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Canadian Surface Combatant RFQ

May I ask for clarification as the exchange leaves me uncertain....

Is the number quoted for "Production Only" of $2.78 billion USD per ship accurate or not? As if we are collectively trying to come up with Apples-to-Apples comparisons, that seems like a good basis for such a comparison.
 
You are entirely incorrect about the “buying an AAW ship with limited ASW capabilities”. We are buying a ship which can survive for the next 30 years. The ASW suite is impressive, too.

Statements like this are convincing me that you do not have the first clue about warships or naval warfare.
That comment about the lack of ASW was in response to the article that UZLA posted and I read a few times. It states that we are sacrificing ASW for the new systems. Should have made that more clear.

Canada has always been a strong leader in ASW technology.
 
May I ask for clarification as the exchange leaves me uncertain....

Is the number quoted for "Production Only" of $2.78 billion USD per ship accurate or not? As if we are collectively trying to come up with Apples-to-Apples comparisons, that seems like a good basis for such a comparison.
I think he took that off the PBO 2019 report. They did some estimates and rolled up the total production costs to come up with the $53.2 B CAD for production. They seem to include taxes and contingency as well as inflation, but not really clear how they got there. You can see the report at the link below. On the DND budget the contingency is about 30% and taxes aren't included. An extra 13% on the DND estimate for max program costs matches pretty close to the PBO total, but that's really based on using up the full contingency.

Previously the PBO and AG have done some odd things like and they do it in isolation from the actual project, so might be higher in some areas and lower in others, but probably not a wholey unreasonable estimate. The problem with comparing it to other countries spend is that normally they don't have anything that is included under pre-production, in-service and some of the production costs. For example the US supplies a lot of weapon systems to the yards, so those procurement costs are usually under a different budget. We take a different approach and lump in absolutely everything. Also, we all have different contract clauses, and that can drastically affect the implementation plan and related costs, so you would need full access to the contracts, financials and production data for two build projects to compare side by side. We aren't going to get that from another country, and the CPF data is old enough to have some relevance issues.

They also are including all the IP licensing (including the Type 26 design) in pre-production work, and you pay that even when you build at the original shipyard. There are a lot of things in the budget that you have to pay regardless of where you build the ship, so the only really good way for a direct comparison is use the labour rate. As soon as you use standard economic benefit calculations for about 1000 personnel working for 30 years, it's pretty hard for a foreign yard to compete, especially when you start looking at the logistic issues and costs with overseeing a build and doing training overseas.

 
That comment about the lack of ASW was in response to the article that UZLA posted and I read a few times. It states that we are sacrificing ASW for the new systems. Should have made that more clear.

Canada has always been a strong leader in ASW technology.
Sacrificing ASW? The Type 26 was designed as an ASW Frigate by the British as it's primary function. Yes we are putting more above-water warfare systems on it but the CSC will still have an HMS and a TAS plus the Cyclone and possibly AUVs/ROVs. This makes them as good or even more capable than the Halifax-class in terms of ASW capability.
 
Sacrificing ASW? The Type 26 was designed as an ASW Frigate by the British as it's primary function. Yes we are putting more above-water warfare systems on it but the CSC will still have an HMS and a TAS plus the Cyclone and possibly AUVs/ROVs. This makes them as good or even more capable than the Halifax-class in terms of ASW capability.
If I'm not mistaken, I was under the impression that the electric drive system on T26 was being touted as one of the main reasons why it would be an exceptional ASW platform. As a matter of fact, I thought the whole point to the T26 was an ASW bias, given they already have an AAW class?
 
If I'm not mistaken, I was under the impression that the electric drive system on T26 was being touted as one of the main reasons why it would be an exceptional ASW platform. As a matter of fact, I thought the whole point to the T26 was an ASW bias, given they already have an AAW class?
The British are using the Type 26 to replace the Type 23, which is designed specifically for ASW.
 
It will be at least a decade before Canada sees any of its new frigates

New frigates are being packed with more combat capability than comparable ships of allies

It will be 2031, at the earliest, before the navy sees the first of its new frigates; a setback brought about partly by the fact Canada, Britain and Australia are still feeling their way around how to build the ultra-modern warship.

The outgoing president of Irving Shipbuilding Inc., which is in charge of constructing combat ships for the federal government, said he anticipates steel will be cut on the first of the new generation high-end warships by mid-2024.

"We have been trying to take an honest look at where we are and what it will take to build the ship," said Kevin McCoy who recently announced his retirement from the East Coast shipbuilder.

The current estimate is that it will take up to seven-and-a-half years to build the surface combatant, a timeline being used by Britain's BAE Systems Inc., which is constructing the first of what's known as the Type 26 design.

Both Canada and Australia are building their own variants.

"Early on [in the shipbuilding process] estimates are not very good," said McCoy. "Early estimates are not very good for price; they're not very good for size; they're not not very good for duration," McCoy said. "The British ship has a seven-and-a-half year build cycle. So, we're locked in. We said our build cycle will be seven-and-a-half years as well."

If they can find ways to speed up the process, they will, he said.

If that timeline holds, it means the federal government's marquee shipbuilding strategy will be two decades old by the time it produces the warship it was principally set up to create.

While Irving has been pumping out smaller, less complicated arctic patrol ships and Seaspan, in Vancouver, is building coast guard and science vessels, the strategy conceived by the former Conservative government was driven by the necessity of replacing the navy's current fleet of Halifax-class frigates.

Originally, when the shipbuilding strategy was unveiled, it envisioned Canada receiving the first new frigate in 2017. A lot of water, wishful thinking and even money has gone under the bridge since then.

Building off existing design

The current Liberal government, since taking over in 2015 and embracing the strategy, has been opaque in its public estimates of the build time; suggesting, in some documents, a delivery time in mid-2020s while other more internal records have pegged the first new frigate in the 2027 timeframe.

The Department of National Defence, in a statement, acknowledged some of the design and build intricacies are now better understood, and because of that; the first warship will be "approximately 2-3 years later than the previous estimate."

A spokeswoman echoed McCoy's remarks about finding ways to move construction along.

"We continue to look for efficiencies and are actively working with industry to accelerate the project in order to deliver this important platform to the RCN as soon as possible," said National Defence spokesperson Jessica Lamirande.

One of the ways they could do that, she said, would be to construct some, less complex modules of the warship early, the way it has been in the navy's Joint Support Ship project at Seaspan's Vancouver Shipyard.

McCoy, a blunt-talking former U.S. Navy admiral, suggested the expectations going to the surface combatant program were ultimately unworkable because the federal government came in expecting to do a so-called "clean sheet" design; meaning a warship built completely from scratch.

It was the shipyard, he said, which ultimately inched the federal government toward building off an existing design because of the enormous risk and expense of purpose-built ships, a position the Liberals adopted in the spring of 2016.

The selection of the British Type 26 design by the Liberal government has spawned criticism, a court challenge and will figure prominently in upcoming reports by the auditor general and the Parliamentary Budget Officer.

Combat capability packed into ship

The nub of the complaints have been that the frigate is not yet in the water and is still under construction in the United Kingdom.

The defence department acknowledged that adapting the British design to Canadian expectations and desires will take a year longer than originally anticipated and is now not scheduled to be completed until late 2023, early 2024.

Canada, McCoy said, can expect to pay no more $2.5 billion to $3 billion, per ship as they are produced, which is, he claimed, about what other nations would pay for a warship of similar capability.

"This is a big ship, lots of capability" he said, indicating that full displacement for the new frigate will likely be about 9,400 tonnes; almost double the 4,700 tonnes of the current Halifax-class.

McCoy said what is not generally understood amid the public concern over scheduling and cost is the fact that the Canadian version of the Type 26 will be expected to do more than its British and Australian cousins.

Where those navies have different warships, performing different functions, such as air defence or anti-submarine warfare, Canada's one class of frigates will be expected to perform both because that is what the government has called for in its requirements.

Dave Perry, a defence analyst and vice president of the Canadian Global Affairs Institute, has studied the program and said he was surprised at the amount of combat capability that was being packed into the new warship.

"On the one hand, Canada's one [class] of ship will have more combat capability than many of the other classes of ship that our friends and allies sail with, but it also adds an additional level of complexity and challenge getting all of that gear, all of that firepower into one single floating hull and platform," he said.

 
At approx 9400 tonnes the CSC isn't far behind the 9500 long tons of a Arleigh Burke Flight III and basically right in line with a Flight IIA at 9300 long tons, even accounting for the slight differences between the types of measurement.
A bit bigger than the high 7000s that I was tracking previously.
 
That's about the displacement of US Navy heavy cruisers built before WW II:

USS_New_Orleans_(CA-32)_underway_in_Puget_Sound_on_30_July_1943_(NH_94847).jpg

USS New Orleans 1943.

Mark
Ottawa
 
9400 tonnes seems like a huge increase in weight as only a few months ago it was stated at 7800 tonnes. Are these different displacements? Like one is a light load and the other a heavy load? Did the ship grow from 150m long to 170m?
 
I'm wondering why they are still called frigates if they're going to be twice as big (displacement) than the current ones? What would be the traditional name for a ship of this size, destroyer, cruiser?
 
I'm wondering why they are still called frigates if they're going to be twice as big (displacement) than the current ones? What would be the traditional name for a ship of this size, destroyer, cruiser?
That's not decided by displacement in modern day. It more by role the craft is to preform.
 
9400 tonnes seems like a huge increase in weight as only a few months ago it was stated at 7800 tonnes. Are these different displacements? Like one is a light load and the other a heavy load? Did the ship grow from 150m long to 170m?
Canadian Surface Combatant:
• Full-load displacement: 9 400 tonnes
• Length: 151.4 metres
• Beam: 20.75 metres

Arleigh Burke Flight IIA:
• Full-load displacement: 9 500 tonnes
• Length: 155 metres
• Beam: 20 metres
 
I see that, I'm just curious what the different numbers mean and where they come from? The UK is 6900 tonnes/8000+ full load, AUS is 8800 full load and the Canadian was 7800 but is now 9400?
 
I'm wondering why they are still called frigates if they're going to be twice as big (displacement) than the current ones?
The MKS 180 frigates might be about 10 000 tonnes. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/MKS_180_frigate
What would be the traditional name for a ship of this size, destroyer, cruiser?
It depends on the year. The Adventure-class cruisers, for example, had a displacement of 2 713 tonnes. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Adventure-class_cruiser
 
I see that, I'm just curious what the different numbers mean and where they come from? The UK is 6900 tonnes/8000+ full load, AUS is 8800 full load and the Canadian was 7800 but is now 9400?
It depends on the weights of the sensors, weapons, computers, electronics, etc. in the design. None of these frigates have been built. So these three displacements might change. “New frigates are being packed with more combat capability than comparable ships of allies.”

"Early estimates are not very good for price; they're not very good for size.” Warships are sometimes designed with a growth margin—empty space in the ship for more equipment in, say, a major mid-life refit. And can 8 000+ be equal to 9 400?
 
McCoy said what is not generally understood amid the public concern over scheduling and cost is the fact that the Canadian version of the Type 26 will be expected to do more than its British and Australian cousins.



Not entirely correct with regard to the RAN. The RAN's Hobart class are AAW, ASuW and ASW capable, as will be the Hunter class. Significantly, both classes will use the same combat system, gun, VLS, etc.
 
Not entirely correct with regard to the RAN. The RAN's Hobart class are AAW, ASuW and ASW capable, as will be the Hunter class. Significantly, both classes will use the same combat system, gun, VLS, etc.
“Where those navies have different warships, performing different functions, such as air defence or anti-submarine warfare, Canada's one class of frigates will be expected to perform both because that is what the government has called for in its requirements.” Does the Hobart-class have a bias toward air warfare? Does the Hunter-class have a bias toward anti-submarine warfare?
 
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