Afghanistan: Why we should be there (or not), how to conduct the mission (or not) & when to leave

[Edward Campbell]

We may not be in a position to hector, but that has never restrained Canadian politicians in the past, and I doubt if it willl anytime soon.

You are, of course, quite correct. But: it's bad policy even as it is good, domestic politics.

Sadly, but avoidably, the politicians sins are catching and bureaucrats and soldiers have decided that they, too, should join in. The Clerk of the Privy Council would do us all a favour if he would tell bureaucrats and soldiers to "put a sock in it" and ask the Pm to tell ministers to do the same.

 

[Edward Campbell]

We may not be in a position to hector, but that has never restrained Canadian politicians in the past, and I doubt if it willl anytime soon.

I'm certainly not suggesting that Canadians soldiers, especially those who have served, and those Canadians who have born extraordinary burdens and paid too high a price, are not in a position to hector and complain or just grouch about the imbalance of effort in Afghanistan. They have earned the right to hector.

It is at the national, policy and political level that I find hectoring counter-productive. It is unnecessary, unwarranted in some cases,and, above all, unbecoming. We want to be a leader amongst the middle powers; good leaders set examples; they "walk the walk" and leave the talking to the followers.

 

[MarkOttawa]

Two informative post by BruceR at Flit:

Today's essential Afghan viewing (ANA vs. ANP)
http://www.snappingturtle.net/flit/archives/2009_08_20.html#006504

Cordesman report on Iraq army (and Bruce makes some ANA comparisons)
http://www.snappingturtle.net/flit/archives/2009_08_20.html#006505

Whilst Terry Glavin spotlights a real enemy (see the last three paras):

The People Will Win. Long Live Afghanistan.
http://transmontanus.blogspot.com/2009/08/people-will-win-long-live-afghanistan.html

Mark
Ottawa

 

[MarkOttawa]

Conclusion of a piece by Robert Kagan--it seems to me that Canadians have related moral scruples--wanting UN sanction/cover for military action, and then not considering it enough in Afstan:

The President and the 'Necessary War' Myth
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/08/21/AR2009082102922.html

...
The fact is, unless the nation is invaded or its very survival is imminently threatened, going to war is always a choice. So what is the point of trying to make this elusive distinction anyway? For many, including Obama, the present purpose is to distinguish Afghanistan from Iraq, Obama's "good" war from George W. Bush's "bad" war. But it won't work. As Haass correctly argues, right or wrong, they were both wars of choice.

But there is a deeper reason, as well, for Obama to claim necessity in Afghanistan.
http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/nation/la-na-obama-vfw18-2009aug18,0,838307.story
It is part of what increasingly seems to be a striving for moral purity in international affairs by this administration. Obama and his top advisers apologize for America's past sins, implicitly suggesting they will commit no new ones. And that goes for fighting wars. No one can blame you for fighting a war if it is a war of necessity, or so they may believe. All the inevitable ancillary casualties of war -- from civilian deaths to the occasional misbehavior of the troops to the errors of commanders -- are more easily forgiven if one has no choice. The claim of necessity wipes away the moral ambiguities inherent in the exercise of power. And it prevents scrutiny of one's own motives, which in nations, as in individuals, are rarely pure.

This hoped-for escape from moral burdens is, however, an illusion. Just because America declares something necessary doesn't mean that the rest of the world, and especially its victims, will believe it is just. The claim of necessity will not absolve the United States, and Obama, from responsibility for its actions.

As Reinhold Niebuhr pointed out long ago, Americans find it hard to acknowledge this moral ambiguity of power. They are reluctant to face the fact that it is only through the morally ambiguous exercise of their power that any good can be accomplished. Obama is right to be prosecuting the war in Afghanistan, and he should do so even more vigorously. But he will not avoid the moral and practical burdens of fighting this war by claiming he has no choice. An action can be right or just without being necessary. Like great presidents in the past, Barack Obama will have to explain why his choice, while difficult and fraught with complexity, is right and better than the alternatives.

Robert Kagan, a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,
http://www.carnegieendowment.org/experts/index.cfm?fa=expert_view&expert_id=16&prog=zgp&proj=zusr
writes a monthly column for The Post.

I think one could argue that no Canadian war since 1867 has been one of necessity--except World War II and in 1939 it did not actually appear to be one.

Mark
Ottawa

 

[MarkOttawa]

And a post, both impassioned and reasoned, by Brian at The Canada-Afghanistan Blog:

The Election
http://canada-afghanistan.blogspot.com/2009/08/election.html

Mark
Ottawa

 

[MarkOttawa]

Regarding WW II (at end of Torch post):
http://toyoufromfailinghands.blogspot.com/2009/08/afstan-war-of-necessity.html

Prime Minister William Lyon Mackenzie King said this in October 1939, just under 80 years ago; how far we have come:

"Canada is engaged in a war which is a crusade to save Christian civiilization and the liberty of mankind, Prime Minister Mackenzie King declared in a radio address last night.

The present struggle, he asserted, is for the preservation not alone of national and personal freedom but of freedom also of the mind and of the soul .

Stating he had always had a positive hatred of war, Premier King, said no other course but the overthrow by arms of Nazi Germany would prevent Naziism extending its tyrannical power over all nations and descent of the whole world into a new and terrible age of barbarism..."

Mark
Ottawa

 

[MarkOttawa]

President Obama will soon have to make some tough decisions--militarily and politically:

U.S. faces hard choices on Afghanistan war plans
http://washingtontimes.com/news/2009/aug/23/mullen-worried-over-public-support-afghan-war/

...

Army Gen. Stanley McChrystal, the top U.S. commander in Afghanistan, is completing an assessment of what he needs to win the fight there. That review, however, won't specifically address force levels, according to Adm. Mike Mullen, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

But military officials privately believe Gen. McChrystal may ask for as many as 20,000 additional forces to get an increasingly difficult security situation in Afghanistan under control. One leading Republican already is saying Gen. McChrystal will be pressured to ask for fewer troops than he requires.

"I think there are great pressures on General McChrystal to reduce those estimates," Sen. John McCain, Arizona Republican, said in an interview broadcast Sunday. "I don't think it's necessarily from the president. I think it's from the people around him and others that I think don't want to see a significant increase in our troops' presence there."

Adm. Mullen on Sunday described the situation in Afghanistan as "serious and deteriorating," he but refused to say whether additional forces would be needed [video here
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/21134540/vp/32528042#32528042 ].

"Afghanistan is very vulnerable in terms of (the) Taliban and extremists taking over again [emphasis added], and I don't think that threat's going to go away," he said.

Adm. Mullen also expressed concern about diminishing support among a war-weary American public as the United States and NATO enter the ninth year of combat and reconstruction operations...

Adm. Mullen said the security situation in Afghanistan needs to be reversed in the next 12 to 18 months [emphasis added]...

More troops needed in Afghanistan, allies tell U.S. envoy
Commanders say the insurgency in the east is intensifying, but a request for a troop increase could face resistance from Congress as public support for the war appears to be softening. (Headline rather misleading--not the allies doing the telling but Americans, see following story)
http://www.latimes.com/news/la-fg-afghanistan-holbrooke24-2009aug24,0,6743493.story?track=ntothtml

...
Although American attention has focused primarily on the fight in southern Afghanistan, many senior U.S. military officials have come to the view that they need to step up the fight against Jalaluddin Haqqani and other insurgent leaders in mountainous eastern Afghanistan [emphasis added]. They believe that a greater U.S. push there, combined with pressure from Pakistani troops on the other side of the border, could grind down the groups, several of which range between the two Asian nations.

Some military officials believe Haqqani has suffered setbacks because of Pakistani army pressure and is at a vulnerable moment.

"In the east we have an opportunity," said an advisor to the U.S. command. "The Pakistanis have done damage to the Haqqani network."

U.S. Army Maj. Gen. Curtis Scaparrotti, commander of forces in the east, told reporters traveling with U.S. envoy Richard C. Holbrooke on Sunday that Haqqani "is the central threat" in the east and that "he's expanded that reach."

Commanders with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization said Haqqani, who formerly centered his attacks in Afghanistan's Khowst province, has been advancing farther afield, including as far south as southern Paktika province...

U.S. Military Says Its Force in Afghanistan Is Insufficient
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/24/world/asia/24military.html?ref=todayspaper

...
Mr. Holbrooke [US special representative to Afghanistan and Pakistan] visited regional command centers in Kandahar, Herat, Mazar-i-Sharif and Bagram on Saturday and Sunday. Speaking to Afghan reporters at the NATO base in Mazar-i-Sharif, Mr. Holbrooke said that part of the new strategy would include reaching out to members of the Taliban [emphasis added] who show a willingness to lay down their arms. Many Taliban fighters, Mr. Holbrooke said, “fight because they’re misguided, or because they want a job.”

“Anyone who renounces Al Qaeda and comes back to work peacefully in the Afghan system,” he continued, “will be welcome.”...

Meanwhile, Globeite Paul Koring in Washington commits a clanger:
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/state-of-afghanistan-deteriorating-top-us-soldier-says/article1261705/

...
Thousands of U.S. Marines are currently being sent to Kandahar along with neighbouring Helmand province...

It's actually the US Army arriving in force at Kandahar, Mr Koring.
http://toyoufromfailinghands.blogspot.com/2009/08/canada-hands-off-part-of-kandahar.html

Mark
Ottawa

 

[Loachman]

I didn't get an accurate account, but there were lots of Marines arriving in KAF in the period prior to my departure earlier this year, with an impressive number of helicopters (AH1W, UH1N, CH53).

 

[MarkOttawa]

Loachman: Quite--from April:
http://toyoufromfailinghands.blogspot.com/2009/04/aurora-to-afstan-at-lastmore-on-us.html

...
With the imminent arrival of more than 100 helicopters from the U.S. army's 82 Aviation brigade, as well as scores of U.S. Marine Corps helicopters...

But I'm sure Mr Koring had ground troops in mind and the Marine 2nd Expeditionary Brigade in focused at Helmand:
http://toyoufromfailinghands.blogspot.com/2009/06/us-marine-expeditionary-brigade.html

Mark
Ottawa

 

[MarkOttawa]

A letter of mine in the Ottawa Sun (last at link):

Not a major concern
http://www.ottawasun.com/comment/letters/2009/08/25/10607781.html

Re: “Quittin’ time in Afghanistan” (Aug. 23).
http://www.torontosun.com/comment/columnists/eric_margolis/2009/08/23/10569911-sun.html
Eric Margolis writes “The war really is about oil pipeline routes and western domination of the energy-rich Caspian Basin.”

Nonsense. Afghanistan has no role in the production or transportation of Caspian Basin oil. Most of that oil is in Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan. Azerbaijan has no need for Afghanistan as a pipeline route. Neither does Kazakhstan. Its oil is exported by pipeline via Russia and to China.

Margolis also mentions “western oil and gas pipelines.” There is indeed a long-standing plan to transport natural gas produced in Turkmenistan by pipeline through Afghanistan to Pakistan and maybe India. But that is hardly a vital national security or capitalist interest for the U.S., or for other NATO members. Moreover, the pipeline would not be “western.” The participating countries will own it. And, given current conditions, such a pipeline is not likely to be built for quite a while. In any case, most of the gas would be for Pakistani and perhaps Indian consumption — not a major concern for other countries.

Mark Collins

Ottawa

(Pipelines are always a touchy subject) [their comment]

A Canadian journalist in, er, action:

Canadians ready for Afghanistan
NPS panel looks at culture of embattled country
http://www.insidebayarea.com/california/ci_13205983

When talking about Afghanistan, the Canadian journalist seems to see the cup as half empty, while the Canadian Army general sees it as half full.

Graeme Smith, foreign correspondent for The Globe and Mail, one of Canada's leading newspapers, spoke pessimistically at the opening session of a conference Tuesday at the Naval Postgraduate School on culture and counterinsurgency in southern Afghanistan.

His talk came after a presentation by Canadian Brig. Gen. Daniel Ménard to his officers about the Canadian Army's mission to Kandahar Province.

Ménard will lead 5,400 soldiers and embedded civilian experts to the province next month in a joint U.S.-Canadian unit under Canadian command.

The conference at NPS is one of the final acts in preparing for the move. The conference continues through Thursday.

The Canadians, Ménard said, hope to achieve a number of goals during their deployment. They want to enable the Afghan National Security Force to promote law and order in Kandahar, strengthen the local government's ability to deliver core services, rehabilitate the province's irrigation system and the Dahla Dam that supplies it, build or repair more than 50 schools, and provide security for the populace.

Sheriff in town

Smith, who was on assignment in Afghanistan from 2006 until this year, said the best the Canadians can expect to do is the least amount of harm.

He described his role at the session as "more like a court jester" [emphasis added] than a lecturer, but warned the troops that their presence will mean an escalation of violence and a proportionate increase in civilian deaths.

Soldiers will find their ability to act limited, Smith said, but offered "a few suggestions to make your presence in Afghanistan less damaging."..

Smith criticized the news media, himself included, for failing to report major events, such as political changes, military activities and atrocities.

Many of those "are never on the radar," he said. "A key blind spot is that we have no idea what ordinary Afghans want."

Ménard said Afghans have been through a lot, but there has been progress. He said Afghans aren't so different from Westerners that they don't want some of the same things: less fighting, the ability to live a normal life, a relative degree of prosperity and safety.

"If we can help them get there, we'll do it," Ménard said.

And Canadian blogger Babbling Brooks in brilliant action, properly rounding up the usual suspects committing journalism:

Real propaganda
http://toyoufromfailinghands.blogspot.com/2009/08/real-propaganda.html

Mark
Ottawa

 

[The Bread Guy]

And Canadian blogger Babbling Brooks in brilliant action, properly rounding up the usual suspects committing journalism:

Real propaganda
http://toyoufromfailinghands.blogspot.com/2009/08/real-propaganda.html

C'mon, now - the Taliban has denied they did it, both in an official statement (links to Milnet.ca forum with statement), and to Al Jazeera - they wouldn't lie about something like this, would they?   

 

[MarkOttawa]

Terry Glavin zeroes in:

News From Afghanistan: Understatement-ad-Absurdum, Snake Oil and Propaganda
http://transmontanus.blogspot.com/2009/08/news-from-afghanistan-understatement-ad.html

Mark
Ottawa

 

[MarkOttawa]

Yet again--at The Toch:

More Afghan pipeline nonsense
http://toyoufromfailinghands.blogspot.com/2009/08/more-afghan-pipeline-nonsense.html

Rounding up the usual conspiracy theories--letter in the Toronto Star...

Mark
Ottawa

 

[Colin Parkinson]

Here is a fairly accurate description of events to show how distant a pipeline would be.

http://www.worldpress.org/specials/pp/pipeline_timeline.htm

Even if a agreement was signed today, construction could not start for years. A route would have to surveyed, agreed upon by all parties involved (read payoffs) Geotechnical work would have to be done, resulting in route changes, resulting in more haggling about payoffs and that all happens before even 1 metre of pipe is laid. So far after 2 large companies have spent 20years trying to do this, even the route survey are not complete. The people bringing up these theories think laying pipe is like rolling out a garden hose. I review pipelines here and with all of the resources we have it takes years to select a route, over well known terrain with excellent geology information available. I had a pipeline proposal show up at my office for me to read, it weighed 60lbs and that was for about 400km of pipe.

I should also mention that IF a pipeline was to be built through Afghanistan, the government and people would benefit through employment increased transportation infrastructure, increase in skilled labour thanks to training given to locals and through a legitimate source of revenue thanks to the transit fees that would have to be paid. Of course can’t have the natives getting their own funds, then they might tell the NGO’s to piss off.

 

[MarkOttawa]

Title says it all:

How to Lose in Afghanistan
By Anthony H. Cordesman
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/08/30/AR2009083002252.html

The United States cannot win the war in Afghanistan in the next three months -- any form of even limited victory will take years of further effort. It can, however, easily lose the war. I did not see any simple paths to victory while serving on the assessment group that advised the new U.S. commander, Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal, on strategy, but I did see all too clearly why the war is being lost.

The most critical reason has been resources. Between 2002 and 2008 the United States never provided the forces, money or leadership necessary to win, effectively wasting more than half a decade. Our country left a power vacuum in most of Afghanistan that the Taliban and other jihadist insurgents could exploit and occupy, and Washington did not respond when the U.S. Embassy team in Kabul requested more resources...

The appointments this summer of Karl Eikenberry as ambassador to Afghanistan and McChrystal as commander of U.S. and allied forces have created a team that can reverse this situation. In fact, given the rising unpopularity of the war and Taliban successes, they are our last hope of victory. Yet they can win only if they are allowed to manage both the civil and military sides of the conflict without constant micromanagement from Washington or traveling envoys. They must be given both the time to act and the resources and authority they feel they need. No other path offers a chance of a secure and stable Afghanistan free of terrorist and jihadist control and sanctuaries...

McChrystal has not announced a need for more U.S. troops, but almost every expert on the scene has talked about figures equivalent to three to eight more brigade combat teams -- with nominal manning levels that could range from 2,300 to 5,000 personnel each -- although much of that manpower will go to developing Afghan forces that must nearly double in size, become full partners rather than tools, and slowly take over from U.S. and NATO forces [emphasis added]. Similarly, a significant number of such U.S. reinforcements will have to assist in providing a mix of capabilities in security, governance, rule of law and aid. U.S. forces need to "hold" and keep the Afghan population secure, and "build" enough secure local governance and economic activity to give Afghans reason to trust their government and allied forces. They must build the provincial, district and local government capabilities that the Kabul government cannot and will not build for them. No outcome of the recent presidential election can make up for the critical flaws in a grossly overcentralized government that is corrupt, is often a tool of power brokers and narco-traffickers, and lacks basic capacity in virtually every ministry.

Unfortunately, strong elements in the White House, State Department and other agencies seem determined to ignore these realities... 

If these elements succeed, President Obama will be as much a failed wartime president as George W. Bush. He may succeed in lowering the political, military and financial profile of the war for up to a year, but in the process he will squander our last hope of winning. This would only trade one set of political problems for a far worse set in the future and leave us with an enduring regional mess and sanctuary for extremism. We have a reasonable chance of victory if we properly outfit and empower our new team in Afghanistan; we face certain defeat if we do not.

The writer holds the Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. The views expressed here are his own.

Mark
Ottawa

 

[MarkOttawa]

A Torch post:

What the Afghan war demonstrates about Canada
http://toyoufromfailinghands.blogspot.com/2009/08/what-afghan-war-demonstrates-about.html

The, to me pitiful, fact that a wealthy nation of 33 million people cannot keep some 1,000 troops in combat--with around 30-40 fatalities a year--for more than five years. Reasons: political controversy, public ambivalence, and a very limited military capacity.

Earlier:
http://toyoufromfailinghands.blogspot.com/2009/06/canada-and-afstan-i-cringe-for-my.html

    Canada and Afstan: I cringe for my country

Mark
Ottawa

 

[MarkOttawa]

Canadian OMLTs, and a US Marine ETT--post at The Torch:

Embedding with the Afghans
http://toyoufromfailinghands.blogspot.com/2009/08/embedding-with-afghans.html

Mark
Ottawa

 

[vonGarvin]

"Reductio ad Bushium":

If these elements succeed, President Obama will be as much a failed wartime president as George W. Bush.

G.W. may have dropped the ball on Afghanistan; however, after an initial fumble in Iraq, he was able to make a third and long and convert into a first down in the red zone.  The quarterback may have changed, allowing B.O. to go in for the win; however, I'm not so sure that "Bush Bashing" is any more productive than Obama Bashing>

 

[tomahawk6]

The democrats dont have much backbone for a fight so they may look for an opportunity to bail.
Saw this from Michael Yon who has been in Helmand with the Brits. I guess they didnt like his analysis because his embed was canceled.

We need more troops.  The leadership tells us that the Taliban and associated groups control only small parts of the country.  Yet enemy influence is growing, and so far, despite that we have made progress on some fronts, our own influence is diminishing.  For example, an excellent British infantry unit that I embedded with in Iraq and now Afghanistan, the “2 Rifles,” is staked out in the “Green Zone” around the Helmand River.  HQ for 2 Rifles is at FOB Jackson near the center of the map above.  There are several satellite FOBs and Patrol Bases, each of which is essentially cut off from the outside world other than by helicopter or major ground resupply efforts (which only take place about once a month).  The latest ground resupply effort from Camp Bastion resulted in much fighting.  The troops up at Kajaki Dam are surrounded by the enemy, which has dug itself into actual “FLETs.”  FLET is military-speak for “Forward Line of Enemy Troops.”  In other words, the enemy is not hiding, but they are in trenches, bunkers and fighting positions that extend into depth.  The enemy owns the terrain.

The British are protecting Kajaki Dam but otherwise it’s just a big fight and no progress is being made.  The turbine delivery to the dam, which I wrote about last year, was a tremendous success.  Efforts to get the turbine online have been an equally tremendous failure.  Bottom line: the project to restore the electrical capacity from Kajaki Dam is failing and likely will require multi-national intervention to bring it online and to push back the enemy.

We need more helicopters.  Enemy control of the terrain is so complete in the area between Sangin and Kajaki that when my embed was to switch from FOB Jackson to FOB Inkerman—only seven kilometers (about four miles) away—we could not walk or drive from Jackson to Inkerman.  Routes are deemed too dangerous.  Helicopter lift was required.  The helicopter shortage is causing crippling delays in troop movements.  It’s common to see a soldier waiting ten days for a simple flight.  When my embed was to move the four miles from Jackson to Inkerman, a scheduled helicopter picked me up at Jackson and flew probably eighty miles to places like Lashkar Gah, and finally set down at Camp Bastion.  The helicopter journey from Jackson began on 12 August and ended at Inkerman on the 17th.  About five days was spent—along with many thousands of dollars in helicopter time—to travel four miles.  Even Generals can have difficulty scheduling flights.  Interestingly, when I talk with the folks who reserve helicopter space, they say the Generals are generally easy-going about the lack of a seat, but that Colonels often become irate.

 

[Colin Parkinson]

and the Brits are paying a price in equipment, 2nd Chinook lost


British forces lose Chinook helicopter as it crash-lands in HelmandMichael Evans,
The British task force has lost a second Chinook helicopter within ten days. It crash-landed yesterday with 19 people on board.

The Chinook, with a crew of four, was ferrying soldiers from the 2nd Battalion The Rifles battle group when it landed heavily, east of Sangin in northern Helmand, suffering severe damage to the undercarriage, nose and front rotor. None of the passengers or crew was injured.

The Ministry of Defence said that the Chinook was unflyable. “Despite all options being investigated, due to the location and the environment the decision was taken that it could not safely be recovered and so it was subsequently destroyed by military personnel using explosives,” it said.

The troops continued with their planned operation and the crew was picked up by one of the two other Chinooks on the mission.


On August 19 a British Chinook being used to drop special forces soldiers came under enemy attack, causing one of the engines to catch fire. The pilot made an emergency landing and no one was hurt. Both Chinooks were reduced to scrap to prevent the Taleban gaining access to equipment on board.

The loss of two such valuable helicopters means that the British military now has only about 11 Chinooks to transport troops and supplies around Helmand. Eight Chinook Mk3s that were bought for the special forces are being reverted to ordinary utility helicopters at a cost of more than £90 million. However, the first of these will not be ready for operations in Afghanistan until next year.

http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/Afghanistan/article6815587.ece