Afghanistan: Why we should be there (or not), how to conduct the mission (or not) & when to leave

[The Bread Guy]

Do you think-for one moment-  one second -finding or,,, whatever to ,,to Bin Laden would make one iota of difference to the present situation ??

You sir are living in the past

Anyone?  Anyone? op:

 

[vonGarvin]

Do you think-for one moment-  one second -finding or,,, whatever to ,,to Bin Laden would make one iota of difference to the present situation ??

You sir are living in the past

*cracking knuckles*
Great...now I have to TYPE 2000 words because you conveniently forgot the recent past!!!  :threat:
First of all, there was some dude named Osama bin Laden.  (see photo 1)  He ran a terrorist organisation that hated the west in general, and the US in particular.
One day, whilst living in Afghanistan with tacit approval of the government (the so-called "Taliban"), he dediced to attack the US.  So, he launched some suicide boats against a US ship.  The ship, called "The USS Cole", suffered grave damage and many lives were lost.
Slick Willy decided to launch some cruise missiles.  Not much else happened.
11 months later, ObL decided to up the ante, since the US had already demonstrated that they were indeed weak-kneed cowards.  (Now look at photo 2)
Well, the so-called Weak Kneed ones were part of this alliance called NATO.  This alliance got together and declared this an attack against them all.  Canada, by the way, was part of this alliance.  So, the US, backed up by its friends, went to the Taliban and said "Give him up".  They said no.  So, the US (and friends) said "Game over".  So, they bombed Afghanistan, which allowed the western-friendly "Northern Alliance" to kick some Taliban ass.  ObL and friends ran away, and they tried to fight the US in Iraq, but ended up getting their asses handed to them.  Though they did knock the Spaniards out of Iraq, the US just kept coming and coming and killing ObL's followers to the point that his group is largely irrelevant.
Now the Taliban.  They hate the west as well.  They also like making Martyrs of themselves.  Hence their lemming-like attacks against NATO (remember the friends of the US?)  Also, as a side note, the UN (that big, non-aligned group of nations) declared that the US (and friends) had every right to attack Afghanistan, given the overwhelming evidence that the planning and support of the attack (as seen in photo 2) originated from there, with the tacit approval of the government of Afghanistan.

*sigh*
Next time just use Google and find it for yourself.  Or I can put up more pictures for you.  Or use monosyllabic words.  (As a side note, why does "monosyllabic" have five syllables?)

 

[Edward Campbell]

Hey, fellows. You understand, I know, that if we cannot manage to talk with each other or talk to each other, civilly, that a Mod will along to lock this up.

I'm pretty sure that you are both gentlemen - reasonable men who can disagree, reasonably, even when the issues are emotive.

Thanks, gentlemen, for helping to keep interesting threads open.

 

[observor 69]

*cracking knuckles*
Great...now I have to TYPE 2000 words because you conveniently forgot the recent past!!!  :threat:

I know the feeling. 
And that's the reason you find me responding with bits of googled (it's a noun, it's a verb) articles or just not bothering to rise to the bait.

 

[helpup]

I agree with Rambler summation.  However I would like to add, if you dont agree with the reason for being there fine.  How about we undertook a commitment to help that nation get it's collective feet on the ground with a Govt that can (corrupt or not is not the main point) look after the Afghanis interests.  With a military that can defend that Govt's policy. A police for that can look after local, regional and national interests.  We started this job as a response to an attack on one of the members of NATO.  That has evolved over time into " lets set this up so the Afghanis can look after themselves." 

There have been lots of mistakes along the way, disjointed plans and lack of commitment from various nations.  By and large Afghanis do want us there to bring peace and prosperity.  Something that country has been short of for over 30 years.  Those that do not want us there are outside of being the minority, aided by various countries that would prefer a destabilized Afghanistan, and just to hurt the West in general. 

We are starting to get the numbers over there that are needed to blanket the various regions.  I wont say it is something we are winning but it is something we can do.  ( You could argue that it is something NATO must do if it is to remain relevant or capable in playing a role in this evolving world.)

These things take time, they take commitment or have people forgotten how long we were in Cyprus, Bosnia and the other spots around the world where we were either trying to impliment peace or imposing a peace.

Finally for this post ( I could go on) I would rather that we finnish what we started over there.  Doing anything less reflects poorly on Canada, and NATO, and just strikes me as WRONG.  I have done that before didnt like it then, dont like it now. 

 

[MarkOttawa]

Start of a rather lengthy round-up post at The Torch:

The US, Afstan and Kandahar (and Canada): Who's really in charge
http://toyoufromfailinghands.blogspot.com/2009/08/us-afstan-and-kandahar-whos-really-in.html

A Wall St. Journal story on new US and ISAF commander Gen. McChrystal's thinking...

Mark
Ottawa

 

[McG]

Sorry, Mr. Rasmussen, Canada has done its bit
Montreal Gazette
11 Aug 09

Anders Fogh Rasmussen, new secretary-general of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, says the Afghanistan combat role of the Canadian Forces should be extended beyond our scheduled 2011 withdrawal date. "From an alliance point of view," the former Danish prime minister said, "I would strongly regret if (withdrawal) became the final outcome" for Canada.

Sorry, Mr. Secretary-General, but you're reminding us of that comic-strip label: "People unclear on the concept." No Canadian political party would even hint at extending the 2011 deadline, which was only barely accepted in Parliament. The Conservative government, the clearest supporter of the mission, instantly rebuffed Rasmussen's gambit.

"From an alliance point of view," Mr. Rasmussen, we regret that certain major members of NATO can't be prevailed upon to fight. After the U.S. and U.K., Canada has had the highest number of soldiers killed in Afghanistan. Bigger countries, notably France and Germany, have troops deployed under restricted conditions which usually keep them safe - and ineffective.

True, withdrawal has its problems. CanWest News Service reported last month that in Uruzgan province where the Netherlands has an important combat presence, a local leader has warned the Dutch that if they withdraw on schedule next July he will have to flee the country or do a deal with the Taliban. The inherent danger of any military "sunset clause" is that it tells opponents they can wait us out.

The U.S., preparing to leave Iraq, has already added manpower in Afghanistan, and Pentagon leaders are reportedly ready to ask for thousands more men. But expecting the U.S. to go it alone is ultimately impractical and even shameful. Still, asking Canada to re-enlist is just not reasonable.

 

[The Bread Guy]

...or is there a noticeably higher incidence of MSM stories suggesting, "hey, we should be staying, you know".  Funny how these are coming out now that it appears the PM is firm on going - where were these arguments, say, a couple of years ago?  :

From the Canadian Press:

A Canadian departure from Kandahar in 2011 would seriously undermine NATO's war in Afghanistan, said a U.S. counter-insurgency expert, who served as a special adviser to the alliance's new ground commander, Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal.

The withdrawal of a small number of troops is not as big an issue as the loss of experience and credibility with local Afghans in what has become the most important battleground in the war-torn country, said Anthony Cordesman (link to think tank bio)

"It isn't simply a matter of troop levels," Cordesman, of the Centre for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, said in an interview with The Canadian Press.

"It's a matter of experience continuity; having shaped the security presence in one of the most critical provinces in the country. And so would a Canadian departure seriously hurt NATO? The answer at least this point seems to be: Yes." ....

 

[zipperhead_cop]

Maybe it's just a big ole "wag the dog" style psy op?  Get enough people all over the world saying "gawd, we can't do this thing without you!!" and all of a sudden the sheeple look up from Dancing With The Stars and say "hey, we can't just bail on them now.  They need us!"  Canadians need to be needed. 
Now, throw in a health dash of "Canada is doing a better job than the United States" (which I don't believe) to invoke that old unfounded cultural conceit and you'll see protests on The Hill demanding that we stay. 
Next, because our elected Honourable Members are SO in tune with the desires of their constituents, well... you can't just ignore the will of the people, right?  Then we have it come up in The House again, another vote and presto-zippo.  We're back in the game.  Never mind the toll the whole overreaching Gong Show is having on the CF. 
It's flawless. 

 

[The Bread Guy]

Silly me - I just thought it was another manifestation of some media's "hey, if the government wants x, we have to root into why it shouldn't happen" approach.

 

[observor 69]

How about the Yanks are making a major change in their approach to Afghanistan? Recommitment to the mission at all levels diplomatically  and militarily plus new tactical application of classic COIN methodology defend the people first. 
ISAF until now has not had sufficient personnel and resources, now that it does it makes sense for all NATO members to make an effort to support the mission.

But you already knew this right! 

 

[Gunner98]

...or is there a noticeably higher incidence of MSM stories suggesting, "hey, we should be staying, you know".  Funny how these are coming out now that it appears the PM is firm on going - where were these arguments, say, a couple of years ago?  :

The PM is awaiting an election call and he will side with what the majority of the population want.  Once re-elected with his dream majority government he can quickly change his side of the issue.  The military will remain but a pawn for the government either to win re-elections or to win in the international popularity game.  A PM can have it both way, his predecessors have proven it.

 

[helpup]

He can be boxed in on that issue, especially during an election.  If he comes out publically to refute hidden agenda claims and catagorically states ( much like he has now) no we are out of there.  That would slow to no go changing things even if he wins a majority ( and I dont see a healthy majority in the works right now)

Working with the liberals and sending out feelers to meet the international request to extend the mission would be, I believe, more feasible. 

I think the more likely however would be a slight extension by a tour or so to wind things up and a remaining presence for OMLT with support.  I dont like the idea of leaving, and wish a way was found but I am also a realist.

 

[MarkOttawa]

A thoughtful post by BruceR at Flit:

Past 2011, is mentoring an option?
http://www.snappingturtle.net/flit/archives/2009_08_12.html#006489

It's always difficult to read tea leaves, and parse what the government really means when it says Canada will no longer have a "combat role" after 2011 in Kandahar. I'm not sure they know what they really mean. It is, however, a position that now enjoys overwhelming popular and political support. The question is, if we were respondent to American or NATO pressure to continue on in some capacity anyway, what options now remain open with that? Would a continued presence of a Canadian Provincial Reconstruction Team still be open for debate? (Probably.) Would the use of helicopters in transport roles be? (Possibly.)

How about continuing ANSF mentoring? Maybe not so much.

It's not just that mentors, with their ANSF partners, are in combat as much as, if not more than the regular battalion troops in the same province, making their "non-combat" designation pretty much a joke. Nor is it that they have to follow the same Western-level force protection standards in their defended locations and vehicles. When you're a 4-man team working a platoon house with 30 dependable ANA or ANP, there's no margin for error there. And it's not just that they'd necessarily have to sponge off the nearest main force battalion for all kinds of things (a logistical train, to start with).

No, it's also that, assuming the Canadian battle group in Kandahar does leave, it will be replaced by another nationality. Almost certainly, in this case, an American battalion. Well, the whole point of Canadian mentors most days is not to teach cute little lectures, it's to achieve synchronization of effects through liaison. Which means explaining the Canadian military to Afghans and the Afghan military to Canadians, and working out all the differences that come with that.

Hey, we're as close to Americans as you can get, I guess, without being American, but it's an open question whether an American battle group commander is really going to achieve maximal value by having soldiers of a third nation, any third nation, as his interface between him and the local ANSF, rather than an American ETT or PMT. A Canadian OMLT might be somewhat better that way than a Romanian one, I suppose, but it isn't the best possible solution for getting that hard seal on the intent side that, if I were a U.S. battalion commander, I would want to have. No, once you remove the Canadian battle group you're there to interface with (and that the Afghans and you are depending on to stay alive) the need for corresponding mentoring teams from the same nationality definitely diminishes.

This is even more strongly the case if you're talking the brigade level, where I worked. I may know something now about Canadian and ANA brigade-level staff procedures, but my knowledge of American brigade-level procedures, in practice, is fairly limited. So why exactly would I be the right person to explain them to Afghans? (Never mind that before Afghanistan, Canada hadn't had a brigade deployed in combat since the Korean War, so maybe we're not the best people to explain brigade procedures to anyone.)

Now, we have a lot of mentoring experience with the ANA as an army, and if you'd like to take advantage of that, possibly with a reduced mentor component (say 30-60 soldiers with previous tour experience) imbedded in a mixed-force structure under overall U.S. leadership (as augmentees, for instance), well, that makes a lot more sense. But having the only way Afghans can talk to Americans being through both an interpreter AND a Canadian in either direction would not seem optimal, and keeping over 200 Canadian soldiers in a mentoring role in Kandahar Province past 2011 not the best application of our limited resources, sorry to say.

And the conclusion of one today:

Today's essential Afghan reading: to-and-fro edition
http://www.snappingturtle.net/flit/archives/2009_08_12.html#006491

...

Canadians should be clear that, while our military has gained respect for the disproportionate casualties it has incurred since 2005, we haven't necessarily impressed anyone with that military's actual prowess in its counterinsurgency operations, at least to date. Being respected for one's toughness and for one's ingenuity are two different, and sometimes almost unrelated, things. To take a more extreme example, the British army on the Somme is respected rightly for taking heavy casualties and staying in the fight, but condemned for the pointless tactical approach that produced those same casualties.

The problem is that, in leaving in 2011 (which will be seen by many, regardless of the reasons, as an unwillingness to incur further casualties), we risk significantly undercutting our new rep for toughness, while still leaving the historical question open as to our smartness.

(Not that that's disastrous, mind. In that sense, we would be in a somewhat parallel position to the Australians in Vietnam.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Military_history_of_Australia_during_the_Vietnam_War
We may think we had some better ideas than the Americans, but after we leave early, or in a losing effort, it can't be said in retrospect that they received the full historical test. As an army, though, that kind of non-decision does not have to be crippling, as the Australians have since showed.)

See also this post.
http://kingsofwar.wordpress.com/2009/08/07/afghanistan-two-years-from-now-youll-be-saying-marcellus-wallace-was-right/
And Pat Lang, who has the distinction of having danced this dance the first time.
http://turcopolier.typepad.com/sic_semper_tyrannis/2009/08/its-1963-again-this-time-afghanistan.html

Mark
Ottawa

 

[vonGarvin]

No mentoring, no nothing.  If our military mission is to end in 2011, that means no PRT, no OMLT, no BG, no TFK.  The only military presence would be the MPs in Kabul.  Anything else means that our military mission would continue.

 

[Edward Campbell]

MGen (ret’d) Lewis MacKenzie has a slightly different take on it in this opinion piece, reproduced under the Fair Dealing provisions (§29) of the Copyright Act from today’s Globe and Mail:

http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/opinions/canada-will-not-abandon-afghanistan/article1249819/

Canada will not abandon Afghanistan
Come 2011, we'll be there one way or another

Lewis MacKenzie

Thursday, Aug. 13, 2009

The headline just about screamed: “Sacrifices will be for naught if we flee Afghanistan.” Sensational? Misleading? How about a real insult to Canada's disproportionate contribution to the international community's bid to keep Afghanistan from sliding back to the Dark Ages?

Parliament's decision that Canada will terminate its Afghan combat role in 2011 – that is to say, its battle group of about 1,000 soldiers “outside the wire” securing ground and seeking out insurgents – is already generating more smoke than fire in the media. And we still have two years to go!

It's an embarrassing fact that Canada, a G8 country presumably because of its wealth, is incapable of maintaining 1,000 combat soldiers abroad indefinitely. This, despite the fact that previous white papers called for the capability of maintaining a combat brigade (4,000 to 5,000 combat soldiers) overseas in support of coalition operations.

During the 1990s, the “decade of darkness,” a sleeping public paid scant attention to the devastating impact of a 27-per-cent reduction to an already modest defence budget that left only one option to commanders – dramatically cut the number of personnel in uniform. Yet, since March of 2002, Canada has maintained a sizable presence – proportionally larger than any other country – in Afghanistan.

Over Christmas 2005, when the odds were high that the Taliban were in a position to attack and capture Kandahar city, the centre of gravity and birthplace of their movement, Canadian units started their move from Kabul to Kandahar and, during the summer of 2006, soundly defeated the insurgents in a conventional fight. We have been there ever since, in one of Afghanistan's most volatile provinces.

With a deployable full-time army of fewer than 15,000, we now have many soldiers with multiple tours in Afghanistan. By 2011, some will have four and possibly five. Add to each tour a year-long training regime before deployment and you start to understand the challenge of maintaining a modest-sized fighting force in the field.

The infantry that provides the bulk of the battle group's strength is doing so with fewer than 5,000 deployable full-time soldiers. Without augmentation by an even smaller and invaluable part-time militia, we would have been forced to abandon the Afghan mission before now.

During the past eight years, our soldiers have suffered per capita casualties well beyond those of any other country. Using the United States for comparison, our population is about 10 per cent of theirs. Our 127 killed would roughly translate to 1,270 U.S. fatalities; the U.S. number is currently just under 800. This comparison is in no way a criticism of any other country – it merely provides a measurement of our unwavering commitment to the Afghan campaign.

Those who suggest that our departure from the primary combat role in 2011 would render the sacrifices of our dead and wounded “wasted” are respectfully (particularly to surviving family and friends) wrong.

Those sacrifices saved Kandahar city and, for the past four years, the entire province of Kandahar when NATO, at the political level, was incapable of generating anything close to the number of boots on the ground that should have been provided to assist our contingent. When the history of the current Afghan conflict is written, Canada will be credited with playing a major role in the country's survival in the most critical early stages of the war.

As far as Canada's abandoning Afghanistan in 2011, even without reading between the lines, you can bet this won't happen. Afghanistan is the largest recipient of our foreign aid, with a number of signature projects that will continue. An ever-growing civilian presence assisting with governance and other aspects of nation-building also will continue.

The very effective Provincial Reconstruction Team and its protection element will no doubt stay, along with an increased number of mentors to help train the Afghan army and national police. The United States will probably lobby for retention of our outstanding medical facility at Kandahar airfield, along with the recently deployed helicopters and perhaps our artillery unit. The latter two will be controversial and lead to heated parliamentary debate because of their association with that dreaded term “combat.”

Let's face it: The Americans know as much about our army as we do, and they're probably surprised that we have been able to maintain a battle group in theatre as long as we have. By 2011, that will have been longer than the two world wars combined. I doubt very much we will be asked to extend a combat task they know we would find exceedingly difficult to do.

Canada will not abandon Afghanistan in 2011, no matter what the headlines suggest for the next two years.

Lewis MacKenzie is a retired major-general who was the first commander of United Nations peacekeeping forces in Sarajevo.

It is, pretty much, the party line from Moscow Ottawa; viz:

• We have done great things;

• We have done more than our “fair” share;

• The army is tapped out – it needs a “time out;”

• We will still be “engaged” – just not in combat. We’ll have our very own caveats that will – everyone hopes – keep the casualty lists down;

• Parliament has spoken – if you like the pull out it’s a good, Conservative, idea; if you don’t like the pull out you can blame it all on Iggy and the Liberals; and

• We – Canadians, Conservatives, whoever – can have it both ways.



Edit: grammar/punctuation

 

[vonGarvin]

That goes against what the CDS has said on the matter.  "No military mission" means just that.  No BG, but also no PRT and no OMLT.  No Air Wing, no nothing.  That was his take on things.

OMLT cannot stay as they definitely engage in combat (arguably more than the BG).  PRT also engage in combat, perhaps not as much; however, IEDs (the number one killer) hits everyone.  If the government says "End Ex", then that's that.  Conduct a Relief in Place with an incoming unit, and wave good bye as we fly out of KAF.  That is the party line from "the boss".

 

[Edward Campbell]

That goes against what the CDS has said on the matter.  "No military mission" means just that.  No BG, but also no PRT and no OMLT.  No Air Wing, no nothing.  That was his take on things.

OMLT cannot stay as they definitely engage in combat (arguably more than the BG).  PRT also engage in combat, perhaps not as much; however, IEDs (the number one killer) hits everyone.  If the government says "End Ex", then that's that.  Conduct a Relief in Place with an incoming unit, and wave good bye as we fly out of KAF.  That is the party line from "the boss".

The "boss," indeed. Whenever someone told me that "they" had just decided something (usually something unpleasant) my first question, always, was: "Which they?"

Who is the "boss?" Boss of what?

These decisions (there are several of them, I think), whatever they may be in (or may have become by) the Spring/Summer of 2011 are about 99.99% political, so my guesstimate is that Gen. Natynczyk's views on the whole matter are of little to no importance. Minister McKay - or his successor, and there's likely to be at least one before July 2011 - will have some, but quite limited, influence on the matter.

The "boss" is the PM and he will seek the advice of his political brain-trust, including his polling teams. The polls matter now and may (will if we are still in a minority parliament - Conservative or Liberal minority, same difference) matter just as much in 2011. That means that the public, per se, and public "opinion leaders" and public "opinion makers" (many in the media) may be the "boss."

 

[vonGarvin]

The "boss," indeed. Whenever someone told me that "they" had just decided something (usually something unpleasant) my first question, always, was: "Which they?"

Who is the "boss?" Boss of what?

These decisions (there are several of them, I think), whatever they may be in (or may have become by) the Spring/Summer of 2011 are about 99.99% political, so my guesstimate is that Gen. Natynczyk's views on the whole matter are of little to no importance. Minister McKay - or his successor, and there's likely to be at least one before July 2011 - will have some, but quite limited, influence on the matter.

The "boss" is the PM and he will seek the advice of his political brain-trust, including his polling teams. The polls matter now and may (will if we are still in a minority parliament - Conservative or Liberal minority, same difference) matter just as much in 2011. That means that the public, per se, and public "opinion leaders" and public "opinion makers" (many in the media) may be the "boss."

Of course, my mention of the CDS as boss was deliberately in quotes.  I guess I'm just passing on his take of direction received thus far.  I understand that the employment of the military is simply a matter of foreign policy at the sharp end, and in two years, many things can (and probably will) happen.  Governments may come and go, outside events may affect policies and so forth. 
I suppose only time will tell.

 

[Edward Campbell]

And see this from here.

This, asking Australia to replace Canada, is real political pressure on Canada.

Despite what Janice Gross Stein, Eugene Lang and others have said, good relations with "official Washington" do matter - military burden sharing in Afghanistan does translate into a better softwood lumber deal. 

How we perceive ourselves to be perceived by the Americans also matters to Canadians. Remember how excited we all got when George W Bush said Britain was America's "best friend forever" and ignored Canada in a State of the Union address? Wow! The media made it sound like the sky had fallen. If Canadians want to be "respected" or, if that's impossible, at least mentioned in passing, then we need to "do" what America wants done. Right now that means staying in Afghanistan, in combat. In 2011? Too soon to tell.

Oh, and guess who matters when policy is discussed?

(Answer, from my secret decoder ring: him He's not a clone of Kevin Lynch, but defence has too few friends in the top levels of the public service.)