Divining the right role, capabilities, structure, and Regimental System for Canada's Army Reserves

[MilEME09]

So how many are in HQs? Generally when one uses a fact to back up their argument, the underlying fact is linked in some way to support that argument.

I don't even I think even the 100 or 900 number is correct unless you are trying to say just those are the numbers in the PRes alone? 1 CMBG my opinion ( see difference from fact) would easily fill the 900 numbers and a large portion of the officers but i am not sure what org you are saying has the bloat.

You like to make assertive posts that you can't or don't ever back up when challenged. I don't disagree we have too much HQ bloat in certain areas but please show us the money or at least the right numbers. If it is just the PRes folks what are you including just PRes? RegF posns? Where are they? Even general ballpark would be better than spewing number with no context.

Next would be to highlight where there is redundancy in those officer numbers so we can see if there truly is an imbalance.

*edited to clarify

Numbers are just PRes CSS and do not include any RSS positions, only class A and B, spread out over the 3 CBGs, 40% of which are outside the service battalions. I should of been more detailed In my posts, absolutely. These numbers are as of Oct of last year , within the 107 officers in the div is over 50 of captain and above. Again PRes CSS only. It is my opinion, and only that, that an officer for every 7.2 troops is a low number. I'd be happy to clarify more if need be

 

[MJP]

Ok so just PRes, you are right the ratio seems off are they mostly Class A or B?

I tend to agree with dapaterson that more CSS is likely needed as a foundation for the PRes world. They already do institutional support tasks in their various areas often without the underlaying support that others do for the same roles.

​

 

[MilEME09]

Ok so just PRes, you are right the ratio seems off are they mostly Class A or B?

I tend to agree with dapaterson that more CSS is likely needed as a foundation for the PRes world. They already do institutional support tasks in their various areas often without the underlaying support that others do for the same roles.

​

All class A and B, the chart I have access to doesn't break it down by class A and B, just lumps them all together unfortunately.

I agree CSS is a foundation, and in the PRes perhaps more important then combat arms. By that I mean the training cycle is longer. In event of war it would take much longer to train a mechanic then an infanteer. Meaning it would take longer for our tail to effectively grow to properly support our teeth.

 

[daftandbarmy]

You and I frequently diverge a bit (not far, but a bit) on some issues but on this one I'm in violent agreement with you particularly because I'm of the view that the reserves should own significant stocks and varieties of deployable equipment so that it can grow the force beyond what the equipment of the Reg F currently allows.

There is no way on God's green earth that the reserves can manage any level of equipment holdings unless there is an existing chain of maintainers and supply (don't like the term material management- why does the CAF replace a perfectly useable two syllable word with a seven syllable compound) folks who can, firstly ensure that equipment is kept serviceable under ordinary peacetime conditions; secondly train the force in those skills; and third, make the force fully sustainable in an emergency by the addition of many more of the same and also the transport, food services, finances, etc etc services).

This is why in my model Res F I have two manoeuvre brigades, one combat support brigade and two combat service support brigades (rather than ten dinky undermanned infantry brigades) and, quite frankly if we could expand the reserves beyond its current numbers, the first thing that I would add is yet another combat service support element (to facilitate theatre level sustainment) before any others.

Or, perhaps, for a start you could just add a decent sized maintenance/ sustainment component to the existing CAF bases and give the priority to the reserves.

That would address about a million stupid little issues that stop training like, you know, VOR rates that can resemble the German Army at Falaise 1944, radios that are so well maintained that it's better (and safer) to use cellphones, or no C6s for a couple of years.

 

[MilEME09]

Or, perhaps, for a start you could just add a decent sized maintenance/ sustainment component to the existing CAF bases and give the priority to the reserves.

That would address about a million stupid little issues that stop training like, you know, VOR rates that can resemble the German Army at Falaise 1944, radios that are so well maintained that it's better (and safer) to use cellphones, or no C6s for a couple of years.

That will need to be supported by a supply system that delivers in time. I shouldn't have to wait 2 months for parts to fix a C6.

 

[daftandbarmy]

That will need to be supported by a supply system that delivers in time. I shouldn't have to wait 2 months for parts to fix a C6.

Maybe Logisitk Unicorp can start delivering other important items for the CAF, apart from sexy fur hats that is

 

[SeaKingTacco]

Love that fur hat. Best piece of Arctic gear on issue.

 

[FJAG]

Or, perhaps, for a start you could just add a decent sized maintenance/ sustainment component to the existing CAF bases and give the priority to the reserves.

That would address about a million stupid little issues that stop training like, you know, VOR rates that can resemble the German Army at Falaise 1944, radios that are so well maintained that it's better (and safer) to use cellphones, or no C6s for a couple of years.

I'm not so much a fan of base support because its not deployable per se except in one of those ad hoc'd NSE things. I would prefer to see a hybrid Reg F and Res F workshop like company whose Reg F members provide the maintenance support for their Res F brigade and train their Res F maintainers during peacetime and in an emergency can mobilize as a unit to provide a complete above brigade level maintenance company within a sustainment brigade or NSE (if that floats your boat). (Same for above service battalion level supply companies/battalions, transport company/battalions - we need both IMHO)

As a victim of the great unification reshuffle and the formation of the "base" concept, I generally dislike anything that is static and doesn't have a deployable field role. It's not that hard to design a maintenance organization that has a dual role of ongoing support in peacetime and a field role in an emergency. Equipping it is the limitation. Our leadership does not like spending money on a "potential" need. It would rather truck along as if nothing will ever go wrong.

 

[dapaterson]

Doctrinally you need both static and deployable, since not all functions can be done deployed and since you are in theory continuing to train and prepare follow on forces; if 100% of your support is deployed, who supports the ongoing force generation effort?

The Army often fails to grasp the difference between green and purple support, and somehow expects support elements to work full-time 9-5, while also deploying at the same tempo as combat arms who do not work 9-5.

 

[MilEME09]

I'm not so much a fan of base support because its not deployable per se except in one of those ad hoc'd NSE things. I would prefer to see a hybrid Reg F and Res F workshop like company whose Reg F members provide the maintenance support for their Res F brigade and train their Res F maintainers during peacetime and in an emergency can mobilize as a unit to provide a complete above brigade level maintenance company within a sustainment brigade or NSE (if that floats your boat). (Same for above service battalion level supply companies/battalions, transport company/battalions - we need both IMHO)

As a victim of the great unification reshuffle and the formation of the "base" concept, I generally dislike anything that is static and doesn't have a deployable field role. It's not that hard to design a maintenance organization that has a dual role of ongoing support in peacetime and a field role in an emergency. Equipping it is the limitation. Our leadership does not like spending money on a "potential" need. It would rather truck along as if nothing will ever go wrong.

Within RCEME doctrine, a maintenance battalion would have a company dedicated to training, with a platoon dedicated to Jr, intermediate, and senior technicians. However our doctrine of the respective corps hasn't blended perfectly. We have OJT cells, but not dedicated training cells to mentor and train all. This is because we rely on the schools, but they do not have the capacity now to generate personal. Log and RCEME doctrine read as elements are independent of each other especially at higher levels, but in reality they never are.

 

[FJAG]

Yay! I just figured out how to insert multiple quotes!

Doctrinally you need both static and deployable, since not all functions can be done deployed and since you are in theory continuing to train and prepare follow on forces; if 100% of your support is deployed, who supports the ongoing force generation effort?

The Army often fails to grasp the difference between green and purple support, and somehow expects support elements to work full-time 9-5, while also deploying at the same tempo as combat arms who do not work 9-5.

I maybe wasn't too clear. I do see a role for base support but when I look at providing better service support for a full-sized Res F brigade, I see a further need.

I just think that we are missing a capability by not having above-brigade-level (I'd like to call them divisional but that always gets me branded as a dinosaur) Res F service support elements that have the capability of deploying added resources over and above what is within the brigade itself. You probably understand the rationale of why we did it much better than I but it strikes me as strange that we've spent decades developing doctrine and creating establishments for service support at the company, battalion and brigade and above level but the moment we deployed operationally we threw all that out the window and started ad hocing NSEs by stripping the battalions of much of their service support and then amalgamating it into a national theatre level organization. I presume it was economical and convenient in a static theatre setting but it runs roughshod on providing experience with our actual doctrine.

I read Conrad's book "What the Thunder Said" and was left with the distinct impression, that when the NSEs are allocated positions on these operations then, like the artillery, the organizers fail to understand and properly staff the resources required to have a properly functioning establishment in place. (for example the absence of a proper armoured LAV recovery vehicle was glaring) The result is we cobble together the best we can, doctrine be damned.

Within RCEME doctrine, a maintenance battalion would have a company dedicated to training, with a platoon dedicated to Jr, intermediate, and senior technicians. However our doctrine of the respective corps hasn't blended perfectly. We have OJT cells, but not dedicated training cells to mentor and train all. This is because we rely on the schools, but they do not have the capacity now to generate personal. Log and RCEME doctrine read as elements are independent of each other especially at higher levels, but in reality they never are.

The artillery has gone through phases where at times the artillery school did all DP1 training, then the regiments did it as well and finally specific battle schools. I've frankly lost track of where things stand now. So I see the problem. At least with the artillery all you need is a gun, a truck and a range. In your case there's probably a boat load of training aids and workshop tools and facilities needed which might be harder to find outside the school environment. We need a lot more maintainers, IMHO, and organizing a "school-in-a-box" system for training DP1s that can be trucked out to a unit or facility for months at a time might be useful.

I do wonder why RCEME doesn't have it's own supply chain. I know it's always in fashion and theoretically saves positions by consolidating functions such as for "materiel management" but if spare parts and tools were separate from all the toilet paper and ammunition and water and gasoline etc functions. (Yup I know it's separated internally within supply but the folks who need a critical motherboard to get their radar up and working don't want to hear that "we're waiting until the end of the week to consolidate an order".)

 

[Colin Parkinson]

You can use the same software tracking systems but different streams and certain parts have a standing priority in that system that can be upgraded or downgraded as needed. In my day our first line maintenance and supply had parts that had automatic stock levels, as soon as you issued a part and your stock fell below X number, the system autogenerated an order. that reduced shortages at the unit level, that is of course if Depot had more to supply you

 

[MJP]

You can use the same software tracking systems but different streams and certain parts have a standing priority in that system that can be upgraded or downgraded as needed. In my day our first line maintenance and supply had parts that had automatic stock levels, as soon as you issued a part and your stock fell below X number, the system autogenerated an order. that reduced shortages at the unit level, that is of course if Depot had more to supply you

While a bit of side track, you can do it with our current system. Knowledge is lacking in executing and setting max and mins (I actually posted a how to on the site) and there is no central control on some aspects and over control on other aspects.

The other larger issue is that depot or 3rd line stock is either in Edm or Montreal depots. Depending on where you are geographically determines where your supporting depot is and how the system automatically directs your order. However, if that depot doesn't have the right stock it does not get automatically redirected to the other depot for order fulfillment. You have to manually re-direct it and that is suppose to happen at the unit level. So unless a unit control and supporting parts shop is on the ball orders languish in the system.

 

[FJAG]

You can use the same software tracking systems but different streams and certain parts have a standing priority in that system that can be upgraded or downgraded as needed. In my day our first line maintenance and supply had parts that had automatic stock levels, as soon as you issued a part and your stock fell below X number, the system autogenerated an order. that reduced shortages at the unit level, that is of course if Depot had more to supply you

Gets me back to the old army days when we didn't have no steenkin' software. Everything was on little cardboard cards. Still have no idea how our tiffies kept the batteries running but they were always there and parts magically appeared. It's not that we didn't have the odd hangar queen for a bit and the old 25s, 125s and 524s had a pretty high failure rate and we were constantly swapping them out from here and there to keep the CPs and FOOs up and running. Our Sig Sgt and Rad Tech were two of the busiest guys in the echelon. I know when I was BK G for three years that the battery's maintenance det (which was pretty large - I seem to remember thirteen or fourteen of them - since we were a tracked SP bty) were by far my favourite people.

 

[Eaglelord17]

Here's a statistic to support hq cuts, especially in the PRes, 3 division has almost 900 pers in CSS, just over 100 are officers. That's a ridiculously high ratio.

Actually that is a fantastic rate in comparison to the CF in general. If anything the CAF should be following those numbers much closer as right now for the whole organization its about a 1:4 ratio.

The CAF should seriously look into providing apprenticeships or incentives for skilled trades people to join the Reserves. Possibly make it a partnership where they get you signed as a apprentice (the hardest part of the whole apprenticeship process) and work with local shops to make it happen (possibly a wage subsidy for the civilian employer to incentivize them to work with the CAF). That way you can effectively build skilled tradesmen without having to actually employ them yourselves (maybe make a condition in there that they get so much time off a year for military training). This would obviously cost more money, but the idea that you pay say 10-15% of their wage and get a skilled individual out of it might be worthwhile. Certainly cheaper than employing them full time to build those skills up.

 

[MJP]

Gets me back to the old army days when we didn't have no steenkin' software. Everything was on little cardboard cards. Still have no idea how our tiffies kept the batteries running but they were always there and parts magically appeared. It's not that we didn't have the odd hangar queen for a bit and the old 25s, 125s and 524s had a pretty high failure rate and we were constantly swapping them out from here and there to keep the CPs and FOOs up and running. Our Sig Sgt and Rad Tech were two of the busiest guys in the echelon. I know when I was BK G for three years that the battery's maintenance det (which was pretty large - I seem to remember thirteen or fourteen of them - since we were a tracked SP bty) were by far my favourite people.

It was also a time when platforms were very simple and could be fixed by an 18 year old with a grade 10 education and very little training.

The other thing we did was subscribe to the school of inventory where any inefficiency in your system can be hidden because you just always have the parts.

Nowadays platforms are complex, have way more parts and we've gone from fixing those parts to just pull and replace. However we also don't have the inventory to lean on like we used too, so that replace aspect has to be carefully managed to make sure parts are in the right area. We are not good at that. Part of that is much of our senior managers both military and civilian lived in the era where we just held lots inventory, so they think we still do it that way but also our system is inefficient.....very very inefficient

 

[FJAG]

Actually that is a fantastic rate in comparison to the CF in general. If anything the CAF should be following those numbers much closer as right now for the whole organization its about a 1:4 ratio.

The CAF should seriously look into providing apprenticeships or incentives for skilled trades people to join the Reserves. Possibly make it a partnership where they get you signed as a apprentice (the hardest part of the whole apprenticeship process) and work with local shops to make it happen (possibly a wage subsidy for the civilian employer to incentivize them to work with the CAF). That way you can effectively build skilled tradesmen without having to actually employ them yourselves (maybe make a condition in there that they get so much time off a year for military training). This would obviously cost more money, but the idea that you pay say 10-15% of their wage and get a skilled individual out of it might be worthwhile. Certainly cheaper than employing them full time to build those skills up.

I've always thought we should be putting tons of service support reservists through light and heavy equipment mechanics course, food services courses, health services course, transport courses etc through community colleges by paying their tuition but no salary, then giving them military conversion course with the army in the summers - with pay- and then having them locked in for an obligatory period of service to compensate for the tuition costs. Heck we could put some of them on a year or two of Class B after that fixing things and giving them work experience for a good civilian career. Betcha we could fill up the service battalions in a few years.

 

[MilEME09]

While a bit of side track, you can do it with our current system. Knowledge is lacking in executing and setting max and mins (I actually posted a how to on the site) and there is no central control on some aspects and over control on other aspects.

The other larger issue is that depot or 3rd line stock is either in Edm or Montreal depots. Depending on where you are geographically determines where your supporting depot is and how the system automatically directs your order. However, if that depot doesn't have the right stock it does not get automatically redirected to the other depot for order fulfillment. You have to manually re-direct it and that is suppose to happen at the unit level. So unless a unit control and supporting parts shop is on the ball orders languish in the system.

Agreed, it's not the systems(program) fault, it is a good system. The CAFs problem comes from a lack of user understanding, and two as pointed out by you and last years AG report into our supply system. Depot isn't always stocked, impact the AG found many items are set to 0 hold which for a military is a bad thing.

 

[Colin Parkinson]

How often does the supply and procurement side sit down with specialists on the operational side to assess service to the users and upcoming needs?

 

[FJAG]

Agreed, it's not the systems(program) fault, it is a good system. The CAFs problem comes from a lack of user understanding, and two as pointed out by you and last years AG report into our supply system. Depot isn't always stocked, impact the AG found many items are set to 0 hold which for a military is a bad thing.

This raises a question that has interested me for some time: how does the system (software or whatever) correct for such a situation?

Does the system need a manual input to override or correct such a setting? And if so is there a policy/overwatch system in place to make such corrections on the thousands of disparate parts recorded in the system?

Or does the system itself (through some magical algorithm) self correct itself when a given parameter is exceeded?

This again reminds me of Target's failure in Canada which in very large measure came about because the software (which itself was very powerful) was not properly programmed (to an extent the requirement to incorporate bilingualism and the metric system to an existing product line proved difficult) and ended up causing major supply management failures as a result of which the customer base (which was very excited by the chain's entry into Canada) lost faith in the brand. Target ultimately decided it couldn't cure the problem and took a multi-billion dollar hit to extricate itself.