maintain. And the army reserve hasn’t had the greatest track record at trsining large numbers of RCEME.

And civi side probably isn’t an option. If you’re contracting out your first and second line maintenance, you’re not building a fighting force. And besides, the reserves are dispersed, and what neighbourhood auto shop can maintain a remote weapons system?

Which is exactly why I suggested the GM ISV.

If Jane & Joe Public can take care of their Colorado ZR2s, so can the PRes. You could probably even get a "C&R" variant for the Armd Recce & have them fill a light cav/DFS role.